Iraqi and Syrian towns and cities seized by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham. Map created by The Long War Journal. Click to view larger map.

After seizing control of the northern city of Mosul in the past 24 hours, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham has advanced southward and taken control of territory in the provinces of Salahaddin and Kirkuk.

In Kirkuk province, ISIS fighters "overran the Hawijah, Zab, Riyadh and Abbasi areas west of the city of Kirkuk, and Rashad and Yankaja to its south," Colonel Ahmed Taha told AFP.

"Taha said soldiers and police in Zab abandoned their posts, while Hawijah district council chief Hussein al Juburi said soldiers in the area were apparently ordered to depart, allowing militants to move in and raise their flag over the police station," AFP continued.

Usamah al Nujayfi, the speaker of Iraq's Council of Representatives, reported earlier today that ISIS fighters took control of the airport in Sharqat, a city halfway between Kirkuk and Mosul, seized a helicopter, and freed prisoners.

Nujayfi, whose brother is the governor of Ninewa province, said that "all of Nineveh province fell into the hands of militants."

Several prisons, including Badush in Ninewa, which had housed top-level jihadist leaders and operatives, many of whom had been captured by US and Iraqi forces over the years, were emptied as the ISIS advanced. More than 2,500 prisoners are said to have been freed in Ninewa province alone.

Iraqi forces abandoned their posts in Mosul after an ISIS assault and left behind their weapons, ammunition, and equipment, including armored vehicles. A video released by an ISIS fighter driving through the city shows scores of ISIS fighters moving around in convoys and dozens more on the streets as abandoned or destroyed Iraqi police and military equipment litters the streets. [See LWJ report, Video from ISIS fighter shows aftermath of 'liberation' of Mosul.]

The recent ISIS advances in northern and central Iraq effectively put the terror group in control of nearly a third of the country. The ISIS already controls most of the large western province of Anbar, save the provincial capital of Ramadi and some small pockets.

The 10 members of the IMU suicide assault team and IMU leader Usman Ghazi superimposed over an image of aircraft at Jinnah International Airport.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan said it executed the June 9 suicide assault on a terminal at Jinnah International Airport in Karachi that killed at least 18 Pakistanis, including 11 security personnel, and 10 jihadists.

Usman Ghazi, the emir of the IMU, issued a statement on the group's website claiming credit for the deadly attack, which had forced the Pakistanis to shut down flights at the airport for 12 hours. Ghazi's statement was obtained by the SITE Intelligence Group.

"Yesterday 11th of Sha'ban (9th of June 2014), at midnight of Monday ten brave martyrdom seeking mujahids of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan wearing their explosive-filled vests attacked very special section of Karachi International Airport of Pakistan which is not visible to the common folk visiting the Airport," Ghazi said, according to SITE.

The IMU leader also claimed that the operation "destroyed many of the fighter jets, American drones and other military planes which were in that special section ...." No aircraft are reported to have been destroyed during the operation.

Ghazi said the Karachi airport attack was executed "as the revenge to the latest full-scale bombardments and night attacks with fighter jets by Pakistan Apostate Army which started in 21st of May, 2014 in Waziristan." He is referring to the airstrikes in North Waziristan that have even angered Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the "good Taliban" commander who is favored by the Pakistani state. Bahadar has threatened to end his peace agreement with the government if the attacks do not cease.

Ghazi threatened further attacks and said the group also has a support network outside of the tribal areas.

"This martyrdom operation of ours is neither the first one nor the last one," he said.

"We are not alone in our sacred jihad ... today Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has many partners cooperating in its jihad not only in the Tribal Areas, but also in other cities and villages of Pakistan," he continued.

The statement was accompanied by pictures of the suicide bombers and various photographs of the assault on the airport.

Ghazi's statement supports claims by Pakistani officials that Uzbek nationals were involved in the attack.

The attack had initially been claimed by the the Movement of the Taliban, which said it was carried out to avenge the death of former emir Hakeemullah Mehsud as well as to punish the government for launching airstrikes in North Waziristan.

While the IMU and Taliban's claims to the attack may seem to conflict, it is very unlikely the IMU could have operated in Karachi without the direct support of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. The Taliban has an extensive support network in the southern Pakistani city.

Additionally, the IMU has conducted joint operations with the Taliban on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in the past, including suicide assaults such as this week's attack on the international airport in Karachi.

In one of the more prominent attacks, IMU/al Qaeda leader Bekkay Harrach, who was also known as Al Hafidh Abu Talha al Almani, was killed while leading an assault on Bagram Airbase in May 2010. Harrach led a team of 20 fighters assembled from the ranks of al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, according to his martyrdom statement. Before his death, Harrach produced propaganda for al Qaeda in which he threatened to attack Germany.

The IMU has also claimed it executed the May 29, 2013 suicide assault on the governor's compound in Panjshir in concert with the Afghan Taliban.

Iraqi and Syrian towns and cities seized by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham. Map created by The Long War Journal. Click to view larger map.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham continues its lightning advance southward after seizing control of Mosul, the country's second largest city, and the province of Ninewa and other areas of Salahaddin and Kirkuk provinces yesterday. ISIS has now captured the Salahaddin cities of Bayji, which has Iraq's largest oil refinery, and Tikrit, the provincial capital.

ISIS units traveling in a convoy of more than 60 vehicles advanced into Bayji last night, and torched several government buildings, court houses, and police headquarters, according to ITAR-TASS and Reuters. ISIS fighters are said to have surrounded the refinery and sent a delegation to security forces who are holding out in the complex.

According to Reuters, the 250 security personnel agreed to withdraw from the refinery complex, the largest in Iraq.

After seizing Bayji, ISIS fighters moved to take control of Tikrit, the provincial capital and home town of former dictator Saddam Hussein.

Tikrit is now said to be effectively under ISIS control. According to Samarra Al-Gharbiyah News, the provincial government center in Tikrit was overrun by ISIS fighters and Governor Ahmad Abdallah is reported to have been captured.

"All of Tikrit is in the hands of the militants," a police colonel told AFP.

ISIS also freed hundreds of prisoners being held in the city. More than 2,500 prisoners, many thought to be hardened jihadists, were also reportedly freed yesterday when ISIS took control of Mosul.

In addition to taking control of Ninewa province yesterday, the ISIS captured several areas outside of Kirkuk and in Salahaddin province. [See LWJ report, ISIS seizes more towns in northern and central Iraq.]

ISIS' blitzkrieg from Mosul to Tikrit covered nearly 250 miles in the span of several days. The majority of the Iraqi security forces in the way of the ISIS either abandoned their posts and weapons and equipment, or melted away after brief skirmishes.

The scope of the operation, including the territory covered, indicates that tens of thousands of ISIS fighters participated in the recent fighting.

The recent ISIS advances in northern and central Iraq effectively put the terror group in control of nearly a third of the country. The ISIS already controls most of the large western province of Anbar, save the provincial capital of Ramadi and some small pockets.

The US killed 16 jihadists, including four Uzbeks, in two drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas. The strikes ended a six-month pause in Pakistan.

In the first strike, the unmanned Predators or the more deadly Reapers fired several missiles at a compound and a vehicle in the village of Darga Mandi in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan, Dawn reported. The village is just outside of Miramshah, the home of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban subgroup that is closely tied to al Qaeda.

Four "Uzbeks," likely from the al Qaeda-allied Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and two members of the Movement of the Taliban in Punjab were reported to have been killed in today's strike.

The US has launched five other strikes in Darga Mandi since the drone program in Pakistan began in 2005. In one strike, on Sept. 5, 2013, the US killed Mullah Sangeen Zadran, the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network leader and Taliban shadow governor of Afghanistan's Paktika province who held Bowe Bergdahl, the US soldier who was recently exchanged for five top Taliban leaders held at Guantanamo Bay.

In the second strike, which took place early on the morning of June 12, US drones fired six missiles at "four different compounds and a pick-up truck" in the village of Danda Darpa Khel in the Miramshah area of North Waziristan, Dawn reported. Ten "militants" are reported to have been killed in the attack. More than five drones are said to have circled the area during the strike.

The strikes took place just one day after both the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan claimed credit for the suicide assault on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi. The IMU, which claimed it attacked US aircraft being stored secretly at the airport, likely carried out the attack in conjunction with the Taliban. [See LWJ report, IMU involved in suicide assault on Karachi airport.]

Today's drone strike is the first in Pakistan since Dec. 25, 2013. The US put the program on hold after the Pakistani government entered into peace talks with the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan.

Although US officials have claimed that the drone strikes were halted due to a lack of identifiable high-value targets in Pakistan, intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal said that is not the case.

"Pakistan remains a hub for al Qaeda and allied movements operating along the AfPak border and beyond," one intelligence official said. "Al Qaeda's General command is still operating there, and is staffed by a new and dangerous generation of leaders. Zawahiri and his staff are still operating in Pakistan."

Part of the problem, another intelligence official observed, is that while the US has confined its strikes to the tribal areas, and particularly to North and South Waziristan, where al Qaeda has been active in the past, al Qaeda's operations are not limited to those areas.

"We didn't kill Osama bin Laden in North Waziristan, he was living comfortably in Abbottabad when the SEALs showed up," the official said. "Do we think it is any different for Zawahiri?"

Iraqi and Syrian towns and cities seized by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham. Map created by The Long War Journal. Click to view larger map.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham's rapid advance southward to Baghdad after taking control of Mosul just three days ago appears to have been halted outside of the gates of Samarra, home to one of the holiest shrines in Shia Islam.

Iraqi security forces in Samarra blunted the ISIS' assault from the north late yesterday, stopping an armed convoy from entering the city. The military is said to have deployed aircraft while battling the ISIS vanguard.

The Iraqi military's stand in Samarra stands in contrast to its performance in Mosul, Tikrit, Bayji, and other cities and towns taken over by the ISIS. Iraqi forces often surrendered or melted away in these cities, leaving behind weapons, ammunition, and police and military vehicles. Thousands of prisoners have been freed during the ISIS onslaught.

The attack on Samarra is the second in a week. On June 5, the ISIS assaulted Samarra from the west, and took control of five neighborhoods before being ejected by the military and police. [See LWJ report, ISIS takes control of areas in central Iraqi city.]

Samarra is home to the al Askaria Mosque, one of the most holy shrines in Shia Islam. Al Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor of the ISIS, bombed the Golden Dome of the al Askaria Mosque in February 2006, sparking massive sectarian fighting between Iraq's Shia and Sunnis.

The ISIS has threatened to destroy the mosque if Iraqi forces refuse to withdraw from the city.

The Shia-led Iraqi government will likely make a stand at Samarra, given the importance of the mosque. Additionally, there are reports that Shia militias are beginning to organize and deploy forces to protect religious sites.

According to The New York Times, "at least four brigades, each with 2,500 to 3,000 fighters, had been hastily assembled and equipped in recent weeks by the Shiite political parties to protect Baghdad and the political process in Iraq. They identified the outfits as the Kataibe Brigade, the Assaib Brigade, the Imam al-Sadr Brigade and the armed wing of the Badr Organization."

ISIS takes control of three towns; clashes reported in Taji

As Iraqi forces make their stand in Samarra, the ISIS was able to take control of the towns of Dhuluiyah, Saadiyah, and Jalula to the southwest. ISIS fighters are said to have overran an airbase in Dhuluiyah and captured hundreds of prisoners.

Further south, reports from Iraq indicate that the ISIS is conducting raids on towns along the road between Samarra and Baghdad. According to Rudaw, a Kurdish-language news outlet, ISIS fighters have battled Iraqi forces in the town of Taji, which is just north of Bagdad. The outcome of the fighting has not been disclosed.

The ISIS may be attempting to interdict the Iraqi military and the Shia militia's attempts to reinforce units holding out in Samarra and other cities and towns along the road north of Baghdad.

The ISIS is adept at laying IEDs to decimate military convoys as well as using ambushes with small arms, machine guns, and RPGs to interdict supply columns. The ISIS's control of eastern Anbar province allows it to use the area as a staging ground to launch attacks on Highway 1. Karma, a city in Anbar that is under ISIS control, is just 15 miles due west of Taji.

The recent ISIS advances in northern and central Iraq effectively put the terror group in control of nearly a third of the country. The ISIS already controls most of the large western province of Anbar, save the provincial capital of Ramadi and some small pockets.

One of the five senior Taliban leaders transferred to Qatar in exchange for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl played a key role in al Qaeda's plans leading up to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Mohammad Fazl, who served as the Taliban's army chief of staff and deputy defense minister prior to his detention at Guantánamo, did not have a hand in planning the actual 9/11 hijackings. Along with a notorious al Qaeda leader, however, Fazl did help coordinate a military offensive against the enemies of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan the day before. And Osama bin Laden viewed that Sept. 10 offensive as an essential part of al Qaeda's 9/11 plot.

The 9/11 Commission found that the hijackings in the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, were the culmination of al Qaeda's three-step plan. First, on Sept. 9, 2001, al Qaeda assassinated Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Massoud in a suicide bombing. Massoud's death was a major gift to the Taliban because he was their chief rival and still controlled parts of the country. The assassination was also intended to weaken opposition to the Taliban and al Qaeda within Afghanistan before the United States could plan its retaliation for the most devastating terrorist attack in history. The Northern Alliance did, in fact, play a role in America's response.

The following day, Sept. 10, al Qaeda and the Taliban took their second step. A "delayed Taliban offensive against the Northern Alliance was apparently coordinated to begin as soon as [Massoud] was killed," the 9/11 Commission found.

Fazl and one of bin Laden's chief lieutenants, Abdul Hadi al Iraqi, played key roles in this setup for 9/11. At the time, al Iraqi oversaw what al Qaeda called the Arab 55th Brigade, which was Osama bin Laden's chief fighting force inside Afghanistan and fought side by side with Mullah Omar's forces.

According to a leaked Joint Task Force Guantánamo (JTF-GTMO) threat assessment of Fazl, al Iraqi met with Fazl "on several occasions to include immediately following the assassination of [Massoud] in September 2001." Al Iraqi "stated the Northern Alliance was demoralized after the assassination and [he] met with [Fazl] to immediately coordinate an attack with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance."

Al Qaeda viewed both the assassination of Massoud and the offensive launched the following day as necessary components of the 9/11 plot. At first, Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders were said to be wary of any spectacular attack against the US, as it would likely draw fierce retaliation from the world's lone superpower. (The 9/11 Commission did find "some scant indications" that Omar "may have been reconciled to the 9/11 attacks by the time they occurred.") The plan to attack the US was controversial even within al Qaeda, with some senior leaders objecting to the idea.

But Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders believed, correctly, that the first two steps of their plan would ensure the Taliban's continuing support. The 9/11 Commission found that as Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda's military chief at the time, Mohammed Atef, "deliberated" the 9/11 hijackings "earlier in the year," they "would likely have remembered that Mullah Omar was dependent on them for the Massoud assassination and for vital support in the Taliban military operations." And, while the commission's sources were "not privy to the full scope of al Qaeda and Taliban planning," bin Laden and Atef "probably would have known, at least," that the "general Taliban offensive against the Northern Alliance" on Sept. 10 "would rely on al Qaeda military support."

The 9/11 Commission's final report goes on to say that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the mastermind of 9/11, remembers Atef "telling him that al Qaeda had an agreement with the Taliban to eliminate Massoud, after which the Taliban would begin an offensive to take over [all of] Afghanistan."

Mohammad Fazl's cooperation with al Iraqi was, therefore, part of the plan KSM remembered.

Fazl reportedly met with al Iraqi earlier in 2001 as well. Another Guantanamo detainee named Abdul Zahir served as al Iraqi's assistant and translator for several years. Al Iraqi relied on Zahir, a native Afghan, to translate for him during operational meetings with Taliban commanders.

Zahir told authorities that Fazl met with al Iraqi "in the summer of 2001," according to the leaked JTF-GTMO threat assessment for Fazl. "At the time," the file reads, Fazl "was visiting all front-line commanders to get status reports on front-line divisions." Al Iraqi confirmed Zahir's story, admitting that he met with Fazl "and the Taliban on the front lines."

The file for Fazl contains many additional details in this vein, showing how al Qaeda and the Taliban's military forces in pre-9/11 Afghanistan were intertwined. Fazl also worked closely with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an al Qaeda-linked fighting force that continues to fight throughout Afghanistan. A declassified file authored at Guantanamo describes Juma Namangani, a cofounder of the IMU, as one of Fazl's "direct commanders." During his time in custody at Guantanamo, Fazl admitted that the Taliban supported the IMU with "money, weapons and logistical support."

The Guantanamo files also note that Namangani, who was killed in late 2001, "received direct funding" from Osama bin Laden.

Fazl's close relationships with the IMU and al Qaeda were known even prior to the 9/11 attacks. The United Nations sanctioned Fazl for his role as a senior Taliban leader on Feb. 23, 2001. In addition to being a "close associate" of Mullah Omar and helping him "establish the Taliban government," the UN noted that Fazl "had knowledge that the Taliban provided assistance to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ... in the form of financial, weapons and logistical support in exchange for providing the Taliban with soldiers."

The UN's sanctions page also points out that Fazl "was at the al Farouq training camp established by al Qaeda." The UN did not say what Fazl did at the camp, but al Farouq was al Qaeda's primary training facility prior to the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, some of the 9/11 hijackers were trained there.

Al Qaeda and Taliban still closely allied

As controversy over the deal for Sgt. Bergdahl has continued to swirl, current and former Obama administration officials have sought to draw a sharp distinction between the threat posed by the Taliban Five and al Qaeda.

"These five guys are not a threat to the United States," former secretary of state Hillary Clinton said during an interview on NBC News last week. "They are a threat to the safety and security of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It's up to those two countries to make the decision once and for all that these are threats to them. So I think we may be kind of missing the bigger picture here. We want to get an American home, whether they fell off the ship because they were drunk or they were pushed or they jumped, we try to rescue everybody."

State Department deputy spokesperson Marie Harf relied on this same talking point during a press conference on June 5. "Look, these were not good guys. I am in no way defending these men," Harf said. "But being mid- to high-level officials in a regime that's grotesque and horrific also doesn't mean they themselves directly pose a threat to the United States."

During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on June 11, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel insisted that "we had no direct evidence of any direct involvement in their direct attacks on the United States on any of our troops." (Under questioning, Hagel conceded that the Taliban Five were, in fact, involved in planning operations against US-led coalition forces in late 2001.) Behind closed doors, other key Obama administration officials have similarly stressed that the Taliban Five don't directly threaten the United States. The Daily Beast reported that John Brennan, director of the CIA and previously President Obama's chief counterterrorism adviser, has "argued that the Taliban Five were primarily focused on fighting against other Afghans and never had a record of attacking Americans outside of their own country."

It is true that Fazl and his Taliban colleagues have not directly planned 9/11-style attacks on the United States. But according to this logic, most of al Qaeda wasn't a threat on 9/11 and isn't a threat today. Most al Qaeda operatives are not involved in spectacular terrorist plots against the West. (The 9/11 attacks, for instance, were highly compartmentalized.) Regardless, the Taliban's relationship with al Qaeda made it considerably easier for Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants to plan their war against the US, and this nexus remains a threat.

The Taliban's Afghanistan "was the incubator for al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks," the 9/11 Commission found. Another passage from the commission's final report reads: "The alliance with the Taliban provided al Qaeda a sanctuary in which to train and indoctrinate fighters and terrorists, import weapons, forge ties with other jihad groups and leaders, and plot and staff terrorist schemes."

In addition to Fazl, each of the other four members of the Taliban Five -- Khairullah Khairkhwa, Abdul Haq Wasiq, Norullah Noori, and Mohammad Nabi Omari -- contributed to this alliance. According to leaked JTF-GTMO files and court documents, the US government believes that Khairullah Khairkhwa was tied to Osama bin Laden and that he oversaw one of the deceased al Qaeda master's training camps in western Afghanistan.

According to the United Nations, Abdul Haq Wasiq served as the deputy director of intelligence for the Taliban, and in this role he "was in charge of handling relations with al Qaeda-related foreign fighters and their training camps in Afghanistan." It was in these same camps that al Qaeda trained terrorists for its plots against the US.

Like Fazl, Norullah Noori was a Taliban military commander, and in this capacity he coordinated operations with al Qaeda's paramilitary forces.

And, finally, JTF-GTMO concluded that Mohammad Nabi Omari planned anticoalition attacks with al Qaeda and other affiliated forces.

The Taliban Five may not plan any direct attacks against the United States in the future. But they have already strengthened the hand of al Qaeda terrorists who have planned such attacks in the past. And the Taliban and al Qaeda remain closely allied today. The Taliban has consistently refused to break its relationship with al Qaeda.

A version of this article was published at The Weekly Standard.

Iraqi and Syrian towns and cities seized by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham. Map created by The Long War Journal. Click to view larger map.

The lightning advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham and its allies from Mosul to the outskirts of Samarra, as well as its capture of several towns in eastern Diyala, all over the course of several days, appears to be part of a greater strategy to surround the capital of Baghdad before laying siege to it. This plan, to take over the "belt" region outside of Baghdad and cut off the capital, appears to be the same strategy used by the ISIS' predecessor back in 2006.

The 2006 plan, which was drawn up by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the forerunner of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), was discovered after the US found a crude map on the body of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, al Qaeda in Iraq's leader who was killed by US forces in Baqubah in June 2006. The "Baghdad belts" map was released by Multinational Forces-Iraq during its offensive to liberate vast areas under al Qaeda/ISI control in 2007 and 2008.

Zarqawi's plan was to seize control of the outer provinces and Baghdad's belts, or key areas surrounding the capital. The ISI would then use its bases in the belts to control access to Baghdad and funnel money, weapons, car bombs, and fighters into the city. The ISI also planned to strangle the US helicopter air lanes by emplacing antiaircraft cells along known routes in the belts areas around Baghdad.

Al Qaeda in Iraq's map of the Baghdad belts, found by US forces on Abu Musab al Zarqawi's body in June 2006.

In the ISI's 2006 plan, the Baghdad belts were divided into five regions: the "Southern Belt," which included northern Babil and southern Diyala provinces; the "Western belt," which included eastern Anbar province and the Thar Thar area; the "Northern belt," which included southern Salahaddin province and cities such as Taji; the "Diyala belt," which included Baqubah and Khalis; and the "Eastern belt," which includes the rural areas east of Baghdad.

Watching the ISIS' operations today, it appears the group is attempting to implement a strategy which is very similar, if not identical, to the previous one. This should come as no surprise; Nasser al Din Allah Abu Suleiman, ISIS' current war minister, was a leader in al Qaeda in Iraq/ISI when the Baghdad belt strategy was implemented. Suleiman was appointed by al Qaeda in May 2010 to serve as the terror group's top military commander after his predecessor, Abu Ayyub al Masri, was killed in a raid by Iraqi and US forces in April 2010.

US intelligence officials contacted by the Long War Journal who have extensive experience with al Qaeda in Iraq and the campaign to dislodge the group that began in 2007 said they believe the ISIS has dusted off its old plans to encircle Baghdad.

ISIS marches to the Baghdad belt

ISIS took the first step at the beginning of the year when it seized control of Fallujah and most of Anbar province. ISIS advanced to the outskirts of western Baghdad in March and April, when it captured Karma and Abu Ghraib.

After taking control of most of Anbar, ISIS launched a series of bombings and attacks in northern Babil province and southern Baghdad. The town of Jurf Al Sakhar is said to have fallen under ISIS control. The towns of Musayyib, Yusufiyah, Mahmoudiyah, Iskandariyah and Latifiyah in the so-called "triangle of death" area south of Baghdad have seen an uptick in attacks. These areas, which include a significant Sunni minority, sit along the fault line with Sunni and Shia, and were controlled by the ISI prior to the US surge in 2007.

ISIS' control of Anbar as well as eastern areas in neighboring Syria allowed it to set its sights on northern, central, and eastern Iraq. Over the past week ISIS forces, backed by allied groups such as Ansar al Islam, Jaish Muhammad, and even the Baathist-led Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order, seized control of Mosul and then swept southward, taking over Tikrit, Bayji, and several areas outside of Kirkuk before the southward advance was halted at Samarra.

ISIS forces also pressed into eastern Diyala province, capturing villages and towns in the Hamrin Mountains as well as Jalula and Saadiyah, and are threatening to move into Khalis and Baqubah.

As ISIS and allied forces moved southward, units also attacked along the highway between Samarra and Baghdad. The town of Dhuluiyah, just east of Balad, fell to ISIS units, while heavy fighting was reported in Taji, a city on the outskirts of Baghdad.

Dislodging ISIS will be a difficult task

The ISIS advance toward Baghdad may be temporarily held off as the government rallies its remaining security forces and Shia militias organize for the upcoming battle. But at the least, ISIS should be able to take control of some Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad and wreak havoc on the city with IEDs, ambushes, single suicide attacks, and suicide assaults that target civilians, the government, security forces, and foreign installations. Additionally, the brutal sectarian slaughter of Sunni and Shia alike that punctuated the violence in Baghdad from 2005 to 2007 is likely to return as Shia militias and ISIS fighters roam the streets.

Even if Iraqi forces are able to keep the ISIS from fully taking Baghdad and areas south, it is unlikely the beleaguered military and police forces will be able to retake the areas under ISIS control in the north and west without significant external support, as well as the support of the Kurds.

The ISIS and its allies are in a position today that closely resembles the ISI's position prior to the US surge back in early 2007. More than 130,000 US troops, partnered with the Sunni Awakening formations and Iraqi security forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands, were required to clear Anbar, Salahaddin, Diyala, Ninewa, Baghdad, and the "triangle of death." The concurrent operations took more than a year, and were supported by the US Air Force, US Army aviation brigades, and US special operations raids that targeted the ISI's command and control, training camps, and bases, as well as its IED and suicide bomb factories.

Today, the Iraqis have no US forces on the ground to support them, US air power is absent, the Awakening is scattered and in disarray, and the Iraqi military has been humiliated while surrendering or retreating during the jihadists' campaign from Mosul to the outskirts of Baghdad. The US government has indicated that it will not deploy US soldiers in Iraq, either on the ground or at airbases to conduct air operations.

ISIS is advancing boldly in the looming security vacuum left by the collapse of the Iraqi security forces and the West's refusal to recommit forces to stabilize Iraq. This has rendered the country vulnerable to further incursions by al Qaeda-linked jihadists as well as intervention by interested neighbors such as Iran. Overt Iranian intervention in Iraq would likely lead any Sunnis still loyal to the government to side with ISIS and its allies, and would ensure that Iraq would slide even closer to a full-blown civil war, and risk a wider war throughout the Middle East.

The head of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, Abu Iyad al Tunisi, has released a statement calling for reconciliation between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) and other jihadist groups. The statement was published on June 13, with the banner shown above, on the group's Twitter feed.

Abu Iyad hails the mujahideen's "conquests in the Land of the Two Rivers," saying they should serve to bring together all of the "jihadist factions that fight to raise the banner of monotheism" and seek to enforce Islamic sharia law. Abu Iyad says the mujahideen should set aside their differences and "open their hearts to a new comprehensive reconciliation," according to a translation obtained by The Long War Journal. All of the jihadists should also reconsider their "policies in the Levant based on the latest regional developments."

There have been multiple attempts at reconciling the ISIS with other jihadist groups in Syria, including al Qaeda's official branch, the Al Nusrah Front. The ISIS emir, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, and other members of the group's leadership have repeatedly refused these entreaties. But Abu Iyad says the jihadists should once again seek a "comprehensive reconciliation" plan.

Abu Iyad says he "defers these demands" to al Qaeda head Sheikh Ayman al Zawahiri and the emir of the Al Nusrah Front, Abu Muhammad al Julani. If the pair announce their support for the gains made by the ISIS, other jihadist factions, and the Sunni tribes in Iraq, then it "might result in orders by the lead of the disputing organization that would put an end to infighting."

The head of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia also addresses Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Abu Iyad says the head of ISIS should "swiftly respond to the demands of the revered leaders and scholars," who have called on him both in public and in private to reconcile. Ramadan is a good time to end the infighting, Abu Iyad argues, especially as the infidels' "projects" are collapsing throughout the region.

This is the second time since the beginning of the year that Abu Iyad has released a statement on the jihadist infighting. In January 2014, he published a message urging the rival factions to reconcile and focus their efforts on the Syrian regime. Abu Iyad said that he considers the ISIS, the Al Nusrah Front, and all the jihadi factions to be his "brothers." The Ansar al Sharia leader called on a number of jihadist figures, including Zawahiri (the "doctor of the Ummah" and "sheikh of the Mujahideen") to resolve the matter.

In his January statement, Abu Iyad also named Abu Qatada as one of the jihadist leaders who could help end the ongoing dispute. Abu Qatada is imprisoned in Jordan. Despite his confinement, Abu Qatada has released a number of statements criticizing the ISIS.

Earlier this year, Ansar al Sharia Tunisia also promoted a letter that Abu Qatada wrote at the behest of Abu Iyad. In the letter, Abu Qatada covered events in Libya, Syria, and Tunisia. He praised the participation of Tunisia's youth in the Syrian jihad as a "blessed matter." [See LWJ report, Abu Qatada provides jihadists with ideological guidance from a Jordanian prison.]

Ansar al Sharia recruits from Tunisia (as well as Libya) have reportedly gone off to fight in Syria in droves, which is likely one reason Abu Iyad has taken a keen interest in the infighting.

The US killed an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula commander and four fighters in the second recorded drone strike in southern Yemen this month.

Earlier today, the remotely piloted Predators or the more deadly Reapers fired several missiles at a vehicle "in a mountainous area" in al Saeed in Shabwa province, according to The Associated Press. US drone strikes in Yemen routinely target AQAP leaders and fighters as they travel in vehicles.

Yemeni officials told the news agency that an AQAP commander known as Musaad al Habashi was among five AQAP members riding in the vehicle when it was struck by missiles. AQAP has not released an official statement on the strike or a martyrdom statement for al Habashi, whose role in AQAP is unclear.

Elsewhere in Shabwa province, the Yemeni military claimed it killed four AQAP fighters who "were planning to carry out terrorist attacks in Naqba area in [the] Hibban district," the state-run Yemen News Agency (SABA) reported. Yemeni forces also destroyed "a number of their cars and arms warehouses."

Shabwa has been a hotbed of AQAP activity. The terrorist group took control of several areas in Shabwa and neighboring Abyan over the past year.

Background on US strikes in Yemen

The US has launched 14 strikes in Yemen so far this year. The last strike took place on June 4 in the AQAP stronghold of Wadi Abida in Marib province. A local commander known as Jafar al Shabwani and three fighters are said to have been killed.

An uptick in strikes in March and April of this year coincided with a Yemeni military offensive to dislodge AQAP from strongholds in Abyan and Shabwa provinces.

The pace of the drone strikes in Yemen decreased last year from the previous year (26 in 2013, versus 41 in 2012). The reduction in the number of strikes coincided with a speech by President Barack Obama at the National Defense University in May 2013. The strikes are being reduced as the US government is facing increasing international criticism for conducting the attacks in both Yemen and Pakistan.

The number of strikes might have been much lower in 2013 were it not for an al Qaeda plot emanating from Yemen that was uncovered by US officials in late July. The plot led the US to close down more than 20 embassies and diplomatic facilities across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The plot involved AQAP emir Nasir al Wuhayshi, who now also serves as al Qaeda's general manager.

Between July 27, 2013, after the plot was disclosed, and Aug. 10, the US launched nine strikes in Yemen; no drone strikes were reported for seven weeks prior to July 27. The burst in attacks was intended to disrupt the plot and take out AQAP's top leadership cadre and senior operatives. The US killed Kaid al Dhahab, AQAP's emir for Baydah province, during that time period.

AQAP and al Qaeda still seek to conduct attacks against the US. In a recent AQAP video featuring Nasir al Wuhayshi, who is both the emir of AQAP and al Qaeda's overall general manager, he said America remains a target.

"O brothers, the Crusader enemy is still shuffling his papers, so we must remember that we are always fighting the biggest enemy, the leaders of disbelief, and we have to overthrow those leaders, we have to remove the Cross, and the carrier of the Cross is America," Wuhayshi said.

Wuhayshi made the statement in the open to a gathering of more than 100 people.

For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US airstrikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2014.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham's administrative division in Salahaddin proudly displayed photographs of the capture and execution of Iraqi soldiers after it took over a base in the province.

The graphic photographs were released today on the Twitter account belonging to Wilayat Salahaddin, or Salahaddin Division. The ISIS has divided its "state" in Iraq and Syria into 16 administrative units, or wilayats.

The stream of photographs begins by showing ISIS fighters in dirt-caked pickup trucks with machine guns mounted in the beds traveling to Tasfirat prison in the city of Tikrit, and then launching an assault with dismounted troops. Tikrit fell to the ISIS earlier this week.

After capturing the base, the ISIS takes photographs of dozens of US-supplied armored Humvees, Ford and Chevy pickup trucks, and various military transport and supply vehicles that were left behind.

ISIS fighters are then photographed posing over the bloodied and mutilated corpses of the slain soldiers. The ISIS photos show the capture, transport, and execution of scores of Iraqi soldiers. Most of the soldiers are in civilian clothes, but some are seen wearing civilian clothes over their uniforms.

Iraqi soldiers had reportedly shed their uniforms and deserted en masse as the ISIS blitzkrieg advanced from Mosul to Tikrit and on to the outskirts of Samarra in the course of one week. At least four Iraqi Army divisions are said to have melted away during the ISIS onslaught.

In the photos, the Iraqi soldiers are rounded up at gunpoint and placed on flatbed trucks, some of which appear to have been captured from the base. Some of the ISIS fighters are seen holding US-made M-16 assault rifles, which had been issued to the Iraqi Army and police forces.

The ISIS fighters then order the frightened soldiers to lie face down in shallow ditches, with their hands behind their backs. ISIS fighters then open fire on the unarmed prisoners of war.

The ISIS is said to have executed thousands of Iraqi soldiers during its southward advance to Baghdad. Several Iraqi military bases are believed to have been overrun. Forward Operating Base Speicher, which once was a major US military hub in Salahaddin province, was reportedly seized by the ISIS during its southward push.

Over the past week, the ISIS took control of Ninewa and most of Salahaddin province, as well as parts of Diyala province. Most of Anbar province fell under ISIS control in January.

WARNING: Many of the images below are graphic and show the execution of Iraqi soldiers. The intent of publishing these photographs is to document the war crimes committed by the ISIS. The images are a selection of more than 60 published by the ISIS' Salahaddin Division. You can view the all of the photographs here.

ISIS fighters move in a convoy in Salahaddin province:

ISIS fighters open fire from a pickup truck as dismounted troops assault a base:

ISIS fighters travel in a captured Iraqi police pickup truck:

A captured American-made Iraqi Army Humvee:

Two ISIS fighters pose with captured military vehicles:

Two ISIS fighters pose over the body of a dead Iraqi soldier:

Iraqi soldiers are herded to a truck to be transported to their execution:

Iraqi soldiers are transported to the execution site:

ISIS fighter opens fire on Iraqi prisoners as they lie in a shallow ditch:

An ISIS fighter holds a US M-16 rifle as captured Iraqi soldiers lie face down on the ground:

An Iraqi soldier wore civilian clothes over his uniform in an attempt to disguise himself:

ISIS fighters form a line and execute the captured Iraqi soldiers:

The Pakistani military has launched what it described as a "comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists" in the Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.

The operation, called "Zarb-e-Azb" after the name of the Prophet Muhammad's sword, was announced today by the Inter-Services Public Relations, the public affairs arm of the Pakistani military, which said it is targeting "foreign and local terrorists who are hiding in sanctuaries in North Wazirastan [sic] Agency."

"Using North Waziristan as a base, these terrorists had waged a war against the state of Pakistan and had been disrupting our national life in all its dimensions, stunting our economic growth and causing enormous loss of life and property," the ISPR statement said. "They had also paralyzed life within the agency and had perpetually terrorized the entire peace loving and patriotic local population."

The Pakistani military has been "tasked to eliminate these terrorists regardless of hue and color, along with their sanctuaries," the ISPR claimed. "These enemies of the state will be denied space anywhere across the country."

The ISPR did not specifically name the groups targeted in the North Waziristan offensive. The military appears to be focusing only on the foreign terror groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Turkistan Islamic Party, according to the military's own statements.

The ISPR announced that "a number of Terrorists hideouts in Degan, Datta Khel in NWA [North Waziristan Agency], were targeted by jet aircrafts" in the early morning hours.

"There were confirmed reports of presence of foreign and local terrorists in these hideouts who were linked in planning of Karachi airport attack," the ISPR continued. "Over 50 Terrorists, mostly Uzbek foreigners" were killed.

A later ISPR announcement said that "precise and targetted [sic] air strikes 8 hideouts of Terrorists in NWA were destroyed killing 105 terrorists, most of them Uzbek foreigners." The military also claimed that the towns of Mir Ali and Miramshah have been cordoned off. The military is calling for "militants who chose to quit violence and give up their arms."

Abu Abdur Rehman Almani, a "key commander of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," and several fighters of the Turkistan Islamic Party are said to have been killed in the operation, but Almani's death has not been confirmed, Dawn reported. Almani's nom de guerre indicates he may be of German origin. He is said to have been involved in the June 10 suicide assault on an airport in Karachi. Both the IMU and the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan claimed credit for the attack.

"Good Taliban" unlikely to be targeted in Operation Zarb-e-Azb

It is unlikely that the so-called "good Taliban" groups such as the Haqqani Network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadar Group will be targeted in the operation. The Pakistani state considers the Haqqanis, Bahadar, and the Mullah Nazir Group in South Waziristan to be good Taliban as they do not advocate attacking the Pakistani state and instead direct their forces to fight in Afghanistan. These independent Taliban factions are considered to be strategic depth against the Indians in Afghanistan.

The bad Taliban are the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, the Punjabi Taliban, and other jihadist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Turkistan Islamic Party in the tribal areas that threaten or attack the Pakistani state.

But the good Taliban shelter and support the bad Taliban, as well as al Qaeda. Top al Qaeda, Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leaders and operatives have been killed in US drone strikes in the past.

The response of the good Taliban to the Pakistani military operation is not yet known. Hafiz Gul Bahadar, one of the most powerful Taliban leaders in North Waziristan, has threatened to end his peace agreement with the government if the military goes on the offensive. And the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan said it would back Bahadar if he declared war on the state. [See LWJ report, Pakistani military strikes anger 'good Taliban' commander, and Threat Matrix report, Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan vows to defend 'good Taliban'.]

The Pakistani military has previously launched limited offensives in North Waziristan, but has refused to deal with the Haqqanis and Bahadar's group. In those past operations, foreign fighters melted away to neighboring tribal agencies, Baluchistan, and eastern Afghanistan, only to come back after the offensive ended.

Al Nasir Li Din Allah Abu Sulayman, the ISIS war minister [left]; Abu Bakr al Baghdadi al Husseini al Qurshi, emir of the ISIS [right]. Photos from Al Sumaria.

As the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) rampages through Iraq with the help of allied forces, one personality remains characteristically quiet: the group's war minister.

For more than four years, a man called "Al Nasir Li Din Allah Abu Sulayman" has directed the group's operations. Yet very little is known about the ISIS leader who likely is playing a prominent role in the jihadists' stunning advances.

In April 2010, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the ISIS' predecessor, suffered major losses. The ISI was created to serve as the jihadists' political umbrella and included al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), al Qaeda's affiliate in the country. But both of the group's chief leaders, Abu Omar al Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al Masri (a.k.a. Abu Hamza al Muhajir), were killed in counterterrorism raids. At first, the US military concluded, "Abu Omar al Baghdadi" was a fictitious personality created by al Qaeda leaders to put an Iraqi face on their foreign-led insurgency efforts. After the US and its allies exposed this stunt, the role was backfilled by an Iraqi named Hamid Dawud Mohamed Khalil al Zawi, who was killed.

Abu Ayyub al Masri, however, was the real deal from the start. He had served Ayman al Zawahiri since the 1980s and joined al Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 1990s.

Al Masri rooted himself in Iraq before the US-led invasion in 2003. According to former CIA director George Tenet and other sources, US intelligence officials tracked al Masri inside Baghdad in 2002. And when Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the unruly founder of AQI, was killed in 2006, Abu Ayyub al Masri was waiting to take over. With al Masri in place, al Qaeda's senior leaders had a trusted operative capable of overseeing their efforts in Iraq.

The April 2010 raids changed that. The little-known Abu Bakr al Baghdadi became the ISI's emir, eventually rising in infamy as he expanded his group's operations into Syria (becoming the ISIS in the process) against the wishes of Ayman al Zawahiri and al Qaeda's general command. And when al Baghdadi refused to leave Syria in April 2013, he set in motion the chain of events that led al Qaeda's general command to disown the group.

Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was not the only jihadist to ascend within the ISI's ranks in April 2010. So did "Al Nasir Li Din Allah Abu Sulayman," who was appointed the group's war minister after al Masri's demise. The first part of his alias ("Al Nasir Li Din Allah") is actually an honorific meaning "The Victor for the Religion of God."

Even as the ISI turned into the ISIS and the enlarged organization became an international pariah, however, the war minister remained in the shadows.

Murky terror master

According to published accounts, the ISIS war minister's real name is Neaman Salman Mansour al Zaidi. He is believed to be a Moroccan and may also be a citizen of Syria.

There have been reports of his death, including in 2011, but those turned out to be false.

One of the few times the world heard from the war minister was in April 2010, when the ISI announced his appointment. The group issued a statement in which al Zaidi threatened attacks on "Iraqi security and military targets" as well as Shiites.

A handful of press accounts have provided intriguing, but unconfirmed, details.

In September 2011, the Baghdad-based Al Mada newspaper published an interview with an al Qaeda defector named Nazim al Juburi, who explained the leadership structure of AQI and the ISI. Most of the group's leaders "are locals," al Juburi said, "except for the military commander, the so-called minister of war, who is always an [non-Iraqi] Arab so that there may be no constraints or red lines that would prevent him from ordering operations against some components of the Iraqi society -- operations of which Iraqi [AQI/ISI] leaders may not be convinced."

Al Juburi continued by pointing out that the organization's minister of war is a "Moroccan figure" and that he was trained in camps in Hadithah, which the US struck in 2003.

Although al Juburi referred to the camps by the name "Hadithah," it is likely he was referring to the foreign fighter training camp in Rawah. Contemporaneous press accounts say that US forces attacked the camp in June 2003, killing mostly non-Iraqi guerrilla fighters. An Iraqi policeman who claimed to have seen their graves said, according to the Chicago Tribune, that the dead included fighters from "Afghanistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen." At least 80 men, ranging in age from 15 to 50, were reportedly killed. And officials said a significant number of SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles were recovered as well.

Al Juburi told the same story during an interview on Al Arabiyah television in May 2010. The former ISI member claimed that a non-Iraqi is chosen for the position of war minister because there are no "cultural, social, or tribal impediments which might prevent him from carrying out operations demanded by the international organization." Al Juburi added that the non-Iraqi war minister's "loyalty is to the international organization," referring to al Qaeda, and this "will make him carry out anything demanded from him."

An earlier account by Al Hayat in May 2010 claimed to trace the war minister's pedigree back to al Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan. The source for this alleged information was not named in Al Hayat's account, which said that al Zaidi "received his training in Afghanistan and studied with senior aides of Osama bin Laden." And the Moroccan-Syrian is supposedly "known to be very fanatical and cruel when implementing punishments against violators" who do not carefully execute his instructions. He is also reportedly multilingual, with working knowledge of French, Russian, and Dari Persian, in addition to Arabic.

Al Hayat's source claimed that the war minister fought in Iraq for two months in 2006 and again in 2007, traveling through Syria to get to the battlefields. (This conflicts with al Juburi's version of events, as he claimed al Zaidi was in Iraq as early as 2003.)

The Al Hayat report cited an anonymous Iraqi security official, who claimed that, in keeping with al Qaeda's protocols, the new war minister is a non-Iraqi Arab "who is close to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and to its leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri." In this respect, at least, Al Hayat's reporting was consistent with Al Juburi's synopsis.

War ministry orchestrates attacks

The ISIS and its predecessor, the ISI, have repeatedly pointed to the group's war ministry as the brains behind its terrorist operations.

In late 2010, several jihadists stormed a church in Baghdad. They apparently intended to hold members of the congregation hostage, but Iraqi security forces quickly surrounded the church, leading to a shootout. More than 50 people were killed during the exchange of fire. Most of them perished when one of the attackers either threw a grenade into a basement where some of the hostages were being held, or detonated his suicide bomb there.

Iraqi security officials said they found two Egyptian and three Yemeni passports on the terrorists.

"Upon guidance issued by the Ministry of War in the Islamic State of Iraq in support for our downtrodden Muslim sisters that are held captive in the Muslim land of Egypt and after accurate planning and selection, an angry group of righteous jihadists attacked a filthy den of polytheism," the ISI said in a statement claiming responsibility for the attack.

On July 21, 2012, Abu Bakr al Baghadi announced a new wave of attacks in Iraq. The campaign, named "Destroying the Walls," was orchestrated by the war ministry.

A few days after Baghdadi's announcement, on July 24, 2012, the ISI stated that it was "beginning a new phase of jihadi work to take back the areas from which the Islamic State had moved away in previous times," referring to the ground loss during the American-led surge of forces. The "war ministry had its sons mobilized and launched the brigades of the mujahideen and their military and security groups in a blessed new invasion during the month of Ramadan, targeting the pressure points of the Safavid [Iranian] project and its tenets and its followers and supporters in this land," the statement read, according to a translation by the SITE Intelligence Group.

The ISI explained that the "chosen targets were accurately distributed over governmental headquarters, security and military centers, and the lairs of Rafidah [Shiite] evil, heads of the Safavid government and its people, and its Sunni traitor lackeys who sold the religion, the honor and the land, and made the lands of the Muslims permissible along with their cities to the dirtiest people on the earth and the lowest of evils."

More than 100 Iraqis were killed in the campaign's initial wave of violence, which only escalated from there. A massive jailbreak in Tikrit was among the complex assaults executed by the war ministry in the months that followed.

In all likelihood, the ISIS war ministry played a significant role in planning the current rebel offensive. But you would never know that from al Zaidi. He has, thus far, remained quiet throughout his forces' latest advances.

Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi (right). The photo was posted on Twitter by sharia officials in the Al Nusrah Front, as well as other jihadists, after Maqdisi's release from prison in Jordan.

Jordan has released an influential ideologue known as Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi (whose real name is Isam Mohammad Tahir al Barqawi) from a prison and his fellow jihadists are celebrating on social media. Among those praising Maqdisi's release are officials in the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria.

Maqdisi has been imprisoned on multiple occasions inside Jordan through the years. At one point, he was a spiritual mentor to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the deceased founder of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). However, Maqdisi eventually criticized Zarqawi's terrorist tactics in Iraq.

During an interview on Al Jazeera in July 2005, Maqdisi advised AQI and Zarqawi to change their methods, saying that too many Iraqis were being killed in suicide bombings. Maqdisi also argued against AQI's indiscriminate slaughter of Shiites, which Zarqawi's heirs in Iraq continue to carry out to this day.

Maqdisi's critique drew a sharp six-page reply from Zarqawi, who warned his former adviser to "not follow the path of Satan that leads to your destruction." According to the Associated Press, Zarqawi wrote: "Beware, our noble sheikh, of the trick of God's enemies to lure you to drive a wedge in the ranks of the Mujahideen."

Maqdisi's back-and-forth with Zarqawi prefigured, in many ways, the current disagreements within the jihadist community over how to approach the fight against Bashar al Assad's regime and associated forces in Syria. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), which evolved out of Zarqawi's AQI, wages jihad in much the same manner.

In fact, Maqdisi has been highly critical of the ISIS, assuming that statements attributed to him during his confinement are authentic. The ISIS and the Al Nusrah Front have been at odds with one another for more than a year. And, in early February, al Qaeda's general command disowned the ISIS.

In May, Maqdisi purportedly released a statement branding the ISIS as a "deviant organization." The jailed ideologue claimed that he had tried to broker a reconciliation between the ISIS and other parties, but the group's leadership refused his efforts. Maqdisi also claimed that he had been in contact with al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri to "put him in the picture regarding my efforts at a reconciliation initiative or adjudicating between" the ISIS and the Al Nusrah Front. Maqdisi blasted the ISIS' failure to comply with Zawahiri's orders. [See LWJ report, Jailed jihadist ideologue says the ISIS is 'deviant organization.']

Many online jihadists are heralding Maqdisi's release from prison on social media. Abu Sulayman al Muhajir, a top sharia official in the Al Nusrah Front who was involved in al Qaeda's mediation efforts in Syria, praised Allah for Maqdisi's release. A hashtag dedicated to Maqdisi was embedded in Abu Sulayman's post on Twitter, which also included the photo above.

Sami Uraydi, a Jordanian who serves alongside Abu Sulayman as a senior sharia official in Al Nusrah, took to his Twitter account to cheer Maqdisi's release.

Similarly, Twitter user "Shaybat al Hukama," who is suspected of being a well-connected al Qaeda media operative, thanked Allah for the release of "our sheikh" in a tweet. Al Hukama is thought to be based in Afghanistan or Pakistan and fervently supports Ayman al Zawahiri.

Another jailed jihadist thinker in Jordan, Abu Qatada, has joined Maqdisi in criticizing the ISIS. [See LWJ report, Abu Qatada provides jihadist with ideological guidance from a Jordanian prison.]

Despite their opposition to the ISIS' practices, however, both Maqdisi and Abu Qatada convinced the Al Nusrah Front not to widen the infighting. And the al Qaeda branch has publicized writings from the pair. That is, the Al Nusrah Front considered Maqdisi to be an influential thinker even during his time in prison. And now he has been freed.

The US Department of State has added a top al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader who has been involved in plots to target US diplomatic facilities in Yemen and worldwide, as well as attacks against Yemeni troops, to its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists. The US targeted the AQAP leader a drone strike late last year.

Shawki Ali Ahmed al Badani, "a leader and operative" in al Qaeda's branch in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, was added to the US' terrorism list earlier today, State said in a press release announcing the designation. Badani "has long been involved in terrorist activity as a member of the group."

Badani "played a key role in a plan for a major attack in summer 2013 that led the United States to close 19 diplomatic posts across the Middle East and Africa."

The diplomatic facilities were closed after American officials learned that al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri had communicated, via a complex Internet-based system, with more than 20 al Qaeda operatives around the world. The al Qaeda terrorists reportedly discussed a possible attack on a US embassy or consulate. During the communications, Zawahiri also made it known that he had appointed Nasir al Wuhayshi, the head of AQAP, as the new general manager of al Qaeda's global operations.

Additionally, Badani "reportedly assigned an AQAP operative to target the US Embassy in Sanaa, Yemen, for attacks" in 2012, State said.

He is also "connected to a suicide bomber who killed over 100 Yemeni soldiers in a May 2012 attack," State reported. In that attack, a suicide bomber detonated in the middle of a formation of troops from the Central Security Organization, a paramilitary branch of the Ministry of the Interior, as they practiced for a parade.

Badani has been described by the Yemeni government as one of "the most dangerous terrorists affiliated with al Qaeda." In 2013, the Yemeni government offered a reward of $100,000 for information leading to his capture.

Badani has been targeted by US drones in Yemen at least once, with disastrous results. On Dec. 12, 2013, US drones targeting Badani accidentally killed 15 civilians as they traveled in a wedding party in Rada'a in the central province of Baydah.

Around 8 p.m. on June 15, approximately 20 armed Shabaab fighters entered the village of Mpeketoni, just southwest of the Kenyan tourist destination island of Lamu. Opening fire on townspeople, the fighters killed at least 48 people.

During the hours-long rampage, the gunmen set fire to a bank, hotels, and a police station while chanting "Allahu Akbar." In the attack, the militants reportedly took men who were watching the World Cup match in the Breeze View Hotel and shot and killed them in front of the women. Local police made a distress call at 9 p.m. local time, but additional officers did not respond until 1 a.m.

In a statement sent to Al Jazeera on June 16, Shabaab said: "The Mpeketoni raid was carried out in response to Kenyan military's continued invasion and occupation of our Muslim lands and the massacre of innocent Muslims in Somalia."

The group warned tourists to stay away from the country as the Kenyan government was "fighting a losing war" against them. Ominously, Shabaab stated: "The prospect of peace and stability in Kenya will be but a distant mirage .... Brace yourself for the depredations of war and that which you have with your hands sown."

The following night, Shabaab fighters killed at least eight people in Poromoko, near Mpeketoni. Afterward, Shabaab military spokesman Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab told Reuters: "We raided villages around Mpeketoni again last night .... Our operations will continue." Villagers in Poromoko stated that 12 women were also taken by Shabaab in the attack.

The massacre in Mpeketoni is the deadliest attack launched by Shabaab since it targeted the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi last September, killing at least 67 people.

Apparently ignoring Shabaab's claim of responsibility, Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta in a televised statement to the nation yesterday blamed the attacks on "local political networks." Kenyatta, who has been president since April 2013, commented: "The attack in Lamu was well planned, orchestrated, and politically motivated ethnic violence against a Kenyan community, with the intention of profiling and evicting them for political reasons. This therefore, was not an Al Shabaab terrorist attack."

According to Kenyatta, the attacks could have been prevented if known intelligence had been acted on. Citing actions taken, the president said "all concerned officers have been suspended and will be charged immediately in a court of law." However, one report in the Kenyan press noted that according to the Cabinet Secretary for the Interior and Co-ordination of the National Government, the officers involved were transferred.

Mpeketoni is located in a region that experienced ethnic clashes last year. In the 1970s, then-President Jomo Kenyatta, Uhruru's father, moved roughly 30,000 ethnic Kikuyu Christians from Central Kenya to the area, dispossessing parts of the local communities.

Kenyatta's government has been criticized for its responses to Shabaab's violent activity across Kenya. The East African nation sent forces into southern Somalia in 2011 to combat Shabaab, and Kenyan forces remain there to this day.

Out of the Palestinian unity deal forged between Hamas and Fatah earlier this month, a new splinter has formed. Hesn is a shadowy Iran-backed jihadist faction in the Gaza Strip. The group's name is an acronym for Harakat as-Sabeereen Nasran li-Filastin, or "The Movement of the Patient Ones for the Liberation of Palestine."

Hesn (or hosn) means "fortification" or "bulwark." The implication is that the traditional Palestinian factions have gone weak in the knees. And for these Iran-backed fighters, one can understand why they believe this is so. The Fatah faction, since Mahmoud Abbas took over in 2005, has disavowed violence against Israel. Hamas, after the fall of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt last year, has been severely weakened - both economically and politically - which has curbed its appetite for violence. And now, after the formation of the unity government, even the Iran-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is vacillating between an outright campaign of violence and supporting the current fragile calm in the name of Palestinian nationalism.

Vacuums don't last long in the Middle East. Hesn's emergence is a case in point. But it's too soon to tell whether the group will have an impact.

For one thing, Hesn has not been around for very long. The first clues of the group's existence came in late May, in the northern Gaza refugee camp of Jabaliya, when a funeral was held for a Nizar Saeed Issa. The details surrounding Issa's death are fuzzy, but it was reported that he died after suffering injuries related to an unspecified explosion.

Issa's death garnered a substantial amount of support on social media platforms such as Facebook. That is when flags and photos bearing his image appeared alongside the newly created symbol of Hesn. The symbol is the same wielded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and Hezbollah. Iran has not claimed ownership of this group. It appears clear, however, that Hesn is yet another proxy group in Iran's violent orbit.

After Issa's death, sources indicated that Hisham al Salem is the group's current leader. Formerly a commander of the military wing of PIJ, the Quds Force Brigades, al Salem has now confirmed to a Gaza journalist from Al Monitor that he was "one of the prominent leaders" of Hesn, and that he had formed the predominantly Shiite group as a way to continue the resistance against Israel during the pause in violence, however informal and tenuous, prompted by the reconciliation agreement.

Al Salem has figured prominently in the Shiite movement in Gaza for years. His name came up a few years ago as the chairman of a now-defunct Shiite charity called al-Baqiyat al Salihat society, based in Jabaliya, the same city where Issa was killed. The charity was purportedly a vehicle to spread Shiite Islam on behalf of Iran in Gaza's nearly homogenous Sunni society. Amid its deteriorating ties with Iran over the Syrian civil war, the Hamas government in Gaza dismantled the Iranian-backed organization in 2011.

In the Al Monitor interview, al Salem was quick to downplay his alleged sectarian leanings, stressing that he sees "no reason to separate as Sunnis and Shiites." Al Salem has made a name for himself in Gaza as an outspoken advocate for Shiism, however, which has led to friction with PIJ figures, who accuse him of spreading 'sectarian strife.'

Perhaps for these reasons, Hesn now appears to be in the crosshairs of Hamas. The Facebook page for Hesn featuring the group's logo and links to Shiite forums is now defunct, ostensibly taken down by an adversary or removed for the group's protection.

But this does not mean that the group has dissolved. Al Salem claims the group has a shura council and an armed wing, although he did not reveal their numbers. Al Salem also did not elaborate on their overall mission in his interview with Al Monitor, apart from saying that the objective is "resistance."

While the group remains murky, its very existence is a sign that Iran is not prepared to allow for quiet in the Palestinian territories, even as Hamas and Fatah seek time and space to solidify their fragile unity arrangement. This serves only to underscore Iran's goals in the Palestinian arena. Instead of heeding the will of the overwhelming majority of Palestinians who support the efforts to re-forge a unified national identity after years of fracturing, Iran appears intent to push the Palestinians into conflict with Israel - or even themselves.

Jonathan Schanzer is vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (Washington, DC). Grant Rumley is an analyst currently based in Jerusalem.

As the Pakistani military is launching airstrikes against foreign terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Turkistan Islamic Party in an operation that began on June 15, the US has entered the fray and killed six "militants" in a drone strike in the tribal agency. The strike is the third in the past week.

The unmanned Predators or the more deadly Reapers fired several missiles at a compound and a vehicle in the village of Darga Mandi in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan, Dawn reported. The village is just outside of Miramshah, the home of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban subgroup that is closely tied to al Qaeda.

The exact target of the strike and the identities of those killed have not been disclosed. Jihadist groups operating in the area have not commented on the strike.

The airstrike is the second in Darga Mandi in the past week. On June 11, the US killed four "Uzbeks," likely from the al Qaeda-allied Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and two members of the Movement of the Taliban in Punjab in an attack on the village.

In addition to the two strikes in the past week, the US has launched five other strikes in Darga Mandi since the drone program in Pakistan began in 2005. In one strike, on Sept. 5, 2013, the US killed Mullah Sangeen Zadran, an al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network leader who was also the Taliban's shadow governor for Afghanistan's Paktika province. Zadran had held Bowe Bergdahl, the US soldier who was recently exchanged for five top Taliban leaders detained at Guantanamo Bay.

In the second strike last week, on June 12, the US killed 10 Taliban and Haqqani Network leaders in the nearby village of Danda Darpa Khel. The strike is said to have killed Haji Gul, a senior Haqqani Network commander, and two leading Afghan Taliban commanders known as Mufti Sofian and Commander Abu Bakar. [See LWJ report, Drone strike killed Haqqani Network, Afghan Taliban commanders.]

The June 11 and 12 strikes were the first in Pakistan since Dec. 25, 2013. The US put the program on hold after the Pakistani government entered into peace talks with the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal that there was no shortage of al Qaeda and other terrorists to target during the six-month lull. [See LWJ report, US launches 2 drone strikes in Pakistan, breaks 6-month lull.]

Today's strike also coincides with Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the Pakistani military offensive in North Waziristan. The military claims it has killed more than 180 "terrorists" and "foreigners," and zero civilians, during a series of airstrikes in North Waziristan.

The Pakistani military appears to be focusing on foreign terrorist groups as well as the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and is not confronting the Haqqani Network or the Hafiz Gul Bahadar group. These two independent Taliban factions are considered "good Taliban" as they do not openly advocate attacking the Pakistan state. But The Haqqanis and the Bahadar group, the two most powerful Taliban factions in North Waziristan, shelter and support al Qaeda, IMU, TIP, and the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan (the "bad Taliban"). [See LWJ report, Pakistan launches 'comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists' in North Waziristan, and Threat Matrix report, Pakistani forces focus on 'foreigners' in North Waziristan operation.]

Ahmed Abu Khattalah, who is suspected of taking direct part in the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya, has been detained by the US. Abu Khattalah was the most conspicuous of the alleged attackers. He even granted interviews to journalists from multiple media outlets since the attack.

Abu Khattalah's accomplices have been less ostentatious, however, preferring to operate in the shadows. Dozens of terrorists who helped overrun the US Mission and Annex in Benghazi, killing four Americans, remain free.

In January, the State Department added Abu Khattalah to the US government's list of specially designated global terrorists, describing him as a "senior leader" of Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi. Two other jihadists were designated at the same time: Abu Iyad al Tunisi, who heads Ansar al Sharia Tunisia; and Sufian Ben Qumu, who leads Ansar al Sharia in Derna, Libya.

The State Department also added the Ansar al Sharia chapters in Benghazi, Derna, and Tunisia to the list of foreign terrorist organizations. (Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi and Derna operate under the same banner, as simply Ansar al Sharia Libya.)

Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi and Derna were both "involved" in the Sept. 11, 2012 "attacks against the US Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya," according to State. Ansar al Sharia Tunisia was responsible for the assault on the US Embassy in Tunis three days later, on Sept. 14, 2012.

Ben Qumu is an ex-Guantanamo detainee and was previously identified by US military and intelligence officials as an al Qaeda operative. According to a leaked Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) file, Ben Qumu's alias was found on the laptop of an al Qaeda operative responsible for overseeing the finances for the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The information on the laptop indicated that Ben Qumu was an al Qaeda "member receiving family support."

Some of Ben Qumu's men from Ansar al Sharia in Derna were among the Benghazi attackers, according to US intelligence officials. Neither Ben Qumu, nor his fighters, have been detained.

Like Ben Qumu, Abu Iyad al Tunisi (whose real name is Seifallah Ben Hassine) has a lengthy al Qaeda-linked pedigree that stretches back to pre-9/11 Afghanistan.

Multiple al Qaeda-affiliated parties involved in Benghazi attack are still at large

In addition to Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi and Derna, jihadists from at least three other al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist groups participated in the Sept. 11 assault in Benghazi.

On Jan. 15, the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released its report on the terrorist attack. "Individuals affiliated with terrorist groups, including AQIM, Ansar al Sharia, AQAP, and the Mohammad Jamal Network, participated in the September 11, 2012, attacks," the report reads.

AQAP, AQIM, and the Mohammad Jamal Network all established training camps in eastern Libya after the rebellion against Muammar el Qaddafi began in 2011.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are both official branches of al Qaeda and have sworn allegiance to Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's emir. The head of AQAP, Nasir al Wuhayshi, was also appointed the general manager of al Qaeda's network in August 2013.

In October 2013, both the UN and the US designated the Mohammad Jamal Network (MJN) as a terrorist organization. The designations explicitly recognized the MJN's ties to al Qaeda's senior leadership, including Ayman al Zawahiri, as well as to AQIM and AQAP.

Mohammad Jamal is a Zawahiri loyalist who was trained by al Qaeda in the late 1980s, and served as a leader in the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in the 1990s. Jamal is currently imprisoned in Egypt and charged with plotting attacks inside the country. During trial proceedings earlier this year, he held up a picture of Osama bin Laden along with a note that read, "Al Qaeda is perched on the hearts of the believers."

Although Jamal is imprisoned, US officials previously told The Long War Journal that the Egyptian government had denied American officials direct access to him. US officials were able to pass questions to their Egyptian counterparts, but not allowed to question Jamal directly. It is not clear if this situation has changed since The Long War Journal first reported on it in February 2013.

Some of Jamal's fighters took part in the Benghazi attack, but there is no indication that any of them have been killed or captured. Likewise, none of the terrorists "affiliated" with AQIM or AQAP who took part in the attack have been captured.

Still other individuals reportedly involved in the assault remain free.

A Tunisian named Ali Ani al Harzi was detained in Turkey in late 2012 at the behest of US officials, who found that al Harzi had posted updates on the attack on social media. After being deported to his native Tunisia, al Harzi was questioned by FBI agents for just three hours in December 2012. Ansar al Sharia Tunisia stalked the FBI agents, posting their pictures online and criticizing the Tunisian government for allowing the Americans to question al Harzi.

The following month, in January 2013, al Harzi was released from prison and Ansar al Sharia Tunisia posted a video online celebrating his freedom. Since then, the Tunisian government has accused al Harzi of participating in an assassination ring that killed two prominent politicians. Tunisians authorities further alleged that the assassins operated under orders from Abu Iyad al Tunisi.

Another suspect in the attack is Abu Faraj al Chalabi. US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal say that al Chalabi served as a bodyguard for Osama bin Laden during the 1990s. Al Chalabi traveled to Pakistan after the attack and intelligence officials say there is evidence that he brought materials from the US Mission and Annex in Benghazi with him. No US officials would confirm to The Long War Journal what, exactly, al Chalabi carried with him to Pakistan.

Al Chalabi was detained in Pakistan and then held in Libya. He was reportedly questioned, but the extent of the interrogations is unknown. Al Chalabi was freed in short order.

Abu Khattalah is, therefore, the first alleged participant in the Benghazi attack to be held by the US. Most of his accomplices remain free.

FBI agents working with the agency's Joint Terrorism Task Force arrested a suspected al Qaeda supporter in late May for plotting to kill newly returning American soldiers in the greater Rochester area. The media first reported on the foiled terrorist plot in early June.

The suspect, Mufid A. Elfgeeh, a US citizen who was born in Yemen, had written on his Twitter feed: "al Qaeda said it loud and clear, we are fighting the American invasion and their hegemony over the earth and people." According to Time Warner Cable Buffalo, Elfgeeh used his Twitter micro-blog to promote funds for "jihadists and for weapons in Syria." Elfgeeh "expressed on numerous occasions his interest in killing American servicemen" returning from war zones, according to Rochester law enforcement authorities [see video news conference].

The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle reported extensively on Elfgeeh's arrest, in front-page stories on June 3 and June 7. The first article,"Tweets Helped Lead to Arrests," included a photograph of a bearded and handcuffed Elfgeeh escorted by US marshals.

In an elaborate sting operation, FBI agents arrested Elfgeeh in a Walmart lot as an informant delivered a cache of weapons and ammunition to him. According to an affidavit, the purchased weapons were a "Walther PPK .32-caliber handgun with a functional silencer affixed to the barrel, a Glock 26, 9-millimeter handgun with a functional silencer affixed to the barrel, two boxes of .32-caliber ammunition, and two boxes of 9-millimeter ammunition." The weapons provided to Elfgeeh were non-functional.

The FBI had been monitoring Elfgeeh since 2013, during which time the alleged al Qaeda suspect had inquired about the price of hand grenades. "In early 2013, an individual who has occasionally worked as informant for the FBI 'first reported information about Elfgeeh,"' the Democrat & Chronicle reported. Thus far the FBI has paid the informant $21,700 and secured visas for family members. A second informant played a further role in extracting information about Elfgeeh's views on the Middle East and the US.

Upstate New York media reports noted that Elfgeeh planned to murder US soldiers returning from Afghanistan as well as Shiite Muslims in the Rochester area, but zeroed in on returning US military personnel in March. It is unclear what prompted Elfgeeh to abandon his plan to target the Shiite community.

But it was in March that Elfgeeh mentioned that a French-Algerian man had killed three French military members, referring to Mohamed Merah, a jihadist who had trained with al Qaeda in Pakistan. Merah killed three French paratroopers and four French Jews in Toulouse in 2012, before being killed in a standoff with security forces. [See LWJ report, Another Look at a French 'lone wolf'.]

The Democratic & Chronicle titled its June 7 article on Elfgeeh, "Terror suspect may be 'lone wolf,'" and raised the question whether Elfgeeh was "working on behalf of anti-American factions." While the headline suggested an independent terrorist, the text of the article depicted a suspect with family connections to a downstate extremist milieu.

According to that second article, Elfgeeh's uncle Abad was arrested in Brooklyn in 2003 for suspected participation in a terrorism network. It noted that Abad "was alleged to have funneled millions to his homeland of Yemen." The article further stated: "He even helped a prominent Yemeni cleric, Sheik Mohammed Ali Hassan al Moayad, transfer money; once a spiritual adviser to Osama Bin Laden, the fundamentalist al Moayad was convicted in 2005 of conspiring to support al Qaeda and Hamas."

In 2006, a US district court in Brooklyn sentenced Abad Elfgeeh to 15 years in prison for illegally funneling nearly $22 million overseas, but omitted terrorism charges.

In a recorded conversation with an FBI informant in Rochester, Mufid Elfgeeh's anti-Americanism was evident. He said, "It's like [Americans] go to Afghanistan killing everybody. It's like they went to Yemen now killing everybody. Doesn't make no difference."

Peter Ahearn, the former head of the FBI's western New York regional office who later worked as a senior adviser with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, surmised: "My guess is ... you're dealing with a lone wolf." He added, "They're just as dangerous as somebody getting directions from somebody overseas -- probably more dangerous because they're working on their own."

While Ahearn carefully couched his words, the upcoming court proceedings will likely reveal more evidence about possible connections between Elfgeeh and al Qaeda's network.

Al Qaeda activity in upstate New York has been noted before. In fact, over 10 years ago Ahearn oversaw an investigation into an al Qaeda network in Lackawanna, a small town just outside of Buffalo.

In 2003, six US citizens of Yemeni background ("the Lackawanna Six") were convicted for providing material support to al Qaeda. A seventh member of the al Qaeda cell, Jaber Elbaneh, is a fugitive thought to be in Yemen; US authorities have offered a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture. In March of this year, Lackawanna Six member Sahim Alwan, a witness in the trial of Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, told the court that prior to the 9/11 attacks, Osama bin Laden had asked him what his fellow Muslims in the US thought about al Qaeda's suicide operations.

On June 16 the Democrat & Chronicle reported that Elfgeeh's bail hearing has been postponed until July 15. The investigation is continuing.

It may turn out that Elfgeeh, like Mohamed Merah, is not truly "a lone wolf" but instead has links to al Qaeda. In Merah's case, those links were not publicly revealed for over a year following his death.

Benjamin Weinthal is a fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham's media wing in Wilayat Ninewa released a series of photos yesterday to social media sites illustrating the group's staggering gains. They also demonstrate wide public support for ISIS in the northern Iraqi province. The ISIS has divided its "state" in Iraq and Syria into 16 administrative units, or wilayats.

The first series of photos shows the advance of ISIS fighters through Ninewa province and depicts the group's control over various military installations, such as headquarters of the Iraqi Army's Second Regiment in Ninewa. ISIS proudly displays the ammunition, weapons, vehicles, and even airplanes left behind by the Iraqi military that are now in the terror group's hands. All of these pictures are captioned "Pictures from the Invasion of Asadullah [Lion of Allah] al-Bilawi Abu Abdul Rahman." As The Long War Journal previously reported, ISIS has named the current offensive after a now deceased ISIS commander, 'Adnan Ismail Najm, also known as Abu Abdul Rahman al Bilawi.

The second group of photos displays mass demonstrations in Ninewa province in support of the ISIS. The demonstrators hold banners expressing the solidarity of some of northern Iraq's tribal confederations, including the al Sada and the al Jabbour, with the ISIS.

Last week, the ISIS took control of Ninewa and most of Salahaddin province, as well as parts of Diyala province. Most of Anbar province fell under ISIS control in January.

An Iraqi Air Force Air command base in Ninewa taken over by ISIS:

Tail sections of bombs left behind by Iraqi military:

Aging Saddam-era airplanes left behind by Iraqi military:

Iraqi government trucks left behind:

Headquarters of the Iraqi Infantry 2nd Regiment, 26th infantry brigade:

What was once the headquarters of Ninewa's Second Emergency Regiment:

This banner from demonstrations in support of ISIS in Ninewa announces the al Sada tribe's solidarity with ISIS:

These three black banners congratulate ISIS on behalf of the Jabbour, al Madi, and Maadeed tribal confederations: