Over the past week, a Twitter account linked to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) posted the biographies of two fallen AQAP militants, Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad Barashid and Ahmed bin Abu Bakr al Beiti. The two were among the nearly 300 inmates who escaped from a Political Security prison in Mukallah on the coast of Hadramout province on June 22, 2011. Additionally, both AQAP militants had also sought to fight in the jihad in Iraq.

The Yemeni government under the leadership of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh had a long history of facilitating and encouraging Yemenis to participate in various jihadi arenas, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2007, a Yemeni newspaper tallied 1,800 Yemenis who had traveled to Iraq for jihad; their families said the young men were trained by top-level Yemeni military commanders. In early March 2014, The Long War Journal reported that a US drone strike in northern Yemen had killed AQAP commander Ali Juraym, who was known to have returned to Yemen from fighting in Iraq.

Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad Barashid

[Photo source: Twitter]

On May 23, the Twitter account "Nafeh al Teeb" began tweeting biographical information about a martyred AQAP fighter named Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad Barashid, who was also known by his nom de guerre, Abdul Salam al Hadhrami. As his nickname portends, Barashid was from Yemen's eastern province of Hadramout. Information relayed in his Twitter biography indicates that Barashid went to Iraq in 2006 to wage jihad against the American occupation and specifically fought in the city of Beiji in northern Salahuddin province. Apparently Barashid requested to carry out a "martyrdom operation," and al Qaeda in Iraq's media wing, al Furqan Foundation, recorded his last will and testament. Unfortunately for Barashid, "the operation was delayed due to security reasons."

Barashid's biography continues with his eventual capture in Syria and delivery to Yemen for imprisonment on charges of waging jihad against America. Barashid was jailed at the Political Security prison in the city of Mukallah until the massive prison break on June 22, 2011. Barashid's biography claims that 67 other AQAP militants escaped that day and that Barashid "was among the first participants in digging the tunnel" out of the prison. After escaping, Barashid rejoined the ranks of the newly branded Ansar al Sharia and allegedly fought in the battles at Dofas in Abyan in late August 2011.

Barashid's biography states that he was killed at the age of 28 as a result of an American drone strike in Hadramout province. If he was killed this year, it would have been the result of either the Jan. 8 or Jan. 15 drone strikes in Hadramout.

Ahmed bin Abu Bakr al Beiti

[Photo source: Twitter]

On May 27, the Twitter account "Nafeh al Teeb" began tweeting biographical information relating to fallen AQAP fighter Ahmed bin Abu Bakr al Beiti, also known as Yahya al Hadhrami. Like Barashid, al Beiti was a native of Hadramout province and hailed from the coastal city of Mukallah. His biography mentions that he had tried to travel to Afghanistan "before the September 11 strikes" but found that option "was not available to him." In 2006, he headed for Iraq and showed a particular interest in carrying out a suicide attack. Al Beiti was captured en route while in Syria and delivered back to Yemen.

Al Beiti was imprisoned for three and a half years, ostensibly at the Political Security prison in Mukallah, and subsequently escaped in the June 2011 prison break. He rejoined AQAP upon his escape and is said to have fallen "in the battle of revenge in Abyan," an apparent reference to fighting in Abyan following the US drone strikes that inaugurated the Yemeni government's southern offensive in late April.

One of the arguments used by the Obama administration for a rapid drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan by the end of 2016 is that the US and the Coalition have reduced al Qaeda there to "remnants." To the contrary, however, a study by The Long War Journal of International Security Force press releases detailing raids against al Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan shows that, since ISAF began reporting on these raids, jihadist groups have maintained a persistent presence in the country. ISAF's data is generally backed up by independent press reports, as well as al Qaeda and allied groups' own propaganda on their operations throughout Afghanistan.

These ISAF raids have targeted al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union (or Islamic Jihad Group), Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, Hizb-i Islami Khalis, and generic "foreign fighters," a term often used by ISAF to describe al Qaeda and other foreign groups. While all of these groups are not official al Qaeda branches, they cooperate closely with al Qaeda, enable al Qaeda to operate in multiple provinces, and have stated they are part of the international jihad. Additionally, al Qaeda often recruits leaders from these groups to fill leadership positions in al Qaeda. ISAF has occasionally reported that Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and IMU leaders and operatives were also members of al Qaeda.

The maps below plot the special operations raids targeting al Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan that were reported by ISAF in official press releases from early 2007 until ISAF stopped issuing these press releases in the beginning of June 2013. [Click on the colored pins for reports on individual raids.]

The data used in the maps below do not include groups such as the Haqqani Network, an official branch of the Taliban that works closely with al Qaeda, as the number of raids against the Haqqanis alone is too large to plot; US government terrorist designations of Haqqani leaders show just how closely these two groups cooperate. Keep in mind also that ISAF did not report on every single raid; the press releases are merely a sampling, or a window into some of the raids against al Qaeda. Over the years, US military and intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal that there were far more raids against al Qaeda and its allies that have gone unreported.

The press releases indicate that between early 2007 and June 2013, al Qaeda and its allies were targeted 338 different times, in 25 of 34 of Afghanistan's provinces. Those raids have taken place in 110 of Afghanistan's nearly 400 districts.

In those 338 raids, al Qaeda was targeted 114 times, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 139 times, generic "foreign fighters" 85 times, the Islamic Jihad Group 19 times, Lashkar-e-Taiba 5 times, the Hizb-e-Khalis 2 times, and the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan 1 time.

The data below should put to rest the idea that al Qaeda maintains an estimated 50 to 100 fighters in Afghanistan. Obama administration and senior US military officials have been making this claim since 2010, and have not deviated from the estimate, despite heavy targeting, especially in 2010 (76 raids), 2011 (90 raids), and 2012 (67 raids). The high level of targeting from 2010 to 2012 coincides with the US "surge" in forces, which ended at the end of 2011. However, with 42 raids against al Qaeda and allies between January and June in 2013, there is no indication that ISAF was letting up pressure on the terror group.

Additionally, the data indicates that al Qaeda has not had a "resurgence" in Kunar and Nuristan over the past few years, as is often reported. Rather, al Qaeda has in fact maintained a persistent presence in these two provinces. Al Qaeda has also maintained a foothold in Ghazni, Nangarhar, Khost, Paktia, and Paktika over the years. ISAF has targeted al Qaeda's network in these provinces consistently since 2007 up until the time when ISAF press reports stopped.

Map Key

Red - al Qaeda
Blue - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Green - foreign fighters
Teal - Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan)
Yellow - Lashkar-e-Taiba
Pink - Hizb-i Islami Khalis
Purple - Islamic Jihad Union

Dot - Killed/Captured
No Dot - Targeted

2013

Special operations forces launched 42 raids in 2013 between Jan. 1 and the beginning of June, when ISAF ended its operational reporting. Raids against al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba alone took place in Ghazni, Nangarhar, Kunar, and Nuristan.

View Al Qaeda in Afghanistan - 2013 in a larger map

2012

There were 67 raids against al Qaeda and its allies in 2012. Raids against al Qaeda alone took place in Paktia, Paktika, Ghazni, Kunar, Nuristan, and Takhar.

View Al Qaeda in Afghanistan - 2012 in a larger map

2011

There were 90 raids against al Qaeda and its allies in 2011, the largest number of raids tracked in a single year. Raids against al Qaeda alone took place in Ghazni, Nangarhar, Wardak, Laghman, Khost, Kunar, Balkh, Takhar, Kandahar, and Zabul, and also likely in Paktika, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Farah ("foreign fighters" along with groups such as the IMU were targeted in several raids).

View Al Qaeda in Afghanistan - 2011 in a larger map

2010

In 2010, special operations forces targeted al Qaeda and allied groups 76 times. Al Qaeda and foreign fighters alone were targeted in Ghazni, Nangarhar, Wardak, Logar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Kunar, Kunduz, Badakhshan, Kandahar, Zabul, and Farah.

View Al Qaeda in Afghanistan - 2010 in a larger map

2009

In 2009, special operations forces targeted al Qaeda and allied groups 30 times. Al Qaeda alone was targeted in Ghazni, Nangarhar, Khost, Paktika, Kunar, Helmand, and Kandahar.

View Al Qaeda in Afghanistan - 2009 in a larger map

2008

Special operations forces targeted al Qaeda and its allies 28 times in 2008. Al Qaeda itself was targeted in Ghazni, Nangarhar, Khost, Paktia, and Kunar.

View Al Qaeda in Afghanistan - 2008 in a larger map

2007

ISAF reported on three raids against al Qaeda starting in April 2007. Al Qaeda was targeted in Khost and Nangarhar.

View Al Qaeda in Afghanistan - 2007 in a larger map

Al Qaeda has published a response to the nine jihadists operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan who sided with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) in a letter disseminated in March. The ISIS, which was disowned by al Qaeda's general command in February, has been attempting to solicit support from jihadists around the world. And the nine jihadists, led by a veteran al Qaeda leader known as Abu Huda al Sudani, constitute one of the few factions to have publicly rallied to the ISIS' cause thus far.

Al Qaeda's response to the nine jihadists was penned by Abu 'Amer al Naji, a previously obscure al Qaeda ideologue who nonetheless writes that he has lived with the group for "many years." Naji's statement, which was posted on May 28, was first obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Naji responds to several criticisms levied by the nine jihadists, who blasted al Qaeda's decision not to brand all Shiites as infidels, found fault in al Qaeda's approach to the so-called Arab Spring, and believe that al Qaeda has been too lax in enforcing sharia law, among other criticisms.

Naji writes that al Qaeda's decision to refrain from branding all Shiites as heretics is well-founded in its version of Islamic jurisprudence. He cites statements made by senior al Qaeda leaders several years ago, in addition to commentaries written by Abu Musab al Suri, Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi and Abu Anas al Shami, to support his case.

Al Suri is a major al Qaeda ideologue whose works are widely cited. It is likely that al Suri is currently imprisoned in Syria by the Assad regime, although there have been contradictory reports concerning his status. Al Maqdisi is an influential jihadist ideologue who is imprisoned in Jordan and has become a forceful critic of the ISIS from behind bars. Ironically, al Maqdisi's brother was one of the nine signatories of the pro-ISIS letter.

Abu Anas al Shami was the spiritual adviser for Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the first head of al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Shami was killed during the height of the Iraq War, and al Qaeda's reference to him is likely an attempt to influence the thinking of jihadists whose careers began in Zarqawi's organization. Both the ISIS and the Al Nusrah Front, which is al Qaeda's official branch in Syria and the ISIS' rival, grew out of Zarqawi's terror network.

As the nine signatories of the pro-ISIS letter revealed, not everyone within al Qaeda was happy with the group's approach to the Arab uprisings that began in early 2011. The dissenting jihadists argue that al Qaeda should have opposed the crumbling Arab regimes through force, instead of initially taking a back seat to the millions of Muslims who protested in the streets.

The letter's authors complained about al Qaeda's supposedly "[e]xcessive complimenting of what was called the Arab Spring, and inciting unprotected people from the men and women to go out to the streets and squares to face the powers of apostasy that were well armed, so that people would change the regimes, and so that we would go after that to ride them [to power], and whenever they did not do enough." The ISIS' spokesman, Abu Muhammad al Adnani, has made a similar argument, criticizing al Qaeda's leadership for not waging open jihad against all of the regimes, including those that supplanted dictatorships post-Arab Spring, throughout North Africa and the Middle East.

Thus, the ISIS and its supporters object to al Qaeda's calibrated approach to the post-Arab Spring world, in which the jihadists sometimes use tactics other than violence, including proselytization, to spread their ideology. It is for this reason, among others, that the ISIS has accused al Qaeda of changing its own ideology, going as far as to claim that the al Qaeda of Ayman al Zawahiri is substantively different from Osama bin Laden's organization.

Naji responds to these criticisms, saying that all of the "scholars and preachers in our time," excluding those who served the existing regimes, agreed with the wisdom of supporting the revolutions. He writes, "I do not know what is the embarrassment in encouraging the Muslim people to revolt against its rulers in order to establish Islamic Sharia?" In fact, al Qaeda ideologues have repeatedly argued that the uprisings did not finish the job, because their version of sharia law has not been implemented in the societies that revolted.

Naji argues that al Qaeda's rhetorical support for the uprisings did not reflect a change in the organization's direction. He cites statements by Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri, Attiyah abd al Rahman, Abu Yahya al Libi, and Abu Dujana al Basha to prove his point. Indeed, one of the handful of documents released to the public after being recovered from Osama bin Laden's compound reveals that the al Qaeda leader believed at least some of the Islamists rising to power in post-Arab Spring countries could be won over to al Qaeda's cause.

In addition, Naji accuses the dissenters of "libel" for alleging that al Qaeda's leaders argued that the jihadists should take a back seat ("we would go after that to ride them [to power]") to the protesters. He says that unnamed works by Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi demonstrate the flaws in the nine disaffected jihadists' thinking.

The pro-ISIS jihadists believe that al Qaeda has been lax in enforcing sharia law. Naji responds by pointing to the works of Abu Yahya al Libi, an al Qaeda leader who was killed in a US drone strike in 2012. Al Libi argued that the jihadists have the right to exercise discretion when implementing sharia law in conflict zones.

And in a bit of inside baseball, Naji points to an al Qaeda sharia hearing in which one of the letter's signatories reportedly vouched for an unidentified person who fled the dispute. Naji rhetorically asks if sharia should not be applied in that case, too. The implication is that one of the letter's signatories could be held accountable for backing an untrustworthy party.

Naji concludes by dismissing the nine jihadists' religious credentials, arguing that not one of them "considers himself from the people of knowledge," and Naji does "not think that anyone knows them as such and considers them like that." The same could be said for how many other Islamic scholars view Naji and his ilk inside al Qaeda.

Naji's statement is being promoted at the top of the Shumukh al Islam forum with the same banner that can be seen at the top of this article. Shumukh was initially supportive of the ISIS in its dispute with al Qaeda's senior leadership, but the site, which has been taken down multiple times, did not remain in the ISIS camp for long.

US officials have identified the American who took part in a suicide operation carried out by the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, earlier this month.

The State Department confirmed yesterday that the jihadist, known as Abu Hurayra al Amriki, was in fact an American. "I can confirm that this individual was a US citizen involved in a suicide bombing in Syria," Jen Psaki, the State Department spokesperson, said during a press briefing. "We don't have further information beyond that at this - to share at this time."

But officials later told the press that the man was named Moner Mohammad Abusalha. According to The New York Times, which has published an account of Abusalha's background, the American recruit was in his early 20s, "grew up in Florida and traveled to Syria late last year."

"Mr. Abusalha had been among several dozen Americans on the radar of federal law enforcement officials because of past trips to Syria," the Times reports. The Daily Beast reported earlier this month that US intelligence officials think that more than 100 Americans have joined the jihad in Syria. Other publications have since confirmed that figure.

The Times contacted both an unnamed Al Nusrah Front fighter and a member of another group, Suqour al Sham, who knew Abusalha in Syria. Suqour al Sham is a part of the Islamic Front, a coalition of rebel groups that is often portrayed as moderate. The group frequently fights alongside Al Nusrah and took part in the operation in which Abusalha and three other operatives detonated massive truck bombs.

Rumors that an American had taken part in the coordinated suicide bombings first surfaced on Twitter earlier in the week.

The SITE Intelligence Group reported on May 25 that an American was reportedly among the suicide bombers, in addition to a Syrian and men from the Maldives and "Turkistan," which is likely reference to Central Asia or China.

As The Long War Journal reported on May 27, an Al Nusrah Front sharia official provided the first confirmation that Abu Hurayra was an American, calling him "al Amriki" in a tweet. The Al Nusrah official, Abu Sulayman al Muhajir, relocated from Australia to Syria last year. Abu Sulayman posted the image shown at the top of this article along with text that reads: "Performed a martydom operation in Idlib, Jabal Al-Arba'een. May Allah accept him."

The video below appears to show the truck bomb Abusalha drove being packed with explosives and then detonated. The Al Nusrah Front, which released the video, said that 16 tons of explosives had been loaded into truck.

The US government announced today that Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, who was held by the Taliban since 2009, has been released. Bergdahl was exchanged for the top five Taliban commanders held at Guantanamo. The Taliban detainees are reportedly being transferred to Qatar, which helped broker the deal.

The Taliban has long sought freedom for the "Gitmo Five," all of whom are experienced jihadists and helped run the Taliban's operations in pre-9/11 Afghanistan. They served in various military and intelligence roles.

All five of the detainees were deemed "high" risks to the US and its allies by Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). Two of the five, according to files prepared at Guantanamo, have been wanted by the UN for war crimes.

One of them served as a key intermediary between the Iranian regime and the Taliban after 9/11. During meetings between these two former foes, the Iranians pledged to assist the Taliban in its war against the US.

The Obama administration has long sought to coax the Taliban into meaningful peace talks, which have thus far been fruitless. The Taliban has demanded that the "Gitmo Five" be released before those talks move forward.

A key goal of those talks is to get the Taliban to renounce al Qaeda, something Mullah Omar's group has declined to do. It is difficult to see how the prisoner swap helps to achieve that goal. All five of the now ex-Gitmo detainees were closely allied with al Qaeda prior to their detention. And Bergdahl was initially captured by members of the Haqqani Network, which remains one of al Qaeda's strongest allies to this day.

The Long War Journal has published extensive profiles of the five former Guantanamo detainees previously. See LWJ reports: Iran and the Taliban, allies against America; Afghan peace council reportedly seeks talks with Taliban commanders held at Gitmo; DC district court denies former Taliban governor's habeas petition; Taliban seek freedom for dangerous Guantanamo detainees; and Afghan Taliban announces new 'political office' in Qatar.

The profiles below, which are based on declassified and leaked documents, are culled from these previous accounts.

Abdul Haq Wasiq (Internment Serial Number 4), senior Taliban intelligence official

Abdul Haq Wasiq, a former Taliban intelligence official, "had direct access to Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) leadership," according to a leaked JTF-GTMO threat assessment. Wasiq "was central to the Taliban's efforts to form alliances with other Islamic fundamentalist groups to fight alongside the Taliban against US and Coalition forces after the 11 September 2001 attacks."

JTF-GTMO concluded that Wasiq "utilized his office to support al Qaeda and to assist Taliban personnel elude capture" in late 2001. Wasiq also "arranged for al Qaeda personnel to train Taliban intelligence staff in intelligence methods."

Al Qaeda's training of Taliban operatives, arranged by Wasiq, was reportedly conducted by Hamza Zubayr, a terrorist who was formerly an instructor at one of al Qaeda's most important training camps. Zubayr was killed during the same September 2002 raid that netted 9/11 facilitator Ramzi Binalshibh. The assistance from Zubayr was crucially important to the Taliban's intelligence efforts, according to the JTF-GTMO file, because many of the administrators in the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence "had no prior intelligence background."

Mullah Norullah Noori (ISN 6), senior Taliban military commander

Another leaked JTF-GTMO file described Noori as a "senior Taliban military commander" who was engaged in hostilities "against US and Coalition forces in late 2001." Noori is "wanted by the United Nations (UN) for possible war crimes including the murder of thousands of Shiite Muslims."

When the JTF-GTMO threat assessment for Noori was authored in February 2008, his brother was still active in the fight against the Coalition. Noori's "brother is a Taliban commander directing operations against US and Coalition forces in Zabul Province." Noori himself "remained a significant figure to Taliban supporters" even after his capture.

In addition to his ties to Mullah Omar and other senior Taliban leaders, Noori was "associated with...senior al Qaeda members and other extremist organizations."

Declassified memos authored at Guantanamo provide more details about Noori's al Qaeda ties. Noori "fought alongside al Qaeda as a Taliban military general, against the Northern Alliance" in September 1995. Noori also "hosted al Qaeda commanders" and "met a subordinate of Osama bin Laden to pass a message from the Taliban supreme leader" - that is, a message from Mullah Omar.

Mullah Mohammad Fazl (ISN 7), Taliban deputy minister of defense

Mullah Mohammad Fazl was one of the Taliban's most experienced commanders prior to his capture in November 2001. Like Noori, according to another leaked JTF-GTMO file, Fazl is "wanted by the UN for possible war crimes including the murder of thousands of Shiites." Fazl "was associated with terrorist groups currently opposing U.S. and Coalition forces including al Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and an Anti-Coalition Militia group known as Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami."

Fazl had "operational associations with significant al Qaeda and other extremist personnel," according to JTF-GTMO. One of the high-ranking al Qaeda commanders Fazl long cooperated with was Abdel Hadi al Iraqi, who led Osama bin Laden's Arab 055 Brigade in the Taliban's Afghanistan. The 055 Brigade was bin Laden's chief fighting force and served alongside Taliban units.

Immediately "following the assassination of Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud in September 2001," al Iraqi explained to US officials, "the Northern Alliance was demoralized" and he met with Fazl to "coordinate an attack with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance."

Prior to his detention, Fazl "wielded considerable influence throughout the northern region of Afghanistan and his influence continued after his capture." Fazl's "name and capture have been used in recruiting campaigns by the Taliban."

"If released," JTF-GTMO warned in a February 2008 memo, Fazl "would likely rejoin the Taliban and establish ties with [Anti-Coalition Militia] elements participating in hostilities against U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan."

Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa (ISN 579), former governor of Herat province

Khairkhwa was one of Mullah Omar's closest confidantes prior to his capture. According to a JTF-GTMO file, Khairkhwa "was directly associated" with both Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. "Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks," the leaked JTF-GTMO file reads, Khairkhwa "represented the Taliban during meetings with Iranian officials seeking to support hostilities against US and Coalition Forces." In June 2011, a DC district court denied Khairkhwa's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, based in large part on his admitted role in brokering the Taliban's post-9/11 deal with the Iranians. [See LWJ report, DC district court denies former Taliban governor's habeas petition.]

As the governor of Afghanistan's western Herat province, Khairkhwa and "his deputy were probably associated with a militant training camp in Herat operated by deceased al Qaeda commander (in Iraq) Abu Musab al Zarqawi."

In declassified memos prepared at Guantanamo, US officials alleged that Khairkhwa became a major drug trafficker as well. Khairkhwa reportedly built three walled compounds that he used to manage his opium trade. And he allegedly oversaw one of Osama bin Laden's training facilities in Herat, too. One US government memo noted that only Khairkhwa or bin Laden himself "could authorize entrance" to the facility, which was one of bin Laden's "most important bases" and "conducted terrorist training two times per week."

Mohammad Nabi Omari (ISN 832), senior Taliban leader who served multiple roles

In a leaked memo dated Jan. 23, 2008, JTF-GTMO analysts recommended that Nabi be held in "continued detention" by the Defense Department. Nabi "was a senior Taliban official who served in multiple leadership roles," according to JTF-GTMO. Nabi "had strong operational ties to Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) groups including al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), some of whom remain active in ACM activities."

Intelligence reports cited by JTF-GTMO indicate that Nabi was a "member of a joint al Qaeda/Taliban ACM cell in Khowst and was involved in attacks against US and Coalition forces." Nabi also "maintained weapons caches and facilitated the smuggling of fighters and weapons."

Prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Nabi worked for the Taliban's border security and in this capacity had "access to senior Taliban commander and leader of the Haqqani Network, Jalaluddin Haqqani." Haqqani was the Taliban Minister of Frontiers and Borders at the time and this is what gave Nabi the opportunity to become Haqqani's "close associate," according to JTF-GTMO.

One "sensitive contact" told authorities that Nabi was one of "three former Taliban commanders loyal to Haqqani." The other two are Nabi's brother-in-law, Malim Jan, and Gul Majid. The three worked under still another Taliban commander, Zakim Khan.

Malim Jan was nicknamed the "Butcher of Khowst" for his reported role in murdering 300 people there. Jan was a sub-commander under Haqqani and the head of a "Secret Police" unit.

Intelligence reports cited by JTF-GTMO indicate that Malim Jan, Gul Majid, and Zakim Khan were all still active in the insurgency in Afghanistan as of late 2007.

A "sensitive contact" told authorities that Nabi participated in a Jan. 26, 2002 "planning session to identify a new Governor of Khowst and to propose a list of members for the Khowst City Shura Council loyal to Haqqani." Several other high-level Taliban and Haqqani officials attended the meeting. One of them "directed the group to reconvene after members discussed names with al Qaeda members in their provinces." The leaked JTF-GTMO memo notes: "The plan was to have all personnel identified and vetted to prepare for future al Qaeda control of the area under Jalaluddin Haqqani."

Beginning in February 2002, according to another intelligence report cited by JTF-GTMO, Nabi and "three al Qaeda affiliated individuals held weekly meetings to discuss ACM plans and to coordinate Haqqani loyalists."

Then, in July 2002, an "Afghan government employee" reported that Nabi had joined "a new Khowst province ACM cell comprised of Taliban and al Qaeda commanders who had operated independently in the past." The list of cell members provided by this source included not only Taliban and al Qaeda leaders, but also individuals affiliated with the HIG and the Haqqani Network.

The JTF-GTMO file includes an intriguing detail about one member of Nabi's cell - a Haqqani money courier named Malik Khan. "Ayman al Zawahiri, the number two leader of al Qaeda" at the time, and now al Qaeda's emir, "has stayed at Khan's compound located outside Miram Shah," Pakistan.

In August 2002, Nabi reportedly helped two al Qaeda operatives smuggle "an unknown number of missiles along the highway between Jalalabad and Peshawar," Pakistan. The missiles were smuggled in pieces, with the intent of rebuilding them for attacks near the Jalalabad airport. On Aug. 28, 2002, JTF-GTMO analysts noted, "two Americans were killed during attacks against the Khowst, Gardez, and Jalalabad airports."

Nabi was captured in September 2002, detained at Bagram, and then transferred to Guantanamo. It was the end, temporarily at least, to a career that started in the 1980s when Nabi first fought as a mujahideen against the Soviets.

Hours after the US government announced that Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl had been released in exchange for the top five Taliban commanders held at Guantanamo, the Taliban released a statement celebrating the trade. The Taliban's statement, which was first obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, was posted online in Arabic and Pashto.

The five Taliban commanders once held at Guantanamo have been profiled multiple times by The Long War Journal. [For instance, see LWJ report, Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl exchanged for top 5 Taliban commanders at Gitmo.]

"With great happiness and joy we give glad tidings to all people, and especially the mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate, and the families of the five senior leaders of the Islamic Emirate, and those who love them and their families," the Taliban says in the opening lines of its announcement of the prisoner swap.

The Taliban is quick to point out that the five ex-Guantanamo detainees were "liberated as a result of non-straightforward negotiations between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and America with mediation from Qatar, and those people will reside in Qatar with their families." In other words, the Taliban stresses that it did not participate in direct negotiations with the Americans. The US government has been pursuing negotiations with the Taliban as part of a reconciliation process for years.

The Taliban also argues that it got a good deal in the prisoner exchange. "It is worth mentioning that the Islamic Emirate, in exchange for the release of its five prominent people,...released one America soldier that it had captured five years ago and handed him over to America," the Taliban says, according to SITE's translation.

The Taliban claims that the "five senior leaders of the Islamic Emirate" will be "received by the members of the Political Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and members of the Leadership Shura [Consultative Council]" of the Taliban in Qatar.

The Taliban announced that it had opened its "political office" in Qatar in early 2012. At the time, the Taliban "demanded the release of its captives from Guantanamo through a prisoner exchange." [See LWJ report, Afghan Taliban announces new 'political office' in Qatar.] That demand has now been met.

The Taliban concludes its statement by saying that it "aims to also quickly release the [other] imprisoned mujahideen, and wants all international human rights organizations to join in their efforts with the Islamic Emirate and the Afghan people to grant all the prisoners their legal and humanitarian rights, and the freedom to live their lives as they wish."

Mullah Omar, the reclusive head of the Taliban, has purportedly released a statement hailing the transfer of the top five Taliban commanders from Guantanamo to Qatar. Omar says their freedom is a "great victory."

The five Taliban leaders were exchanged for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, who has been held by the Taliban since 2009.

A copy of the statement attributed to Omar has been posted on the Taliban's Urdu-language web site.

Omar thanks the government of Qatar, as well as its emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, for his help in brokering the deal and for hosting the Taliban leaders. In earlier statements, both President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry similarly thanked Qatar for its assistance.

Omar offers his "heartfelt congratulations to the entire Afghan Muslim nation," including "all the mujahideen and to the families and relatives of the prisoners for this great victory."

The Taliban had demanded the release of the five commanders from Guantanamo for years. In early 2012, the Taliban announced that it had established a "political office" in Doha for the expressed purpose of securing their freedom.

In addition to Omar's statement, the Taliban has also posted pictures of the now ex-Guantanamo detainees being greeted by supporters and family members in Qatar. As The Long War Journal has previously documented, all five were closely linked to al Qaeda prior to their detention and deemed "high" risks to the US, its interests, and its allies, according to leaked Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) threat assessments.

The first picture posted by the Taliban appears to show Mullah Norullah Noori, a senior Taliban military commander. According to a leaked JTF-GTMO file, Noori has been "wanted by the United Nations (UN) for possible war crimes including the murder of thousands of Shiite Muslims." He fought alongside al Qaeda in pre-9/11 Afghanistan.

The second unlabeled photo, seen below, seems to be of Abdul Haq Wasiq, a senior Taliban intelligence official. He arranged for al Qaeda to train the Taliban in "intelligence methods," according to a leaked JTF-GTMO file.

The third photo [below] shows Mullah Muhammad Fazl, the former Taliban deputy minister of defense. Fazl's face is obscured in the photo. Like Noori, according to the JTF-GTMO files, Fazl is "wanted by the UN for possible war crimes including the murder of thousands of Shiites." Fazl worked closely with al Qaeda leaders, including Abdul Hadi al Iraqi, who is still detained at Guantanamo.

The fourth photo shows Mohammad Nabi Omari, a Taliban leader who served in multiple roles and coordinated attacks with al Qaeda and other affiliated groups in Afghanistan.

The fifth and final photo is of Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa, the former Taliban governor of Herat province. Khairkhwa had multiple ties to al Qaeda prior to 9/11, according to the JTF-GTMO files. He also helped broker a deal between the Iranian regime and the Taliban, who were historically at odds with one another. As a result of the deal, the Iranians agreed to support the Taliban in its war against the US.

For more on the five Taliban leaders released from Guantanamo, see The Long War Journal's previous reports.

One of the Taliban's top spokesmen said that the recent prisoner exchange between the US and the Taliban will do nothing to further US hopes for reconciliation in Afghanistan as the Taliban "don't believe in the peace process."

The exchange of US Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who reportedly went absent without leave while on duty in Paktika province in 2009, for five senior al Qaeda-linked Taliban leaders held at Guantanamo Bay took place over the weekend. The five Taliban leaders, who were deemed "high" risks to the US and its allies by Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), include two accused of war crimes by the UN.

The five freed Taliban commanders have been identified as Abdul Haq Wasiq, an intelligence official; Mullah Norullah Noori, senior military commander; Mullah Mohammad Fazl, the Taliban's former deputy minister of defense; Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa, the Taliban's former governor of Herat province; and Mohammad Nabi Omari, a senior leader. JTF-GTMO had previously recommended that all five remain in custody as they posed a threat to the US. [See LWJ reports, Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl exchanged for top 5 Taliban commanders at Gitmo, and Taliban says 'five senior leaders' have been 'liberated' from Guantanamo.]

The prisoner exchange took place over the course of several months of negotiations between the US and the Taliban which were brokered by the government of Qatar. The five Taliban leaders have been sent to Qatar and are banned from travel for one year.

US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel had told NBC's Meet the Press that the US is hopeful that the negotiations that led to the prisoner exchange can further reconciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

"So maybe this will be a new opening that can produce an agreement," between the Taliban and the Afghan government, Hagel said yesterday.

Within hours, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid shot down Hagel's optimism for reconciliation.

"It won't help the peace process in any way, because we don't believe in the peace process," Mujahid said.

Instead of portraying the exchange as the beginning of reconciliation, Taliban emir Mullah Mohammed Omar called the release of the five commanders a "great victory" and a "huge and vivid triumph." The Taliban also published photos of the five released commanders as they arrived in Qatar. [See LWJ report, Mullah Omar hails release of 5 top Taliban commanders as 'great victory'.]

"This huge accomplishment brings the glad tidings of liberation of the whole country and reassures us that our aspirations are on the verge of fulfillment," Omar said, according to a statement released yesterday at the Taliban website, Voice of Jihad.

Taliban have rejected peace talks in the past

This is the second time this year that US calls for reconciliation have been rejected by the Taliban. In January, the White House reiterated that it wanted to negotiate with the Taliban.

"We call again on the Taliban to put down their arms and begin peace talks, which is the surest way to end the conflict in a peaceful manner," the White House statement said.

The Taliban immediately rejected the White House's plea for peace talks.

"We strongly reject the American demand," Zabihullah Mujahid, an official Taliban spokesman, said in an email sent to The Long War Journal.

The US government has unsuccessfully pursued peace talks with the Taliban for the past five years. The administration has stated that a peace deal with the Taliban will end the fighting and prevent al Qaeda from operating in the country.

Previously, the US has demanded that the Taliban denounce al Qaeda and join the Afghan political process. The demand that the Taliban denounce al Qaeda was dropped last year as the Taliban were permitted to open an office in Qatar. Western officials wanted the Taliban to use the office to conduct peace talks, but the Taliban insisted it was to be used to raise the profile of the group in the international community and serve as a "political office." Additionally, the Taliban said they would use the office in Qatar to secure the release of the five al Qaeda-linked commanders who were finally freed this weekend. [See LWJ report, Taliban want release of 5 al Qaeda-linked commanders in exchange for captured US soldier; and Threat Matrix report, Taliban insist on using 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,' flying flag at Qatar 'political office.']

The Taliban signaled in early 2012, during another US push for peace talks, that they had no intentions of disowning al Qaeda, and refused to denounce international terrorism. A Taliban spokesman even said that al Qaeda is officially operating under the banner of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

"They [al Qaeda] are among the first groups and banners that pledged allegiance to the Emir of the Believers [Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban], and they operate in Afghanistan under the flag of the Islamic Emirate," a spokesman to jihadist forums known as Abdullah al Wazir said in February 2012.

"They are an example of discipline and accuracy in the execution of missions and operations entrusted to them by the Military Command of the Islamic Emirate," Wazir continued, calling al Qaeda "lions in war." [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda 'operates in Afghanistan under the flag of the Islamic Emirate': Taliban spokesman; and Threat Matrix report, Taliban expand list of demands, refuse to denounce 'international terrorism.']

An Uzbek jihadist group known as the Imam Bukhari Jamaat released a video of its training camp in Syria. It is the latest video by jihadist groups that shows fighters going through training at camps inside Syria.

The video, which was produced by Al Fath Studios and released in late May, was obtained by From Chechnya to Syria, a website that tracks fighters from the Russian Caucasus and Central Asia who are fighting in Syria.

The Imam Bukhari Jamaat group is named after an Uzbek cleric who authored a collection of hadith, or traditions of the Prophet Mohammad, that are considered to be among the most authentic. The group is allied with the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, and Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar, a jihadist group led by fighters from the Islamic Caucasus Emirate.

In the video of the Imam Bukhari Jamaat's training camp, 31 trainees, who are dressed in identical uniforms and whose faces are covered, march in a double-file formation around the parade ground carrying assault weapons and other various arms. One trainee flies the black banner of jihad while marching.

The trainees then stop and stand in formation as their leader addresses an unmasked commander, whose face is digitally obscured. During the commander's address, children are seen at the camp.

After the camp commander addresses the group, footage of the fighters executing rifle drills, conducting martial arts training and exercises, and navigating an obstacle course is shown.

While the site of the camp has not been disclosed, it may be located "around Hraytan in Aleppo Province," as the group is known to operate there, according to Joanna Paraszczuk, who manages From Chechnya to Syria.

The Imam Bukhari Jamaat is the second Uzbek jihadist group to emerge in Syria in recent months. The other, the Seyfuddin Uzbek Jamaat, is led by Abu Hussein and fights for the Al Nusrah Front. US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal that the Seyfuddin Uzbek Jamaat is aided by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an al Qaeda-allied group that is active in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Central Asia. [See LWJ report, Uzbek commands group within the Al Nusrah Front.]

Jihadist groups in Syria are disclosing training camps

At least five training camps have been disclosed by jihadist groups over the past three months.

In mid-March, the Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, al Qaeda's branch in Syria, announced that it is running two training camps in Syria. Its Ayman al Zawahiri Camp is located in the city of Deir al Zour and is named after al Qaeda's current emir. The other camp, whose location was not disclosed, is called the Abu Ghadiya Camp and is named after the leader of the al Qaeda in Iraq facilitation network that was based in eastern Syria. Abu Ghadiya was killed in a US special operations raid in eastern Syria in the fall of 2008.

In the beginning of April, the Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar (Army of Emigrants and Supporters, or Muhajireen Army), a group of foreign fighters led by commanders from the Caucasus, released video of its training camp in Aleppo province. The video included footage of a bomb-making class.

And in early May, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham announced the existence of the Zarqawi Camp, which is named after the slain founder of al Qaeda in Iraq, on the outskirts of the Syrian capital of Damascus.

The videos from ISIS, Al Nusrah Front, Muhajireen Army, and Imam Bukhari Jamaat training camps are reminiscent of others released by al Qaeda from the network of camps in Afghanistan during the 1990s. Al Qaeda used camps such as Khalden and Al Farouq to churn out thousands of foreign fighters who fought alongside the Taliban in the 55th Arab Brigade. But al Qaeda also selected graduates of the camps to conduct attacks in the West, including the Sept. 11, 2001 operation against the US.

As the Obama administration seeks to invest more heavily in training and arming 'vetted, moderate' rebels in Syria's three-year civil war, a conflict that has already claimed over 150,000 lives and drawn the largest-ever concentration of foreign jihadists, the wisdom of this course becomes increasingly questionable. The US' efforts so far have brought neither loyalty to the US, nor victory or even battlefield dominance for the truly moderate rebels, who are outnumbered and outweighed by al Qaeda-linked and other Islamist groups.

Syria has become a de rigeur training ground for jihadists worldwide. Over 2,000 European jihadists alone have gone to Syria to fight, according to a recent European Union estimate. The US' weak attempts to vet, arm, and train purportedly moderate fighting groups have merely fueled an ongoing conflict that shows no signs of abating and is producing a new generation of well-connected foreign fighters who leave the Syrian killing fields to extend the Islamist fight into new battle zones. The result of the continued stalemate between the Assad regime and the rebels is the spawning of a new breed of jihadist cells carrying out a widening array of terrorist activity outside Syria.

Al Qaeda-linked groups, including the official Syrian branch known as the Al Nusrah Front, as well as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), are now running training camps in Syria that turn out jihadists capable of mounting attacks against the West. As early as December 2012, Die Welt reported that "Western intelligence operatives say that al Nusrah runs several large training camps in Syria where Islamists with fighting experience - veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan - train new recruits, including Islamists from Western countries."

In late October 2013, Mike Rogers, chairman of the US House Intelligence Committee, warned that al Qaeda allies in Syria were now "talking about conducting external operations, which is exactly what happened in Afghanistan, which led to 9/11." Days later, a senior US administration official said that ISIS is "really a transnational threat network," that poses "[an] increasing threat to our regional partners, and it's an increasing threat to us."

In March of this year, Al Nusrah announced the establishment of two training camps in Syria. And in April, the ISIS released video showing its "Zarqawi" training camp on the outskirts of Damascus. That same month, the Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar (Army of Emigrants and Supporters, or Muhajireen Army), a group of foreign fighters led by commanders from the Caucasus, released video of its training camp in Aleppo province; the video included footage of a bomb-making class. The Muhajireen Army is led by Salahuddin al Shishani, a Chechen, and is closely allied with Al Nusrah; the ISIS; and Ahrar al Sham, an al Qaeda-linked group that is part of the Islamic Front, a large Islamist coalition in Syria. Most recently, an Uzbek jihadist group known as the Imam Bukhari Jamaat has released a video of its training camp in Syria; the group is allied with Al Nusrah and the Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar.

The recent videos from ISIS, Al Nusrah, Muhajireen Army, and Uzbek jihadist training camps are reminiscent of others released by al Qaeda from the network of camps in Afghanistan during the 1990s. Al Qaeda used camps such as Khalden and Al Farouq to churn out thousands of foreign fighters who fought alongside the Taliban in the 55th Arab Brigade. Significantly, al Qaeda also selected graduates of the camps to conduct attacks in the West, including the 9/11 operation against the US. [See LWJ report, Al Nusrah Front names training camps after top al Qaeda leaders.]

Democratic governments worldwide as well as Middle Eastern kingdoms are becoming increasingly concerned about the blowback from jihadists who were either extremists before fighting in Syria or became radicalized while there. The elusive movements of returning Syrian jihadists have become moreso now that a number of countries, but by no means all, have begun criminalizing travel to and from Syria for jihad.

Efforts to track these individuals are sketchy at best, and it would appear that in most cases, the whereabouts of a returning Syrian fighter is not generally known until he or she commits a terrorist act. The problem is exacerbated by the jihadist groups' efforts to obscure the identities of fighters; in December, the Wall Street Journal reported that groups such as the Al Nusrah Front and the ISIS confiscate foreign fighters' passports and reuse them for other purposes; in addition, jihadists' deaths may be faked in order to erase their biometric data from Western databases.

The Long War Journal has noted a number of instances since 2011 in which jihadists, usually in cooperation with al Qaeda-linked groups, have left Syria and established new terrorist networks, recruited more fighters, and carried out attacks. The following list, arranged geographically, is a just a sampling. It does not include Syrian-related jihadist activity in Lebanon, Iraq, or Turkey, which is beyond the scope of this article; nor does it attempt to list every nationality in the Syrian foreign fighter ranks, as jihadists from over 70 countries are now fighting in Syria. The list below merely highlights some of the terrorist activity outside Syria that is being carried out by individuals who have participated in the Syrian jihad.

EUROPE

Belgium: On May 30, police arrested Mehdi Nemmouche, 29, a French national and ex-convict who traveled to Syria in January 2013 and is suspected of carrying out the May 24 shooting attack at a Jewish museum in Brussels that killed three people and severely injured a fourth victim. He was detained in Marseille during a random drug stop while traveling by bus from Amsterdam via Brussels. In his possession was a flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), a Kalashnikov, a handgun, and a camera containing a video in which he claimed the Brussels attack and regretted it had not been more successful. He is thought to have returned from Syria in March, after fighting with the ISIS. He reportedly had an accomplice who helped him escape after the shooting. He was already known to French intelligence at the time of the attack.

In late December, terrorist threats were made against targets in Brussels and Antwerp, including the Atomium monument and Antwerp's Central Station, warning Muslims to avoid revelers on New Year's Eve. The threats were issued on the Facebook account of a Vilvoorde member of the banned Sharia4Belgium organization who is thought to have died in Syria.

In November, politicians and the Belgian royal family received email death threats and bomb warnings that appeared to come from Islamists. Two of the targeted politicians had been involved in efforts to stop jihadists from traveling to Syria.

In October, authorities detained suspected jihadist Jejoen Bontinck, who was arrested at his home in Antwerp after returning from Syria.

In late September, Belgian police in Vilvoorde arrested Ismail Abdelatif Al Lal, a top financier for an al Qaeda-linked network based in Spain that sent Spanish and Moroccan jihadists to Syria. The head of the recruiting network was arrested on Sept. 16 in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, and eight other members were arrested in Ceuta in June. Lal had made at least three trips to Syria, accompanying suicide bombers. The judge presiding over the arrests noted that although the network was involved in sending jihadists to Syria, "there are increasing references to perform[ing] jihad at home."

In August, authorities in Antwerp and Vilvoorde discontinued welfare benefits for 29 Belgian jihadists in Syria who were were accessing their benefits through banks in Turkey. In April the federal prosecutor's office said it was aware that 33 persons from Antwerp and Vilvoorde had traveled to Syria for jihad; almost all were linked to the Islamist group Sharia4Belgium, whose leader, Fouad Belcakem, was in custody.

France: On June 2, security forces arrested four people in Paris and southern France for links to a jihadist recruiting network that sends fighters to Syria. On May 30, French authorities in Marseille arrested Mehdi Nemmouche, a suspect in the killing of three people at a Jewish museum in Brussels on May 24, who allegedly trained in Syria with terrorist groups. Authorities did not indicate whether the latest arrests are related to the arrest of Nemmouche.

In mid-May, French counterterrorism police arrested six French nationals in Strasbourg who had recently returned from fighting in Syria. Earlier in May, French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve announced the deportation of an Algerian who had been arrested in Turkey and handed over to France on suspicion of facilitating the movement of extremist fighters into Syria. The longtime French resident was linked to jihadist groups in Afghanistan and Syria.

In what is likely a low estimate, Cazeneuve claimed that some 285 French nationals were fighting in the ranks of the Syrian rebels and 120 others were currently in transit between the two countries. The figure had spiked by 75 percent in recent months, he noted, adding that 25 French nationals were known to have died fighting in Syria and about 100 had returned to France. According to a March report in The Daily Beast, in January then Interior Minister Manuel Valls "estimated that 700 French nationals or residents of France were more or less involved in the Syrian conflict, that 250 were currently in Syria, 99 were in transit to get there, 150 had showed interest in going there, 76 had already returned, and that 21 had died on Syrian soil."

On March 26, counterterrorism authorities announced the prevention of an imminent terrorist attack in the Cote d'Azur region and the arrest of a jihadist who had returned from Syria. The suspect, Ibrahim B., had fled in 2012 along with two other members of the terrorist group Cannes-Torcy to Syria, where they allegedly joined the Al Nusrah Front. A raid on his apartment in Mandelieu-La-Napoule near Cannes resulted in the seizure of 900 grams of the explosive TATP, as well as a gun and a computer. A prominent al Qaeda-linked jihadist website had recently reissued a call for attacks in France.

On March 23, Le Nouvel Observateur published an interview with Senegalese-born jihadist filmmaker Omar Diaby, also known as Omar Omsen, who claimed to be the emir of an 80-man French brigade of the Al Nusrah Front. Diaby had traveled to Mauritania, Senegal, and Turkey, as well as twice to Syria.

In December, police were formally investigating about 20 French nationals, many with dual Middle Eastern or North African citizenship, who had returned from fighting in Syria.

Some 800 French nationals are thought to have traveled to Syria to fight.

Norway: On May 27 police arrested a Somali and two Kosovans, all Norwegian citizens residing in Oslo, suspected of supporting the ISIS. The two Kosovans are brothers who reportedly fought in Syria and had a brother who died there. At least 50 Norwegians are thought to have traveled to Syria for jihad, and seven have died there, all fighting for the ISIS. Norwegian Islamists in the Prophet's Ummah group advised members to use encrypted chats when talking about the Syrian jihad.

In early May, Albanian and Norwegian media noted the death in Syria of Egzon Avdyli, an ethnic Kosovan who had grown up in Norway. He is said to have died while fighting in the ISIS ranks. Avdyli, a former spokesman for the Norwegian radical Islamist group Prophet's Ummah, reportedly left Norway for Syria early this year. A Norwegian journalist who had interviewed Avdyli several times said Avdyli had encouraged other young people to travel to Syria for jihad and also "supported the establishment of an Islamic state in Norway or other Western countries." Norwegian intelligence now considers the danger of jihadists returning from Syria to be the most significant terror threat to Norway. [See Threat Matrix report, Norwegian Islamist who fought for ISIS killed in Syria.]

Spain: On May 30, Security forces in Melilla arrested six jihadists involved in a network that sends fighters to al Qaeda camps in Syria, Mali, and Libya. Cell leader Benaissa Laghmouchi Baghdadi, 42, who had spent eight months in Syria, has ties to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in Mali. Some of the six suspects are also linked to Sharia4Spain, a branch of a global Internet-based jihadist network, which recruits fighters for Syria and Mali.

On April 30, Spanish security forces, working with French police, arrested Abdelmalek Tanem, an Algerian national who also has French citizenship, in Almeria. He had recently returned from Syria, where he worked as a facilitator along the Turkish border, integrating European jihadists into the Al Nusrah Front and the ISIS.

In a joint operation in mid-March, Spanish and Moroccan authorities targeting an al Qaeda recruiting network arrested four suspected members in Spain and three in Morocco. The network, whose activities extend to Morocco, Belgium, France, Tunisia, Turkey, Libya, Mali, Indonesia, and Syria, is headed by Melilla resident Mustafa Maya Amaya, who funneled recruits to the ISIS, the Al Nusrah Front, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Some of the suspects arrested in the operation had returned home after going to conflict zones such as Syria; and in January, a suspected jihadist returning from Syria was arrested in Malaga as a potential "threat to national security," CNN reported.

Sweden: In October 2013, Haytham Rahmeh, the Syrian-born former leader of a Stockholm mosque, was said to have smuggled large quantities of weapons to Syrian rebels for the prior 18 months. Rahmeh, a member of the Syrian National Council and a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, reportedly purchased the weapons mainly in Libya, and with the help of the Commission for Civilian Protection transported them through Turkey to Syria.

In June 2013, the chief analyst at the Swedish intelligence agency expressed concern about the dangers of Syrian jihadists, noting that at least 30 Swedes were known to have fought in Syria, and "many" had returned. Among those jihadists known to have gone to Syria are some who planned attacks in Sweden and "have been part of this violence-endorsing Islamist, or al Qaeda-inspired, environment for quite some time," he stated. Professor Magnus Ranstorp of Sweden's National Defence College observed that while Germany has a program for ex-jihadists, not a single person in Sweden had defected from jihadism, so far as he knew. [See Threat Matrix report, Swedish intelligence concerned about Syrian jihadists.]

United Kingdom: Two young men were arrested at Heathrow airport on May 31 for suspected involvement in Syria-related terrorism. One was thought to be engaged in funding terrorism in Syria. According to the Daily Mail, the Queen's Speech on June 4 will mention "plans to target the estimated 400 extremists with British links who have travelled to Syria since the conflict began."

On May 20, Mashudur Choudhury, 31, became the first Briton convicted of a Syria-related terrorism crime. The former youth worker at a Portsmouth mosque had traveled to Syria in October with four other men to join the ISIS, and was detained upon his return.

On March 1, former Guantanamo detainee Moazzam Begg, 45, and Gerrie Tahari, a 44-year-old woman, pled not guilty to charges of providing terrorism training and funding terrorism overseas, and were remanded in custody. They were arrested in Birmingham along with two other men. Begg, an activist for an organization advocating for rights of counterterrorism detainees, was arrested on suspicion of having attended a terrorist training camp in Syria and assisting with terrorism there.

In February, British authorities were said to be "closely monitoring" some 250 British jihadists who have fought in Syria and returned home. A British fighter with the ISIS in Syria appeared in a YouTube clip warning aspiring British jihadists of the difficulties of the battle zone.

AFRICA

Libya: An Egyptian Interpol officer recently told Al Shorfa that the agency has been trying for months to help Maghreb countries deal with the reverse migration of jihadists from Syria. Interpol is currently focusing on those who have fought with Al Nusrah, ISIS, and other armed terrorist groups.

In an April Daily Beast article on the takeover of a former US special forces training base outside Tripoli by al Qaeda-linked forces, a US military official said: "Libya in general is a major thoroughfare, the I-95 for foreign fighters into Syria from Africa."

On March 2, the bodies of four alleged Ansar al Sharia members who had fought in Syria were found on a road linking Benghazi's Benina airport to Al-Abya.

In August 2013, Israel National News reported on Ansar al Sharia training camps in Libya that were actively training and exporting fighters for the jihad in Syria. Evidence indicated that the Libyan training camps were in operation as early as April 2012, months before Ansar al Sharia's deadly attack on the US mission in Benghazi, and that they involved coordination with Tunisian facilitators who assisted in preparing the jihadists to fight in Syria.

Hundreds, if not thousands, of Libyan fighters are thought to have traveled to Syria to fight with rebel groups. Many of these Libyans are believed to be fighting with the ISIS or the Al Nusrah Front. Abd al Mahdi al Harati, a deputy of Abdul Hakim Belhaj, the former emir of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, led 6,000 fighters in a brigade known as Liwa al Ummah for six months in 2012. The unit was comprised primarily of Syrian fighters, but included a large contingent of Libyans, Sudanese, Palestinians, Egyptians, and Arabs.

Tunisia: In February, Kamel Zarrouk, the deputy emir of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, was reported to have been killed while fighting alongside the ISIS in Syria. In May 2013, he claimed that "the Al Nusrah Front, Ansar al Shariah, al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and the mujahedeen in Somalia, Mali, and Algeria, we all stand united against our enemies." He is known to to have recruited youths in Tunisia to wage jihad in Syria.

Tunisians make up one of the largest groups of foreign fighters in Syria. More than 5,000 Tunisians are thought to have traveled to Syria to fight with the rebels. In early February, Tunisian Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou claimed that the government has prevented more than 8,000 of his countrymen from traveling to Syria to wage jihad.

Tunisians who have fought in Syria have appeared prominently in Ansar al Sharia's propaganda. Ansar al Sharia Tunisia has released numerous images of Tunisian "martyrs" who died while waging jihad in Syria. So many Tunisians have fought in Syria that in March 2013, Ansar al Sharia Tunisia's leader Seifallah ben Hassine (a.k.a. Abu Iyad al Tunisi) discouraged the practice and said the wars in Syrian and Mali have "emptied Tunisia of its young." Similarly, al Qaeda-linked groups in Syria have also featured Tunisians in their propaganda. [See LWJ report, Ansar al Sharia Tunisia deputy leader reportedly in Syria.]

MIDDLE EAST

Egypt: On April 10, Egyptian authorities arrested Wael Ahmed Abdel Fattah on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks in Egypt. State media said he had returned from Syria, where he fought with the Al Nusrah Front. Between November 2013 and April 2014, the al Qaeda-linked terrorist group Ansar Jerusalem (Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) confirmed that at least four of its fighters who died in Egypt had fought in Syria prior to returning to Egypt. [See Threat Matrix report, Al Nusrah Front fighter reportedly arrested for planning attacks in Egypt.]

In late March, security sources said some of those arrested during a recent raid on an Ansar Jerusalem cell had previously fought in Syria. On March 10, Egyptian authorities arrested Mohammed Durri Ahmad al Taliawi in connection with car bomb attacks in Cairo on Jan. 24 that were claimed by both Ansar Jerusalem and a smaller jihadist group, Ajnad Misr. He had previously been to Libya and Syria, where he "took part in terrorist acts." He also was linked to a case involving Mohammed al Zawahiri, the brother of al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri. Two other terrorists, Ansar Jerusalem's Walid Badr and Saaed al Shahat, both fought in Syria before returning to Egypt, where they died. [See Threat Matrix report, Egypt says suspect in Cairo attack fought in Syria and Libya.]

Walid Badr, a former army officer, was a suicide bomber in a failed assassination attempt against Egypt's Interior Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim, on Sept. 5. Badr had reportedly been trained by Muhammad Jamal al Kashef, a UN-designated terrorist and longtime subordinate to al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri. [See LWJ report, Ansar Jerusalem releases video of assassination attempt on Egypt's interior minister.]

Badr's accomplices included "Egyptians and two Palestinians who joined the Free Syrian Army and Al-Nusra Front," Egyptian media reported in February, noting that the arrests were made by Egyptian authorities "targeting Syrian suspects." One source said the "suspects returned from Syria because the jihad in Egypt became a duty particularly after the toppling of ousted President Mohamed Mursi." [See LWJ report, More ties between Ansar Jerusalem and the Syrian jihad reported.]

Shahat had participated in Egypt's Arab Spring uprising in 2011, traveled to Syria to fight with the rebels, and subsequently returned to Egypt to be with his "mujahideen brothers" and partake "with them in their jihad and preparation." He blew himself up to avoid capture by Egyptian security forces in December 2013. [See Threat Matrix report, Egypt identifies Ansar Jerusalem leader as group announces deaths of fighter and preacher.]

Israel: Since the start of the Syrian conflict, the Shin Bet has warned that authorities "fear they [Israeli Arabs] will be exploited by terrorists [in Syria], both as a source of information about targets in Israel, as well as for carrying out military operations against Israel." In July 2013, Hikmat Massarwa, an Israeli Arab from Taybe, was sentenced to 30 months in jail. He had gone to Syria and trained with members of the Syrian opposition. While in Syria, Massarwa had been asked to carry out a suicide attack in Israel, but he declined. As of October 2013, at least 10 Israeli Arabs were thought to have joined the rebels in their fight against the Assad regime. Some of those who fought in Syria and returned to Israel have been arrested by Israeli authorities. [See Threat Matrix report, Israeli Arab reportedly killed fighting regime forces in Syria.]

Jordan: In July 2013, Jordanian Salafist sources claimed that over 500 Jordanian jihadists had gone to Syria and a number of them had joined the Al Nusrah Front.

In late 2012, al Qaeda commissioned a cell of Jordanian citizens who had fought in Syria to plot attacks inside their home country. They reportedly were targeting the US Embassy and were planning a complex assault that involved other targets as well. [See Al Qaeda and the threat in Syria, Thomas Joscelyn's September 2013 testimony to the House Committee on Homeland Security.]

Palestinian Territories: In June 2013, jihadists in Syria called on Hamas fighters as well as members of other Palestinian factions in Gaza to join the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC), an al Qaeda-linked consolidation of a number of Salafi jihadist groups operating in the Gaza Strip.

And in May 2013, a video featuring Abu Talha al Libi, the sharia official of the Chechen-led Muhajireen Army, was released by the Ibn Tamiyyah Media Center (ITMC). In the video, titled "Fear Allah, O Hamas," al Libi slammed Hamas' campaign against Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip. The Muhajireen Army (Emigrants' Army), a unit consisting of foreign jihadists who fight in Syria, is closely allied with the ISIS, and also fights alongside the Al Nusrah Front. [See LWJ report, Salafi jihadist from Gaza reportedly killed fighting for ISIS in Syria.]

Saudi Arabia: In March, Suleiman al Sabi'ee, a Saudi jihadist who had recently returned from Syria, told a Saudi TV interviewer about his experience fighting alongside the ISIS. He had decided to head to Syria after his brother was killed while fighting alongside the Syrian rebels. During his sojourn in Syria, al Sabi'ee, who has a strong social media presence and sizable following on sites such as Twitter and Keek, quickly discovered that ISIS was interested in using his social media accounts as a platform for spreading the group's message. Al Sabi'ee alleged that ISIS members took over his social media accounts and exploited his large following to call others to participate in jihad; he also claimed that ISIS members used his accounts to attack the Saudi royal family and incite violence against the Saudi government. [See Threat Matrix report, Saudi jihadi recounts his time with ISIS.]

Yemen: In early May, a Yemeni official told The Long War Journal that the April 20 airstrikes on an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula training camp in Al Mahfad were intended not only to destroy AQAP's base and sites in Al Mahfad and deter their recruiting and training capability, but also to kill Saudi fighters who had returned from Syria. He said that "dozens [of Saudis have] infiltrated the border and joined AQAP." More than 30 AQAP fighters were killed in the drone strike and accompanying Yemeni airstrikes. [See LWJ report, AQAP notes death of local leader in drone strike.]

ASIA

Kyrgyzstan: In early February, authorities announced the arrest of six suspected terrorists in Osh; some had allegedly trained in international terrorist group camps in Syria and fought there before returning to Kyrgyzstan. The suspects were said to be planning attacks in Osh and Bishkek. Kyrgyz fighters are known to have traveled to Syria and some have joined the Al Nusrah Front.

In September 2013, a Kazakh national and two Kyrgyz citizens who recently returned from fighting in Syria were arrested in the southern region of Osh on terrorism charges. Authorities said the three men had been dispatched from Syria by the Union of Islamic Jihad (IJU) to conduct terrorist activity in Kyrgyzstan.

Pakistan: In July 2013, Reuters reported that the Pakistani Taliban had sent "hundreds of men" to Syria to fight alongside their "Mujahedeen friends," at the request of "Arab friends." A Pakistani Taliban commander said: "We have established our own camps in Syria. Some of our people go and then return after spending some time fighting there." Members of al Qaeda and other and various Central Asian groups were also said to be traveling from Pakistan to Syria to fight. [See Threat Matrix report, Hundreds of Pakistani jihadists reported in Syria.]

Incidentally, back in 2009, LWJ reported that more than 20 Britons who had trained in al Qaeda terror camps inside Pakistan had returned to Britain, and that Pakistan's intelligence agency, which had been monitoring them, did not inform British authorities until after the men had entered the UK. British authorities were said to be "nearly overwhelmed" at the time in tracking these returning jihadists. Al Qaeda was already known to be running several camps for Westernized members. In October 2007, the presence of one such facility, in Mir Ali in North Waziristan, had been noted. "According to the intelligence reports, this al-Qaeda camp is planning attacks in Europe, notably the United Kingdom, Germany and France," the Asia Times reported. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda-trained Britons return from Pakistan.] The author of that Asia Times report, Syed Saleem Shahzad, was tortured and killed in May 2011, allegedly by Pakistan's intelligence agency.

The US killed three al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula fighters, including a local commander, in the first recorded drone strike in more than three weeks.

The strike, which took place last evening in the Maghifar area of the Wadi Abida district in Yemen's central province of Marib, targeted a pickup truck, according to local reports. Yemeni tribal leaders said that Jafar al Shabwani, a local AQAP commander from the Al Shabwan tribe of Wadi Abida, and two of his fighters were killed in the airstrike.

AQAP has not released an official statement on the strike or a martyrdom statement for al Shabwani.

Wadi Abida has long been considered an AQAP stronghold and recruiting base in Marib, and local tribes regularly provide AQAP militants with protection and cover.

The US has conducted six other drone strikes in Wadi Abida since October 2012. Three of those strikes took place this year, two occurred in 2012, and one was conducted in 2012. Thirty-one AQAP fighters and two civilians are reported to have been killed in the six strikes, according to data compiled by The Long War Journal.

The Wadi Abida district was also the location of the last recorded drone strike in Yemen. On May 12, the remotely piloted Reapers or Predators targeted a vehicle as it was driving in the village of Husoun al-Jalal. Six AQAP fighters are thought to have been killed in the attack.

Last night's strike highlights a continuing trend of the US targeting local AQAP commanders and fighters who are waging a local insurgency against the Yemeni government. This trend was first identified by The Long War Journal in the spring of 2012 [see LWJ report, US drone strike kills 8 AQAP fighters, from May 10, 2012].

This contradicts a US Department of Justice white paper that claimed the drone program will target only those AQAP operatives who "present an 'imminent' threat of violent attack against the United States."

Background on US strikes in Yemen

The US has launched 13 strikes in Yemen so far this year. In addition to last night's strike, one strike took place in May, and there were four April, four in March, and three in January. The uptick in strikes in March and April coincided with a Yemeni military offensive to dislodge AQAP from strongholds in Abyan and Shabwa provinces.

The pace of the drone strikes in Yemen decreased last year from the previous year (26 in 2013, versus 41 in 2012). The reduction in the number of strikes coincided with a speech by President Barack Obama at the National Defense University in May 2013. The strikes are being reduced as the US government is facing increasing international criticism for conducting the attacks in both Yemen and Pakistan.

The number of strikes might have been much lower in 2013 were it not for an al Qaeda plot emanating from Yemen that was uncovered by US officials in late July. The plot led the US to close down more than 20 embassies and diplomatic facilities across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The plot involved AQAP emir Nasir al Wuhayshi, who now also serves as al Qaeda's general manager.

Between July 27, after the plot was disclosed, and Aug. 10, the US launched nine strikes in Yemen; no drone strikes were reported for seven weeks prior to July 27. The burst in attacks was intended to disrupt the plot and take out AQAP's top leadership cadre and senior operatives. The US killed Kaid al Dhahab, AQAP's emir for Baydah province, during that time period.

AQAP and al Qaeda still seek to conduct attacks against the US. In a recent AQAP video featuring Nasir al Wuhayshi, who is both the emir of AQAP and al Qaeda's overall general manager, he said America remains a target.

"O brothers, the Crusader enemy is still shuffling his papers, so we must remember that we are always fighting the biggest enemy, the leaders of disbelief, and we have to overthrow those leaders, we have to remove the Cross, and the carrier of the Cross is America," Wuhayshi said.

Wuhayshi made the statement in the open to a gathering of more than 100 people.

For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US airstrikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2014.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham seized control of several neighborhoods in the central Iraqi city of Samarra during an assault launched earlier today.

Over 150 ISIS fighters entered the city on pickup trucks mounted with antiaircraft guns and attacked police forces in eastern Samarra, according to news reports. At least six policemen were killed and dozens more were wounded during the fighting. One unconfirmed report indicated that 38 policemen were killed.

The ISIS has taken control of the neighborhoods of al Muthana, al Jubairiya, Salah al Din, and al Shuhda, and "parts of the al Khadhra," according to Ammon News.

Police forces retreated to protect other areas of the city, including the al Askaria Mosque, one of the most holy shrines in Shia Islam. Al Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor of the ISIS, bombed the Golden Dome of the al Askaria Mosque in February 2006, sparking sectarian fighting between Iraq's Shia and Sunnis.

Iraqi warplanes are reported to be targeting ISIS units in Samarra, but there are no reports on the number of ISIS casualties.

Samarra was a major hub for al Qaeda in Iraq between 2005 and 2007. Samarra also served as a base for al Furqan, the group's media operation, before US special operations forces heavily targeted its cells in the city in 2007. Top al Qaeda in Iraq leaders have been killed in the city in the past.

Samarra is the latest Iraqi city to fall under full or partial control of the ISIS. The ISIS, along with anti-government tribes, remains in control of Fallujah after taking over the city in early January.

The ISIS also controls other towns and rural areas in Anbar. Two days ago, the Iraqi military launched an offensive to recapture the town of Saqlawiyah. The results of the operation have not been disclosed.

The ISIS has been able to display its military power in Anbar. In late March, the ISIS paraded scores of vehicles and hundreds of fighters from Fallujah to Abu Ghraib, a city just miles outside of Baghdad. The parade was held in daylight, and Iraqi forces did not attempt to attack the ISIS column.

The ISIS was al Qaeda's official branch in Iraq before a dispute with another branch in Syria, the Al Nusrah Front, led al Qaeda's General Command to disown the ISIS earlier this year. While the ISIS has lost territory in Syria due to fighting with Al Nusrah and other groups in Syria, it has continued to expand areas under its control in Iraq.

This week Boko Haram militants have continued their insurgency across northern Nigeria with little challenge from Nigerian authorities.

Between June 2 and June 3, the group conducted a number of attacks, killing over 200 civilians in several villages in northeastern Nigeria. In one instance, Boko Haram members dressed as soldiers told townspeople that they had come to protect residents. After gathering them in the town center, the militants began shouting "Allahu akbar" and opened fire, killing dozens. Some villagers who attempted to flee were shot and killed by gunmen lurking outside the village.

The villages attacked included Danjara, Agapalwa, and Antagara in the Gwoza local government district. The emir of Gwoza was shot and killed last week by Boko Haram militants as he rode in a convoy with other community leaders.

Another report indicated that a fourth town, Goshe, was also hit by Boko Haram, where at least 100 people were killed. One resident said: "They laid siege on the village and opened fire with Kalashnikovs and fired RPGs, burning the entire village with its 300 homes and a few mosques."

The deceptive tactic of dressing as Nigerian soldiers offering protection appears to have become part of Boko Haram's modus operandi. Wearing military uniforms, Boko Haram militants kidnapped over 200 schoolgirls in Chibok in April. One student, who managed to escape after the kidnapping, commented that "[w]hen we saw these gunmen, we thought they were soldiers, they told all of us to come and walk to the gates, we followed their instructions."

On June 4, militants committed a particularly nasty attack on Barderi, a village near Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. Telling villagers that they were going to preach to them, the militants opened fire as they gathered, killing at least 45 civilians.

Early in the morning today, militants fought with Nigerian security forces for three hours in Madagali in Adamawa state in northeastern Nigeria, where the attackers burnt down several buildings, including a church, and killed two civilians.

Heavily criticized for its lack of successful action against Boko Haram, the Nigerian military conducted an aerial bombardment of Boko Haram strongholds on June 4.

The airstrikes are likely to do little to change the score significantly between the Nigerian military and Boko Haram, however, and they are less likely to improve the military's efficacy and image. The Nigerian military and government have been heavily criticized for their response to Boko Haram, particularly to the April abductions.

Additionally, there have been reports of suspected collusion between members of Boko Haram and Nigeria's security forces. The fact that Boko Haram members have been seen on several occasions wearing Nigerian military uniforms in itself suggests links between individuals within the security structure and Boko Haram. On June 3, it was reported that 15 senior Nigerian military officers, including 10 generals, were found guilty by court martial of sharing information and ammunition with Boko Haram.

Striving to build an Islamic state in Nigeria, Boko Haram appears to be continuing to increase its operational tempo. In the near term, it does not appear that the Nigerian military is moving quickly to confront the threat and it is likely that Boko Haram will be able to continue launching attacks on innocent civilians in northern Nigeria.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham, a former al Qaeda affiliate that operates in Iraq and Syria, praised French, German, and Libyan suicide bombers in the latest release of its English-language magazine, which is called "Islamic State News." The three suicide bombers are the latest foreign "martyrs" celebrated by the ISIS.

The second edition of Islamic State News, an 11-page digital magazine comprised of photographs, short captions, and statements, was released yesterday by the al I'tisaam Media Foundation, the ISIS' official media outlet. The magazine was obtained by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Islamic State News breaks out its updates by wilayats, which are divisions or administrative units of the Islamic State. The ISIS has identified 16 wilayats in territory under its control or influence in Iraq and Syria. [See LWJ report, ISIS' 'Southern Division' praises foreign suicide bombers.]

The announcement of the suicide bombers is on the third page under the heading "Wilayat Homs."

Photographs of the three suicide bombers are published under the statement "Victory through Allah and then the truthfulness of the istishhadiyyun." The term 'istishhadiyyun' is used to describe suicide bombers. Photographs of large smoke plumes from explosions, presumably from the bomb blasts, are shown next to those of the French and Libyan suicide bombers.

The dates and results of the suicide attacks were not disclosed. Nor were the true identities of the three suicide bombers; only their noms de guerre were provided.

The French suicide bomber, identified as Abdur-Raheeem al Faransi, reportedly conducted his attack in the village of Umm al 'Amad.

The German suicide bomber, identified as Uthman al Almani, is said to have launched his attack in the village of Al Kaafaat.

And the Libyan suicide bomber was identified as Abu Aasim al Libi. He executed his attack in the village of Al Hiraki.

ISIS increases its propaganda on foreign suicide bombers

Over the past several months, the ISIS' Baghdad, Southern, Ninewa, and Diyala divisions have all released statements that celebrated foreign suicide bombers.

The ISIS has said that suicide bombers from Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan or Pakistan, Tajikistan, the Russian Republic of Chechnya, France, Germany, England, and Denmark have carried out attacks for the group.

Just as its feud with al Qaeda over the ISIS' expansion into Syria began heating up, the ISIS began to increase its propaganda highlighting the role of foreign suicide bombers in its operations. The uptick in such propaganda may be an attempt to emphasize the international nature of the group's cadre. The ISIS and its emir, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, are seeking to portray themselves as the true standardbearers of international jihad instead of a regional terror group focused on Iraq and Syria. And the ISIS is signaling to foreign jihadists that they should join the terror group's ranks as their deaths will be celebrated as martyrdoms.

Just one day after the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham launched an assault on Samarra and briefly took control of five neighborhoods, the jihadist insurgent group attempted to seize Mosul. Additionally, the ISIS took over Anbar University in Ramadi and held hundreds of students and staff hostage for several hours before retreating.

Yesterday evening, hundreds of ISIS fighters "advanced on Mosul from the northwest and deployed in large numbers in the west of the city," Reuters reported. Three Iraqi soldiers and four policemen were killed in the resulting clashes.

In southern Mosul, a suicide assault team made up of five heavily armed ISIS fighters attacked a weapons depot and killed 11 soldiers. Some of the members of the suicide assault team detonated their suicide jackets during the raid. And in the nearby village of Muwaffakiya, a minority Shabak community, a pair of suicide car bombs killed six people.

It is unclear how much of Mosul was briefly under ISIS control before Iraqi forces launched their counterattack. Iraqi officials told the news agency that an estimated 10 percent of Mosul still remains under ISIS influence. The military claims to have killed 105 ISIS fighters and destroyed more than 20 vehicles as most of the ISIS assault team withdrew to desert areas on the outskirts of Mosul.

Mosul was the last major city to serve as a bastion for the ISIS after the US and Iraqi forces launched counterinsurgency operations as part of the surge that began in 2007. By the time US forces left Iraq at the end of 2011, the ISIS was operating as terrorist cells in the city. Close proximity to Syria allowed the ISIS to continue operating in Mosul and the northwestern province of Ninewa. The ISIS began reasserting itself as the Syrian civil war picked up steam in the summer of 2011 and US forces withdrew from Iraq a few months later in December.

Attack on Anbar University

Today in Ramadi, the provincial capital of Anbar, an ISIS assault team killed three policemen who were guarding the entrance to Anbar University. The ISIS team then entered the university and held dozens of student hostage.

Iraqi forces battled with ISIS fighters as students fled the university grounds. The ISIS abandoned the school during the clash. No students were killed.

Ramadi was one of two major cities in Anbar that were taken over by the ISIS at the very beginning of this year. Although Iraqi forces claimed to have retaken control of Ramadi, clashes are routinely reported both inside and outside the city. Earlier this week, a suicide bomber killed one of the top leaders of the Anbar Awakening, an anti-ISIS tribal militia that is supported by the government. Fallujah remains under the control of the ISIS and allied tribal groups.

The ISIS, which was al Qaeda's official branch in Iraq, established the Al Nusrah Front in Syria. Al Nusrah formally announced its existence in January 2012. This year, al Qaeda's General Command disowned the ISIS in April after a yearlong dispute over leadership of the jihad in Syria broke out into fighting between the ISIS on one side and Al Nusrah, allied with jihadist and Free Syrian Army groups, on the other.

The jihadist infighting in Syria does not appear to be negatively impacting the ISIS' military operations in Iraq, however. The ISIS has gained control of large parts of Anbar as well as areas in Salahaddin, Diyala, and Ninewa provinces, and has stepped up attacks in other provinces. The ISIS maintains training camps in both Iraq and Syria, and is able to launch massed assaults in multiple provinces simultaneously, while continuing to deploy suicide bombers, IEDs, and assassination teams in both countries.

Khairullah Said Wali Khairkhwa.

Two court decisions provide insights into the career of Khairullah Khairkhwa, who was recently transferred from Guantanamo to Qatar along with four other senior Taliban leaders in exchange for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl.

On May 27, 2011, District Court Judge Ricardo Urbina published his opinion rejecting Khairkhwa's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. And, on Dec. 14, 2012, the DC Circuit Court issued its ruling affirming Judge Urbina's opinion.

The courts concluded that Khairkhwa was a member of the Taliban's Supreme Shura council, an elite group of 10 leaders who reported directly to Mullah Omar. The Shura oversaw the Taliban's military and intelligence operations, as well as other activities.

A recent piece published by the Los Angeles Times, "Most of 5 freed Taliban prisoners have less than hard-core pasts," argued that Khairkhwa was a "moderate" political figure within the Taliban and had no military responsibilities. The court decisions reveal, however, that this is not true. Khairkhwa held multiple positions within the Taliban's pre-9/11 regime, including governor of Herat province and interior minister. His responsibilities included a military role.

Khairkhwa remained one of Mullah Omar's closest confidantes until his capture in 2002. And intelligence in the US government's possession shows that he had direct ties to Osama bin Laden.

"Even after his appointment as Governor of Herat in 1999, [Khairkhwa] remained integrally involved in the Taliban's military forces, operating within the Taliban's formal command structure and facilitating the movement of Taliban troops both before and after the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom," Judge Urbina's opinion reads. "Moreover, on the eve of Operation Enduring Freedom, [Khairkhwa] was dispatched to Iran by Taliban leaders in Kandahar to discuss Iran's offer to provide military assistance to the Taliban in anticipation of the imminent U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan."

The Long War Journal has previously documented Khairkhwa's role in the Iran-al Qaeda dealings, in which two former foes joined together against a common enemy. [See LWJ reports, Iran and the Taliban, allies against America and DC district court denies former Taliban governor's habeas petition.]

The Iranians promised the Taliban three things during this and other meetings: to provide the Taliban with weapons, open the borders for "Arabs" (meaning al Qaeda operatives) traveling to Afghanistan to fight, and to help negotiate a pact with the Northern Alliance. The third initiative was fruitless, as the Northern Alliance remained opposed to the Taliban. The other two have come to fruition. In the years that followed Khairkhwa's meeting with the Iranians, Iran supplied the Taliban with weapons. And, according to the Treasury and State Departments, al Qaeda operates a facilitation network inside Iran to this day that shuttles fighters to and from South Asia. In other words, the terms of assistance offered by Iran were very real.

Khairkhwa's military role went far beyond the meetings with the Iranians. According to Judge Urbina's ruling, Khairkhwa "has also exhibited a detailed knowledge about sensitive military-related matters, such as locations, personnel and resources of Taliban military installations, the relative capabilities of different weapons systems and the locations of weapons caches."

Judge Urbina continued:

Furthermore, the petitioner operated within the Taliban's formal command structure, providing material support to Taliban fighters both before and after the outset of hostilities with U.S. coalition forces. These facts are consistent with the Taliban's governance model, in which nearly all senior Taliban officials were tasked with both civilian and military responsibilities.

And, according to the Circuit Court's decision, Khairkhwa knew so much about the Taliban's arms that he "provided detailed information of the Taliban's assessments of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and of the Taliban's efforts to obtain and protect Stinger missiles."

Some have argued that Khaikhwa was attempting to either join or surrender to Hamid Karzai's government when he was captured.

This is not what happened, according to the DC District Court and the Circuit Court, both of which rejected Khaikhwa's claims. First, the District Court found that there is no evidence Khairkhwa attempted to turn himself into American forces (another story that was offered during Khairkhwa's habeas hearing). Nor is there any evidence that Khairkhwa was a "moderate" who was trying to distance himself from the Taliban.

District Court Judge Urbina found [citations omitted]:

Likewise, even if the petitioner contacted Hamid Karzai in mid-November 2001 to discuss the possibility of surrender, the petitioner did not turn himself in, but was instead captured in Chaman, Pakistan approximately three months later. The petitioner has provided no credible explanation for what he was doing or what steps he had taken to disassociate himself from the Taliban during the months after he allegedly contacted Hamid Karzai to discuss the possibility of surrender.

Judge Urbina went on to evaluate other aspects of Khairkhwa's story. Khairkhwa claimed that he went to Chaman, Pakistan (instead of turning himself in Afghanistan, which would have been the easier option) simply because he needed medical treatment for his stomach. Not so, according to the District Court [citations omitted]:

[Khairkhwa], however, was not captured at a medical office in Chaman. Rather, it is undisputed that the petitioner was captured at the Pakistani residence of senior Taliban official Abdul Manan Niazi. As previously discussed, Niazi was a former Taliban military commander and Governor of Kabul, who had personally overseen the massacre of thousands of Shiites in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998 and was part of the Taliban delegation that traveled to Iran in October 2001 to discuss Iran's offer to provide military assistance to the Taliban. The fact that [Kharikhwa] was captured at the home of a hardline Taliban military commander greatly undermines the [Khairkhwa's] contention that he had disassociated himself from the Taliban prior to his apprehension by Pakistani authorities.

In sum, Judge Urbina found:

Throughout his tenure in the Taliban, [Khairkhwa] remained a prominent leader and a close ally of Mullah Omar. [Khairkhwa's] ties to Mullah Omar persisted even after a U.S. cruise missile struck Mullah Omar's vehicle in the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom, and Mullah Omar limited his contacts to his most trusted lieutenants, including [Khairkhwa].

Thus, Khairkhwa remained very much in the fight after the US-led invasion began. The Circuit Court found a complete "absence of anything showing that he dissociated himself from the Taliban." Contacting Karzai or other officials is not evidence that Khairkhwa had a change of heart. He was merely seeking possible alternative paths for survival during the initial American onslaught -- "hedging his bets," as the District Court found. But even then Khairkhwa stuck with the Taliban.

The book on Khairkhwa is even more disturbing. During Khairkhwa's habeas proceedings, according to Judge Urbina's decision, the US government "raised a host of additional allegations against [Khairkhwa], including allegations that the petitioner had ties to Usama bin Ladin, harbored al Qaida operatives in Herat during his tenure as Governor of Herat and commanded a Taliban garrison at Mazar-e-Sharif during Operation Enduring Freedom." The court did not address these allegations because other evidence was "sufficient to establish the lawfulness of [Khairkhwa's] detention."

As The Long War Journal has reported, the allegations of Khairkhwa's ties to bin Laden and al Qaeda are contained in the declassified and leaked files authored by Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). The fact that the government introduced these allegations into evidence during Khairkhwa's habeas proceedings demonstrates that it still believes this evidence to be true. That is, the US government still believes that Khairkhwa was tied to al Qaeda's most senior leader.

In any event, there is no material dispute over Khairkhwa's importance, regardless of the tales some are now arguing.

According to Judge Urbina's ruling, Kharikhwa "rose to the highest level of the Taliban and had close ties to Mullah Omar, who repeatedly appointed [Kharikwha] to sensitive, high-profile positions." Even "after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, [Khairkhwa] remained within Mullah Omar's inner circle, despite the fact that Mullah Omar had limited his contacts to only his most trusted commanders."

The Circuit Court found that the Taliban's Supreme Shura council, which Khairkhwa sat on, "supervised subordinate councils responsible for military operations" and was staffed with "military commanders." Khairkhwa was "no exception," as he, too, had commanded Taliban forces.

And now Khairkhwa has been released to Qatar. It is no wonder why Mullah Omar is so pleased.

Note: A version of this article was published at The Weekly Standard.

The Movement of the Taliban claimed credit for last night's assault on Jinnah Airport in Karachi that shut down all flights, and said the attack was executed to avenge the death of Hakeemullah Mehsud, the former leader of the group who was killed in a US drone strike last year.

The assault was executed by 10 heavily armed Taliban fighters, some of whom are said to be of Uzbek nationality, Pakistani officials told Dawn. If true, these are likely to be members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the jihadist group that is allied with the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan and al Qaeda.

The Taliban fighters clashed with Pakistani police and airport security guards at a terminal for nearly six hours until the fighting ended. Security officials confirmed that the airport was cleared of Taliban fighters 12 hours after the assault began. Flights to and from the airport were suspended during the fighting.

All 10 Taliban fighters and other 18 people, including 11 security guards and four airport workers, were killed during the fighting.

Pakistani officials claimed that the Taliban sought to destroy the airplanes at the terminal.

Taliban groups on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have viewed air bases and airports as significant targets. Two of the more prominent attacks over the past several years include the Afghan Taliban's assault on Camp Bastion in Helmand in September 2012 (two US Marines were killed, and six Harriers were destroyed and two more were damaged); and the Pakistani Taliban's attack on Pakistani Naval Station Mehran in Karachi in May 2011 (10 Pakistani troops were killed, and two US-made P-3C Orion maritime surveillance planes were destroyed and another was damaged).

Taliban spokesman Shahidullah Shahid took credit for last night's assault, and said it was executed to avenge the death of Hakeemullah, who was killed by US drones in November 2013, as well as revenge for military attacks in Pakistan's tribal areas.

"We carried out this attack on the Karachi airport and it is a message to the Pakistan government that we are still alive to react over the killings of innocent people in bomb attacks on their villages," Shahid said, according to Dawn.

"It's just the beginning, we have taken revenge for one [Hakeemullah], we have to take revenge for hundreds," he continued, indicating that the ceasefire between the government and the Taliban has been discarded.

Shahid also described the Pakistani government's negotiating tactics as a "tool of war."

As talks between the Taliban and the government broke down over the past several months, the Pakistani military launched a series of attacks against the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan as well as against groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Turkistan Islamic Party in North Waziristan. The Taliban have claimed the military has used indiscriminate force and has leveled villages.

Yesterday's attack took place less than two weeks after a faction of the Mehsud branch of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, which is led by Khalid Mehsud, also known as Sajna Mehsud, split from the large movement. Sajna favors peace talks with the government, and has allied with the so-called "good Taliban" groups such as the Hafiz Gul Bahadar group. The "good Taliban," who are supported by Pakistan's military and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, do not favor attacking the Pakistani state but do support al Qaeda and other foreign terror groups, and also support the jihad in Afghanistan.

Nearly two months after the abduction of over 300 schoolgirls in the Borno state town of Chibok, Boko Haram has reportedly kidnapped 20 women in northeastern Nigeria.

In today's incident, gunmen arrived at the Garkin Fulani village, near Chibok, around noon and forced the women at gunpoint into their vehicles. Three men who tried to stop the attack were also taken. Although a Wall Street Journal report refers to the victims as "girls," their age is not yet clear.

At the time of the attack, the girls were participating in preparations for the village's weekly market. They were pulled into the assailants' truck along with rice and instant noodles. Boko Haram members have attacked these types of markets in the past to stock up on needed goods.

Although the Nigerian military was unable to protect these women, it has been touting a successful operation it conducted over the weekend. On June 7, soldiers launched an ambush on terrorists as they exited a forest in northeastern Nigeria purportedly on their way to attack villages in Borno and Adamawa states. Nigerian forces killed over 50 militants in the operation, seizing weapons and vehicles from them.

Unfortunately, this success appears to be the exception, rather than the norm, when it comes to combating Boko Haram. In the past few months, the al Qaeda-linked terror group has been conducting deadly attacks with increased frequency in its fight to build an Islamic state in Nigeria. The group received international attention weeks after it kidnapped over 200 schoolgirls from their school on the night of April 14. Some of the girls have since managed to escape, but the majority of them remain captives of Boko Haram. The group staged several violent attacks last week, killing hundreds of civilians. and assassinated a local Muslim leader the week before.

Boko Haram, whose name means "Western education is forbidden," was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States in November 2013. The group's vocal leader, Abubakar Shekau, and two al Qaeda-linked Boko Haram leaders were added to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists in June 2012.

In its annual assessment of global trends in terrorism, the US State Department noted that the government of Nigeria has "made little progress" in addressing the grievances of Nigeria's northern population. It advised the Nigerian government "to employ a more comprehensive strategy to address Boko Haram that combines security efforts with political and development efforts to reduce Boko Haram's appeal, address the legitimate concerns of the people of northern Nigeria, and protect the rights of all of Nigeria's citizens."

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham seized control of Mosul, which is the provincial capital of Ninewa and Iraq's second largest city, after five days of heavy fighting with Iraqi forces. Mosul is the second major city to fall to the former al Qaeda affiliate this year.

Fighters from the ISIS took control of government buildings, including the provincial headquarters, as well as police stations and military installations inside and outside of the city, according to reports. Several police stations were torched by the ISIS. Some Iraqi soldiers and policemen are said to have shed their uniforms before fleeing their posts to avoid being captured and executed by ISIS fighters.

The ISIS has raised the black flag of jihad and "announced over loudspeaker that they had 'come to liberate Mosul and would fight only those who attack them,'" the BBC reported.

Usamah al Nujayfi, the speaker of Iraq's Council of Representatives whose brother is the governor of Ninewa, told Al Baghdadiyah Satellite Television that "the right and left sides of the city of Mosul as well as its districts and subdistricts have been completely occupied."

Nujayfi also accused Iraqi security forces of abandoning their posts and leaving weapons, ammunition, and armored vehicles behind.

"When the battle intensified inside the city of Mosul, these forces gave up their weapons and the commanders fled, leaving behind arms, armored vehicles, and locations for the terrorists," Nujayfi continued. "Mosul Airport and some aircrafts and command locations have fallen, not to mention arms warehouses. Prisons have been taken and the prisoners have been released." Some reports indicate that hundreds of prisoners have been freed.

Nujayfi also warned that the ISIS fighters are "now heading toward Salahaddin Governorate," and that the villages outside of Al Shirqat "have been entirely occupied."

It is unclear how many Iraqi soldiers, policemen, and civilians were killed in the latest round of fighting in Mosul.

The ISIS began its assault on Mosul five days ago, when hundreds of fighters entered the city in pickup trucks and attacked government installations and security forces. ISIS fighters took control of several neighborhoods, but the military claimed that it beat back the jihadists and killed 105 fighters as they retreated. Yet the military said that 10 percent of Mosul remained under ISIS control. Eighteen security personnel were reported killed on the first day of fighting.

Mosul was the last major city to serve as a bastion for the ISIS after the US and Iraqi forces launched counterinsurgency operations as part of the surge that began in 2007. By the time US forces left Iraq at the end of 2011, the ISIS was operating as terrorist cells in the city. Close proximity to Syria allowed the ISIS to continue operating in Mosul and the northwestern province of Ninewa. The ISIS began reasserting itself as the Syrian civil war picked up steam in the summer of 2011 and US forces withdrew from Iraq a few months later in December.

Mosul is the second major city to fall completely under the control of the ISIS this year. At the beginning of January, the ISIS and allied tribal groups seized Fallujah, the second largest city in Anbar province. The ISIS immediately imposed sharia, or Islamic law. Ramadi, the provincial capital of Anbar, also briefly fell under the ISIS' control, but Iraqi forces regained much of the city. Other smaller cities and towns in Anbar are under the ISIS' influence.

A video from a fighter in the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham details the chaos in Mosul after the jihadist insurgent group took control of the city earlier today.

The video, which was released on YouTube by an ISIS fighter who goes by the name of "Ibn al Azd," is captioned "The camera roams the streets of Mosul and the displaced return after its liberation//Islamic State [ISIS]."

In the short video, an ISIS fighter films from a vehicle as another ISIS fighter drives through the main roads of Mosul. The aftermath of the ISIS' rout of the Iraqi military is caught on film.

The video shows a number of police and armored military vehicles that are abandoned, burning, or torched. A checkpoint, once manned by policemen, is deserted. Several columns of smoke are seen rising in the background. Sporadic gunfire, presumably of the celebratory type, is also heard in the background.

The cameraman also records several vehicles and columns driven by masked ISIS fighters. Many of the vehicles are flying the ISIS' black flag of jihad. Additionally, masked fighters are seen roaming the streets.

While it is difficult to determine exactly how many ISIS fighters are seen in the short, 2:43 video, the number easily approaches 100 or more. Given that the ISIS has been reported to be in complete control of Mosul, this means hundreds of fighters organized to launch the assault.

The cameraman also claims that the video is documenting "the return of the displaced after al Maliki's bombardment of their houses."

"One of the citizens who wants to reach his family took a police car for himself," the cameraman says as his vehicle drives alongside a police pickup truck.

The ISIS took control of Mosul earlier today after five days of fighting with Iraqi forces. The ISIS attacked the city last week, but the military claimed it repelled the offensive and killed 105 ISIS fighters. Usamah al Nujayfi, the speaker of Iraq's Council of Representatives, said the Iraqi military and police abandoned the city and left weapons and ammunition behind while fleeing the ISIS offensive. [See LWJ report, ISIS takes control of Mosul, Iraq's second largest city.]