Ansar al Islam's Twitter feed.

While the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) is the most prominent insurgency group in the offensive against the Iraqi government, it is by no means the only organization participating in the assault. Baathists and other organizations, including jihadist groups, are involved in the fighting as well. Among them is Ansar al Islam (AAI), which was founded in September 2001.

AAI has claimed at least 14 operations on its Twitter feed since the beginning of the rebel offensive earlier this month. The tweets were posted on June 12.

Five of the claimed attacks took place in the province of Kirkuk, and another five on the road between Kirkuk and Tikrit, a city northwest of Baghdad. Another two operations were purportedly executed inside Tikrit. And the remaining two assaults were carried out in Mosul and on the road between Mosul and Baghdad.

Nearly all of the attacks targeted the Iraqi military and police. AAI claims to have killed a number of soldiers, officers, and policemen; and also captured weapons, ordinance, and vehicles. In addition, one of the operations targeted an oil field.

AAI garnered international attention after the 9/11 attacks, when al Qaeda members and other jihadists fled from Afghanistan to the Kurdish areas of Iraq where AAI has long been based. The most notorious of these jihadists was Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who supported AAI. A video distributed online by AAI in June 2013 named Zarqawi, who was killed in 2006, as one of its earliest allies. However, Zarqawi's own group blossomed, becoming al Qaeda in Iraq and eventually the Islamic State of Iraq.

According to the US government, AAI had its own ties to al Qaeda's senior leadership. In March 2004, the US State Department added AAI to the government's list of foreign terrorist organizations. AAI "has close links to and support from al Qaeda," State said in an announcement at the time. The State Department's announcement continued: "Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden participated in the formation and funding of the group, which has provided safehaven to al Qaeda in northeastern Iraq." And Ansar al Islam members "trained in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan."

Despite these historic ties, there is no solid, publicly-available evidence that AAI is under the command of al Qaeda's senior leadership today. In recent months, prominent jihadists have used social media to spread the rumor that AAI has become an official branch of al Qaeda. The move allegedly came in response to the feud between al Qaeda and the ISIS' senior leadership. While it is certainly possible that such a deal was brokered behind closed doors, neither AAI, nor al Qaeda, has officially confirmed it.

Operating in Iraq while at odds with the ISI, ISIS

The rivalry between the ISIS and jihadist groups in Syria, including the Al Nusrah Front, an official branch of al Qaeda, has garnered the limelight in jihadist circles. But AAI has repeatedly come to blows with the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), before it expanded into Syria, and the ISIS as well. (The ISIS was formed by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the emir of the ISI, after he decided to operate in Syria.)

A review of AAI's statements from late 2012 until recent months shows that the organization has repeatedly attempted to quell its fight with the ISIS. The group even appealed to Ayman al Zawahiri, who did not answer AAI's request for help. It is not clear why Zawahiri declined to support the group. Zawahiri has answered appeals from other jihadists embroiled in a fight with the ISIS, including the Al Nusrah Front.

Below is a partial timeline of AAI's statements since October 2012. The statements reveal that AAI has continued to operate in Iraq despite its rivalry the ISIS. The messages and videos described below were released via AAI's Twitter feed, or on its al Thabaat online forum. Many of the statements were first obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Oct. 16, 2012 - In a letter addressed to the "leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq," AAI says that it has been forced to change its longstanding policy of support and neutrality for al Qaeda's branch in Iraq because of the ISI's repeated attacks. "As we have decided and announced, and since the beginning and to this day, the positions of our leadership toward Al Qaeda, Al Tawhid al Jihad [the precursor to al Qaeda in Iraq and the ISI], and the Islamic State of Iraq are clear and defined either by support or positive neutrality, without intervening in any political or military plans of Al Qaeda or its affiliated groups in Iraq or other places and without contradicting or instigating against them," the statement reads. "We are changing our position only to comply with sharia and we were forced to do this by a major toll we paid for the sake of God. Any other way would benefit only the enemies and exclude jihad and Islam from any positive outcome." AAI goes on to warn that it "is very important to cooperate together to limit the irresponsible behavior of some members, which could lead to chaos that harms jihad." The group's warning prefigures events that will unfold in Iraq and Syria in the coming months.

Nov. 25, 2012 - AAI launches a suicide bombing targeting a Shiite militia camp in the Iraqi town of Rabia, which sits on the border with Syria. The group claims that the militia members were about to be deployed to Syria to fight on behalf of Bashar al Assad and against Sunni forces. Interestingly, in a statement released on Dec. 1, 2012, AAI says that the ISI cooperated in the operation. "After the camp was demolished almost completely, a detachment from the heroic brothers of the Islamic State of Iraq mobilized so as to destroy those who remained, and the brothers all returned him safely," SITE's translation of the statement reads.

Feb. 17, 2013 - AAI sends a letter to Ayman al Zawahiri asking for his assistance in its ongoing dispute with the ISI. The authors of the letter, who call themselves the "command" of AAI, are highly respectful of Zawahiri, saying they "express their utmost respect and appreciation" for the al Qaeda emir. However, there is no indication in the letter that AAI is following orders from al Qaeda's senior leadership. AAI repeatedly refers to the ISI as "your branch," meaning AAI believes the ISI answers to Zawahiri. AAI also says Zawahiri is "the primary reference for the Islamic State of Iraq, and the only party responsible for them that is recognized by them." The group later mentions the letter in a public statement dated Sept. 18, 2013. The group says that when it sent this letter to Zawahiri in February 2013, the al Qaeda emir was "responsible for the Islamic State at the time." Months after AAI's February 2013 letter, the ISIS leadership openly disobeys orders from Zawahiri.

June 3, 2013 - AAI announces that it has an official Twitter account. The announcement is distributed online by the al Fajr Media Center, which disseminates al Qaeda's propaganda. In the days leading up to the announcement, AAI posts messages highlighting the activities of its fighters in Kirkuk and Mosul.

June 4, 2013 - AAI releases a statement denying media reports that it had declared war on the ISI. The statement is attributed to the group's media department in the Mosul district. AAI denounces the ISI for spilling the blood of their fellow jihadists, but praises members of the group who have abstained from the infighting. "You have knowledge that the Islamic State of Iraq often loses control over the escalation valves as a result of the various decision-making sources," AAI writes.

July 1, 2013 - AAI appeals to Islamic scholars to help end the infighting with the ISI. The group says that it failed to receive a response from Zawahiri to its Feb. 17, 2013 letter, and so it is now seeking support from other jihadist thinkers. AAI says that "elements of the Islamic State of Iraq organization are deployed to kill the mujahideen of Ansar al Islam."

Sept. 18, 2013 - AAI announces that the ISI has forced the group to retaliate, yet it remains open to reconciliation. "We, the Command of Ansar al Islam ... announce officially that the Islamic State of Iraq has forced us to respond to their aggression and injustice and to reward them in kind," the group says in a statement translated by SITE. "We did not wish for matters to come to this, for the history of Ansar al Islam and its relationship with the banners testifies to its dealing with the banners of jihad with support originally, and positive neutrality out of necessity." The group says that it attempted to resolve the dispute with the ISI through "initiatives and constant messages for reform and halting of the fitna [discord], but it did not receive any response." One of these "initiatives" was the group's letter to Zawahiri in February 2013, which did not elicit a response from the al Qaeda leader.

Oct. 12, 2013 - AAI recounts the history of its failed negotiations with the ISIS and says that its rival has not lived up to the terms of a proposed ceasefire. In a message released on its Twitter feed and its online forum, AAI claims that members of the ISIS have repeatedly targeted AAI jhadists in the city of Mosul. AAI's list of attacks indicates that the group maintains a significant presence in the city, which was seized by rebels in June 2014.

Oct. 14 - 15, 2013 - The group addresses its Eid al Adha greetings to Indians, Kurds, and Syrians, showing that it is attempting to appeal to an audience far outside of Iraq. In its message to Syrians, AAI endorses a bizarre conspiracy theory in which the US is pursuing an alleged plan devised by the historian Bernard Lewis. This "plan" supposedly hinges on "creating an American-Israeli-Iranian balance of interests that protects a gradual and quiet Iranian expansion in the region," according to a translation by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Nov. 6, 2013 - AAI pledges to fight the "Sons of Iraq" after press reports indicate that Iraqi prime minister Nouri al Maliki will seek to revive the anti-al Qaeda group. AAI says the "Sons of Iraq" are apostates and it is "necessary to fight them." The "Sons of Iraq" were part of the Awakening movement that, along with American and coalition forces, previously turned back al Qaeda in Iraq's advances. In reality, Maliki refused to fully integrate the "Sons of Iraq" into Iraqi security forces and the coalition dwindled in size and capacity, with some members even joining the ISIS and other anti-government groups.

Dec. 11, 2013 - The group posts pictures from its Sheikh Rashid Ghazi Camp, which is named after a deceased extremist cleric in Pakistan. Ghazi was killed in July 2007 when Pakistani forces laid siege to the Red Mosque in Islamabad. The mosque harbored al Qaeda and other jihadist groups. AAI had previously "addressed a message" to Ghazi's brother, "expressing its wish to correspond with him about religious issues and advice," according to the SITE Intelligence Group. AAI posts additional pictures from the camp in the weeks that follow.

March 3, 2014 - AAI posts a video of the Sheikh Rashid Ghazi Camp. The video features a clip of Osama bin Laden from a 2007 speech entitled, "Come to Jihad." In the speech, bin Laden praises Sheikh Ghazi, saying that he and his students sought to implement sharia law in Pakistan.

Oren Adaki, an Arabic language specialist and research associate at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, contributed to this article.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) seized the Turkish consulate in Mosul, Iraq last week, abducting 49 people, including several diplomats, guards, and others. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that Turkey would retaliate if any Turkish citizen were harmed, warning ISIS should not "test Turkey's resolve." Ankara also requested an emergency NATO meeting, after which Secretary-General Rasmussen said that NATO would not hesitate to defend and protect Turkey.

The Turkish government is clearly alarmed by the crisis in Iraq. ISIS has threatened Turkish national security since it emerged as a key player in Syria, particularly after it took control over the strategic town of Jarablus in January. Now, the militant group seems to have increased its control over Turkey's bordering towns in Iraq as well. So why does Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan insist on referring to ISIS as an "entity," while avoiding calling it a terrorist organization?

ISIS may have become a security threat to Turkey, but many blame the very existence of this threat on the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) itself. Turkey's open-door policy since the beginning of the Syrian crisis has allowed many Syrians jihadists to freely enter its territory, and Ankara has been accused of turning a blind eye, if not direct support, to foreign jihadists in its territory. Syrian Kurds continue to argue that Turkey provided Sunni jihadists, including ISIS, with arms and sanctuary. They allege that Turkey has done this to counter the Kurdish militant group People's Protection Unit (YPG), which it regards as the Syrian arm of the Kurdish terrorist group that has long plagued Turkey, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK).

It's not only foreigners who fault the Turkish government on this issue. In an address to his party meeting on June 17, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkey's main opposition leader, openly accused Erdogan of supporting ISIS, saying that for the first time in history Turkey has become a country that supports terrorism. "The biggest terror attack in our history was done by al Qaeda in 2003, and yet so many foreign al Qaeda fighters have crossed over to the Middle East from Turkey. We have paid the price for this, and we continue paying it," Kilicdaroglu said. Following the speech, the Republican People's Party (CHP) submitted a proposal to the parliament for an inquiry into ISIS funding by Turkey.

On the same day, Devlet Bahceli, leader of the Turkish Nationalist Party (MHP), also made a similar speech. Calling the apparent shift in the government's Syria policy the product of "a late confession of remorse," he explained that those who helped and provided support to ISIS in Syria are now primarily responsible for the blood that is being shed. "Unfortunately the AKP is in this mess and it is a rotten ring of this dark hand that has inflamed this ISIS monster. The AKP's Syria policy is the reason why our borders are now filled with radical and savage elements," Bahceli said.

Ankara has denied all accusations, charging instead that the West is to be blamed for not intervening in Syria when the civil war first erupted, or even after Syrian president Bashar al Assad crossed the American red line by his alleged use of chemical weapons. Still, Ankara has indicated a shift in Turkish policy by condemning extremism in Syria and pledging to tighten its border control efforts. Arguably, most of this has remained in rhetoric as Turkey's borders still seem open to jihadists. It's also worth questioning why Ankara designated Jabhat al-Nusra, another al-Qaeda linked militant group, as a terrorist organization on June 3, but not ISIS. However, it now appears clear that Ankara at least acknowledges that it cannot contain the extremism problem that it helped create.

Turkish officials are now reportedly holding talks with ISIS for the return of the hostages. But the problem goes beyond freeing the diplomats. On the same day the Turkish consulate was seized, ISIS also captured 28 Turkish truck drivers who were carrying diesel from Turkey to a thermal power plant in Mosul. On Tuesday June 17, ISIS abducted another 15 Turkish citizens. ISIS is not expected to relinquish these Turks any time soon.

Finally, there is an open question as to whether Turkey's dangerous border policies have already allowed foreign terrorists to establish cells inside Turkey. With ISIS expanding its control over key provinces in Iraq and Syria, Turkey will need to recalibrate its policies if it is to escape this current crisis unscathed.

Click to view Pakistani military operations in North Waziristan in a larger map.

The Pakistani military has claimed that more than 250 "terrorists" and zero civilians have been killed during the first week of military operations in the Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.

According to press releases published between June 15-21 on the website of the Inter-Services Public Relations, the public affairs arm of the Pakistani military, 257 "foreign and local terrorists," "Uzbek foreigners," "foreigners," and "ETIM terrorists," a reference to the Turkistan Islamic Party, a Central Asia terror group, have been killed.

The military states that no civilians have been killed in the weeklong operation, a stunning claim given the historical lack of precision by Pakistani attack helicopters and strike aircraft, and the environment in which groups such as the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan and other jihadist groups are operating. These groups often live in compounds that include women and children.

The Pakistani government has not identified a single "terrorist" killed in the weeklong operation, which has used "precise and targeted air strikes" from attack helicopters and fighter-bombers against "hardcore Terrorists hideouts." The Pakistani military's claims are impossible to corroborate, as the media is forbidden from reporting from North Waziristan during the operation. The Pakistani media has repeated the military's claims uncritically.

The largest airstrike, on June 15, supposedly killed 140 "terrorists" and zero civilians.

"Most of those killed are Uzbeks," a reference to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the press release continues. "Many ETIM [Turkistan Islamic Party] terrorists and their affiliates have also been killed in the strikes. It was a massive blow to the terrorists and one of their main communication centre has been dismantled."

Another 25 "foreign and local terrorists were killed" in airstrikes that targeted "Terrorist's [sic] hideouts including a training camp and an IED making factory around Hasokhel." Again, no civilians were reported killed.

In the past, such airstrikes on large gatherings, compounds, and camps by US drones have resulted in civilian casualties. The remotely piloted drones are far more accurate than Pakistani strike aircraft, and often hover over targets for hours or days to gather intelligence before striking.

The Pakistani government has yet to to publicly identify the exact target of the operation. None of the military's statements released so far name the Haqqani Network or Hafiz Gul Bahadar's Taliban groups as targets of the operations. These two groups, despite sheltering and supporting al Qaeda, IMU, TIP, and the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, are considered "good Taliban" by political and military officials as they do not advocate attacking the Pakistani state. [See LWJ report, Pakistan launches 'comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists' in North Waziristan, and Threat Matrix report, Pakistani forces focus on 'foreigners' in North Waziristan operation, for more detail on the operation and "good Taliban" vs. "bad Taliban".]

ISPR press releases:

June 15, 2014
June 16, 2014
June 17, 2012
June 19, 2014
June 20, 2014
June 21, 2014

Ansar al Islam (AAI), a jihadist group founded in northern Iraq in September 2001, has released a set of photographs purportedly showing its ongoing operations. Since the latest rebel offensive against the Iraqi government began earlier this month, AAI has launched attacks against the military and police. In posts on its official Twitter feed on June 12, AAI claimed 14 attacks. [See LWJ report, Ansar al Islam claims attacks against Iraqi military, police.]

On June 22, the group posted a new set of 10 photos on its Twitter page. While the photos are part of AAI's propaganda campaign, they are generally consistent with what is known from other sources about AAI's operations in northern Iraq. Still, The Long War Journal could not independently verify AAI's specific claims.

The first photo shows the "spoils," Iraqi tanks, which AAI claims to have captured after "the brothers took control over" an Iraqi Army brigade's compound in Kirkuk.

In the second photo, AAI shows a "liberated" region in Kirkuk and claims that nine "brothers" were wounded in its operations there.

The third photo shows the "lions" of AAI on their way "to raid the apostates' headquarters." The hashtags accompanying this tweet indicate that the pictured operations targeted sites in Kirkuk and Tikrit.

A fourth photo allegedly shows an AAI member raising the group's flag (described as the "banner of monotheism") above an entrance to Tikrit.

AAI claims to be in "full control" of a road between Tikrit and Kirkuk. A fifth photo allegedly shows AAI forces patrolling the road.

A sixth photo shows an AAI checkpoint. The accompanying text in the tweet says that the "brothers control the area of Jabal Hamrayn," which is north of Baghdad, and "set up checkpoints there."

The seventh photo purports to demonstrate AAI's control over the highway between Tikrit and Kirkuk.

AAI fighters celebrate in this eighth photo.

In this photo, the ninth in the series, AAI fighters man a checkpoint on the highway between Tikrit and Kirkuk. The picture is intended to further demonstrate the "brothers' control over the highway."

The tenth and final photo is accompanied by text that reads, "Forgiveness [granted] to a large number of apostates after the announcement of their repentance for working with the apostate security forces." The hashtags accompanying the tweet identify the security members as being from Mosul, Kirkuk, and Salahaddin, a province in northern Iraq.

This piece of propaganda may be intended to demonstrate another point of difference between AAI and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). The two organizations have long been rivals. In its own propaganda videos, the ISIS has shown members of the Iraqi security forces being beheaded and shot.

Oren Adaki, an Arabic language specialist and research associate at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, contributed to this article.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham's Ninewa Division released a set of photographs that details the attack on and capture of an Iraqi military command center, captured military hardware, and the execution of Iraqi prisoners.

The Ninewa Division, one of 16 wilayats or administrative units in the ISIS' Islamic state that spans Syria and Iraq, released the 39 photographs on its Twitter account. The photographs are captioned "Pictures from the Invasion of Asadullah [Lion of Allah] al-Bilawi Abu Abdul Rahman." As The Long War Journal previously reported, ISIS has named the current offensive after a now deceased ISIS commander, 'Adnan Ismail Najm, also known as Abu Abdul Rahman al Bilawi.

The stream of photographs begins by showing a group of ISIS fighters meeting at a compound, presumably for their pre-mission briefing. Next, a series of photographs shows an ISIS convoy of technicals, or pickup trucks mounted with machine guns, moving down a road and then engaging with what appears to be a small military outpost. ISIS forces defeat the Iraqi troops and raise their black banner of jihad over the base.

The ISIS fighters then appear to move to another Iraqi military base and take it over. In one photograph, an ISIS fighter poses in front of a sign that says "The Second Operations Command Center." This may refer to the headquarters of the 2nd Iraqi Army Division, which reported to the Ninewa Operational Command.

Some of the photographs show captured Iraqi military hardware, including an armored US-made Humvee and Soviet-era armored fighting vehicles. ISIS fighters are also depicted launching rockets.

The photoset concludes by showing the brutal execution of what appears to be three Iraqi security personnel who were captured in the assault. The military identification cards of two of the men who were executed are displayed. The three Iraqi troops are kneeling on the ground as three ISIS fighters shoot them in the back of the head with pistols.

The Ninewa Division's most recent photographs are consistent with others produced by that group and by the neighboring Salahaddin Division. A series of pictures released on June 15 by the Salahaddin Division showed the group's spoils of war after capturing a prison in Tikrit, as well as the execution of scores of captured Iraqi soldiers. Another photoset released on June 19 by the Ninewa Division showed an overrun military base, captured military hardware, and local support for the group in the province.

WARNING: One of the images below is graphic and shows the execution of Iraqi soldiers. The intent in publishing these photographs is to document the war crimes committed by the ISIS. The images are a selection of 39 published by the ISIS' Ninewa Division. You can view the all of the photographs here.

ISIS fighters gather for what appears to be a pre-mission briefing before attacking Iraqi military installations:

ISIS fighters move down a road in a convoy of technicals:

An ISIS technical opens fire on a military base:

An ISIS flag flies from a technical engaged in combat:

ISIS fighters enter a small military outpost:

A slain Iraqi soldier near the HESCO barriers of the military outpost:

ISIS fighters prepare to raise their flag over the captured military outpost:

An ISIS fighter drives what appears to be an Iraqi Army armored personnel carrier:

An ISIS fighter sits atop a captured US-made armored Humvee that appears to have been owned by the Iraqi National Police:

ISIS fighters enter a military base:

A captured armored vehicle that appears to have been owned by the Iraqi National Police:

An ISIS fighter poses under a sign that reads: "The Second Operations Command Center."

The ISIS' black banner of jihad is raised over the command center:

ISIS fighters fire a rocket:

Two captured Iraqi soldiers are photographed, and their military IDs are displayed:

ISIS fighters execute three Iraqi soldiers:

The rapid advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham and its allies is the culmination of over two years of strategy by the renewed terrorist group. Previously "essentially defeated" by American, Iraqi, and Sunni Awakening forces, ISIS has since 2011 carried out a methodical campaign of resurgence, abetted by the dissolution of Syria, the removal of US combat power, and the sectarian policies of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's government.

ISIS, which is leading the charge, is now seeking to consolidate its gains in Iraq and repeat its 2006 "Baghdad Belts" strategy that prefaced the worst sectarian bloodshed of the Iraq War. The challenge of removing the entrenched insurgent groups from recently gained territories will prove impossible in the short to mid-term without a number of key factors, including a change in the national government and renewed, significant international involvement in Iraq, both of which are unlikely.

It's a sectarian war ... but it isn't

Analysts have correctly pointed out that Maliki's polices have fueled Sunni anger and provided an opportunity for the ISIS to assert itself as the sword of the Sunnis. The ISIS offensive has been augmented by other Sunni groups, including the Naqshbandi Army, a collection of former Baathists and ostensible Islamists intent on reestablishing Sunni dominance, led by former Saddam Hussein aide Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, as well as other jihadist groups such as Ansar al Islam and Jaish al Muhajideen. Additionally, the Sunni Muslim Scholars Association, a group of hardline religious leaders who resisted the US presence in Iraq, has attempted to credit mainstream Sunni resistance, and not ISIS, for the recent offensive. And Sheikh Ali Hatim Al-Suleiman, the emir of the Dulaimi tribal confederation, has characterized the uprising as a "tribal revolution," while at the same time denigrating "terrorists and ISIS," reported Asharq al-Aswat.

After the US withdrew from Iraq, Maliki failed to support and integrate Sunnis into the security forces. He also attempted to arrest prominent Sunni politicians (notably Iraqi VP Tariq al-Hashimi, finance minister Rafi al-Issawi and parliamentarian Ahmed al-Alwani), and his heavy-handed break-up of (mostly) peaceful Sunni protests against his policies, coupled with minimal concessions to the protesters, has fueled great Sunni bitterness toward his regime, which is widely viewed as an Iranian puppet state. But Sunni antipathy toward Maliki and the central government should by no means be conflated with Sunni approval of ISIS and the radical Salafi jihadist ideology it springs from.

Many leaders of the Sunni tribal Sahwa (Awakening) that took place between 2005-2008 became sworn enemies of al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq (the predecessor of ISIS) after battling them into quiescence, and the Awakening leaders' hatred of the terrorist group's radical ideology and its violence toward enemies and civilians alike was animated and enduring. As late as the Sunni protests begun in 2012, many protesters were publicly distancing themselves from "al Qaeda" (ISIS) as the group attempted to insert itself into the vanguard of the popular movement. And certain tribal leaders, including the widely regarded head of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, are still holding out against ISIS near Anbar province's capital of Ramadi, while asking for support from former American allies.

"We've been fighting al Qaeda in Anbar for the past six months and we're ready to fight for another six months, but we need American support," Abu Risha told Bloomberg News on June 13.

At the height of its power, Abu Risha had lobbied for strategic partnership with America and proposed exporting the successful Awakening to other countries to fight al Qaeda. But he bemoaned loss of contact with his former American allies to journalist Eli Lake in late 2012:

"There is no contact right now," he said. "They don't visit at all. Ever since the United States withdrew, we haven't gotten anyone to visit."

In addition, the first two years of ISIS' military campaign in Iraq after US withdrawal ("Destroying the Walls 1 and 2") were devoted to the methodical assassination of prominent Sunni leaders who had fought the group during the Iraq War. This strategy was motivated by both revenge and the need to eliminate the group's most dangerous enemies: leaders who could continue to rally Iraq's Sunnis against the ISIS. As a result, although ISIS now has casual support among Sunnis who seek to use its military prowess to regain power, and has achieved tolerance from some tribal leaders who view ISIS as a necessary evil or have buckled in fear of the group, the mainstream nationalist Sunni agenda in Iraq greatly diverges from the violent zealotry of the terror group and its planned Islamic Caliphate.

Given time, this ideological gulf between mainstream Sunnis and the ISIS will undoubtedly manifest itself in greater conflict, as it did in Iraq as early as 2005, and as it currently does in Syria, where fellow Sunnis (including jihadist groups) have been battling the ISIS because of its greed and harsh ideology. But history is not on the Sunni nationalists' side. In the early years of the Iraq War, unsupported tribal "Awakenings" against al Qaeda in Iraq repeatedly failed; leaders and movements who resisted the group were assassinated or driven into exile. And the current incarnation of ISIS, flush with international support, recruits, thousands of jihadists freed from Iraq's prisons, and half a billion dollars looted from Mosul's banks, is stronger than it has ever been.

If the past is any guide, the likely Sunni-on-Sunni struggle in ISIS-held territory will not soon uproot the terrorist organization from the vast stretch of territory it has acquired. The Sunni Awakening only flourished with financial support, backed up by the American "surge" and counterinsurgency strategy, along with the cooperation of the central government and security forces supporting the groups. At present, while many Sunnis may despise the Maliki government and pine for a return to dominance in Iraq, they are once again facing the prospect of chafing under repressive Salafi-jihadists policies. But without outside assistance and organization, moderate Sunnis will be unlikely to decisively win what will be a protracted conflict.

But it will become a sectarian war

As ISIS tries to consolidate its rule over the Sunnis in areas it controls in Anbar, Ninewa, Salahaddin, and Diyala, and insert itself into the "belts" of small towns surrounding Baghdad, it will attempt to resume the high tempo "commuter insurgency" that sent waves of suicide bombers and anti-Shia forces into the capital during 2006. The most potent resistance to this offensive will be put up by the Iraqi security forces loyal to the government and by reinvigorated Shia militias such as the Mahdi Army (rebranded as the so-called Peace Army), the Hezbollah Brigades, Asaib al Haq, and the Badr Brigades, with support from Iran.

Barring quick, sweeping political accommodation, which is unlikely in the near-term, and significant, direct Western intervention, which is even less likely, the conflict could slip into the horrific sectarian ghettoization and murder that characterized the worst years of the Iraq War. Overt Iranian intervention in the capital and southern Iraq will only sharpen the sectarian divide, and all Iraqis in the path of this clash -- from the rabidly sectarian to the cosmopolitan resident of Baghdad who casually rejects sectarianism -- will be forced into a brutal struggle. In the north, the Kurds will seek to consolidate their gains in Kirkuk and prevent ISIS incursion, and only time will tell if they broker arrangements with the central government to wage an offensive against ISIS in the territory it has gained.

Thus, unless some powerful political accommodation occurs that redraws nationalist Sunni Arabs into the government in a significant way, Iraq will continue to broadly devolve along sectarian lines, with the outskirts of Baghdad and the edge of Kirkuk marking the major fault lines of the conflict.

The possibility of averting this schism and possible massacre lies with international brokerage that pushes the Iraqi government to come to accommodation with the Sunnis who are against ISIS. The ruling Shia coalition must also placate the Kurds, who will wish to make their gain of Kirkuk permanent and acquire rights to independently export oil from their territory. And any durable political reform would likely include steps that result in the eventual replacement of Maliki, whether in the form of his stepping down or being phased out via the institution of term limits on the office of prime minister.

Problematically, despite significant political pressure from prominent voices, Maliki has shown no inclination to step down, the West retains little leverage to drive political accommodation, and Iran has moved decisively to fill the power vacuum left by the US.

The endgame

The Iraqi government's military prospects of ejecting ISIS and its allies from much of their newly gained territory in Anbar, Ninewa, Salahaddin, and Diyala provinces appear to be slim in the absence of significant external support. ISIS' 2006 Baghdad Belts strategy, which called for the strangling of the capital city by controlling the outskirts and surrounding provinces, was so effective that it nearly caused the defeat of Iraqi and American efforts to stabilize Iraq. ISIS has now dusted off this battle plan and is attempting to reproduce it.

The 2006 Baghdad Belts strategy was so successful that it took more than 130,000 US troops with accompanying air and logistical support, combined special operations raids, the Iraqi military and police, and the Awakening forces all more than a year of concurrent operations to dislodge the Islamic State of Iraq, ISIS' predecessor, from Baghdad, the areas outside the city, and the outlying provinces.

This time, the isolated Iraqi government does not possess the combat power of the US Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force to partner with its military. The Kurds, who once provided tens of thousands of troops to fill or augment the ranks of the Iraqi Army, are seizing areas of interest as Iraqi forces flee the field of battle and they are holding their lines against ISIS and its allies. The Iraqi Army remains plagued by logistical troubles and it has limited intelligence, aerial and movement capabilities. And at least two divisions of the 14 division strong Iraqi Army as well as police and border forces have melted away during the ISIS onslaught. Most recently, ISIS seized the border crossings to Syria at Al Qaim and Al Walid, as well as the Turbail crossing to Jordan after Iraqi forces fled.

Before even thinking of retaking Mosul, the Iraqi military has to clear areas on the immediate outskirts of Baghdad. Complicating the problem is the influx of hundreds, if not thousands, of foreign fighters and more than 4,000 hardened jihadists who have been freed in jailbreaks at Tikrit, Abu Ghraib, Taji, Mosul, and Badush. The Iraqi military has been unable to eject ISIS and tribal allies from Fallujah for the past six months, a city just 30 miles from the capital. If the government and the military have not been able to clean up Baghdad's back yard, the prospects for quickly retaking Mosul, which is more than 250 miles from the capital, are grim.

In order to counter the ISIS offensive, the Maliki government needs to reach a political accommodation with mainstream Sunnis and the Kurds. But without a level of external military support (which is politically infeasible), that alone may be insufficient, and the government will be unable to reassert itself in the more distant provinces.

The US government added two Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders to its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists today. Additionally, the US identified four additional aliases for Lashkar-e-Taiba, or Army of the Pure, and included them on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

The Treasury Department added Nazir Ahmad Chaudhry and Muhammad Hussein Gill, both of whom are described as senior Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) members, to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

Chaudhry currently serves as the leader of LeT's "information wing," and "has served as LeT vice-president, member of the group's central leadership, and as close aide" to Hafiz Saeed, the group's emir, according to the Treasury press release announcing the designations. He "has also been a key strategist for the group and has been involved in LeT operational finance matters."

Gill, a founding member, is LeT's "chief financial officer" and serves as a member of the group's shura, or executive council. "He also has served in LT's revenue wing and has maintained LT's expense records," Treasury stated.

In addition to the designations of Chaudhry and Gill, the State Department updated LeT's Foreign Terrorist Organization listing to include four aliases for the group: Jama'at-ud-Dawa, Al-Anfal Trust, Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool (Movement for Defending the Honor of God), and Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awwal (Movement for Safeguarding the First Center of Prayer).

LeT "has repeatedly changed its name in an effort to avoid sanctions," State's amended designation said. "More specifically, LeT created Jama'at-ud-Dawa as a front organization, claiming that the group was an 'organization for the preaching of Islam, politics, and social work.'" Additionally, State reported that "since at least 2011, LeT has used Al-Anfal Trust to procure goods from the Persian Gulf."

The US government has added an LeT alias to its list of terrorist entities in the past. In November 2010, the Falah-i Insaniat Foundation was listed as a terrorist organization and front for Jamaat-ud-Dawa. FIF leader Hafiz Abdur Rauf and LeT operatives Mian Abdullah and Mohammad Naushad Alam Khan were also added to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

In addition to the designations, the State Department indicated that LeT is active in Afghanistan to this day. According to State, LeT is "responsible for the May 23, 2014 attack on the Indian Consulate in Herat, Afghanistan." In that attack, four heavily armed fighters were killed while attempting to storm the consulate. No group has claimed credit for the assault.

Lashkar-e-Taiba has launched multiple terror attacks against India, most notably the 2008 terror assault on the city of Mumbai which killed 165 people, including civilians and members of Indian security forces. Operating in conjunction with the Jaish-e-Mohammed, another Pakistan terror group, the Lashkar-e-Taiba also executed the December 2001 terror assault on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. In addition, both groups carry out attacks against Coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan, and are closely allied with al Qaeda.

Several Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders are on the list of global terrorists

The US has added several LeT leaders and operatives to its terrorism list since the beginning of 2009. Additionally, the US has offered multimillion-dollar rewards for two of LeT's top leaders.

In July 2009, the US added Arif Qasmani, an LeT liaison with outside terror groups, including al Qaeda; Mohammed Yahya Mujahid, a media emir as spokesman; and Nasir Javaid, an operations chief, military commander, and a trainer in Pakistan

In November 2010, the US added the Falah-i Insaniat Foundation and its leader Hafiz Abdur Rauf, along with LeT leaders Mian Abdullah and Mohammad Naushad Alam Khan, to the list of global terror groups and individuals. Abdullah is a senior fundraiser and runs LeT's military camps. Khan is a financial facilitator, smuggler, and money launderer.

In September 2011, the US designated Zafar Iqbal, an LeT co-founder and a key fundraiser, and Hafiz Abdul Salam Bhuttavi, a deputy emir who in the past has served as interim emir and a main ideologue.

In April 2012, the US offered a $10 million reward for Hafiz Saeed, the emir and co-founder of LeT; and a $2 million reward for his brother-in-law, Hafiz Abdul Rahman Makki, the terror group's deputy leader. Saeed has flaunted his privileged position in Pakistan by appearing on multiple Pakistani news programs and talk shows.

In August 2012, the US added eight LeT leaders and operatives to its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Among those designated were Sajid Mir, the "project manager" responsible for coordinating the November 2008 siege of Mumbai; Amir Hamza, an LeT propagandist; Abdullah Mujahid, LeT's "senior paramilitary commander for Afghanistan" since 2008; Abdullah Muntazir, who also works for LeT's media and propaganda wing; Qari Muhammad Yaqoob Sheikh, who leads LeT's clerics; Hafiz Khalid Walid, a top LeT political official; and Ahmed Yaqub, who is listed by Agence France Presse as LeT's "chief for Bangladesh and Nepal operations."

Hafiz Saeed's son Talha was among the eight LeT operatives and leaders designated in August 2012. Talha has been directly linked to Jubair Ahmad, a Pakistani resident of Virginia who was arrested by the FBI in September 2011 and charged with providing material support to a terrorist group. Ahmad pled guilty in April 2012 and is serving a 12-year prison sentence.

Background on Hafiz Saeed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and al Qaeda

Osama bin Laden and his mentor Abdullah Azzam encouraged Saeed to form LeT in the late 1980s, and helped fund the establishment of the terror outfit. LeT, like al Qaeda, calls for the establishment of a global caliphate and receives funding from Saudis and other wealthy individuals throughout the Middle East.

LeT is an ally of al Qaeda; the two groups provide support for each other, and their operatives train in each other's camps. Prior to 9/11, LeT had established training camps in Kunar province in Afghanistan. The group is known to currently operate in the remote province. Its forces fought alongside al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the assault on the US combat outpost in Wanat in Nuristan province, Afghanistan in July 2008. Nine US troops were killed, and 15 US soldiers and four Afghan troops were wounded in the heavy fight that nearly culminated in the outpost being overrun. US forces ultimately beat back the attack, but abandoned the outpost days later.

LeT continues to run training camps in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the Northern Areas, and the tribal areas, as well as in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

The terror group has an extensive network in Southern and Southeast Asia, where it seeks to establish a Muslim caliphate. The group essentially runs a state within a state in Pakistan; the group has established an organization that is as effective as Lebanese Hezbollah. Its sprawling Muridke complex, just northwest of Lahore in Punjab province, is a town of its own. Throughout Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, LeT runs numerous hospitals, clinics, schools, mosques, and other services. In support of its activities, LeT is active in fundraising across the Middle East and South Asia, and the group has recruited scores of Westerners to train in its camps.

In 2005, the group succeeded in providing aid to earthquake-ravaged regions in Kashmir while the Pakistani government was slow to act. Over the last several years, LeT provided relief to tens of thousands of internally displaced persons who have fled the fighting between the military and the Taliban in the Malakand Division and in the tribal areas, as well as those impacted by the devastating floods in Pakistan in 2010.

The US government designated LeT as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2001. The Pakistani government banned the group in January 2002, but this did little to shut down its operations. The group renamed itself the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and conducted business as usual. After Mumbai, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa used the name Falah-i Insaniat Foundation (FIF), and continued fundraising and other activities. The US designated the FIF as a terrorist group in November 2010.

In reality, Saeed and his leaders rebranded the group as a Muslim charity to mask his group's operations. Saeed has been arrested several times by Pakistani security forces after attacks in India, but each time has been quietly released. After Mumbai, Pakistan claimed to shut down LeT/JuD offices and camps, and detained followers, but the efforts were largely cosmetic. Saeed was placed under a loose house arrest in December 2008, but by August 2009, the Lahore High Court said the government did not have grounds to keep him under house arrest.

Saeed and LeT have strong links with elements within Pakistan's military and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI. LeT is one of the primary terror groups used by Pakistan's ISI to direct military and terror operations inside India and Indian-held Kashmir. During the 1999 Kargil War, when Pakistan invaded Indian-held Kashmir, the LeT fought as the vanguard for Pakistani forces in the mountainous region. LeT units continue to infiltrate into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, with the help of Pakistan's military.

At least 21 people are dead in the Nigerian capital of Abuja after an explosion occurred at a shopping center one hour before the country began playing against Argentina at the World Cup in Brazil today. It is not clear if the attack had any connection to the World Cup tournament. Although no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, Boko Haram is strongly suspected.

Details are still emerging on the explosion. One witness commented that he thought a bomb was dropped at the entrance to Emab Plaza by a motorcyclist. Another witness claimed that it was car bomb.

Today's bombing in Abuja was preceded by a series of attacks in northern Nigeria. On June 23, an explosion rocked Kano's School of Hygiene in northern Nigeria, killing at least eight people and injuring several others. The blast "tore through an area just inside the main gate, where students often gather at food kiosks between classes." Boko Haram is suspected of being responsible for the attack.

Over the weekend, Boko Haram fighters also attacked several villages in Borno state in Nigeria's northeast. According to residents, the attackers wore military uniforms as they went on a six-hour shooting spree in Kwarangilam and Koronginim. Reports stated that at least 40 people were killed in the towns. The Nigerian military reportedly intervened to end the attack, bombing the surrounding area hours into the group's offensive.

Boko Haram is also suspected of kidnapping 60 girls and women, and 31 boys, from another village in Borno on June 21. Aji Khalil, a leader of a local group set up to defend villagers, said: "Some suspected Boko Haram members invaded ... and kidnapped 91 persons. More than 60 married women and young girls as well as children, young men were forcefully taken away by Boko Haram terrorists. Four villagers who tried to escape were shot dead on the spot." Questions remain as to the accuracy of the reports, however. Government officials have yet to confirm details of the events and the number of people abducted.

In mid-April, the group successfully kidnapped 276 school girls from their boarding school in Chibok in Borno state. Although 119 students escaped the group's initial attack and 57 girls have since escaped, 219 school girls currently remain unaccounted for and are presumably still in the hands of Boko Haram.

Striving to build an Islamic state in Nigeria, Boko Haram has been increasing the frequency and deadliness of its attacks in recent months. The group, whose name means "Western education is forbidden," was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US in November 2013.

This image is of two juxtaposed pictures: one of Abu Yusuf al Masri pledging bayat to an ISIS commander who is thought to be Omar al Shishani (right) and the other of Abu Yusuf with a Al Nusrah Front leader named Abu Hassan al Kuwaiti (left). The banner at the bottom of the picture of Abu Yusuf with Shishani reads, "the bayat of the soldiers of Jabhat al Julani [Al Nusrah Front] in Albu Kamal to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham."

An Egyptian commander of an Al Nusrah Front faction in the border town of Albu Kamal in Syria's Deir al Zour province has recently sworn allegiance to the rival Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham. The pledge to ISIS may help ISIS cement its control of both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border along the Euphrates River.

The pledge of allegiance to the ISIS by Abu Yusuf al Masri, the former Al Nusrah commander, was reported on various Twitter accounts managed by jihadists, as well as by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), an independent news organization that reports on the Syrian civil war. Photographs of Abu Yusuf and an unnamed "Chechen commander," who looks to be none other than Omar Shishani, a top ISIS military leader, have been published on Twitter.

Abu Yusuf appears to have two Twitter accounts: @M24544344 and @M2544344. An analysis by The Long War Journal indicates that both accounts appear to be run by Abu Yusuf. These accounts both follow and are followed by established jihadists. And the angry response by another jihadists associated with the Al Nusrah Front, including one who is photographed by the erstwhile Al Nusrah commander, suggests that Abu Yusuf's tweets are legitimate.

Up until June 17, Abu Yusuf tweeted at an account called "Victory Front" (@M24544344, Jabhat al Nusrah); his last post that day was a retweet of al Qaeda ideologue Abu Musab al Suri's treatise on guerrilla warfare. He resumed tweeting on June 23, but on a new account called "Abu Yusuf al Masri" (@M2544344). On his new account, he justified his decision to join ISIS by claiming that Ansar al Islam, which has clashed with ISIS and its predecessors for 10 years, has come to a truce with ISIS and joined "the State."

"Ansar al Islam after fighting between it and the State that lasted for 10 years, its clerics and leaders agreed that this stage cannot bear the conflict so they united under the banner of the State two days ago," he wrote.

Abu Yusuf's claim of an agreement between ISIS and Ansar al Islam has not been corroborated, and it is unclear how he would be privy to such information. Neither ISIS nor Ansar al Islam has publicly disclosed such an agreement. But the two groups are operating as part of an alliance against the Iraqi government and have seized territory in Iraq's Ninewa, Salahaddin, and Diyala provinces.

Abu Yusuf also urged that the differences between jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria be resolved before the US re-enters the conflict.

"We were one group, we differed in opinions and the hearts disputed, and blood was shed and the voice of reason fell silent and the sound of the artillery rose. By Allah, the blood of the mujahideen is above all theories and interpretations," he tweeted.

"The matter is not related to an individual but to a subdued nation [ummah] that does not have the ease of the conflict, the enemy is gathering and America is planning, and it [America] will not distinguish between factions, soon America will come to promote virtue," he continued.

An established jihadist known as Abu Hassan al Kuwaiti, who previously was pictured with Abu Yusuf (see picture above) expressed anger and disappointment with Abu Yusuf's decision to defect from the Al Nusrah Front.

"How does he [Abu Yusuf] have the heart to betray his brothers besieged by ISIS in the city of Deir [al Zour?] who are being killed by the nusayri [Assad] regime, and he is extending his hand to shake with the killer ...." Abu Hassan wrote in a tweet today.

In another tweet today, Abu Hassan noted that "the blood of the Muslims and mujahideen has yet to be wiped off the land of Albu Kamal, so what heart foes he have that he places his hand in the hand of he who kills them!"

Responding to arguments that Abu Yusuf joined ISIS in order to "unite the ranks" of the Muslims, Abu Hassan retorted, "Tomorrow he will join the rafida [Shi'ites] as well and Hezb al Shaytan [Hezbollah] and sau that we were commanded to unite the ranks! What school of jurisprudence is this that allows one to leave Sunni groups and move over to the banner of the shockingly heretical ISIS?!"

Abu Yusuf's defection was also noted by SOHR director Rami Abdurrahman, who commented that ISIS' position along the Iraqi-Syrian border is now strengthened. "We cannot say (ISIS) controls Albu Kamal but we can say they are now in Albu Kamal," he said.

Existing tensions between jihadist factions in Deir al Zour and possible repercussions

It is unclear how many Al Nusrah fighters have joined ISIS in Albu Kamal. Jihadists on Twitter indicated that Abu Yusuf commanded 65 fighters. ISIS has scores of fighters outside of Albu Kamal and controls several villages in the area, according to reports.

Over the past few days, SOHR reports from Deir al Zour have indicated the emergence of tensions between rebel fighters, including some associated with Al Nusrah and the Islamic Front, who are joining ISIS and those who are still resisting the group, after months of infighting between jihadist groups in the province. Yesterday, SOHR reported that ISIS and "local militiamen" clashed violently with Al Nusrah and the Islamic Front near Mo Hasan, and that Al Nusrah "executed a defected first lieutenant who is the commander of An Islamic brigade because he swore allegiance to ISIS."

The day before, ISIS designated the towns of Khesham and Tabia as military areas, and distributed a statement in eastern Deir al Zour refuting rumors that ISIS considers other rebel fighters in the province to be infidels. Interestingly, the Islamic Front in Albu Kamal in Deir al Zour demanded that Al Nusrah clarify its position regarding ISIS after reports that ISIS and Al Nusrah cooperated in the city.

And on June 21, ISIS executed three Free Syrian Army officers in Deir al Zour (the vice-leader of the provincial military council and two commanders in the Al Haq group). The day prior, ISIS took over Mo Hasan and other strategic towns in eastern Deir al Zour, including the headquarters of the rebel battalions' military council.

As SOHR's Abdurrahman told Reuters on June 20, the only remaining strategic town for ISIS to take over in Deir al Zour is Albu Kamal. Clearly, the fighters from Al Nusrah and other rebel factions in the area have been under heavy ISIS pressure to either join the ISIS ranks, per the conciliatory ISIS statement mentioned above, or be overrun. SOHR reported today that ISIS and Al Nusrah are fighting in various locations in Deir al Zour, and that "[i]t is expected that ISIS will storm the city of Albu from Al Qaim area destination."

ISIS continues to advance in Iraq

Abu Yusuf's defection to ISIS may help the group to consolidate its control of both sides of the border, thus adding an additional source of revenue as well as command over what passes between the two countries.

ISIS has taken control of the town of Al Qaim, just across the border from Albu Kamal, as well as the border crossing after Iraqi forces abandoned the town earlier this week in what they called a "tactical retreat."

ISIS continues to slowly advance in other areas in Iraq, reportedly taking over the town of Al Alam north of Tikrit as well as the oil facilities nearby at Ajeel. Also, ISIS is said to have surrounded the Balad Air Base and launched attacks on it from three sides.

Lisa Lundquist contributed to this report.

A former Guantanamo detainee named Lahcen Ikassrien was arrested earlier this month in Spain. Authorities suspect that he has led a network responsible for sending jihadist recruits off to fight in Syria and Iraq. Members of Ikassrien's group reportedly fought for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), although it is not clear when they did so.

Ikassrien's arrest is the latest twist in a story that stretches back to the late 1990s, when Spanish investigators first came to suspect that Ikassrien was involved in al Qaeda's international jihadist network.

Indeed, counterterrorism officials from both Spain and the US concluded that Ikassrien was part of an al Qaeda cell led by Imad Yarkas (also known as Abu Dahdah).

According to numerous accounts, Yarkas served as one of bin Laden's most trusted lieutenants in Europe. Spanish investigators think that Yarkas' men even helped orchestrate a critical planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks in the summer of 2001. Ramzi Binalshibh, al Qaeda's key point man for the 9/11 plot, and Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker, met in Tarragona, Spain in July 2001. According to the 9/11 Commission's final report, US intelligence officials did not find any evidence that suspects other than Binalshibh or Atta were involved in the meeting. But Spanish officials insist otherwise.

Regardless of his putative 9/11 role, Yarkas was arrested in late 2001 and later convicted on terror-related charges by a Spanish court; he was released in May 2013 after serving a reduced sentence. The members of Yarkas' cell who avoided jail went on to help execute the March 11, 2004 train bombings in Madrid.

At the time of the 3/11 attacks, Ikassrien was still detained at Guantanamo. But according to leaked files authored by the State Department and Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), he knew some of the attackers well.

Evidence ruled inadmissible by Spanish court

In late 2001, Ikassrien was captured alongside Taliban members by US forces in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

He was transferred to Spanish custody on July 18, 2005. The plan was for Ikassrien to stand trial, but he avoided a conviction. Leaked State Department cables reveal that the Spanish courts excluded the most incriminating evidence against Ikassrien, including communications intercepted prior to his detention at Guantanamo. That evidence tied Ikassrien directly to Yarkas' cell.

In a cable dated Oct. 20, 2006, the US Embassy in Madrid described the problems that arose in Ikassrien's legal proceedings. The section of the cable discussing Ikassrien's case is entitled, "High-profile Al-Qaeda Suspects."

"Spain's National Court on October 11 [2006] acquitted Lahcen Ikassrien after finding insufficient evidence that he was a member of either al Qaeda or of the Abu Dahdah terror cell in Spain, or that he fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan," the cable reads.

The evidence backing up these allegations existed, but it was excluded from Ikassrien's proceedings. "The court refused to admit any prosecution evidence that was obtained during his detention in Guantanamo or any information gleaned from intercepted phone calls in Spain."

Another leaked State Department cable, sent on July 28, 2006, describes the contents of the intercepted communications. "According to press reports," the cable reads, "the Spanish police intercepts place Ikassrien in Istanbul, Turkey in November 2000 along with suspected terrorists Amer Azizi and Said Berraj."

Both Azizi and Berraj worked for Yarkas. Azizi was subsequently killed in a US drone strike in northern Pakistan. Western counterterrorism officials connected Azizi to a constellation of al Qaeda actors, including those responsible for the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings. Azizi may have also played a role in coordinating the infamous Tarragona meeting between the 9/11 planners. Said Berraj was reportedly involved in the 3/11 train bombings.

"In a separate intercept," the July 28, 2006 cable continues, "Ikassrien requested assistance with [travel] documentation from al Qaeda cell leader [Imad] Yarkas."

These same intercepts were ruled inadmissible during the legal proceedings for Yarkas and other members of his cell. Prosecutors were able to overcome this hurdle with other evidence tying Yarkas to terrorism. But they could not overcome the same evidentiary hurdle with respect to Ikassrien.

The Spanish prosecutor "had sought an eight-year jail sentence" for Ikassrien, according to the Oct. 20, 2006 State Department cable. If the prosecutor had been successful in getting a conviction, and the sought-after sentence, then Ikassrien might have been imprisoned until later this year. But the prosecution could not move forward with its case, despite "noting publicly that Spanish authorities had obtained more than enough evidence of Ikassrien's membership in the Abu Dahdah [i.e., Yarkas] terror cell prior to his stay in Guantanamo."

There was an additional complicating factor in the Spanish prosecutor's attempt to try Ikassrien. His case had become linked to that of another former Guantanamo detainee, and the Spanish court's ruling in that matter nixed the prosecution's plan for trying Ikassrien.

Hamed Abderrahaman Ahmed, dubbed the "Spanish Taliban" by the press, was transferred from Guantanamo to Spain on Feb. 13, 2004. Abderrahaman was convicted on terrorism charges and sentenced to six years in prison in September 2005. However, on July 24, 2006, the Spanish Supreme Court annulled the sentence, finding that Abderrahaman's admissions to Spanish investigators during his time at Guantanamo were inadmissible.

The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "although it is not for [this Court] to issue a pronouncement regarding the situation of those held in indefinite detention, we must state that, as [Abderrahaman] was held in detention under the authority of the US military since he was turned over [to the US] on an undetermined date, all information obtained under such conditions must be declared totally null and nonexistent."

As noted in the State Department's cables, the Spanish court went on to denounce Guantanamo, saying the detention of "hundreds of people, among them [Abderrahaman], without charges, without rights, without controls, and without limits" is "impossible to explain, much less justify."

The court's anti-Guantanamo decision in Abderrahaman's case had an "immediate effect" on the ability of prosecutors to seek Ikassrien's conviction, according to the State Department's July 28, 2006 cable. Ikassrien had been held in preventative detention since his transfer to Spain in 2005, but prosecutors suddenly recommended that he be released on bail. This about-face came "less than a month after prosecutors filed formal charges against Ikassrien."

The evidence compiled by prosecutors for Abderrahaman's trial was the same type of evidence they planned to use against Ikassrien. "The case against Ikassrien is based on three police interviews with him when he was being held at Guantanamo (by the same investigators who interviewed Abderrahaman) and on telephone intercepts developed in the course of the [Imad] Yarkas investigation," the State Department noted. This was the "same evidence thrown out in the Abderrahaman case."

Interestingly, prosecutors also "maintained that Ikassrien's own testimony since his transfer from Guantanamo incriminate[d] him since he has acknowledged traveling to Afghanistan to 'collaborate with the Islamist regime,'" meaning the Taliban. But this was apparently not enough. And "court observers" claimed that "Ikassrien's statements to the National Court have been substantially less incriminating than those of Abderrahaman."

A "high" risk, according to leaked JTF-GTMO threat assessment

Although Spanish authorities had intelligence directly connecting Ikassrien to Imad Yarkas' operations, Ikassrien apparently never admitted this connection during his time at Guantanamo. A one-page memorandum prepared for his combatant status review tribunal (CSRT) noted that he "admits being a member of the Taliban" and to associating with members of al Qaeda-affiliated groups. But there is no mention of Yarkas in the memo.

A separate, leaked threat assessment authored by Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), and dated Nov. 8, 2004, does describe Ikassrien's ties to Yarkas' al Qaeda cell. But JTF-GTMO had to rely on other sources to piece together the story, because Ikassrien did not admit that he was a part of Yarkas' operation.

"Although cooperative with his debriefers," the JTF-GTMO threat assessment reads, Ikassrien's "accounts remain vague and inconsistent when questioned on topics of a sensitive nature." Ikassrien "has yet to admit being part of al Qaeda and continues to deny any knowledge of [sic] any terrorist affiliation."

Ikassrien's denials of "any incriminating information" were not atypical, JTF-GTMO's memo notes. "This is a common anti-interrogation technique used by numerous JTF-GTMO detainees, as well as by known members of al Qaeda."

JTF-GTMO did not believe that Ikassrien's denials were credible, finding he was a "high" risk and recommending that he "be retained under Department of Defense control."

"As early as 1998," the JTF-GTMO reads, Ikassrien "was meeting on a regular basis to discuss the jihad going on in Afghanistan with Amer al Azizi."

Ikassrien's ties to Azizi were noted in the Spanish press. On Oct. 27, 2004, the Spanish daily El Mundo reported that Azizi stayed in a flat in Turkey with Ikassrien and others sometime in 2000. Azizi was "on his way to Chechnya and Afghanistan" at the time. The paper did not say if Ikassrien joined Azizi.

According to JTF-GTMO, other jihadists were involved in the "regular" meetings between Ikassrien and Azizi that began in 1998 as well. The meetings allegedly included some of the same men who went on to carry out the 3/11 Madrid train bombings. One of them was Jamal Zougam, who worked for Yarkas prior to 9/11 and reportedly provided the cell phone detonators used in the 3/11 attacks. Zougam "assisted" Ikassrien "financially on his trip to Afghanistan," the JTF-GTMO file reads.

Another 3/11 suspect and member of Yarkas' network, Mohammed Haddad, "admitted to giving his Moroccan travel document and a copy of his resident permit to" Ikassrien, "who used these documents to attempt to travel to Afghanistan." The JTF-GTMO file does not indicate when Haddad allegedly made this admission.

"Not resting quietly at home"

In early April 2009, US officials met with their Spanish counterparts to discuss the possibility of resettling additional Guantanamo detainees in Spain. Among the attendees, according to a leaked State Department cable summarizing the meeting, was Luis Felipe Fernandez de la Pena, who was then the Director General for North America, Asia and the Pacific in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

Fernandez De la Pena said the Spanish government's "position of principle" is to take a "positive, constructive approach to the issue," according to the cable, dated April 2, 2009. However, he "cited a number of legal and security-related concerns," including the court decision in Abderrahaman's case. "The ruling later became a precedent which prevented another former detainee, Lahcen Ikassrien, from being prosecuted in Spanish courts," the cable reads.

Citing "reports from [Spain's] security services," Fernandez De la Pena said "these same individuals are 'not resting quietly at home.'"

The only two "individuals" mentioned in the cable before this comment are Abderrahaman and Ikassrien. It appears, therefore, that Spanish counterterrorism officials suspected Ikassrien was assisting his jihadist brethren in 2009 -- that is, well before his arrest again earlier this month.

The Pakistani military said it killed the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan's commander for the town of Miramshah in North Waziristan and captured an al Qaeda explosives expert during its ongoing offensive in the tribal agency.

The Inter-Services Public Relations, the Pakistani military's public affairs branch, claimed that the "TTP [Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan] commander of Miramshah, Commander Umer has been killed by security forces last night on the outskirts of Miranshah."

The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan has not announced the death of its commander in Miramshah. An email sent to the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan's media department has not been answered at this time.

Additionally, security forces claimed to have captured "one prominent al Qaeda commander" who was "trying to flee from surrounded area in NWA [North Waziristan Agency]." The Pakistani military identified him as "an explosive, IED, [and] suicide belt expert," but did not name him.

Al Qaeda is known to operate an "electronics and explosives workshop in Pakistan, which is responsible for producing IED components for AQ [al Qaeda] senior leadership," the US State Department noted in a terrorist designation in June 2013. In that designation, the US identified 'Abd al Hamid al Masli as running a workshop in "Waziristan" that provided "paramilitary brigades," or the Lashkar al Zil (Shadow Army), "in Afghanistan with timers, circuits, mines, and remote control devices for use in IEDs." Al Masli, a Libyan, also served on al Qaeda's military committee. [See LWJ report, US adds al Qaeda explosives expert to list of global terrorists.]

Pakistan continues to boast of high "terrorist" and zero civilian casualties

The Pakistani military has claimed that 334 "terrorists," "foreign and local terrorists," "Uzbek foreigners," "foreigners," and "ETIM [Turkistan Islamic Party] terrorists," and zero civilians have been killed since it launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan on June 15.

The last two press releases by the ISPR claimed that an additional 32 "terrorists" were killed during operations. On June 25, the military claimed it killed 13 "terrorists" in airstrikes in Mir Ali. And on June 28, the military claimed it killed 11 terrorists in Mir Ali and eight more, including Commander Umer, in Miramshah. The military has relied almost exclusively on airstrikes from fighter planes and attack helicopters, as well as "Artillery, Tanks and Heavy weapons."

The Pakistani military has said its plan in North Waziristan is to cordon off population centers and allow civilians to flee while launching airstrikes against "terrorists" before moving in with ground forces to occupy the region. The military has used this strategy in the past, only to see top leaders slip the cordon while a rearguard Taliban force engages Pakistani forces in guerrilla warfare.

Pakistani officials have quietly promised US officials that the Haqqani Network, a Taliban subgroup supported by the military and intelligence services that attacks US forces in Afghanistan, would be targeted during the operation. The Haqqanis are headquartered in Miramshah. So far, however, not a single Haqqani Network leader, military commander, or member has been identified as killed or captured during the operation. The Haqqanis' madrassa, the Manba Ulom, has been untouched in the operation.

There is also no indication that Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadar is a target of the operation. Bahadar also wages jihad in Afghanistan against US forces. Both the Haqqani Network and Bahadar's forces, two Taliban groups that shelter and support al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Turkistan Islamic Party, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and other terrorist groups, are considered "good Taliban" by political and military officials as they do not advocate attacking the Pakistani state.

For more information on Pakistan's recent military operation in North Waziristan and "good Taliban" vs. "bad Taliban", see LWJ and Threat Matrix reports:

Pakistan launches 'comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists' in North Waziristan
Pakistani forces focus on 'foreigners' in North Waziristan operation
Pakistani military claims 257 'terrorists,' no civilians killed in North Waziristan offensive
Pakistani Army continues to boast of zero civilian casualties in North Waziristan operation

The Afghan Taliban have been battling government forces for the past week in an attempt to retake control of the district of Sangin in Helmand province. Scores of civilians, security personnel, and Taliban fighters are reported to have been killed in the ongoing fighting.

The Taliban launched their assault on June 19, with an estimated 800 to 1,000 fighters attacking police and military checkpoints in Sangin. The Taliban overran several outposts, then, in what is described as a coordinated offensive, attacked security forces and government personnel in the neighboring districts of Musa Qala, Now Zad, and Kajaki in northern Helmand. Local officials in Sangin claimed that "Pakistanis and Arabs" are involved in the Taliban offensive, while Afghanistan's Interior Minister accused the Pakistani military of participating in the attacks.

The status of the four districts is uncertain. Although Afghan officials have claimed that Sangin is "cleared of the insurgency," residents and local officials in the district said much of the district is no longer under the government's contro and the fighting is ongoing.

The spokesman for the governor of Helmand claimed that the fighting has ended in Musa Qala, Now Zad, and Kajaki.

The fighting in Sangin has taken a heavy toll on Afghan security forces. According to The New York Times, "more than 100 members of the Afghan forces and 50 civilians have been killed or wounded in fierce fighting," local officials said.

Seddiqi, the Interior Ministry spokesman, boasted that "more than 250 Taliban militants were killed" in Sangin alone, TOLONews reported. His claim could not be supported, but he also had said that the fighting in Sangin had ended on June 27.

The Taliban's move on Sangin was foreshadowed in December 2013, when local security forces negotiated a peace deal with the jihadist group. Security forces abandoned some checkpoints, which were then occupied by the Taliban. Additionally, reports from the district indicated that security forces largely remained on base as the Taliban roamed the bazaars.

Sangin was one of the last districts in Helmand province held by the Taliban after US and Coalition forces launched a series of offensives to retake the province in 2010. Scores of US Marines and British soldiers were killed during brutal fighting in the district.

Musa Qala, Now Zad, and Kajaki are also considered to be key terrain by the Taliban, which controlled the districts before the US "surge" and offensive that ended in 2012. Kajaki hosts the dam, which generates electricity for Helmand and neighboring Kandahar province. In the past, the Taliban pirated electricity and profited from it.

The Taliban resurgence in Helmand takes place as the US is drawing down forces for the eventual withdrawal at the end of the year. There are currently an estimated 33,000 US forces in country, but most are focused on "retrograding" from Afghanistan. The US government hopes to keep 9,800 troops in country after 2014, tapering down to only a small presence at the US Embassy by late 2016 .

Iraqi and Syrian towns and cities seized by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham. Map created by The Long War Journal. Click to view larger map.

The Iraqi military offensive to retake Tikrit, the provincial capital of Salahaddin province, appears to have suffered its first setback as the military withdrew troops from the city after heavy fighting.

The Iraqi troops pulled back from much of Tikrit after a ground offensive, which started yesterday, "met stiff resistance" from insurgent forces in the city, the BBC reported. The insurgent alliance includes the jihadist Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham, and the Naqshbandi Army, a collection of former Baathists and ostensible Islamists intent on reestablishing Sunni dominance.

Several armored columns of Iraqi forces entered Tikrit yesterday from the south. Heavy fighting was reported at the provincial council building, Saddam's Hussein's presidential palace, Tikrit University, and elsewhere.

The news of the withdrawal from Tikrit comes one day after Iraqi military officials boasted that they "routed" the fighters, and had "complete success in clearing ISIS from the city, with some militant commanders among the 60 killed."

Iraqi forces are said to have withdrawn to the town of Dijla near Tikrit to regroup.

Insurgents are reported to have heavily seeded the road south from Tikrit to the city of Samarra, which represents the edge of control northward for the Iraqi government, with IEDs, or improvised explosive devices.

The toll of the fighting, which began on June 27 when Iraqi forces air assaulted into Tikrit University, has yet to be fully disclosed. A twitter account of an ISIS supporter, who reported 24 hours ago that "the Safavids [Iranian Shia] retreat 75 KMs away from Tikrit," claimed that 400 prisoners were taken, three helicopters were shot down, and 45 mechanized vehicles were destroyed. The report could not be confirmed.

At least one Iraqi helicopter was shot down during the June 27 air assault at the university, and another may have been damaged badly enough to not be able to leave the ground. Iraqi forces are said to have taken up positions at the university and a nearby base formerly called Camp Speicher by US forces. It is unclear if Iraqi forces remain at the two locations north of Tikrit.

ISIS and its allies seized control of Tikrit on June 11 after its forces captured Mosul to the north and pushed southward. Much of Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salahaddin provinces remain beyond the control of the Iraqi government, which is struggling to regroup its military after nearly two divisions of troops as well as police and border forces melted away or were defeated.

Over the weekend, suspected Boko Haram fighters attacked several villages in northeastern Nigeria, killing dozens of civilians and torching churches and homes.

The attacks took place in villages near Chibok, a predominantly Christian enclave in Borno state from which Boko Haram kidnapped over two hundred school girls in April.

The villages attacked included Kautikari, Kwada, Ngurojina, and Karagau. According to a witness in Kautikari, the insurgents stayed in the village for at least four hours while setting homes and buildings on fire.

During the attacks, the gunmen reportedly rode through the villages on motorcycles throwing explosives at targets. In Kwada, the insurgents burned the entire village, including five churches. The gunmen entered the churches, opened fire on Sunday worshipers, and then set the churches ablaze.

A Nigerian military plane was reportedly deployed five hours after the attacks commenced; at which time, the "gunmen sneaked into the bush."

Boko Haram, whose name means "Western education is forbidden," has launched a series of attacks across the country seeking to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. The group's brazen spate of recent attacks illustrates that it can operate openly and with relative impunity. The group is suspected of attacking a shopping center in Abuja and hitting a medical college in Kano last week after it attacked several villages in Borno state the previous weekend.

This past Sunday's attacks are not the first time the group has targeted Christians or churches. In 2012, a spokesman for the group promised that Boko Haram would "eradicate Christians from certain parts of the country" while fighting to establish "a proper Islamic state." The statement came on the heels of a Boko Haram suicide car bombing outside a church in Jos in February 2012.

On June 26, the United Nations Security Council's al Qaeda Sanctions Committee added Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau to its list of recognized terrorists, subjecting Shekau to financial sanctions and an arms embargo. The UN also added the Nigerian terrorist group Ansaru to its list of terrorist organizations, noting that it is associated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram, as well as with Shekau himself.

The US added Shekau to its terrorist list in June 2012, and designated Ansaru as a terror organization in November 2013.

Nine leading rebel groups in Syria have rejected the Islamic State's claim that it has established a Caliphate stretching across parts of Iraq and Syria.

In a statement released online, the nine groups say "the announcement by the rejectionists [the Islamic State] of a caliphate is null and void," both "legally and logically." The nine groups, all of which have long been opposed to the Islamic State, say that the announced Caliphate will not change how they deal with the organization.

The signatories warn other jihadist individuals and organizations not to support the Islamic State. They argue that the decision to announce a Caliphate is self-serving and an attempt to "abort the blessed revolutions in Syria and Iraq."

Two of the nine signatories are the Islamic Front, a powerful rebel coalition that includes the al Qaeda-linked Ahrar al Sham, and the Majlis Shura al Mujahideen (MSM) in Deir Izzor. The MSM is an alliance of groups, including the Al Nusrah Front, that is opposed to the Islamic State in eastern Syria.

On its Twitter feed, the MSM posted a link to the statement rejecting the Islamic State's announced caliphate. The MSM says the Islamic State's announcement is part of "a systematic campaign to distort sharia terms" and the Islamic State has "distorted jihad, sharia, and [the rules for] punishment, and now they want to distort the Caliphate."

In addition to the Islamic Front and the MSM, the sharia councils of seven other groups signed the rejection of the Islamic State's Caliphate.

The reaction from the Al Nusrah Front's leaders was equally dismissive. The Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, grew out of the Islamic State's predecessor organizations, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). Despite these common roots, the Al Nusrah Front and the Islamic State have been openly at odds since last year.

In a series of tweets in both English and Arabic, Abu Sulayman al Muhajir, a top sharia official in the Al Nusrah Front, sharply criticized the Islamic State's announcement. While using the hashtag #Khilafah_Proclaimed in his tweets, Abu Sulayman argued that the Islamic State's failure to consult jihadi leaders before making the announcement "is a clear breach of Islam."

"The situation has not changed at all here," Abu Sulayman said in one tweet, referring to Syria. "Only difference I see is there is a stronger 'Islamic' justification for them [the Islamic State] to kill Muslims." The Islamic State has long justified the killing of other rebel fighters and leaders by arguing that it is the only legitimate authority in Iraq and Syria.

Abu Sulayman, who is from Australia, served as a mediator during al Qaeda's early attempts to reconcile the ISIS with other jihadist groups in Syria. When those efforts failed, he became a vocal critic of the ISIS and is now a staunch opponent of the Islamic State.

Two other senior Al Nusrah Front officials who are active on Twitter also quickly denounced the Islamic State. One of them, Sami al Uraydi, said the Islamic State's announcement "is really a declaration of war against Muslims, rather than [the establishment of] an Islamic Caliphate." Uraydi levied a criticism similar to Abu Sulayman's as well, arguing that the Caliphate is supposed to be governed by rules agreed upon by Muslim scholars and not according to the demands of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State.

Another Al Nusrah Front official, Al Gharib al Muhajir al Qahtani, dismissed the Islamic State's Caliphate as "imaginary." According to al Qahtani, the Islamic State previously failed to procure the support of "many students of [Islamic] knowledge and leaders." Thus, the group has now become obsessed with the idea of a Caliphate, hoping to earn the jihadist legitimacy it lacked when it was merely a state.

The criticisms of the Islamic State's announcement are unsurprising. In reality, the battle lines between the Islamic State and its rivals in Iraq and Syria were drawn long ago.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), one of al Qaeda's official branches, posted a statement on jihadist forums on July 1 praising the Islamic State's recent military gains in Iraq. AQIM also calls for reconciliation between the ISIS and rival jihadist groups in Syria. The message was first obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

The statement was authored on June 22, one week before the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) rebranded itself as the Islamic State and declared that it now ruled over a caliphate. The Islamic State's controversial caliphate announcement is not, therefore, addressed in AQIM's statement.

AQIM's message is addressed to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), which is how the group will be referred to here.

AQIM begins by praising "the victories of our people the Sunnis in Iraq under the command of their mujahideen sons, and on top of them the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham" (ISIS). Interestingly, AQIM argues that ISIS' advances in Iraq have "alleviated our calamity in" Syria and "mended the rift and directed arrows of the mujahideen to the necks of the enemies of the Ummah and the religion: the Crusaders, the [Shiites], and the apostates."

Therefore, AQIM sees ISIS' advances in Iraq as aiming the jihadists' "arrows" at their appropriate common enemies, instead of one another. However, the gains made by the ISIS in Iraq have not put an end to the infighting in Syria, where the ISIS and its rivals have battled for months.

After calling for broad support for the jihad in Iraq, AQIM's statement then says the jihadist factions should reconcile their differences. AQIM first addresses the ISIS. "We call upon our mujahideen brothers in Iraq and on top of them, our brothers in the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham [ISIS], to take advantage of these conquests and winds of victory to gather and meet, and forget the past of dispute and conflict, and open a new page with their brothers," the group's statement reads, according to SITE's translation.

Without naming any specific groups in Syria, AQIM addresses jihadists there, arguing that they should support the ISIS' efforts in Iraq. "We call upon our mujahideen brothers in Sham to strongly support the conquests of their brothers in Iraq and protect their backs and provide them with what they need to continue their march and complete their victory, as recommended by our Sheikh and Emir Sheikh Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri, may Allah preserve and protect him, because Iraq is a debt upon the entire Ummah."

By referring to Zawahiri as "our Sheikh and Emir," AQIM clearly states that Zawahiri is the group's overall leader. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the head of the Islamic State, famously disobeyed Zawahiri's orders, leading al Qaeda's general command to disown Baghdadi's group in early February. Baghdadi and the ISIS have been attempting to win the support of al Qaeda's regional branches, including AQIM, since then. However, AQIM's statement does not indicate that AQIM is siding with Baghdadi over Zawahiri.

The statement's mention of Zawahiri's recommendation is likely a reference to the al Qaeda emir's repeated calls for the ISIS to abandon the jihad in Syria and return to the fight in Iraq. In early May, Zawahiri released a message entitled, "Testimonial to Preserve the Blood of Mujahideen in al Sham." Zawahiri argued that the expansion of Baghdadi's group into Syria has been a "political catastrophe for the people of the Levant." Zawahiri urged Baghdadi to return to Iraq so that the jihad in Syria would no longer be weakened by the intra-jihadist rivalries.

There is no evidence that the ISIS was in fact complying with Zawahiri's directive when it launched its offensive in Iraq in June. But AQIM is attempting to use the ISIS' gains in Iraq as a basis for reconciling Baghdadi's group with al Qaeda and affiliated groups. Thus, the group links the jihadist gains in Iraq to Zawahiri's stated goals.

Calls for reconciliation not new

AQIM's statement echoes previous calls for reconciliation in Syria. Al Qaeda's senior leadership has repeatedly called for reconciliation, even as the ISIS has denounced its former parent organization and taken the fight to its fellow jihadists. As recently as May, in fact, Zawahiri made yet another attempt at putting an end to the dispute.

In early March, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released an audio message online in which the al Qaeda branch addressed the infighting in Syria. The message was recorded in the aftermath of Abu Khalid al Suri's assassination in Syria. Al Suri was al Qaeda's chief representative in Syria at the time of his death and was presumably killed by fighters dispatched by the ISIS.

"We have one stance toward all groups that wage jihad for the sake of God and we feel sorry for the murder of any of the mujahideen in any group and clear ourselves before God from spilling proscribed blood," an AQAP representative said in the audio message, according to a translation obtained by The Long War Journal. The message continued: "We, in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, have been careful from the beginning to have a brotherly stance toward all the mujahideen. As such, we call upon every Muslim everywhere to keep his hand and tongue away from this sedition and to pray to God sincerely to unite the mujahideen and guide them to the right."

More recently, the head of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, Abu Iyad al Tunisi, issued a statement that is very similar to AQIM's. Abu Iyad hailed the mujahideen's "conquests in the Land of the Two Rivers," saying they should serve to bring together all of the "jihadist factions that fight to raise the banner of monotheism" and seek to enforce Islamic sharia law. Abu Iyad added that the mujahideen should set aside their differences and "open their hearts to a new comprehensive reconciliation."

As in AQIM's statement, Abu Iyad made an explicit reference to Zawahiri, calling him the "doctor of the Ummah" and "sheikh of the Mujahideen." Abu Iyad also said that he "defers" his "demands" for reconciliation to Zawahiri and the emir of the Al Nusrah Front, Abu Muhammad al Julani. If the pair announce their support for the gains made by the ISIS, other jihadist factions, and the Sunni tribes in Iraq, then it "might result in orders by the lead of the disputing organization that would put an end to infighting."

Abu Iyad has known ties to AQIM. In January, for example, the State Department designated Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, announcing that it "is ideologically aligned with al Qaeda and tied to its affiliates, including AQIM."

AQIM desires jihadist cohesion with help of 'scholars'

There have been numerous attempts by al Qaeda and like-minded jihadists to reconcile the Islamic State with its rivals. These efforts have often centered on influential jihadist ideologues acting as mediators. The initiatives have all failed because the ISIS does not recognize any religious authority other than its own.

Nonetheless, AQIM once again suggests that jihadist "scholars" broker a peace deal.

"We call upon our mujahideen brothers in Iraq and Sham to be cohesive and to be merciful among each other, and to communicate with the active scholars, the symbols of the jihadi current, because the condition of the Ummah cannot be mended but by the goodness of the scholars and emirs, and the condition of the emirs cannot be mended but by the guidance of the scholars," AQIM says in its statement, according to SITE's translation.

Indeed, AQIM has long called for leading jihadi ideologues to help settle the dispute.

On Nov. 1, 2013, for instance, Sheikh Abu Yahya al Shinqiti, who serves on AQIM's sharia committee, released a statement concerning the jihad in Syria.

Al Shinqiti warned the mujahideen to avoid infighting, saying they should be "wary of disputes and division." Al Shinqiti also took note of the role played by social media, saying that "rumors" circulated online can serve to exaggerate the differences between various factions. (The latest statement from AQIM returns to this theme, saying the jihadists should "cease their campaign of slander and and backbiting on the forums and means of social communication.")

Al Shinqiti went on to single out Dr. Abdallah Muhammad al Muhaysini for praise. Al Shinqiti expressed his "gratitude" for al Muhaysini's fundraising activities, as well as the Saudi's attempt to established a unified Islamic court for settling the jihadists' differences in Syria. Al Shinqiti asked Allah to make al Muhaysini successful.

Muhaysini's efforts failed when the ISIS rejected his initiative in January 2014. Muhaysini, who is, at a minimum, pro-al Qaeda, is closely allied with the ISIS' rivals in Syria.

Thus, AQIM is keenly aware that the ISIS has rejected the efforts of jihadi ideologues to resolve the ongoing dispute. Still the group calls "upon the scholars of the Ummah and on top of them, our dear sheikhs, the people of honesty and affliction, to continue their quest to defuse the raging war between the mujahideen in Sham, and to work to unite them around the word of truth."

Since AQIM produced its message on June 22, the ISIS declared itself the new caliphate with virtually no outside support from the jihadi "scholars." It is unlikely that the group, which is demanding allegiance from jihadis and Muslims around the globe, will listen to these scholars now with respect to events in Syria.

Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi (right). The photo was posted on Twitter by sharia officials in the Al Nusrah Front, as well as other jihadists, after Maqdisi's release from prison in Jordan in mid-June.

Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, an influential jihadist ideologue who was recently released from prison in Jordan, has released a new statement concerning the Islamic State's advances in Iraq. Maqdisi has long been critical of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), as the Islamic State was previously known. The Jordanian's latest message demonstrates that he has not changed his opinions, and he fears that the Islamic State will use its recent power grab to target its jihadist foes.

In late May, Maqdisi issued a stinging rebuke of the ISIS, calling it a "deviant organization."

Online jihadists have speculated that Maqdisi's denunciation of the ISIS and other statements critical of the group were either coerced by Jordanian security services, or were misinformed because of his status behind bars. Some jihadists even wondered if he was going to retract or modify his previous missives, especially his wholesale condemnation of the ISIS.

But Maqdisi dismisses these claims and stands by his previous statements, saying they were issued after various attempts to reconcile the ISIS to its rivals failed.

"Moral pressures had been exerted upon me to retract the statement that I had issued [in May] after the fruit of long communication with the parties involved in the reconciliation or in the adjudication that the group of the State [ISIS or the Islamic State] had refused," Maqdisi argues, according to a translation by the SITE Intelligence Group. The "claims by some people ... that the statement is null or will be voided" are not true, Maqdisi writes, adding that he "did not promise [to retract his statements] to anyone."

In his statement in late May, Maqdisi revealed new details about his own role in the attempts to mediate between the ISIS and the Al Nusrah Front. The Jordanian ideologue explained that he had been in contact with both the ISIS head Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri.

"I advised him [Baghdadi] privately and advised his [organization] publicly," Maqdisi claimed in his May statement. Maqdisi said he "also wrote to our beloved brother, the Sheikh, the Commander, the Mujahid Ayman al Zawahiri (may Allah protect him)" to "put him in the picture regarding my efforts at a reconciliation initiative or adjudicating between" the ISIS and its rivals. Maqdisi promised Zawahiri that he "would authorize some of [his] closest students to carry this out."

Maqdisi's efforts, like those of other jihadist ideologues, failed. And he criticized the ISIS for rejecting the advice and orders of jihadist leaders, including "especially" Zawahiri.

In his new message, Maqdisi defends his condemnation of the ISIS. The statement "came as a result of communications and correspondence with all the parties, especially the party [the Islamic State] that had rejected previous initiatives and that is refusing the adjudication of the Shariah," he writes.

And while Maqdisi applauds the jihadists' recent gains in Iraq, he fears that the group now called the Islamic State will use its improved position to quash its rivals.

Maqdisi says that he was "asked about the victories of the Islamic State in Iraq," which is one of the Islamic State's previous names. "There is no believer who does not rejoice for the victories of the Muslims no matter who they are," Maqdisi says. But the "fear is for the consequences of these victories and how the Sunnis and the other preaching or jihadi groups and Muslim masses will be treated in the liberated areas."

The Jordanian ideologue asks, "And against whom will the heavy weaponry taken from Iraq and sent to Syria be used?"

Maqdisi raises the same concern when addressing the Islamic State's announced caliphate. While he does not object to the goal of resurrecting the caliphate, Maqdisi fears that the Islamic State will use its new self-proclaimed status to continue targeting rivals.

The Jordanian jihadist asks, according to SITE's translation: "Will this Caliphate be a sanctuary for every oppressed one and refuge for every Muslim? Or will this creation take on a sword against those who oppose it from the Muslims, and strike away with it all the emirates that came before their declared state, and nullify all the groups that do jihad in the cause of Allah in the different battlefields before them. "

To buttress his point, Maqdisi points to the Islamic Caucasus Emirate (ICE) and the Taliban's Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. As the jihadists' regional emirates, they would technically fall under the authority of the caliphate, if it has been truly resurrected.

But Maqdisi says that in the case of the ICE, the group did "not make anything obligatory upon the Muslim masses in the world." Nor, Maqdisi argues, did the Taliban demand allegiance from jihadists elsewhere around the world, as the Islamic State now has.

With the Islamic State now claiming to be above all other jihadist organizations, Maqdisi wonders what will come "of the various fighting groups that pledged" obedience to other leaders in Iraq and Syria.

The straightforward meaning of Maqdisi's arguments and questioning is to challenge the Islamic State's demand of obedience from all other jihadist groups now that it claims to rule as a caliphate. By comparing the Islamic State to the Taliban and the ICE, Maqdisi is pointing out just how much power Baghdadi's group is really claiming to now wield.

Maqdisi was released from prison in mid-June. His freedom was celebrated by many jihadists, including leading figures in the Al Nusrah Front, which is al Qaeda's official branch in Syria and one of the Islamic State's chief jihadist adversaries.

Maqdisi's new statement shows that he is still on the side of the jihadists opposed to the Islamic State.

Iraqi and Syrian towns and cities seized by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham and allied groups. Map created by The Long War Journal. Click to view larger map.

The Islamic State has taken control of several towns in eastern Syria, further securing its line of communications along the Euphrates River Valley from Western Anbar in Iraq to the city of Raqqah in Syria. Over the past two days, some local tribes and rebel factions in the area have responded to the pressure by pledging allegiance to the Islamic State, while other groups have vowed to continue fighting its advance.

Today, the Islamic State took full control of the city of Mayadan and the town of Shuhail in Deir al Zour province after the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, withdrew from the towns without a fight. Parts of Mayadin, the largest city between the provincial capital city of Deir al Zour and the border town of Albu Kamal, have been under the control of the Islamic State since the end of June.

Shuhail is the home town of Abu Muhammad al Julani, the emir of the Al Nusrah Front. During the Iraqi insurgency from 2004-2011, the town served as a jumpoff point for jihadists fighting for al Qaeda in Iraq and its successor organization, the Islamic State of Iraq, to launch attacks across the border. Once the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, Shuhail became a hub for the activities of the Al Nusrah Front inside Syria.

Additionally, the Al Omar oil field, which is located just east of Mayadan, has been under the control of the Islamic State since the end of June. The oil field is estimated to output 10,000 barrels of oil a day, and will serve as additional income for the group, which seized more than $400 million from banks when it took control of Mosul on June 10.

The Islamic State's consolidation of control over most of Deir al Zour province has forced more defections from jihadist groups. The tribes in Shuhail as well as in the villages of Hariji and Namliyah, along with insurgent groups Jaish al Islam, Jaish Mouta al Islami, Liwa al Ikhlas, and Harakat Taliban al Islamiya, have pledged bayat, or an oath of loyalty, to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed leader of the Islamic State who calls himself Caliph Ibrahim. A video of the announcement was released on YouTube.

But in the town of Ashara and nearby villages, units from the Al Nusrah Front, Ahrar al Sham (an Islamist brigade closely allied with the Al Nusrah Front), and Free Syrian Army pledged to continue to fight the Islamic State.

The Islamic State now controls contiguous territory along the Euphrates River Valley from the town of Jarabulus, which borders Turkey, in Syria's northern Aleppo province to the town of Anah in Iraq's Anbar province. The city of Haditha, farther south of Anah, is contested, while the Haditha Dam is under government control. Ramadi is also contested, but Fallujah and several nearby cities and towns are under the control of the Islamic State.

The Islamic State's recent advances in Deir al Zour were enabled by the takeover of the town of Albu Kamal on June 25 as well as Al Qaim in Iraq. An Egyptian Al Nusrah Front leader from Albu Kamal defected to to the Islamic State, causing the town to fall.

Control of the Euphrates River Valley along both sides of the Iraq-Syria border reinforces the Islamic State's perception that it has destroyed the boundaries between the two countries and is truly restoring the caliphate. Militarily, the Islamic State is now able to freely move fighters between Iraq and Syria to reinforce areas in need as well as expand on its recent gains in both countries.

On July 1, the US government filed a motion arguing that the only suspect charged with participating in the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya should be held in pretrial detention. The motion was subsequently granted.

The court document provides specific allegations concerning the role that the jailed suspect, Ahmed Abu Khatallah, played in the events of that night.

Although US officials had been quick to portray the attack in Benghazi as part of a reaction to an anti-Islam video, US prosecutors now say that Khatallah's "participation ... was motivated by his extremist ideology."

And "days before" the attack, Khatallah "voiced concern and opposition to the presence of an American facility in Benghazi." Khatallah has also allegedly "continued to make efforts to target American personnel and property since the" attack in Benghazi and he has "discussed with others his deadly and destructive intentions."

According to US prosecutors, Khatallah "was a commander of Obaidah Ibn Al Jarrah, an extremist brigade that was absorbed into" Ansar Al Sharia (AAS) "after the recent Libya revolution." The government describes AAS as "an Islamic extremist militia in Libya that holds anti-Western views and advocates the establishment of Sharia law in Libya." Khatallah became a "senior leader" of AAS after his brigade merged with the organization.

Several members of AAS in Benghazi have been identified as being among the group that initially breached the gate at the US Mission on the night of Sept. 11, 2012. These fighters include Khatallah's "known associates."

Beyond the allegations of Khatallah's role in the attack, the government's filing includes several other reported details that may point to his ties to the broader terror network. The court filing provides little insight into Khatallah's relationships with other jihadists, however.

'Extensive contacts with senior-level members of extremist groups throughout Libya'

One reason the US government recommended that Khatallah be detained is because he could "communicate his plans for additional deadly attacks to other extremists and encourage them to carry out those plans."

The government alleges that Khatallah "has extensive contacts with senior-level members of extremist groups throughout Libya." Members of these organizations, as well as Khatallah's "close associates who participated in" the Benghazi attack, "are similarly dedicated to carrying out plots to attack American and Western interests."

Although Khatallah's contacts in other extremist groups are not identified in the legal filing, intelligence and evidence compiled by American authorities indicate that Khatallah's men were among fighters from several jihadist groups that participated in the assault on the US Mission.

The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence identified the groups responsible for the Benghazi attack in a report released on Jan. 15. "Individuals affiliated with terrorist groups, including AQIM, Ansar al Sharia, AQAP, and the Mohammad Jamal Network, participated in the September 11, 2012, attacks," the report reads.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are both official branches of al Qaeda and have sworn allegiance to Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's emir. The head of AQAP, Nasir al Wuhayshi, was also appointed the general manager of al Qaeda's network in August 2013.

In October 2013, both the UN and the US designated the Mohammad Jamal Network (MJN) as a terrorist organization. The designations explicitly recognized the MJN's ties to al Qaeda's senior leadership, including Ayman al Zawahiri, as well as to AQIM and AQAP.

The Senate Intelligence Committee's report also cited intelligence showing that AQAP, AQIM, and the Mohammad Jamal Network all established training camps in eastern Libya after the rebellion against Muammar el Qaddafi began in 2011.

In a terrorist designation released on Jan. 10, the State Department indicated that fighters from Ansar al Sharia chapters in both Derna and Benghazi took part in the attack. Ansar al Sharia in Derna is led by a former Guantanamo detainee named Sufian Ben Qumu. During his time in US custody, intelligence officials identified Ben Qumu as an al Qaeda operative.

Thus, when Khatallah and his men allegedly took part in the Benghazi raid, they were accompanied by fighters from at least four different terrorist organizations with known al Qaeda ties: AQAP, AQIM, the MJN, and Ansar al Sharia in Derna.

The US government reiterates in its legal filing that Khatallah has "significant relationships with active leaders and members of extremist groups in Libya, including AAS, who are similarly bent on harming American personnel and property."

Alleged retaliation plans after capture of senior al Qaeda operative

In late 2013, US prosecutors say, Khatallah "expressed anger that the US conducted a capture operation of a Libyan fugitive in Tripoli" and he "took steps to retaliate against the US by targeting US interests in the region."

The "Libyan fugitive" isn't named, but the term surely refers to a senior al Qaeda operative known as Abu Anas al Libi.

At the time of his capture in October 2013, al Libi had been wanted by the US for well over a decade. Al Libi is accused of helping al Qaeda prepare for the Aug. 7, 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Witnesses during the embassy bombings trial identified al Libi as a trained al Qaeda operative who performed surveillance on the embassies and other Western targets prior to the attack. [See LWJ report, Analysis: Al Qaeda seeks to spin capture of top operative.]

An unclassified report published in August 2012 highlights al Qaeda's strategy for building a fully operational network in Libya and offers an analysis of al Libi's suspected role.

The report ("Al Qaeda in Libya: A Profile") was prepared by the federal research division of the Library of Congress under an agreement with the Defense Department's Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office. Al Libi is identified by the report's authors as the "builder of al Qaeda's network in Libya." The report concludes that Ansar al Sharia is likely a part of this network as well.

The US government's filing in Khatallah's case does not say that the imprisoned Benghazi suspect knew al Libi personally or that the pair conspired together. It is possible that such details, if they exist, were left out of the court papers. Based on the publicly available evidence, any conclusion would be speculative.

'Supervised the exploitation of material from the scene'

Prosecutors allege that after US personnel fled from the Mission, Khatallah "entered the compound and supervised the exploitation from the scene by numerous men." No further details are offered.

US intelligence officials have previously told The Long War Journal that another suspect in the Benghazi attack is thought to have brought materials recovered in the compound back to al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan. That suspect, Faraj al Chalabi, served as a bodyguard for Osama bin Laden during the 1990s. Al Chalabi was detained in Pakistan and Libya following the attack, but eventually freed.

It is not publicly known if Khatallah has any ties to Chalabi, and the court documents do not assert any relationship between the two.

Late last night in Kabul province, the Taliban destroyed hundreds of tankers and supply trucks carrying fuel for NATO forces in Afghanistan.

The attack took place as the vehicles gathered at a trucking terminal in the Paghman district of Kabul province. Claiming credit for the attack, said the Taliban said they planted bombs on the trucks and then detonated the devices remotely.

"Mujahideen first planted the huge trucks, the tankers other vehicles with magnet, sticky and plastic bombs which were later detonated, triggering a huge fire that spread form [sic] one vehicle to another one and soon engulfed the entire supply terminal," the Taliban said in a statement released on Voice of Jihad.

The district police chief for Paghman told Pajhwok Afghan News that more than 400 trucks were destroyed in the blaze. Another 250 trucks were moved to safety, the police chief said.

The Taliban claimed that more than 600 trucks were destroyed and "a large number of the local security guards and the US-Nato invaders were killed." No casualties were reported by Afghan officials. The Taliban routinely exaggerate the effects of their operations.

The Taliban said last night's attack on the trucking terminal was "the fourth in a series of attacks targeting US-NATO supply terminal [sic] since the operation Khaibar began." Operation Khaibar is the Taliban's name for their spring 2014 offensive.

The Taliban also carried out two other successful high-profile attacks in Kabul this week. On July 2, a suicide bomber killed eight members of the Afghan National Air Force in an attack on a bus in the capital of Kabul.

And on July 3, a Taliban rocket team hit the military side of Kabul International Airport. Three Afghan helicopters were hit in the attack, including one used to transport President Hamid Karzai, which was destroyed. The attack caused tens of millions of dollars in damage.

In the south, the Taliban have gone on the offensive as part of an effort to retake key areas lost during during US and NATO military operations from 2010 to 2011. The Taliban still control much of Sangin, a strategic district in Helmand province, after launching an operation with more than 1,000 fighters on June 19.

As the Taliban step up their operations in Kabul and in the provinces, the US is preparing to withdraw its combat troops from Afghanistan. The US hopes to keep 9,800 troops for advisory and special operations missions in the country until the end of 2015. That number will be halved by the beginning of 2016, and then withdrawn by the end of that year. Currently there are an estimated 30,000 US troops in Afghanistan.