A senior al Qaeda operative known as Abu Anas al Libi has died in the US as he was awaiting trial. Al Libi was captured in Tripoli during a raid by US forces in late 2013. He had been wanted for his role in the August 1998 US Embassy bombings for more than a decade prior to his arrest.

The US government has in its possession numerous pieces of evidence concerning al Libi's al Qaeda role, including files recovered in May 2011 from Osama bin Laden's home in Pakistan.

The Long War Journal has consistently advocated for the release of bin Laden's files. The Obama administration has released just 17 documents, and a handful of videos, from a total cache of more than 1 million files. Many more of these files, if not almost all of them, should be declassified and released. There are no sources or methods to protect, as everyone knows how this information was obtained. The only files that should remain classified are those that have a direct bearing on the US government's current counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda.

Now that al Libi has passed away, the US government has another opportunity to be more transparent with respect to bin Laden's files. After all, at least some of the documents probably would have been released to the public during al Libi's trial.

Just weeks ago, in mid-December, Benjamin Weiser of The New York Times reported that US prosecutors were seeking to use files recovered during the raid on bin Laden's compound in al Libi's trial.

A close reading of the Times' account reveals that prosecutors intended to use at least five separate letters recovered in bin Laden's safe house.

It does not appear that any of these letters were included in the set of 17 documents released by the Obama administration through the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. None of Abu Anas al Libi's letters to al Qaeda's leaders were released.

The first letter described by the Times is from Atiyyah Abd al Rahman, a senior al Qaeda leader, to bin Laden dated June 19, 2010. Rahman explained that al Libi was one of "the last brothers" to be released from Iran. Al Libi "came only a week ago and I met him and sat with him," Rahman wrote, according to the Times' summary. Rahman appointed al Libi to al Qaeda's security committee. "It is normal for any person after a long absence, especially in jail, that he needs some time to figure out how things work," Rahman noted. Rahman recommended that bin Laden send al Libi a letter, because al Libi was seeking "reassurance."

A second letter, dated Oct. 13, 2010, is a five-page missive from al Libi to Osama bin Laden. "Your forever lover, Your brother," al Libi signs the letter. Al Libi explains, according to the Times, that the al Qaeda "brothers," including bin Laden's sons and other al Qaeda operatives, fled to Iran under orders from Taliban leader Mullah Omar.

A third letter from Rahman to bin Laden was written "[a]bout a month later," according to the Times, meaning it was penned sometime in November 2010. Rahman recommended that al Libi be accepted back into al Qaeda's leadership ranks. Rahman described al Libi as "determined," "visionary," and "difficult somewhat," but also noted that bin Laden knew him. Interestingly, Rahman complained that al Libi had violated al Qaeda's operational security regulations by "contacting his family in Libya, despite knowing that we don't allow any communications."

Al Libi "knows that he was wanted by the Americans," Rahman wrote to bin Laden, according to the Times' summary. "He contacted them via phone repeatedly!"

In a fourth letter, written in March 2011, al Libi requested permission to join some other operatives who were returning to Libya to fight against Muammar al Qaddafi's regime. It is better to "move out sooner rather than later" al Libi wrote.

Rahman forwarded al Libi's letter to bin Laden, the Times reported, and Rahman explained to bin Laden that he approved al Libi's request. This is the fifth letter prosecutors sought to introduce. Rahman noted that al Libi was "a little upset with me for the delay in getting back to him."

A "builder of al Qaeda's network in Libya"

Al Libi did in fact return to his native Libya. As a member of al Qaeda's security committee who returned to North Africa only after receiving permission from his superiors in al Qaeda (Rahman), it is safe to assume that he was doing the terrorist organization's bidding when he set up shop in his homeland.

Indeed, as The Long War Journal previously reported, an unclassified report published in August 2012 highlighted al Qaeda's strategy for building a fully operational network in Libya. The report ("Al Qaeda in Libya: A Profile") was prepared by the federal research division of the Library of Congress (LOC) under an agreement with the Defense Department's Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO).

Abu Anas al Libi played a key role in al Qaeda's plan for the country, according to the report's authors. He was described as the "builder of al Qaeda's network in Libya."

Al Qaeda's senior leadership (AQSL) has "issued strategic guidance to followers in Libya and elsewhere to take advantage of the Libyan rebellion," the report reads. AQSL ordered its followers to "gather weapons," "establish training camps," "build a network in secret," "establish an Islamic state," and "institute sharia" law in Libya.

Abu Anas al Libi was identified as the key liaison between AQSL and others inside the country who were working for al Qaeda. "Reporting indicates that intense communications from AQSL are conducted through Abu Anas al Libi, who is believed to be an intermediary between [Ayman al] Zawahiri and jihadists in Libya," the report notes.

Al Libi is "most likely involved in al Qaeda strategic planning and coordination between AQSL and Libyan Islamist militias who adhere to al Qaeda's ideology," the report continues.

Al Libi and his fellow al Qaeda operatives "have been conducting consultations with AQSL in Afghanistan and Pakistan about announcing the presence of a branch of the organization that will be led by returnees from Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, and by leading figures from the former LIFG." The term "LIFG" refers to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, an al Qaeda-linked jihadist group formed in Libya in the 1990s.

One of al Libi's key allies inside Libya was another senior al Qaeda operative, Abd al Baset Azzouz, who has been close to al Qaeda's senior leaders for decades.

Azzouz was sent to Libya by Zawahiri and "has been operating at least one training center." Azzouz "sent some of his estimated 300 men...to make contact with other militant Islamist groups farther west."

Azzouz was reportedly captured in Turkey last month. [See LWJ report, Representative of Ayman al Zawahiri reportedly captured in Turkey.]

Release bin Laden's files

The Obama administration made a concerted push to portray Osama bin Laden as a doddering old man who was operationally irrelevant. Citing bin Laden documents shown to him by the White House, the Washington Post's David Ignatius described the jihadist leader as a "lion in winter." CNN's Peter Bergen similarly reported that bin Laden was in retirement at the time of his death. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, working off of only those documents provided by the Obama administration, portrayed bin Laden as being sidelined.

What we know about Abu Anas al Libi's al Qaeda role challenges all of these assessments. He was reintegrated into al Qaeda's chain of command after his release from Iranian custody. His role was approved by Rahman, who served as one of bin Laden's top subordinates before being killed in a US drone strike. Rahman made sure that al Libi joined al Qaeda's security committee -- an internal body that is not factored into any public assessments of al Qaeda's structure or hierarchy. And al Qaeda approved al Libi's return to Libya. Other evidence subsequently unearthed by the US government shows that al Libi was acting as one of al Qaeda's top operatives in North Africa at the time of his capture.

This evidence should be released to the public, so we can judge for ourselves how al Qaeda operates.

In addition, any documents or files recovered from bin Laden's compound that deal with the August 1998 US Embassy bombings should be released as well. After al Libi was captured in Libya, his family claimed he had played no role in the twin attacks, which were al Qaeda's most successful operation prior to Sept. 11, 2001. However, there is abundant evidence, including testimony given before a US district court, indicating that al Libi was a key player in the bombings. Releasing any bin Laden files further implicating al Libi in the East Africa attacks would only strengthen the US government's case to the public.

The US launched the first drone strike in Pakistan this year in an attack targeting fighters loyal to a Taliban commander who is favored by Pakistan's government as well as its military and intelligence establishment.

The CIA-operated, remotely piloted Predators or Reapers launched an airstrike on a compound in the village of Wacha Basti in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan earlier today, Dawn reported. Eight people, including an unidentified "high-value target," are reported to have been killed in the strike.

The compound that was hit belongs "to an Uzbek commander of the Taliban's Hafiz Gul Bahadar Group," Dawn noted. Hafiz Gul Bahadar is the top Taliban commander for North Waziristan, and administers the jihadist haven of Datta Khel.

Some Pakistani news outlets are claiming that "outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Commander Hafiz Gul Bahadar" is among those killed. His death has not been confirmed. The reports are questionable as Bahadar is neither "outlawed" nor a leader in the TTP, or Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. Bahadar, while allied with the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, operates independently of the group's leadership.

In fact, the Hafiz Gul Bahadar Group and other jihadist factions such as the Haqqani Network are considered by the Pakistani establishment to be "good" Taliban, as these groups do not advocate attacking the Pakistani state, even while sheltering and supporting jihadist groups that wage war on the government. The so-called good Taliban also support and wage jihad in Afghanistan and India. [See Threat Matrix reports, Pakistan condemns drone strike that targeted 'good Taliban,' and Good Taliban are not our problem, adviser to Pakistan's prime minister says.]

The Datta Khel area in North Waziristan, where today's drone strike took place, is a nexus of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. In addition to the Hafiz Gul Bahadar Group, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and other jihadist groups also operate there. Some of al Qaeda's top leaders have been killed in drone strikes in Datta Khel, including Mustafa Abu Yazid, the group's former general manager; Abdullah Said al Libi, the emir of the Lashkar-al-Zil; and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a top Lashkar-al-Zil general. [See LWJ report, 'Foreign militants' reported killed in latest US drone strike in Pakistan, for more details on Datta Khel and senior al Qaeda leaders killed there.]

The Pakistani military claimed in early September 2014 that it has "cleared" Datta Khel of jihadist groups during Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which began on June 15, 2014. But the operation targeted only the so-called "bad" Taliban, such as the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The Haqqani Network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadar Group were not targeted in the operation, despite Pakistani military claims to the contrary.

US has now launched eight drone strikes in Datta Khel since the Pakistani military claim, indicating that the area remains a jihadist haven. [See LWJ report, US drones strike in jihadist stronghold in North Waziristan.]

US strikes in Pakistan

Today's covert operation in Datta Khel is the first strike reported in Pakistan this year. Last year the US launched 24 airstrikes inside Pakistan; 11 of those strikes took place in Datta Khel, and six more occurred in the Shawal Valley of North Waziristan, which is also an al Qaeda and jihadist hub in the tribal agency. The number of strikes has decreased since the program's peak in 2010, when 117 attacks were recorded by The Long War Journal. [See LWJ report, Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2015.]

In one of the more recent strikes in Datta Khel, on Dec. 8, 2014, the US is thought to have killed an al Qaeda commander known as Omar Farooq. [See LWJ reports, Al Qaeda commander reported killed in drone strike in Pakistan and Senior al Qaeda leader returns to Twitter, praises 'martyrs'.]

The US continues to target and kill al Qaeda and Taliban leaders in Pakistan's tribal areas despite previous claims by Obama administration officials that al Qaeda has been decimated and only two "core" al Qaeda leaders remain active. And al Qaeda remains active outside of Pakistan's tribal areas in the provinces of Baluchistan, Punjab, and Sindh, where the US drones do not operate.

Boko Haram overwhelmed Nigerian and allied troops and overran the Multinational Joint Task Force base in northeastern Nigeria yesterday.

At around 5 a.m. yesterday, the al Qaeda-linked jihadists attacked the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) base, which is located just outside the town of Baga in northeastern Borno state, and battled with soldiers for hours. The Boko Haram fighters attacked the MNJTF base "from all directions," and forced the soldiers to abandon the base, the BBC reported. The number of those killed during the assault, including Nigerian and allied troops as well as Boko Haram fighters, has not been disclosed.

A senator from Borno, Maina Maaji Lawan, confirmed that the base was lost and told the BBC that "[t]here is definitely something wrong that makes our military abandon their posts each time there is an attack from Boko Haram."

Civilians from Baga and five nearby towns are fleeing the area and crossing into Chad to seek refuge, Vanguard reported.

The MNJTF base, which was manned by troops from Nigeria, Niger, and Chad to interdict criminal activity in the Lake Chad area, was expanded in 2014 to help fight the spread of Boko Haram activity in the area where the borders of Nigeria, Niger, and Chad intersect.

Boko Haram has had success in overrunning large military bases in the past. In December 2013, hundreds of fighters from the jihadist group attacked a Nigerian Air Force base base on the outskirts of Maiduguri, the Borno state capital, using trucks and a stolen armored personnel carrier. The jihadists destroyed two helicopters and torched the headquarters building and a police checkpoint before withdrawing.

Later that month, Boko Haram fighters assaulted a base in Bama that housed a tank battalion. An unknown number of soldiers and their families were killed as the fighters attacked the barracks area of the base before withdrawing. [See LWJ report, Boko Haram overruns Nigerian Air Force base, and Threat Matrix report, Boko Haram attacks another base in Borno.]

Boko Haram has rampaged across northeastern Nigerian, particularly in the states of Borno and Yobe, nearly unchecked over the past year. The jihadist group has assaulted and in many cases taken control of towns, kidnapping hundreds of civilians and executing thousands of others, and has even attacked across the border in neighboring Cameroon. A ceasefire between the government and Boko Haram, which was announced in mid-October 2014, was ignored.

Both the United States and the United Nations have tied Boko Haram to al Qaeda's network. Terrorist designations of Boko Haram leaders as well as the group itself by the US and the UN note links, which include support, training, and cooperation in several battlefields in Africa, between Boko Haram and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Shabaab, and jihadist groups in Mali. [See LWJ reports, UN adds Boko Haram to al Qaeda sanctions list; US adds Boko Haram, Ansaru to list of foreign terrorist groups; US adds 3 Boko Haram leaders to list of global terrorists; and Zawahiri's man in Shabaab's 'secret service'.]

Abubakar Shekau, the emir of Boko Haram, has publicly expressed affinity with al Qaeda. In a video released in November 2012, Shekau praised the global jihadist organization, and said he and his fighters support jihad and the "brothers" in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, Libya, and Mali.

Al Qaeda-linked fighters have increased attacks in northern Mali and in neighboring states despite the French-led counterterrorism mission in the African country that is entering its third year.

Early this morning, jihadists assaulted the town of Nampala near the Mauritanian border, killing seven Malian soldiers before the military was able to send reinforcements, Reuters reported. The fighting lasted for nearly seven hours until the jihadists withdrew from the town.

Today's attack is the latest in a string of recent assaults against Malian troops and UN peacekeepers, government officials, and tribal leaders.

On Jan. 4, six Nigerien UN peacekeepers were wounded after their vehicle hit an improvised explosive device in the Ansongo-Menaka axis region near Gao. Additionally on Jan. 4, seven UN-contracted supply trucks en route to Gao were stopped by unidentified gunmen near Kidal and burned.

On Jan. 3, a prominent Tuareg tribal leader and mayor of a town close to the Niger border was killed by "gunmen on four motorcycles," according to Sahara Media. The assailants are believed to have belonged to the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).

On Jan. 2, the UN said it has recorded "a number of clashes in Gao and Timbuktu regions" according to Reuters. The article is not clear on who was involved in the clashes, but the news agency did quote a UN official as saying "We condemn in the strongest possible terms these acts of violence and provocation, especially the hostage-taking and pillaging," tactics that are commonly associated with the jihadist groups operating in the region.

On Dec. 29, militants conducted a rocket attack on the UN base in Tessalit in the Kidal region of northern Mali. While no one was hurt, nine rockets were fired into the UN compound. Ansar Dine, an al Qaeda-affiliated Malian jihadist group, took responsibility for this operation. On Dec. 31, another rocket attack hit the UN base; much like the first incident, no injuries were reported. It is suspected that Ansar Dine was also behind the second attack.

Four major jihadist groups operate in northern Mali and in neighboring countries: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda's official branch in North Africa; al Murabitoon, the alliance between Mokhtar Belmokhtar's al-Mulathameen Brigade and Ahmed el Tilemsi's faction of MUJAO; a MUJAO faction led by Sultan Ould Bady; and Ansar Dine, which AQIM's emir described as the "domestic" arm of AQIM designed to distract the international community from targeting al Qaeda. These groups cooperated with Tuareg rebels to take control of northern Mali in the winter of 2012 and were advancing on the capital of Bamako before French troops intervened in January 2013 and launched a counteroffensive to drive the jihadists underground.

Attacks in Mali and Niger in 2014

Jihadists have launched at least 34 significant attacks in Mali and five more in Niger in 2014, according to data compiled by The Long War Journal [see accompanying map]. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were the most common method used by the groups; 15 IED attacks were launched against French and UN forces as well as civilians in 2014. Jihadists also conducted at least five rocket attacks, including two on the Timbuktu airport. Other violence included two kidnappings outside of Kidal and Aguelhok, and a firefight with French troops that left one commando and 20 jihadists dead.

Five jihadist assaults occurred in Niger. In one incident, near the border with Mali, nine Nigerien troops were killed after clashing with al Qaeda-linked militants. The militants also assaulted a Nigerien prison, a Malian refugee camp, and a patrol of Nigerien troops in three simultaneous operations. During the raid on the prison, several inmates were freed from their cells. [See LWJ report, 1 French commando and 20 militants killed in Mali, 9 Nigerien troops killed in Niger.]

Jihadists also killed one Nigerien soldier in the town of Bani Bangou on the Malian border.

In the recently released edition of Dabiq, the Islamic State's online English magazine, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi's followers make their bitter rivalry with al Qaeda the centerpiece of their presentation to the public.

The cover story, entitled "Al-Qaidah of Waziristan," is written by an alleged al Qaeda defector known as Abu Jarir ash-Shamali.

His story begins before the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when he joined Abu Musab al Zarqawi's organization, Jamaat al Tawhid wal Jihad, in Jordan. Shamali is keen to emphasize the differences between Zarqawi and al Qaeda from the first. It is easy to see why, as the Islamic State is attempting to portray Zarqawi's legacy as entirely its own. Zarqawi, who formally pledged allegiance to al Qaeda in 2004, had been working closely with senior al Qaeda leaders years before he officially became al Qaeda's man in Iraq. Zarqawi is still featured in both al Qaeda's and the Islamic State's propaganda.

But in their retelling of Zarqawi's and al Qaeda's story, Shamali and the Islamic State made an odd editorial decision -- odd, that is, from the perspective of a jihadist group that is trying to poach from al Qaeda's and the Taliban's supporters.

Shamali portrays Osama bin Laden during the 1990s in a somewhat negative light. The gist of Shamali's argument is that bin Laden pulled his punches with respect to the Saudi monarchy and other apostate regimes. Shamali criticizes what he sees as al Qaeda's pre-9/11 "hesitance" to declare the "apostasy" of "rulers and their armies" throughout the Muslim majority world. In Shamali's telling, this was the main point of tension between Zarqawi and al Qaeda's leaders prior to their formal alliance.

According to Shamali, it was not until sometime after 9/11 that bin Laden "declared the apostasy of the rulers of [Saudi Arabia] and their soldiers and the obligation to fight them in some of his addresses." Only then did Shamali and his brethren change their view of al Qaeda "from what it was before" to a more positive opinion.

Throughout much of their propaganda, the Islamic State's jihadists have portrayed themselves as the true heirs of Osama bin Laden. For example, the group produced a series of videos entitled "The Establishment of the Islamic State." In the videos, which were published in English and other languages, Baghdadi's group attempted to undermine al Qaeda's current leadership by revisiting the words of Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, all of whom praised the Islamic State of Iraq before its expansion into Syria and rebranding as a "caliphate." [See LWJ report, Analysis: Al Qaeda attempts to undermine new Islamic State with old video of Osama bin Laden.]

By publishing Shamali's piece, the Islamic State risks undermining its previous anti-al Qaeda propaganda efforts, which were misleading, but still had a cogent story to tell. The group also risks giving credence to its critics within the jihadist world. Citing Shamali's piece, some of the Islamic State's critics on Twitter have been quick to point out that Baghdadi's followers are so extreme that they even attack the legacy of bin Laden, who remains wildly popular among the jihadists. Therefore, Shamali's piece is not a smart attempt to win over al Qaeda's followers.

The Islamic State takes its criticism of other jihadists a step further, as Shamali also disparages the Taliban and Deobandis in South Asia. "We also considered the Taliban in Afghanistan to have shortcomings with regards to teaching tawhid [monotheism] to their individual members," Shamali writes of the pre-9/11 world. "This deficiency caused many of their individuals to fall into shirkī matters [polytheism, or idolatry] such as circumambulating graves and wearing amulets. And sadly, these matters exist until now."

Shamali sees Deobandis as so deviant that he uses the word "Deobandis" as a pejorative to describe the two principal leaders of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Asim Umar and Ustad Ahmad Faruq. Al Qaeda "handed" them "the nerve center of the organization...corrupting all that was left," Shamali writes.

The Islamic State has been trying to cut into al Qaeda's dominant market share within the jihadist community in South Asia. But Shamali's piece will not help the Islamic State accomplish this goal. The Deobandi ideology shares many points in common with the Salafi jihadist traditions of the Islamic State and al Qaeda, but also has some differences. Instead of emphasizing their points of commonality, or ignoring any areas of disagreement, Shamali portrays Deobandis in a wholly negative manner.

Shamali argues that al Qaeda's efforts to "alienate" the many jihadist groups in South Asia "from the Islamic State and [to] incite them" against Baghdadi's group "failed," because "many" of these groups have either given their bayat (oath of allegiance) to Baghdadi "or are on their way to doing so." However, at this juncture, there is little evidence to support Shamali's claim. Only a select handful of jihadist commanders in South Asia have announced their allegiance to Baghdadi. The Islamic State's blatant disrespect for the Taliban will not help it grow in the South Asian jihadist market.

Shamali also concedes that he had a bayat to both Mullah Omar and Ayman al Zawahiri before swearing his allegiance to Baghdadi, thereby breaking his previous oaths of allegiance. It is likely that many jihadists will not look upon his admission in a positive light, as Shamali will be perceived as an oath breaker.

Shamali's revelations about al Qaeda's structure

Shamali spent most of the period after 9/11 in Iranian custody. Shamali says he first left Jordan to wage jihad abroad sometime in 2002 or 2003, but he was detained in Iran while attempting to make his way to Afghanistan. He was released in 2010.

Shamali's story contains multiple indications that al Qaeda's bureaucracy continues to function despite setbacks caused by its jihadist rivals and other enemies. For instance, Shamali says that upon arriving in Miranshah, Pakistan he "wrote a message to Lajnat Bukhārā," or "the Committee of Bukhārā - an administrative committee belonging to the leadership of" al Qaeda. Shamali says the committee was set up after al Qaeda lost two senior officials, Atiyyah Abd al Rahman and Abu Yahya al Libi, in drone strikes.

A senior al Qaeda official named Muhammad bin Mahmoud Rabie al Bahtiyti, also known as Abu Dujana al Basha, is identified as a member of the committee in Shamali's article. The al Qaeda defector says that he met with both Bahtiyti, who has been highly critical of the Islamic State, and the unnamed leader of the Lajnat Bukhārā.

The Lajnat Bukhārā has received little to no attention in the West's public discussions of how al Qaeda is structured, but Shamali's story is an indication that al Qaeda still operates committees as part of its hierarchy. Shamali explains that another committee, the "Security Committee," was "expelled from" al Qaeda, "removed from the field, and forced to remain in their homes" after it was decided that members of the committee had mishandled a controversial situation. Of course, al Qaeda must have had enough of a bureaucracy in place to hold members of the committee accountable in this fashion. And it is likely that the "Security Committee" was replaced in some capacity.

Al Qaeda decided to evacuate many jihadists from the areas of northern Pakistan where they had been holed up for years, Shamali notes, adding that they had been asked to swear allegiance to the Al Nusrah Front even before they relocated to Syria. The Al Nusrah Front, an official branch of al Qaeda, was still part of the Islamic State when al Qaeda began moving its personnel to Syria, Shamali says. He introduces this anecdote in an attempt to portray al Qaeda as scheming against the Islamic State before the two sides had their falling out. But it is further confirmation of something that we know from other sources: Al Qaeda moved personnel out of the American drones' strike zone in northern Pakistan to safer areas.

Shamali also reveals that those al Qaeda commanders who broke their allegiance to Zawahiri were immediately cut off from al Qaeda's payroll. Only a functioning accounting department could make such move.

Shamali confirms one of al Qaeda's anti-Islamic State moves in Iraq. Pro-al Qaeda Twitter feeds circulated rumors earlier this year that al Qaeda was attempting to work with Ansar al Islam, a jihadist group that had long been opposed to the Islamic State and its predecessors in Iraq. Shamali purports to offer new details about this nascent alliance, saying that al Qaeda "received a representative of Ansar al Islam...for the purpose of a joint operation in Iraq with [al Qaeda] against the Islamic State." Al Qaeda's leaders "began facilitating for the representative to meet with Kurdish members" of al Qaeda in the Pakistani city of Miranshah "for counsel and planning."

Shamali says this "counsel and planning was in order to gather Kurdish personnel -- both military and [sharia officials] -- from [al Qaeda] to assist them in training inside Afghanistan so as to operate in Iraq after passing through Iran." Shamali points out that Ansar al Islam published a video highlighting its Sheikh Rashid Ghazi Camp, which was named after an infamous Pakistani jihadist. The video, which was posted online in early March 2014, included a clip of bin Laden praising Sheikh Ghazi.

Shamali argues that even though Ansar al Islam was marketing its adherence to al Qaeda's ways, and meeting with al Qaeda's senior leadership, the anti-Islamic State gambit failed. "Allah made their plot futile," Shamali writes, "for Ansar al Islam declared their [bayat, or oath of allegiance] to the Islamic State." At least part of Ansar al Islam issued a statement swearing allegiance to the Islamic State in the summer of 2014, while another faction remains active in Syria. There continue to be rumors suggesting that al Qaeda will be relaunching its official presence in Iraq in the near future, but that has not been confirmed.

In sum, assuming he is accurately recounting his experience in northern Pakistan, Shamali's anti-al Qaeda diatribe actually tells us something about how Ayman al Zawahiri's organization continues to function. We learn that al Qaeda: has set up an administrative committee known as the Lajnat Bukhārā; had a security committee in place that has been disbanded (it is natural to assume its members have been replaced); is still paying its commanders in Afghanistan and can punish wayward leaders by cutting off their stipends; ordered personnel to evacuate northern Pakistan for Syria and other areas, which we know is true from Osama bin Laden's files and other sources; and had brought Kurdish jihadists to Pakistan for "counsel and planning."

Thus, Shamali's portrayal of al Qaeda is not consistent with Western claims that the group can barely function in South Asia.

Afghan and Coalition forces reportedly killed or captured at least 34 Taliban shadow administrators in 2014, according to local and international media reports. Among those killed were seven Taliban shadow governors, as well as numerous shadow district administrators -- including shadow police, intelligence, and military commanders. At least one other Taliban shadow governor surrendered to Afghan authorities, in Jawzjan province in late December 2014 along with approximately 200 of his subordinates.

Overall, Taliban shadow administrators were reportedly killed in 17 out of Afghanistan's 34 provinces [see first graph below]. The highest number of incidents occurred in Badakhshan and Kunar provinces, with both provinces recording a total of five Taliban shadow administrators killed in each, including their respective shadow governors. In the case of Badakhshan, two Taliban shadow governors were killed within a five-month period.

Approximately 57 percent of the Taliban shadow administrators reportedly killed in 2014 died in clashes with Afghan security forces [see second graph below]. It should be noted, however, that drone strikes in Kunar and Farah provinces resulted in the deaths of at least four Taliban shadow district administrators in 2014. And incidents involving "airstrikes" killed an additional two Taliban shadow district administrators in Kapisa and Badakhshan provinces; it is unclear if those airstrikes were conducted by conventional air assets or drones. In a separate case, one Taliban shadow administrator was killed during an incident of infighting. And in another unique case, Afghan residents gunned down a Taliban district administrator in Farah province in early June 2014. Only 11 percent of the Taliban administrators removed from the battlefield in 2014 were captured alive by security forces.

With the conclusion of the NATO International Security Assistance Mission (ISAF) effort in December 2014, the Afghan government will likely continue to pursue a military campaign against known Taliban leaders. "The killing or arresting of Taliban shadow governors is important because they are running the terror network behind the scenes," Afghan security analyst General (ret.) Fazlullah Jurat told Central Asia Online in November. "Their killing will dampen the morale of insurgents .... They run the show, and if they are eliminated, it will obviously hurt the Taliban," Jurat noted.

Afghan security forces continue to suffer an "unsustainably high" death toll in the fight against insurgents, however. In November, US Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, then the Commander of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), reported to VOA News that 4,634 Afghan security personnel had been killed in action in 2014, compared with 4,350 in 2013, "despite a 25 percent dip in Taliban attacks from 24,000 to 18,000 over the same period."

Notably, the Taliban insurgency has not fared much better. According to a data sampling in early 2014, it was noted that Afghan security forces kill on average 12 Taliban insurgents every day. Approximately 720 Taliban insurgents were killed by Afghan security forces between January and February 2014 alone, according to data compiled by VOA Dari Service.

Although the data presented in the two graphs is based on cross-referenced local and international media reporting, The Long War Journal cannot otherwise independently confirm the exact number of Taliban shadow administrators killed in 2014. Occasionally, the Taliban will confirm the deaths of their shadow administrators, such as with the deaths of the Kandahar and Kunar shadow governors. Other times, the Taliban will vehemently deny the loss of their field commanders and shadow administrators. Additionally, the Afghan government is known to erroneously report the deaths of Taliban commanders, although information provided by the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) is usually supported by visual evidence such as photos or video interviews with captured Taliban commanders.

Incidents involving the reported death or capture of Taliban shadow administrators in 2014:

Jan. 7, 2014 - Mullah Salim, the Taliban shadow district chief for Mizan district, Zabul province, reportedly succumbed to his injuries after being shot multiple times by his own security guards. Salim was hiding in Quetta, Pakistan, at the time of the attack. Salim's death was the latest in a string of intra-Taliban clashes that had left a number of Taliban commanders dead and injured in the Quetta area in late 2013. (Khaama Press)

March 9, 2014 - Afghan security forces reportedly killed the Taliban shadow chief for Bakwa district, Farah province, along with three of his associates late on March 9. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

March 31, 2014 - Afghan NDS officials announced the arrest of Mohammad Fazil, the Taliban shadow chief for Cha'ab district, Takhar province, on March 31. Fazil had reportedly been tasked with carrying out a series of attacks in Takhar to disrupt the Afghan presidential election that was held on April 5. (Khaama Press)

April 7, 2014 - NDS officials confirmed the killing of 17 senior Afghan Taliban leaders, including Nur Qasim Sabari (Haidari), the Taliban's shadow governor for Kunar province, and Qari Osman, the Taliban shadow chief for Shegal district. The Taliban later confirmed the death of Nur Qasim. (Khaama Press, The Long War Journal, Pajhwok Afghan News)

April 16, 2014 - The Taliban shadow governor for Kandahar province, Mullah Abdul Wassay (a.k.a. Qari Abdul Hamid), a prominent Noorzai Taliban commander, was killed in a clash with Afghan forces in Kandahar province. His body was discovered by Afghan officials five days later, apparently in neighboring Helmand province, and his corpse was displayed to journalists in Lashkar Gah. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

May 5, 2014 - Afghan police forces reportedly ambushed a small group of Taliban fighters in Paktia province and killed five insurgents, including Mohammad Nezam Khel, the Taliban shadow chief for Khoshamand district, Paktika province. (Note: The original source article erroneously stated that Khoshamand district is part of Paktia province; it is actually part of Paktika province. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the police ambush occurred in Paktia or in Paktika.) (Khaama Press)

May 11, 2014 - The Taliban shadow chief for Surkh Rod district, Nangarhar province, was reportedly killed along with eight other insurgents in an Afghan security operation launched earlier that morning. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

May 14, 2014 - Afghan security forces launched a "special military operation" in Farah province and reportedly killed at least 55 Taliban militants. Among those killed was Mawlawi Abdul Raziq, the Taliban shadow chief for Gulistan district. (Khaama Press)

May 29, 2014 - Afghan security forces launched operation Zulfiqar-2 in Dasht-e Archi district, Kunduz province, and reportedly killed five Taliban insurgents. The Taliban shadow chief for Khwaja Ghar district, Takhar province, was among those killed, as well as a Taliban military commander named Mullah Nasar. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

May 31, 2014 - Kabir Halal, the Taliban shadow military chief for Yousuf Khel district, Paktika province, was among 25 Taliban fighters reportedly killed during a fierce clash between Afghan security forces and Taliban fighters in the Yousuf Khel district.
(Khaama Press)

June 7, 2014 - Malawi Rahmatullah Hafiz, the Taliban shadow chief for Bakwa district, Farah province, and three other insurgents were reportedly killed in a clash between local residents of Bakwa district and insurgents. Two local residents were also injured in the clash. (ToloNews)

July 8, 2014 - The Taliban shadow governor of Badakhshan province, Qari Fakhruddin, and nine other insurgents were killed in a clash with Afghan security forces in the hotly contested Jurm district. Ghulaam Haidar Haidari, head of the Afghan National Army (ANA) 209th Corps, confirmed that Afghan forces had captured the body of Fakhruddin and his weapons. (ToloNews)

July 9, 2014 - The Taliban shadow deputy governor for Kunduz province, Mullah Mohammad Noor Wasiq, was reportedly killed along with four other insurgents during a clearing operation launched by Afghan security forces in Chahar Dara district, Kunduz province. The clash, which took place in Yatim village, also killed a Taliban commander named Qari Izzatullah, and five other suspected insurgents were detained. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

July 23, 2014 - Airstrikes in Badakhshan province reportedly killed five insurgents, including Mullah Yasin, the Taliban shadow chief for Jurm district. The strikes took place near the Jobiar area of Jurm district. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

July 30, 2014 - Fierce fighting between Afghan security forces and Taliban insurgents in Sangin district, Helmand province, reportedly resulted in 20 insurgents killed, including Mullah Nasir, the Taliban shadow chief for Sangin district. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

Aug. 2, 2014 - Clashes between Afghan security forces and insurgents in Faryab province reportedly left four insurgents dead, including Mullah Nazar, the Taliban shadow chief for Bal Cheragh (Bilchiragh) district, Faryab province. The clash took place in the Tash Qala area of Bal Cheragh district. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

Aug. 4, 2014 - The Taliban shadow chief for Narang district, Kunar province, known as Abdullah, was reportedly killed along with an associate following a gunfight with Afghan security forces in the Watapur district. Three three other insurgents were wounded in the clash and an Afghan policeman was killed. The Taliban later denied that Abdullah had been killed, but conceded that a Taliban commander and his associate had been killed in clash in Watapur district. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

Aug. 11, 2014 - NDS officials announced the capture of Mawlawi Sheikh Ahmad (a.k.a. Haji Wadan), the Taliban shadow chief for Bala Balouk district, Farah province. Sheikh Ahmad was arrested during a security operation in the 7th police district of Kandahar City. (Khaama Press)

Sept. 10, 2014 - Afghan security operations in Wardak province resulted in clashes in Sayyedabad, Nerkh, and Jalrez districts. Six insurgents were reportedly killed, including Sayed Hassan, the Taliban shadow intelligence chief for northern Wardak. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

Sept. 16, 2014 - Airstrikes in Kapisa province reportedly killed 11 insurgents, including Roohullah, the Taliban shadow chief for Koh-i-Safi district, Kapisa province. The airstrikes struck the insurgents in the rugged Pacha Khak area of Kapisa province. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

Sept. 22, 2014 - A drone strike killed the Taliban shadow governor for Herat province, Abdul Qadir, better known as Mullah Abdul Rahman Nika, while he was conducting a meeting in Bakwa district, Farah province. (Pajhwok Afghan News and Xinhua)

Sept. 23, 2014 - Mullah Ghani Shah, the Taliban shadow chief for Pashtun Zarghoon district, Herat province, was reportedly killed along with two associates after unknown gunmen ambushed them in the Obe district. (Bakhtar News)

Sept. 24, 2014 - Airstrikes reportedly killed nine Taliban insurgents in Nangarhar province, including the Taliban shadow chief for Sherzad district, Nangarhar province. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

Sept. 29, 2014 - Afghan security forces reportedly killed Kamal Baradar, the Taliban shadow police chief for Garziwan district, Faryab province, during a gunfight in Garziwan. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

Sept. 29, 2014 - Mawlawi Mamor, the Taliban shadow chief for Doshi district, Baghlan province, was captured with three other insurgents during an Afghan security operation. (ToloNews)

Oct. 25, 2014 - NDS officials announced the arrest of the Taliban shadow chief for Nad-e Ali district, Helmand province. The shadow chief, who remained unnamed, was reportedly captured in Kabul City after the NDS detected his arrival. NDS officials reported that the shadow chief was planning to carry out attacks inside Kabul City. (CentralAsia Online)

Nov. 3, 2014 - Afghan security forces reportedly killed eight insurgents, including Mawlawi Alauddin, the Taliban shadow chief for Argo district, Badakhshan province. (Khaama Press and Xinhua)

Nov. 10, 2014 - The Taliban shadow governor for Takhar province, later identified as Mawlawi Mohammad Ismail, was reportedly killed during an operation by ANA commando forces.The operation was launched late on the night of Nov. 9 in neighboring Kunduz province. (Khaama Press)

Nov. 11, 2014 - Afghan security forces claimed to have killed Mawlawi Mohammad Karim, the Taliban shadow governor for Samangan province, during an operation in Jawzjan province. (Big News Network)

Nov. 15, 2014 - A suspected drone strike killed six Taliban insurgents in Kunar province. Among those killed was the Taliban shadow chief for Manogai (Manogay) district, Kunar province. In a separate incident, the Taliban shadow chief for Argo district, Badakhshan province, was reportedly detained along with four of his associates. (World Bulletin)

Dec. 17, 2014 - Afghan security forces raided the Katiba village, located in Jurm district, Badakhshan province, and reportedly killed eight Taliban fighters. Among those killed was Mawlawi Amanuddin, the Taliban shadow governor for Badakhshan. The death of Amanuddin marked the second shadow governor for Badakhshan killed in 2014. (Xinhua)

Dec. 20, 2014 - Heavy clashes remained ongoing in the Dangam district of Kunar province. The Afghan Ministry of Defense claimed killing 62 insurgents, including Ahmad Khan, the Taliban shadow chief for Dangam district. (Khaama Press)

Dec. 26, 2014 - Afghan security forces claimed to have killed an unnamed Taliban shadow district chief for Alisay district, Kapisa province. (Khaama Press)

Dec. 30, 2014 - Approximately 200 Taliban fighters, including a top Taliban leader for Darzab district, Jawzjan province, surrendered to Afghan authorities and joined the Afghan First Vice President in a peace ceremony. Mullah Nematullah also had served as the Taliban shadow governor for Jawzjan province. (Pajhwok Afghan News)

The identities and backgrounds of the terrorists who assaulted Charlie Hebdo, a French magazine, are still unknown. The Long War Journal cautions against drawing conclusions at this early stage. As of this writing, the terrorists responsible have not even been apprehended. And speculation concerning the circumstances surrounding a terrorist attack has proven to be wrong in the past.

We do know that the magazine, which has published satirical cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, but also personalities from other religious traditions, has been repeatedly threatened by jihadists.

Al Qaeda has taken notice of the magazine, arguing that members of its staff should be targeted for their role in publishing controversial material.

The tenth issue of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's Inspire magazine, for example, includes a "Wanted" poster that is headlined, "Dead or Alive For Crimes Against Islam." The poster is intended to encourage followers to shoot eleven people, all of whom have supposedly offended Islam.

One of the men listed is Stephane Charbonnier, the editor-in-chief of Charlie Hebdo. According to news accounts, Charbonnier was killed during today's attack. He had been living under police protection because of previous threats against his life.

Citing a witness to the terrorist attack, the Telegraph (UK) reports that the terrorists responsible said they were from al Qaeda in Yemen.

The SITE Intelligence Group points out that jihadists from other groups, including Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (ABM) and Tehrik-e-Taliban Punjab, have also taken note of the French magazine. A faction of ABM in the Sinai has sworn loyalty to the Islamic State's Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, while other parts of the group reportedly are loyal to al Qaeda.

In October 2012, al Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn mentioned the magazine in an audio message. "And here is France mocking again our Prophet, Allah's peace and prayer be upon him, and our Shariah and the recent progress that Muslims achieved in the Arab revolutions in general and Libya and Tunisia in particular," Gadahn said, according to the SITE Intelligence Group. "So, where are the lions of Islam to retaliate for their Prophet, Allah's peace and prayer be upon, against France and its immoral newspaper [sic] Charlie Hebdo. We ask Allah to reward in the best way those who burned its headquarters and hacked its website, for you cooled off the chests of Muslims. Is there more?"

The magazine has also poked fun at the Islamic State, which claims to rule over a "caliphate" stretching across portions of Iraq and Syria, and its emir, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.

Again, it is too early to tell if the terrorists were members or followers of al Qaeda, the Islamic State, or completely separate from those two groups.

The Long War Journal is not drawing any conclusions based on previous threats. More evidence is needed to firmly establish the terrorists' identities.

Unidentified terrorists killed 12 people and injured seven in an assault on the Paris office of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo earlier today. Gunmen armed with assault rifles shouted "'we have avenged the prophet" and "Allahu akbar," or God is greatest, as they stormed the headquarters of the magazine that has in the past published irreverent cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed and the emir of the Islamic State.

Just before noon, two gunmen with Kalashnikovs exited a black car and forced an employee of the magazine to let them into the building in central Paris. Once inside, witnesses say that the assailants deliberately targeted journalists, killing the publication's editor and killing or wounding a number of cartoonists.

Two policemen were also killed in the attack, with video posted online showing the assailants wounding one officer and then executing him in the street as he raised his hands in submission. The attackers then entered a black getaway car and fled the scene before moving to a stolen car. The jihadists are still at large.

No group has officially claimed credit for today's attack.

Two independent witnesses said the attackers claimed to be from al Qaeda. Corinne Rey, a cartoonist who was forced to let the attackers into the building, said that "[t]hey spoke French perfectly; they said they we're al Qaeda," The London Evening Standard reported. Cédric Le Béchec, another witness, stated that one of the attackers said "Tell the media that this is al Qaeda in the Yemen," a reference to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, according to The Telegraph.

Jihadists have a longstanding hatred of Charlie Hebdo, whose headquarters was firebombed in 2011 after the magazine published images of the Prophet Mohammed with a bomb embedded in his turban. On Jan. 7, supporters of the Islamic State also expressed outrage after the magazine published a satirical cartoon of the group's emir, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, expressing "best wishes" and good "health." [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda and other jihadists repeatedly threatened French magazine.]

The attack appears to have been executed by hardened and well-trained fighters who may have received instructions at a training facility overseas, or locally in France. The attackers may also be ex-military.

The professionalism of the two attackers is seen in a brief video that shows the execution of one of the two French policemen on the street outside of Charlie Hebdo's headquarters [the graphic video is reproduced below]. The video was captured by witnesses at the scene of the attack and was published on Liveleak.

The two attackers move in side-by-side formation and fire deliberately while shooting at a French police officer who is four to five car lengths away. After the officer is shot and downed, the two gunmen move quickly towards the policemen. One shoots and executes the officer in stride. Both men move past the body, peer up the street for additional targets, then peel off and move back to the black car and leave the scene of the attack.

The tactic of using heavily armed gunmen to attack well defended military targets or lightly defended civilian targets is commonly used by jihadist groups, including al Qaeda, the Islamic State, the Taliban, and a host of allies in the war-torn countries of Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Nigeria. But jihadist groups have also executed such attacks on civilians outside of war zones, including in Mumbai, India in 2008 and Nairobi, Kenya in 2013.

WARNING: The video below is extremely graphic and shows the execution of one of the French policemen. The video is reproduced to detail the professionalism shown by the gunmen who attacked Charlie Hebdo's headquarters in Paris, France.

Sources: France24, AFP, BBC, CBS/AP, Liveleak

French officials have identified three suspects as being responsible for the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo, a French satirical magazine, earlier today. And at least one of them has long been tied to al Qaeda's international network.

A pair of brothers, Said Kouachi and Cherif Kouachi, have been named as suspects, according to the Associated Press (AP). A third suspect has been named as Hamyd Mourad. The Kouachi brothers are in their 30s while Mourad is 18 years old.

According to USA Today, French police revealed during a press conference that the Kouachis were "born in Paris of Algerian descent" and had "returned from Syria this summer."

Cherif Kouachi was part of the so-called "19th arrondissement network," which sent jihadist recruits off to fight for al Qaeda in Iraq and its first emir, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who was killed in 2006. French officials first conducted raids against the "19th arrondissement network" in 2005, imprisoning some of its members. Cherif Kouachi was convicted on terror-related charges for his role in the network and, in 2008, sentenced to three years in prison.

Investigators are currently looking into the Kouachi brothers' foreign ties, including their possible links to al Qaeda or the Islamic State, an al Qaeda offshoot that claims to rule much of Iraq and Syria as a "caliphate."

Thus far, the following details point to ties between the terrorists and al Qaeda. "You can tell the media that it's al Qaeda in Yemen," one of the attackers said during the assault, according to a witness cited in the press. At least one other witness has corroborated this account, saying the attackers claimed allegiance to al Qaeda.

The terrorists' reference to "al Qaeda in Yemen" is really another way of saying al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al Qaeda's official branch in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The emir of AQAP, Nasir al Wuhayshi, is also al Qaeda's global general manager. AQAP has explicitly threatened Charlie Hebdo and its editor-in-chief, Stephane Charbonnier, who was killed in today's attack.

The 10th issue of AQAP's Inspire magazine, which was released last year, includes a "Wanted" poster that is headlined, "Dead or Alive For Crimes Against Islam." The poster is intended to encourage followers to shoot 11 people, all of whom have supposedly offended Islam. One of them is Charbonnier. [See LWJ report, Analysis: Al Qaeda and other jihadists repeatedly threatened French magazine.]

A French official who briefed the press earlier today also claimed that the terrorists are "linked to a Yemeni terrorist network."

Although ties between the Kouachi brothers and AQAP have not been definitively established, their recent travel to Syria could have provided them with the opportunity to work with al Qaeda's Yemeni branch.

AQAP assigned some of its key personnel to the so-called Khorasan group, which is based in Syria and led by senior al Qaeda operatives. The US Government launched airstrikes against the Khorasan group last September, and officials justified the bombings by pointing to its planned attacks in the West.

One of the Khorasan operatives targeted in the bombings is David Drugeon, an al Qaeda bomb maker who is from France.

There are possible links to the Islamic State as well. The Kouachi brothers' contacts in Syria are not known, but they could have met with Islamic State members.

At least one prominent member of the "19th arrondissement network," which Cherif Kouachi was convicted of belonging to, has joined the Islamic State. In December, a Tunisian jihadist named Boubaker el Hakim appeared in a pro-Islamic State video that was posted online. El Hakim also claimed responsibility for the assassinations of two Tunisian opposition politicians during the video.

In July 2013, Tunisian authorities implicated el Hakim in the assassinations, which the officials said were ordered by the leader of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, Abu Iyad al Tunisi. Tunisian officials pointed to el Hakim's jihadist experience in Iraq as one of the reasons he was considered so dangerous. [See LWJ report, Tunisian government alleges longtime jihadist involved in assassinations.]

El Hakim was convicted alongside Cherif Kouachi by a French court in 2008. Both of them belonged to the "19th arrondissement network," and surely knew one another.

It is not known if Cherif Kouachi has maintained any ties to Boubaker el Hakim in the years since.

On social media, followers of both AQAP and the Islamic State are claiming that the Charlie Hebdo attack was the work of their respective organizations.

One of the two brothers suspected of attacking the offices of Charlie Hebdo traveled to Yemen, where he likely received training in a camp run by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Said Kouachi is believed to have traveled Yemen in 2011, according to multiple press outlets.

Citing a "senior American official" who spoke with the media, The New York Times reports that Said trained for "a few months" on small arms. CNN adds that it "is also possible Said was trained in bomb making, a common jihadist training in Yemen."

Video footage of the attack made it clear early on that the attackers had received training. [See LWJ report, Terrorists who attacked French magazine displayed professional training.]

Said and his younger brother, Cherif Kouachi, are the two principal suspects named by French officials.

The attackers reportedly claimed that they were sent by al Qaeda. "You can tell the media that it's al Qaeda in Yemen," one of the terrorists said during the assault, according to a witness cited in the press. Al Qaeda in Yemen is a reference to AQAP, al Qaeda's official branch in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

At least one other witness has corroborated this account, saying the jihadists claimed allegiance to al Qaeda.

AQAP has explicitly threatened Charlie Hebdo and its editor-in-chief, Stephane Charbonnier, who was killed in the attack.

The 10th issue of AQAP's Inspire magazine, which was released in early 2013, includes a "Wanted" poster that is headlined, "Dead or Alive For Crimes Against Islam." The poster is intended to encourage followers to shoot 11 people, all of whom have supposedly offended Islam. One of them is Charbonnier.

A French official who briefed the press shortly after the attack also claimed that the terrorists are "linked to a Yemeni terrorist network."

Thus far, no terrorist organization has claimed responsibility for the attack. Al Qaeda and Islamic State supporters have both praised the terrorists responsible. Twitter accounts linked to AQAP have portrayed the massacre as being consistent with the types of attacks the group has advocated in the past.

French police launched simultaneous raids against jihadists who were holding hostages in two separate locations near Paris, France. The two suspects in the massacre at Charlie Hebdo magazine and a third accomplice who is thought to have executed a policewoman in Paris were killed by police officers as they stormed a print shop and a Jewish grocery where the jihadists were holding hostages, Le Monde reported. Four hostages were killed at the grocery story.

Cherif and Said Kouachi, the two brothers believed to be the gunmen in the Charlie Hebdo attack, were cornered by police inside a printing shop in the industrial section of Dammartin-en-Goele, located about 20 km northeast of Paris, and took one or more hostages. A third man, who police have identified as Amedi Coulibalay, took several hostages at a kosher grocery in Porte de Vincennes in eastern Paris.

Police had issued a wanted notice and photographs of Coulibalay and his girlfriend, Hayat Boumeddiene. On Thursday morning, a gunman armed with an AK-47 and wearing a bullet-proof vest, now said to be Coulibalay, shot two police officers in Monrouge area of Paris. The shooter fled and a female police officer later died of her wounds.

Police surrounded the Kouachi brothers after an intense manhunt. Helicopters are reported to have spotted the pair enter some woods in the Picardy region on foot Thursday. The suspects also stole gas and food from a gas station in the town of Villers-Cotteret, threatening an employee who reported their location to police. Sometime after 9 a.m. this morning, it was reported the two fugitives hijacked a car in the town of Montagny-Sainte-Felicite before fleeing north toward their current location.

One initial suspect in the Charlie Hebdo attack, Hamyd Mourad, turned himself into police on Wednesday night but claimed an alibi. Mourad has not been charged and has since been released. Police had also conducted a series of raids in Paris on Wednesday, resulting in no confirmed arrests.

Links to known jihadists, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula reported

Reports have emerged that the Paris killers and hostage takers have ties to known jihadists and terrorist groups.

US intelligence officials have said that Said Kouachi is believed to have traveled Yemen in 2011 and may have attended a training camp run by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. During the attack on Charlie Hebdo's office, the brothers were heard saying that the attack was executed by "al Qaeda in Yemen," or AQAP.

Cherif Kouachi was convicted in 2008 on terror-related charges for his role in a recruiting network that funneled fighters to al Qaeda in Iraq, and sentenced to three years in prison.

Coulibalay was convicted in 2010 of plotting to free Smain Ait Ali Belkacem, an Algerian terrorist who was sentenced to life in prison for executing a series of bombings in Paris in 1995. Belkacem was a member of the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, or GIA.

Both Coulibalay and Cherif Kouachi "were two of the main disciples Djamel Beghal," according to Le Monde. Beghal visited Osama bin Laden's headquarters in the summer of 2001, met with Abu Zubayda, and agreed to attack the US Embassy as well as a US cultural centre in Paris.

A CNN affiliate in France, BMFTV, interviewed Cherif Kouachi, one of two brothers responsible for the attack on Charlie Hebdo's offices, before he was killed earlier today. A BMFTV journalist reportedly talked to Cherif via phone while he and his brother were holed up at a printing factory.

"We are just telling you that we are the defenders of Prophet Mohammed," Cherif Kouachi told the journalist, according to CNN. "I was sent, me, Cherif Kouachi, by al Qaeda in Yemen. I went there and Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki financed my trip."

Asked to explain when he met with Awlaki, Cherif said "a while ago." Awlaki was killed in a US drone strike in late September 2011.

An audio recording of BMFTV's interview with Cherif has been released online, but CNN says it has not independently verified its authenticity.

Earlier, Reuters reported that the other Kouachi brother, Said, is also suspected of having ties to Awlaki. Citing "a senior Yemeni intelligence source," Reuters reported that Said met with Awlaki during his stay in Yemen in 2011.

Said's putative meeting with Awlaki has not yet been publicly confirmed by US officials.

American officials have told the press, however, that Said is thought to have trained in an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) camp during his visit to Yemen in 2011. Citing a "senior American official" who spoke with the media, The New York Times reported that Said trained for "a few months" on small arms. CNN added that it "is also possible Said was trained in bomb making, a common jihadist training in Yemen."

The possible ties between AQAP and the terrorists who attacked Charlie Hebdo were reported in the first hours after the attack. "You can tell the media that it's al Qaeda in Yemen," one of the terrorists said during the assault, according to a witness cited in the press. "Al Qaeda in Yemen" is a reference to AQAP, al Qaeda's official branch in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

A French official who briefed the press shortly after the attack also claimed that the terrorists are "linked to a Yemeni terrorist network."

In the past, AQAP has explicitly threatened Charlie Hebdo and its editor-in-chief, Stephane Charbonnier, who was killed in the attack. The 10th issue of AQAP's Inspire magazine, which was released in early 2013, includes a "Wanted" poster that is headlined, "Dead or Alive For Crimes Against Islam." The poster is intended to encourage followers to shoot 11 people, all of whom have supposedly offended Islam. One of them is Charbonnier.

And in the very first edition of Inspire magazine in 2010, Anwar al Awlaki called for jihadists to attack cartoonists who had supposedly smeared the legacy of the Prophet Mohammed.

Separately, BMFTV was also in contact today with Amedy Coulibaly, who was not involved in the assault on Charlie Hebdo, but is suspected of killing a Paris police officer and holding hostages at a kosher market.

Coulibaly apparently did not mention any ties to AQAP, but did say he was a member of the Islamic State, an al Qaeda offshoot that claims to rule over parts of Iraq and Syria as a "caliphate." Coulibaly also claimed that he had coordinated his actions with the Kouachi brothers.

It is not clear at this point if Coulibaly had any ties to the Islamic State, or was simply claiming an affiliation.

AQAP and the Islamic State are bitter rivals. The two jihadist groups have engaged in a war of words in recent months.

In mid-November, the emir of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, announced that his "caliphate" had expanded into Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In the process, Baghdadi claimed, the authority of all other existing jihadist groups had been superseded. Baghdadi's announcement was a direct, ideological attack on AQAP.

AQAP's ideologues have responded by arguing that the Islamic State is not a true caliphate and lacks the religious authority to rule as one. AQAP has also released a series of messages that are supportive of al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri.

A newly released audio message from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) features a top official in the group, Harith al Nadhari, praising the attack on the office of Charlie Hebdo earlier this week.

Although the audio message was not released via one of AQAP's official channels, it appears to be legitimate. The release bears the logo of al Malahem Media Foundation, AQAP's media wing.

Al Nadhari begins his roughly 5-minute message by saying the French cartoonists targeted in the attack are the "enemies of Allah's messenger, who have disbelieved in him, lied about him." They are also "the impure from among the sons of France," Al Nadhari says.

Although the audio does not include any claims of credit for the attack, al Nadhari lauds the gunmen as "mujahideen heroes." He justifies the massacre by saying that France is "among the leaders of disbelief," alleging that the nation regularly insults Islam, its prophets, and its followers. Al Nadhari addresses the French nation directly and asks, "When will you stop fighting Allah and his messenger? If you convert to Islam, that would be better for you."

Al Nadhari concludes his statement by telling the French that unless they cease their "aggression against the Muslims...you will not be blessed with security."

A separate written statement, allegedly authored by AQAP, has been disseminated via social media. The message is purportedly AQAP's claim of responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack.

However, The Long War Journal cautions that the statement's authenticity could not be immediately verified. The statement has been tweeted and retweeted by well-connected jihadists who usually promote legitimate messages, but this does not guarantee that it is authentic.

"The operation was directed by the leadership of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)," the statement reads. The targets were chosen deliberately "in retaliation for the display of the Prophet."

The authors of the release also claim that the operation was "the implementation of Sheikh Osama Bin Laden's threat" in which he warned the West against going too far in offending Muslim sensibilities. Moreover, the statement explains that AQAP delayed taking credit "for security reasons" related to the attackers.

The release outlines four messages to the West, as conveyed in the Paris attack. Firstly, violating Muslim sanctities will come at a high price. The authors say that the "punishment will be severe and be a deterrent." Moreover, Western countries will pay the price of their crimes "in their own homes." Additionally, the alleged AQAP message says that al Qaeda's policy of striking the "head of the snake" is ongoing. Lastly, the statement alleges that Inspire, AQAP's English-language magazine, has been a "resounding success," because of the attack on Charlie Hebdo. In Inspire, AQAP called for terrorist attacks against Charlie Hebdo and others who had supposedly smeared the Prophet Mohammed.

At least two media outlets are reporting that AQAP members have claimed responsibility for the attack. The Intercept reports that an AQAP member sent the publication a statement saying that the group "directed the operation." And the Associated Press reports that an AQAP member says the attack was ordered "as revenge for the honor" of the Prophet Mohammed.

Such claims may be accurate, but jihadist organizations typically issue formal statements claiming responsibility for attacks, especially assaults as high-profile as the one on Charlie Hebdo.

#جبهة_النصرة | استهداف مقهى للحزب الوطني الديمقراطي النصيري في #جبل_محسن بعملية استشهادية مزدوجة ثأرا لأهل السنة في #سوريا و #لبنان

— مراسل القلمون (@qalamoon6) January 10, 2015

The Al Nusrah Front for the people of the Levant, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, conducted a double suicide bombing in the predominately Alawite neighborhood of Jabal Mohsen today in Tripoli.

The attack, which targeted a cafe, killed at least seven civilians, according to ABC News. The Daily Star reported that nine people were killed and 30 were wounded.

The Alawite cafe was likely targeted to send a message to Syrian president Bashar al Assad, who belongs to the minority Alawite Shiite religious sect of Islam.

The attack began at 7:30 in the evening when a grenade was tossed into the cafe. Then, the first suicide bomber entered the cafe and detonated his explosive vest. The Daily Star quoted a Lebanese security official as saying that the second suicide bomber could not enter the restaurant and instead "blew himself up outside."

The Al Nusrah Front has taken responsibility for the attack on Twitter [see tweet above]. The jihadist group said the operation was "in revenge for the Sunnis of Syria and Lebanon."

An Al Nusrah figure on Twitter identified the two bombers as Abu Hussein al Tarablusi and Abu Abdulrahman al Tarablusi, two Lebanese natives, according to their noms de guerre. The Daily Star corroborated this claim by reporting that the two suicide bombers, whose real names were Taha Kayal and Bilal Ibrahim, were Lebanese citizens from a poor Sunni neighborhood in Tripoli.

Today's bombing in Tripoli marked the continuing spillover of the fighting in Syria into the neighboring country.

Al Nusrah has executed other suicide operations in Lebanon in the past. In January 2014, the group launched a suicide attack attack on Hezbollah in the Lebanese town of Hermel in the Bekaa Valley. In early February 2014, Al Nusrah executed a second suicide bombing against Hezbollah in Hermel. In both attacks, the jihadist group said its motivation was to force Hezbollah to stop supporting the Syrian regime in Syria.

Al Nusrah has also fought both Hezbollah and Lebanese forces inside Lebanon. On Oct. 6, 2014, the jihadist group released a video showcasing a recent operation in the town of Brital. The attack left 11 Hezbollah fighters dead and several others wounded, while 16 Al Nusrah fighters were killed, according to The New York Times. A few months earlier, Al Nusrah and fighters from the Islamic State battled against Lebanese forces in the border town of Arsal. The attack left several Lebanese troops dead and a number of others were taken hostage.

Other jihadist groups have conducted suicide bombings inside Lebanon. On Nov. 19, 2013, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades targeted the Iranian embassy in Beirut with a twin suicide attack, killing 23 people and wounding more than 140 others. The incident was also claimed as a move to force Hezbollah, which is supported by Iran, to leave the fighting in Syria. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades is an al Qaeda-linked organization that operates in Lebanon and various other Middle Eastern countries. [For more information on the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, see LWJ report US adds Abdullah Azzam Brigades to list of terror groups.]

Additionally, on Jan. 14, 2014, the Islamic State (then known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) claimed credit for a Jan. 2 car bombing in Beirut that killed four people and wounded more than 70. The attack, which may have been executed by a suicide bomber, took place outside of Hezbollah's political office in the neighborhood of Haret Hreik.

A new video has been posted online showing Amedy Coulibaly, who killed a French policewoman and attacked a kosher market in Paris last week, pledging allegiance to the Islamic State and its emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The video does not appear to have been produced by the Islamic State, as it does not bear any of the group's usual markings.

The video was first obtained by the SITE Intelligence Group, which notes that it was released by jihadists "linked" to the Islamic State.

Coulibaly is identified as "Abou Bassir AbdAllah al-Irfiqi" and as a "soldier of the Caliphate" in the opening screen shots.

Coulibaly trains for the attacks, doing pushups and other exercises, in the opening scenes of the video. Weapons and ammunition are displayed on a floor.

The video then cuts to footage of Coulibaly sitting in front of the Islamic State's black banner. At times, he reads from a prepared statement. Coulibaly claims that his actions are completely "legitimate," as he and the terrorists responsible for attacking Charlie Hebdo are "avenging the Prophet."

He mentions the international coalition's war against the Islamic State.

Parts of the video were recorded before last week's attacks began, but some of the production appears to have been put together as the manhunt for Coulibaly and the other terrorists was ongoing.

The video suggests that Coulibaly had one or more accomplices, in addition to the Kouachi brothers, as the footage was clearly spliced together after his death to explain his involvement and motivations. Authorities are currently looking for his girlfriend or wife, who is believed to have traveled to Turkey or Syria.

Coulibaly claims to have coordinated his actions with the Kouachi brothers, who separately assaulted the offices of Charlie Hebdo.

The claims made by Coulibaly in the video are consistent with an interview he gave to a French television channel shortly before he was killed. Coulibaly told BMFTV, an affiliate of CNN in France, that he served the Islamic State and worked in concert with the Kouachi brothers.

Investigators are puzzled by Coulibaly's claim of allegiance to the Islamic State, because Cherif and Said Kouachi said they were sent by al Qaeda in Yemen, a reference to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In his own, separate interview with BMFTV, Cherif Kouachi also explained that he had been in contact with Anwar al Awlaki, an AQAP cleric. [See LWJ report, Paris terrorist reportedly claimed ties to Anwar al Awlaki, AQAP.]

Numerous press accounts published in the past few days have explored the Kouachi brothers' ties to AQAP.

At senior leadership levels, AQAP and the Islamic State are bitter rivals. AQAP rejects the Islamic State's claim to rule as a "caliphate" stretching over large parts of Iraq and Syria. And the Islamic State claims to have expanded its presence into Saudi Arabia and Yemen, thereby usurping the authority of all other jihadists, including AQAP.

Both groups have traded sharp verbal barbs in the ongoing debate between the two sides. Harith al Nadhari, a senior AQAP ideologue who praised the massacre at Charlie Hebdo's offices in an audio message, is a staunch critic of the Islamic State.

But the relationship between Coulibaly and the Kouachi brothers predates the rivalry between the Islamic State and al Qaeda by many years. It is possible that their longstanding friendship trumped the jihadists' leadership disputes when it came time for them to act.

Unverified statements attributed to AQAP have claimed responsibility for the attack on Charlie Hebdo, but not Coulibaly's shooting of a French policewoman and assault on a kosher market. Western officials continue to explore the extent of AQAP's involvement with the Kouachi brothers.

The official Twitter feed and the YouTube page for US Central Command (CENTCOM) were hacked on Monday. The hacker(s) posted messages threatening CENTCOM staff and warning that "ISIS," an acronym commonly used in the West to describe the Islamic State, had infected CENTCOM's computers.

US officials appear to have regained control of the accounts since they were initially compromised. As of this writing, however, CENTCOM's Twitter feed is inactive.

CENTCOM uses its Twitter feed to regularly post updates on the airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Of course, just because the hacker(s) claims to be acting on behalf of ISIS does not mean the cyber intrusion was necessarily launched by the group. Western officials and journalists frequently call the Islamic State "ISIS" or "ISIL," which is a reference to the group's previous name, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, or the Levant. But the organization changed its name to simply the "Islamic State" in June.

Some of the posts mention the "CyberCaliphate." A Twitter account using that handle has been suspended.

"In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful, the CyberCaliphate continues its CyberJihad," one of the hacked tweets read. A roster of CENTCOM staff members, including their contact information, was included in the tweet.

Another tweet read: "AMERICAN SOLDIERS, WE ARE COMING, WATCH YOUR BACK. ISIS." The hashtag #CyberCaliphate was included in the tweet.

Still another tweet included a longer message.

"In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful, the CyberCaliphate under the auspices of ISIS continues its CyberJihad. While the US and its satellites kill our brothers in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan we broke into your networks and personal devices and know everything about you," the message reads. "You'll see no mercy infidels. ISIS is already here, we are in your PCs, in each military base. We won't stop! We know everything about you, your wives and children. U.S. soldiers! We're watching you!"

The authors of the tweet then claimed that "confidential data" from CENTCOM mobile devices were included in a file that was linked to in the tweet.

Two other tweets purportedly show US surveillance or war scenarios for China and North Korea.

The US government has added Mullah Fazlullah, the emir of the fractured Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, to its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists today.

Fazlullah, who assumed command of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) in November 2013 after his predecessor, Hakeemullah Mehsud, was killed in a drone strike, was listed as a global terrorist by the State Department.

State noted that since Fazlullah took control of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, the group has claimed the deadly assault on a school in Peshawar in December 2014 that resulted "in the deaths of at least 148 individuals, mostly students."

"Prior to becoming the leader of TTP, Fazlullah claimed he was behind the killing of Pakistani Army Major General Sanaullah Niazi in September 2013, as well as ordering the shooting of schoolgirl and activist Malala Yousafzai in 2012," State continued. "Fazullah was responsible for the beheading of 17 Pakistani soldiers after an attack in June 2012 and also ordered the targeted killings of elders who led peace committees against the Taliban."

Since Fazlullah took control of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan in late 2013, the group has fractured. [See LWJ report, Taliban splinter group Jamaat-ul-Ahrar forms in northwestern Pakistan.]

Fazlullah, who is also known as Mullah Radio for his radical sermons broadcast throughout the northwest, has been among the top leaders of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan since its founding in 2007. He engineered the Taliban takeover of Swat and neighboring districts from 2007-2009, and brutally ruled over a cowed civilian population. The Pakistani military intervened only after Fazlullah's forces invaded Buner and advanced to just 60 miles from the Pakistani capital of Islamabad. He has vowed to continue the fight to regain control of the Swat Valley.

He is one of the most extreme commanders in a group filled with extremists. He was one of the first leaders to have opposed polio vaccinations. In 2012, he ordered the assassination of Malala Yousufzai, the young schoolgirl who has spoken out passionately against the Taliban in Swat, and accused her of violating sharia, or Islamic law. And in 2013, he took credit for the assassination of a Pakistani Army general who commanded operations in Swat.

Fazlullah is also closely tied to al Qaeda. When he openly ruled Swat from 2007 to 2009, he said al Qaeda fighters were welcome there and that training camps were in operation. One of his top deputies, Ibn Amin, also served as a leader of one of six known brigades in al Qaeda's Lashkar-al-Zil, or Shadow Army. Amin was killed in a US drone strike in Khyber in December 2010.

The Taliban emir is known to take shelter in Afghanistan's remote northeastern province of Kunar as well as in Nangarhar province. US forces largely withdrew from the provinces of Kunar and neighboring Nuristan beginning in 2009 after isolated Army outposts came under deadly attacks. At the time the withdrawal was announced, US military officials claimed the insurgency would recede from the two provinces and that al Qaeda would lose support as US forces were fueling the insurgency. Instead, al Qaeda and groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan have become entrenched in Kunar and Nuristan since the US withdrawal.

A growing cabal of former mid-level Pakistani Taliban commanders and officials have again pledged allegiance (bayat) to the Islamic State and recognized Abu Bakr al Baghdadi as Commander of the Faithful and the Caliph of Muslims. The pledge is part of a push by the Islamic State to expand its profile beyond Iraq and Syria, where the jihadist group controls large areas of both countries.

The oath is featured in a nearly 17-minute video which first appeared in the online jihadist forums on Jan. 10 by the newly created "Khorasan Media" group, and includes footage of a gruesome execution of a purportedly captured Pakistani soldier. Although the video was released in January, given the appearance of mild temperatures and lack of snow cover in the mountains in what is presumably western Pakistan, it was most likely produced a few months ago, possibly in October 2014, not long after the group's first pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State.

The titular mouthpiece of the group is former Pakistani Taliban spokesman Sheikh Maqbool, better known as his former nom de guerre "Shahid Shahidullah." Maqbool introduces Hafez Saeed Khan as the overall emir of the Khorasan Shura. Khan had previously served as the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan's emir for the tribal agency of Arakzai.

In October, both Maqbool and Hafez Saeed Khan pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, along with Hafiz Dolat Khan from Kurram, Maulana Gul an Fateh from Khyber, Mufti Hassan Swati from Peshawar, and Khalid Mansoor from Hangu.

The latest video from January includes pledges of allegiance to the Islamic State from these same individuals as well as from several others. The new additions include:

• Omar Mansoor, who is mentioned as being associated with Pakistan's Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, in Islamabad.
• Sa'ad al-Emrati, representing the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP) faction called the Sa'ad bin Abi Waqas Front in Logar province, Afghanistan.
• Obaidullah Peshawari, representing Tawad al Jihad from Peshawar, Pakistan.
• Jawad, representing the Abtalul Islam (Heroes of Islam) Foundation, a jihadist media group focused on the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in early July 2014.
• Sheikh Muhsin, representing Kunar province, Afghanistan.
• Talha, representing Lakki Marwat district, Pakistan.

Maqbool insisted that several jihadists in Afghanistan's Kabul and Kunduz provinces, as well as many others in Pakistan, including Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, had also given their consent that Hafiz Saeed Khan be nominated the emir for the Khorasan Shura. Maqbool specified that "problems with the roadways" had prevented other representatives from attending the shura and pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in person. He listed these other groups and individuals as:

• The Qamber (Kamber/Kambar) Kheyl tribe in Khyber Agency, Pakistan (the Kambar Kheyl is an Afridi sub-tribe).
• Gul Baleah (Balay/Bali) from Bajaur Agency, Pakistan.
• "Hudhayfah" (Huzaifa) from Dir, Pakistan.
• Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, who was detained at Guantanamo for three years and had previously sworn allegiance to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Dost's oath of allegiance was issued on July 1, 2014. [See Long War Journal report, Ex-Gitmo 'poet' now recruiting for the Islamic State in Afghanistan and Pakistan.]
• Ghulam Rasool from Waziristan, Pakistan.
• The Ansar al-Mujahideen from Waziristan.
• Qari Haroun (Haroon/Harun) from Kunar province, Afghanistan.
• Abu Abdullah from Nangarhar province, Afghanistan.

The Khorasan Shura, while consisting of mostly low to mid-level former Pakistani Taliban militants, exemplifies the fractured status of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan and highlights the competition between smaller and emerging militant groups in South Asia, some of which are seeking to align with the Islamic State brand.

Additionally, Sheikh Abu Yazid Abd al Qahir Khorasani, a well known Salafist preacher from Kunar province and creator of the Abtalul Islam (Heroes of Islam) Foundation, a radical web forum that praises jihad and martyrdom, had also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in July 2014. His purported deputy, Jawad, appears in the January 2015 video along with Hafiz Saeed Khan.

Prior to Maqbool and Hafiz Saeed Khan's defection, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan splintered several times in 2014 after the death of its previous emir, Hakeemullah Mehsud. Two powerful branches from North and South Waziristan as well as a group from Mohmand and other agencies and districts in northwestern Pakistan formed their own factions due to a leadership dispute and infighting. US intelligence officials told The Long War Journal that they estimate that the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan lost more than 70 percent of its strength during the split [See LWJ report, Discord dissolves Pakistani Taliban coalition.]

Islamic State seeks global status

The Islamic State is in competition with al Qaeda to lead the global jihad, and has sought to expand its network and profile beyond Iraq and Syria, where the group's leadership is based. Al Qaeda ejected the Islamic State from its fold in February 2014 after a yearlong leadership dispute over who controls the jihad in Syria. One month later, a group of nine low and mid-level al Qaeda leaders based in Afghanistan and Pakistan joined the Islamic State's predecessor; one was later reported to have been killed in Iraq in August 2014. [See LWJ reports, Previously obscure al Qaeda leader responds to dissenters, and Islamic State leader who defected from al Qaeda reported killed in Mosul.]

In June 2014, the Islamic State declared the formation of a caliphate and appointed Baghdadi its emir. Since it announced the formation of the caliphate, the jihadist group has claimed that it has established wiliyats, or provinces, in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. [See LWJ report, Islamic State leader claims 'caliphate' has expanded in new audio message.]

Since the New Year began, Boko Haram has continued its offensive against Nigerians and its perceived enemies. Setting off what turned into a horrendous chain of events, the jihadist group assaulted and overran a military base that hosted the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) on Jan. 3. The initial attack sent nearby villagers fleeing into neighboring Chad.

In the days that followed, members of Boko Haram attacked the nearby village of Baga and others, killing civilians and burning as they went. Jihadists reportedly unleashed assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades on townspeople.

By Jan. 8, Nigerian officials commented that Boko Haram had razed at least 16 villages in the surrounding area and some 2,000 people were unaccounted for and feared dead.

In a statement to the press on Jan. 13, Nigeria's Director of Defense Information, Maj. Gen. Chris Olukolade, said that only 150 people, including a large number of Boko Haram members, were killed in the confrontation, faulting the claim that 2,000 people were slaughtered. He further stated that many community members were missing because they had fled the area as a result of incessant attacks on their towns. However, what he did not note was that Boko Haram still controls the area. The Nigerian military reportedly began an offensive on Jan. 9 to reclaim Baga. The assaults by both air and ground forces have yet to unseat the terrorist group.

Outside of Baga, Boko Haram has been active on other fronts. On Saturday, Jan. 10, a girl estimated to be around 10 years-old was strapped with an explosive device which detonated at a busy market in Maiduguri in Borno State. The market had been previously hit by suicide bombers in 2014. At least 20 people were killed and many others were injured in the bombing. A metal detector at the scene indicated that the young girl was carrying something suspicious, however the bomb was set off before she could be isolated.

The same day, a car bomb went off at a police station outside of Potiskum in Yobe State. The detonation occurred as the driver of the vehicle was being taken in for questioning. He was killed, along with a police officer.

The following day, two female suicide bombers hit a busy Sunday market in Potiskum. According to a local security source, "One of the bombers looked 23 and the other 15. The first bomber -- the 23 year-old -- detonated her explosives just outside the entrance of the market, where volunteers were screening people going inside the market with metal detectors. The second bomber was terrified by the explosion and she tried to dash across the road but she also exploded."

Boko Haram has also continued its offensive beyond Nigeria's borders. On Jan. 12, several hundred members of the group attacked a Cameroonian military base in Kolofata, about 10 km east of the border with Nigeria. The Cameroonian Army reported that it killed 143 members of Boko Haram in the battle and lost one soldier on their side. Responding to the attack, Cameroon's Information Minister Issa Tchiroma Bakary said, "It is by far the heaviest toll sustained by the criminal sect Boko Haram since it began launching its barbaric attacks against our land, people and goods." The attack on Cameroon's forces came just days after Boko Haram released a video of a man claiming to be group leader Abubakar Shekau, in which he threatened Cameroon's President Paul Biya. The supposed Shekau directed statements at Biya, saying "If you do not repent then you will see the dire consequences."

The US State Department added Abdallah al Ashqar, a leader in the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC), to its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists today.

State described Ashqar as "a Palestinian national reported to be a leader of the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)," which was listed by the US as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity in August 2014.

Ashqar holds multiple leadership positions with the MSC. According to State's designation, he "serves on their military committee" and also "serves as a foreign relations official for the group." In addition to those duties, he "has sought missiles and other materials with which to attack Israel."

The MSC was described by State in its August 2014 designation as "an umbrella group composed of several jihadist terrorist sub-groups based in Gaza." The Israeli military has targeted members and leaders of Tawhid and Jihad Group in Jerusalem, and Ansar al Sunnah, both of which have consolidated under the banner of the MSC. [See LWJ reports, Mujahideen Shura Council is consolidation of Salafi-Jihadist groups in Gaza: sources, and US government adds Gaza-based jihadist 'umbrella' group to terrorist designation lists.]

The MSC is responsible "for numerous attacks on Israel since the group's founding in 2012," State noted.

Among the more high-profile MSC operations are the June 18, 2012 cross-border attack on an Israeli construction site that killed one civilian (the group dedicated the attack as a "gift" to Ayman al Zawahiri and its "brothers" in al Qaeda to avenge the killing of Osama bin Laden); and the March 21, 2013 rocket attack on Sderot, Israel on the eve of a visit by President Barack Obama. The group has also claimed responsibility for a multitude of rocket, mortar, and IED attacks.

The loyalties of the MSC within the ranks of the global jihad remain unclear. While the MSC expressed support for the Islamic State on the same day that al Qaeda disowned the group over a leadership dispute within the Syrian jihad, the MSC has also issued statements in support of al Qaeda leaders. A few weeks after the MSC expressed support for the Islamic State, the group described Abu Khalid al Suri, al Qaeda's representative to Syria who was a fierce critic of the Islamic State, as a "martyr."