European officials estimate that about 300 women from the United States and Europe have joined the various jihadist groups fighting in Syria's civil war. Women from countries including Norway, Canada, the United Kingdom, Austria, France, the Netherlands, and the US are known to have joined the Islamic State. In October, three schoolgirls from Denver, Colorado attempted to travel to Syria to join the jihadist group in Syria, but were stopped in Germany and sent back home. But others have completed the journey, and stayed.


On Dec. 2, a female claiming to live within the Islamic State posted to her Twitter account ways women can help in jihad without fighting. 


In response to a question from a user asking how she could "defend Islam and the oppressed there," Muhajirah Witness, formerly known on Twitter as Muhajirah Amatullah, explained: "So much U can encourage, financially equip a Mujahid, lo0k [sic] after his family, refute the liars etc & make genuine effort 4 Hijrah." Hijra is the Arabic word for migration. 
The owner of the Twitter account changed her name to Muhajirah Witness following the exposure and arrest of the man behind the well-known pro-Islamic State Twitter account Shami Witness.

In the past, Muhajirah Witness has tweeted about life in Raqqah under the Islamic State, boasting about the domestic role women play in everyday life. She has also tweeted about slavery under the caliphate, claiming that Islamic rulings permit men, women, and children to be slaves if they are prisoners of war.

Despite Muhajirah Witness' tweets trying to describe some semblance of a normal life in Raqqah, her statements conflict with the Islamic State's own description of how its fighters treat women.

On Dec. 3, the Islamic State's "Research and Fatwa Department" published a pamphlet detailing how its fighters are to treat female slaves when they are captured. The pamphlet was recently translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI).

The 27 question-and-answer pamphlet explains that Islamic State militants are allowed to have sex with female captives, can capture unbelieving women, and can perform darb ta'deeb, or "disciplinary beatings." The pamphlet makes distinctions between the types of beatings that are allowed (it claims "beating for the purpose of achieving gratification" is not permitted) and discusses when pre-pubescent women are "fit for intercourse."


For example, one of the questions translated reads: "Question 13: Is it permissible to have intercourse with a female slave who has not reached puberty?" The Islamic State answers: "It is permissible to have intercourse with the female slave who hasn't reached puberty if she is fit for intercourse; however, if she is not fit for intercourse, then it is enough to enjoy her without intercourse."


Another question addresses how female slaves are expected to dress and cover parts of the body; "Question 14: What private parts of the female slave's body must be concealed during prayer?" The Islamic State's fatwa contains this answer: "Her private body parts [that must be concealed] during prayer are the same as those [that must be concealed] outside [prayer], and they [include] everything besides the head, neck, hands and feet."


The pamphlet also explains that militants are not allowed to separate pre-pubescent children from their mothers by buying or selling them, but can do so "if the children are grown and mature."


After seizing the town of Sinjar, Iraq in early August, the Islamic State captured what the US State Department estimated is between 1,500 and 4,000 Yazidi girls and women. These women have been raped, tortured, and in some cases even forced to marry the group's fighters. On Dec. 17, several news outlets reported that one Islamic State militant murdered 150 women in Fallujah after the women refused to marry the group's fighters. The mass killings could not be independently verified by The Long War Journal.

The Islamic State's pamphlet highlights the brutal treatment that Yazidi women and others have suffered and will continue to face under the organization's harsh interpretation of sharia law. Yazidi women who have been rescued from the Islamic State have recounted repeated rapes by the group's fighters. Meanwhile, in its official English-language propaganda magazine, "Dabiq," the Islamic State defends its treatment of the Yazidi women, citing Islamic law as its reasoning for capturing and enslaving them.

Despite female Islamic State recruiters describing "positive" aspects of life in Raqqah on their social media accounts, the group's own material shows a different side, one that exposes its real and brutal treatment of women.

Clearly, life in Raqqah is nothing like the rosy picture painted by the Islamic State's female boosters. In November, the United Nations released a report documenting the Islamic State's various war crimes and other atrocities. One section is titled, "Violations against women." In Islamic State-controlled "areas of Syria, women and girls have largely been confined to their houses, excised from public life."

All aspects of their lives are covered by the Islamic State's draconian sharia laws. The UN report notes that these laws are enforced not only by male members of the organization, but also by an "all-female brigade, Al-Khans'aa, which assists in monitoring adherence to dress codes and enforcing punishments."

The Islamic State "has executed women, as well as men, for unapproved contact with the opposite sex, resulting in charges of adultery." In Raqqah, on "three separate occasions" between June and July this year, groups of women were executed "on these grounds," the UN report states. Most of them were "stoned to death, ostensibly for adultery."

The situation is so dire that, according to one witness interviewed by the UN, a 19-year-old "university student" committed suicide rather than marry an Islamic State member, as her parents commanded.

The Islamic State's female supporters do not tweet such horror stories. They prefer to pretend that the oppressive laws they live under are necessary and just.

The spokesman for al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Usama Mahmood, has released a statement condemning the Pakistani Taliban's attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar earlier this week. More than 140 people, mainly children, were killed during the assault.

AQIS' four-page statement was released on Mahmood's official Twitter feed. In an accompanying tweet, Mahmood writes that the "massacre of innocent children" makes "our hearts burst!"

Mahmood stresses in the statement that al Qaeda only learned of the attack through the media, and his statement is based on the assumption that those reports are accurate. In particular, Mahmood says, it is al Qaeda's understanding that the attackers targeted children on purpose and that most of the victims were children.

Mahmood argues that al Qaeda carefully selects its targets inside Pakistan so as to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. He says that the group focuses on "American targets," the "puppet rulers" in Pakistan, and America's "mercenaries" in the Pakistani security and intelligence services.

It is true that the Pakistani Army is subservient to the US, Mahmood writes, and America is completely dependent on Pakistan's military to suppress "any voice" advocating for the implementation of sharia law in Pakistan. But this cannot justify an attack that seeks "revenge" from "innocent Muslims," Mahmood writes.

In harsh terms, Mahmood condemns the Pakistani Taliban's attack as "un-Islamic" and says that al Qaeda's jihadi scholars have already set forth the rules for engaging the enemy, which were not followed in Peshawar. The attack violates the jihadis' version of sharia law, Mahmood claims.

Mahmood also portrays al Qaeda as the defender of Muslims inside Pakistan. Addressing "our beloved Pakistani Muslims," Mahmood says their defense is "our responsibility" and al Qaeda seeks to "relieve" their pain.

Other al Qaeda operatives on Twitter have similarly come out against the attack. One of them is known as Shaybat al Hukama, or "the eldest of the wise." On his own Twitter feed, al Hukama writes that al Qaeda "strongly condemns the massacre of innocent children" in Peshawar and "declares its innocence in front of Allah" for the "shedding [of] innocent blood."

Al Hukama is an al Qaeda media operative and works for the group's senior leadership. In his tweets on the Peshawar attack, posted earlier today, he appears to speak in AQIS' name as well. [For more al Hukama, see LWJ report, Well-connected jihadist tweets, then deletes, explanation of al Qaeda's oath to Mullah Omar.]

AQIS is al Qaeda's newest regional branch, and likely brings together several jihadist groups in Pakistan and the surrounding nations under al Qaeda's banner. Ayman al Zawahiri and other senior al Qaeda leaders announced the formation of AQIS in early September. The group quickly claimed responsibility for an attack on two Pakistani frigates and the assassination of a Pakistani officer.

Mahmood and other AQIS officials have stressed that their jihad is focused on the Pakistani government, including especially the Pakistani Army. But the Pakistani Taliban's siege of the Army Public School, where young children from military families were instructed, was clearly not the type of attack al Qaeda currently endorses.

Al Qaeda and its branches have indiscriminately killed women and children in the Muslim-majority world in the past. But al Qaeda's leaders, including Ayman al Zawahiri, learned that this was a liability for the group.

Other prominent jihadist groups condemn Peshawar attack

The massacre of children in Peshawar has sparked widespread outrage throughout Pakistan and the world, doing damage to the jihadists' battle for hearts and minds in the process. Several prominent jihadist groups have condemned the attack.

Al Qaeda's statement follows a similar condemnation by the Afghan Taliban earlier this week. Other groups have followed the Afghan Taliban's lead.

A group called the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan Jamaat ul Ahrar (TTP-JA) broke away from the Pakistani Taliban's leadership earlier this year. The TTP-JA includes some of the strongest elements of the original Pakistani Taliban coalition.

"Like them [the Afghan Taliban], we condemn the attack on the school and killing of innocent children," Ehsanullah Ehsan, the TTP-JA spokesman, said earlier this week.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, both of which have longstanding relationships with al Qaeda, have similarly condemned the attack. The head of LeT, Hafiz Saeed, has reportedly blamed the carnage on India.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), another al Qaeda-linked group, is one of the few jihadist organizations to endorse the Peshawar siege. According to the SITE Intelligence Group, the IMU has released a statement calling the attack "justified" and "defensive."

The US launched a drone strike in the jihadist haven of Datta Khel in Pakistan's tribal agency of North Waziristan earlier today. The Pakistani military claimed it "cleared" Datta Khel in September as part of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which was launched in mid-June this year.

The CIA-operated, remotely piloted Predators or Reapers fired a pair of missiles at a compound in the village of Mada Khel in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan during the early morning, killing six jihadists, The News reported. A "high value target," who has not been named, is said to have been among those killed, Dawn noted.

Pakistani and regional jihadist groups, including al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, have not released a statement or commented on the strike.

The Datta Khel area in North Waziristan, where today's drone strike took place, is a nexus of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the top Taliban commander for North Waziristan, administers the area, but the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and other jihadist groups also operate there. Some of al Qaeda's top leaders have been killed in drone strikes in Datta Khel, including Mustafa Abu Yazid, Abdullah Said al Libi, and Zuhaib al Zahibi. [See LWJ report, 'Foreign militants' reported killed in latest US drone strike in Pakistan, for more details on Datta Khel and senior al Qaeda leaders killed there.]

Pakistan claimed Datta Khel was "cleared"

The Pakistani military, which launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb on June 15 against the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan and groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, claimed a few months ago that it had "cleared" Datta Khel.

On Sept. 3, the Inter-Service Public Relations, the public affairs branch of the Pakistani military, issued a press release announcing that "security forces have cleared major towns of Miranshah, Mir Ali, Datta Khel, Boya and Degan, which were considered strong holds of terrorists."

Yet two and a half months later, on Nov. 16, Pakistani strike aircraft launched "precise aerial strikes" in which "27 Terrorists including some of their important commanders and foreigners were killed in Datta Khel, North Wazirsstan [sic] Agency today." The airstrikes indicate that the Pakistani military is not on the ground in Datta Khel, and is forced to rely on aircraft to conduct offensive operations.

The US has launched seven drone strikes against jihadist targets in Datta Khel since Sept. 3, when the Pakistani military claimed it cleared the area. According to data compiled by The Long War Journal, 40 jihadists, including al Qaeda and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan fighters and commanders, are reported to have been killed in the drone strikes.

US strikes in Pakistan

Today's covert operation in Datta Khel is the 22nd strike reported in Pakistan this year. Eleven of those strikes have taken place in Datta Khel, and four more in the Shawal Valley of North Waziristan, which is also an al Qaeda and jihadist hub in the tribal agency.

The last strike, on Dec. 8, which also took place in Datta Khel, is rumored to have killed an al Qaeda commander known as Omar Farooq, but there has been no official confirmation of his death. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda commander reported killed in drone strike in Pakistan.]

All 22 attacks have taken place since June 11. The US drone program in Pakistan was put on hold from the end of December 2013 until June 11, 2014, as the Pakistani government attempted to negotiate a peace deal with the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, an al Qaeda-linked group that wages jihad in Afghanistan and seeks to overthrow the Pakistani state.

Just one week after overrunning a district in the northern province of Jawzjan, the Afghan Taliban are now touting the existence of a training camp in neighboring Faryab province.

The Taliban publicized the training camp, which they claimed is in the northern province of Faryab, in an hour-long video that was released on Dec. 18 on their official propaganda website, Voice of Jihad. The Taliban said the video was produced by "The workers of Multimedia Branch of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's Cultural Commission" and created to "notify us about the ongoing situation in Faryab province, Mujahideen military advancements and other noticeable achievements."

In the video, Taliban fighters are shown undergoing weapons training. Some fighters are instructed in firing rifles from a moving vehicle, a tactic commonly used by the Taliban in assassinations of government officials. One target at the range used by the Taliban is labeled "Obama killer." A Taliban commander who is said to be the group's senior trainer for the province is shown on the video.

Qari Sahib Salahuddin, who is also known as Ayyubi and is described as "the Jihadi in-charge of the province," is interviewed at the end of the video. The video purports to show tribal elders and policemen meeting with Taliban officials, attacks against Afghan security forces, and policemen who have been captured by the Taliban. In one scene, a Taliban religious official gives a speech to hundreds of Taliban fighters before they depart for an operation.

The Taliban are known to have had safe havens in Faryab province in the past. In April 2011, the International Security Assistance Force announced a special operations raid against what it described as "a Taliban safe haven known for improvised explosive device activity and weapons cache sites" near the village of Khwaja Kinti in the district of Qaisar. [See LWJ report, Special operations forces raid 'Taliban safe haven' in Afghan north.]

The Taliban and the allied Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which has integrated its forces in the Taliban's command structure in the Afghan north, maintain a strong presence in the provinces of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-i-Pul, and Takhar, and have established suicide training camps in the north over the past several years. ISAF identified the presence of camps in Sar-i-Pul and Samangan province. In March 2011, an ISAF special operations team captured an IMU commander who ran camps in Samangan.

The Taliban have made inroads in Faryab despite the relatively small Pashtun population there; more than 80 percent of the population in the province is Turkmen or Uzbek, while Pashtuns make up just over 10 percent.

Taliban take control of district in Jawzjan

One week before the Taliban released the video of their operations in Faryab, the jihadist group stormed the district of Khamyab in Jawzjan and forced Afghan security personnel to flee. The loss of Khamyab to the Taliban was confirmed by Fakir Muhammad Jawzjani, the provincial chief of police.

"Our soldiers went there to take on the Taliban in Khamyab. There was fighting against the Taliban, but our forces were compelled to withdraw. When the soldiers were returning to [the provincial capital] Sheberghan, they came across the Taliban, who were waiting for them, and the soldiers came under attack again," Jawzjani told RFE/RL.

According to the commander of a local arbaki, or tribal militia, "the Taliban had brought up extra fighters from the Akcha district for the assault on Khamyab." This may mean that the Taliban control Akcha as well, but it is unclear.

The Taliban have stepped up attacks against Afghan and Coalition forces in the capital of Kabul and the provinces as the US and allied forces withdraw the bulk of their forces and have ended the combat mission. As part of their effort to regain control of the country, the Taliban have seized control of several districts in the provinces.

Images from the Taliban's video of operations in Faryab:

Wathiq al Battat, the leader of the Mukhtar Army and secretary-general of Hezbollah in Iraq, was killed yesterday in the eastern Iraqi province of Diyala. Battat had formed the Mukhtar Army in early 2013 and has received support from Iran's Qods Force.

The Mukhtar Army said that Battat was "assassinated today [Dec. 21] by accident in northern Diyala during the struggle with his sons against terrorism," according to a short statement released by the group. The events surrounding the "accident' were not immediately made clear. A source in the Iraqi Interior Ministry told al Quds al Arabi that Battat was killed by "unidentified gunmen," but this has not been independently verified.

The news quickly spread on Twitter, with many Islamic State supporters tweeting that the Islamic State was behind al Battat's death. The claim that the Islamic State was behind al Battat's death cannot be independently verified, and so far the jihadist group has not officially taken credit for his death.

Shiite militias, including the Mukhtar Army, have played a key role in battling the Islamic State in the eastern province of Diyala, which borders Iran. Qods Force, the external operations branch of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps, has played a vital role in supporting Shiite militias combating the Islamic State in Diyala and elsewhere in Iraq. Iranian-backed Shiite militias such as the Hezbollah Brigades, Badr Brigades, Asaib al Haq, and the Peace Brigade (formerly the Promised Day Brigade) have all been spotted on the battlefield.

Battat was the secretary-general of Hezbollah in Iraq (the political party, not the Hezbollah Brigades, a dangerous Shiite militia supported by Iran) when he formed the Mukhtar Army in early February 2013. The Mukhtar Army was created to support the Iraqi government as Sunni political protests against the Iraqi government became more prevalent in early 2013. But shortly after it was mobilized, the militia distributed pamphlets in Baghdad threatening to kill Sunni residents.

In November 2013, the Mukhtar Army fired mortar rounds into northern Saudi Arabia. In an interview with Reuters, Battat said the goal of firing the rounds was to "send a warning message to the Saudis to tell them that their border stations and patrols are within our range of fire." Battat went on to say that the mortar fire was also to get "Riyadh to stop interfering in Iraq."

Just after creating the Mukhtar Army, Battat issued a prescient statement, warning about the yet-to-come jihadist offensive in Iraq.

"The government is stupid for not heeding our warning that al Qaeda is going to attack," Battat said, according to Al Arabiya. The Islamic State, then called the Islamic State of Iraq, was al Qaeda's official branch in the country before a leadership dispute arose with al Qaeda's General Command.

Battat told The Associated Press that the Mukhtar Army is supported by the Iranian government.

He "described himself as a follower of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He said his group receives weapons and other support from Iran, but declined to provide details. He has previously said he is advised by Iran's Qods Force," AP reported.

The Iraqi government issued an arrest warrant for Battat in February 2013, and he was reported to have been detained in the beginning of January 2014. His release was not announced, but he may have been freed by the Iraqi government to aid in the fight against the Islamic State, which launched its offensive to take control of Anbar that same month.

The Islamic State has released pictures online purporting to show its fighters routing a unit from the Hezbollah Brigades near the towns of Yathrib and Tal Gold in Salahaddin province. Based on the date given in the photo set, the fighting took place on Dec. 19.

The photo set was disseminated on Twitter by Islamic State supporters after being posted elsewhere online. The photos bear the title of Wilayat Shamal Baghdad (North Baghdad), which encompasses the area of Yathrib, Tal Gold (or Tal Dhahab), Dujail, Balad, and Duloaiya. The wilayat is just one of the 20 proclaimed administrative divisions of the Islamic State.

A number of pictures detail Islamic State fighters engaging the Hezbollah Brigades unit with small arms fire, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and with at least one technical. The last few pictures detail the weapons, ammo, and gear that were taken from the dead bodies of Hezbollah Brigades fighters, as well as their identification cards. Other photos, which are too graphic to be reproduced here, show the corpses of at least 12 Hezbollah Brigades soldiers.

The pictures were released while a joint effort is underway between the Iraqi Army and several Shiite militia groups to retake Yathrib and its surrounding areas. The current offensive on Yathrib, which is reportedly being led by the Iraqi 17th Division, follows an offensive launched earlier this month. On Dec. 4, the Hezbollah Brigades claimed that the Tal Gold area was completely cleared. On Dec. 5, the Iraqi Army said that its flag flew above Tal Gold and that all the checkpoints in Yathrib were under its control. On Dec. 7, Asaib al Haq, (or the League of the Righteous), another Shiite militia supported by Iran, released a video showing its forces with the Iraqi Army near Yathrib making a similar claim.

However, on Dec. 18, the League of the Righteous released a new video claiming to be making preparations for the liberation of Yathrib. On Dec. 22, it was reported that at least seven villages were taken back by the Iraqi Army and its Shiite militia allies. The current status of Yathrib is unclear, but the area has long been a contested area, with the territory changing hands many times.

The Islamic State is not the only anti-government force operating in the Yathrib area. The Islamic Army of Iraq, an Islamist insurgent group that has allied with jihadists in the past, took credit for shelling Joint Base Balad in Yathrib on Dec. 11.

The Yathrib area and the nearby cities and towns of Dhululiyah, Balad, Ishaqi, Dujail, Dojama, Khalis, Tarmiyah, and Taji are key terrain for the Islamic State. The cities and towns are in the northern Baghdad "belt" and sit along two highways that run between Samarra and the capital city Baghdad, both of which are under the Iraqi government's control. The Islamic State seeks to control the northern belt in an effort to strangle the capital. [For more details on the jihadist group's strategy in Iraq, see LWJ report, ISIS, allies reviving 'Baghdad belts' battle plan.]

The Islamic State has been able to launch attacks on Dhululiyah, Balad, Ishaqi, Dujail, Dojama, Khalis, Tarmiyah, and Taji from the Thar Thar region to the west and Miqdadiyah to the east. Some of the towns have changed hands between the Islamic State and Iraqi forces and allied militias several times since the jihadist group seized control of Mosul and pushed into Salahaddin and Diyala provinces in June. More than six months after the Islamic State launched its offensive to take control of northern and central Iraq, the northern Baghdad belt remains contested between the Iraqi military and allied Shiite militias on one side, and the Islamic State and its Sunni allies on the other.

The Iraqi military has scrambled units from across the country as well as deployed Iranian-backed Shiite militias in an effort to defend the road between Samarra and Baghdad. Shiite militias, including the Badr Brigade, Hezbollah Brigades, Asaib al Haq (League of the Righteous), and Muqtada al Sadr's Promised Day Brigade, all of which are supported by Iran's Qods Force, have been called in to reinforce beleaguered and demoralized Iraqi forces along the Samarra-Baghdad corridor and elsewhere in Iraq. These militias have remained on the front lines and have secured cities and towns, many of which are predominantly Sunni communities. The Islamic State has had some success against these militias; in the first week of December, an Islamic State unit routed a Badr Brigade force near Samarra.

Iran has taken special interest in backing Iraqi security forces against the Islamic State. Qasem Soleimani, the commander of Iran's Qods Force, the special operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, has been spotted numerous times on the various fronts directing military operations. As recently as last month, he was photographed alongside Shiite militiamen in Samarra. The Qods Force commander has also been spotted on other key fronts as Shiite militias continue to battle the Islamic State.

Pictures released by the Islamic State showing the fighting near Yathrib can be seen below:

The Islamic State shot down a Jordanian warplane today as it was conducting operations over the Syrian city of Raqqah, and captured the pilot.

The Islamic State's Raqqah division "identified the pilot as First Lieutenant Mu'adh Yusuf al Kasasbeh," a Jordanian, and published photographs of its fighters capturing him in what appears to be a body of water and then marching him away, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which obtained the images. The jihadist group also published photographs of the wreckage of the warplane.

The jihadist group said it shot down Kasasbeh's aircraft with an anti-aircraft missile as he was flying a mission over Raqqah, the de facto capital of the Islamic State's self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria.

The Jordan Armed Forces confirmed that one of its warplanes was shot down as it was conducting an operation near Raqqah and that one of its pilots was being held "hostage," The Jordan Times reported. Kasasbeh's family confirmed he was being held by the Islamic State.

The Jordanian government claimed that the hostage situation would not impact its involvement in the coalition that has been launching airstrikes against the Islamic State and occasionally the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria. "The government pledged to continue war on terrorism in defending Islam," the newspaper stated.

The Jordanian aircraft is the first from the Coalition that has been shot down by the Islamic State or other jihadist groups in either Iraq or Syria since the US and its allies began launching airstrikes in Iraq on Aug. 7 and Syria on Sept. 22. Kasasbeh is the first Coalition hostage.

The Islamic State and other jihadist groups such as the Al Nusrah Front and the Muhajireen Army have shot down several Syrian warplanes and military helicopters since the civil war began in the spring of 2011. Additionally, the Islamic State has shot down multiple Iraqi military helicopters in Iraq.

The jihadist groups are flush with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons after overrunning numerous Syrian and Iraqi military bases and seizing weapons caches that have been left behind.

On Dec. 20, the Defense Department announced the transfer of four Afghans from Guantanamo to their home country. All four had been previously approved for transfer by President Obama's Guantanamo Review Task Force.

It is often reported that detainees, such as the four transferred to Afghanistan, have been "cleared for release." The implication is that they had been "cleared" of any wrongdoing and their release is risk-free. But this is not true. The task force recommended that all four be transferred subject to "appropriate security measures" being enacted by the host country. That is, the task force expected that whichever country took the four Afghans, the local government would take steps to ensure that they did not pose a threat. In practice, such security measures are often non-existent.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), which oversees the detention facility, assessed the four Afghan detainees years earlier. The secret JTF-GTMO threat assessments for the four detainees -- Mohommod Zahir, Khil Ali Gul, Abdul Ghani, and Shawali Khan -- were authored in 2008 and subsequently leaked online.

In each case, JTF-GTMO deemed the detainee to be "high risk," who "is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies." JTF-GTMO recommended that all four remain in the Defense Department's custody.

Three of the JTF-GTMO threat assessments also begin with a warning: "If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities." Only the file for Zahir does not include this language.

JTF-GTMO's warnings were rooted in intelligence showing that all four now former detainees had been involved in insurgency activities against the US and coalition partners. Each detainee was suspected of either serving in a leadership position, or directly reporting to jihadists who did. At least two of them have been tied to members of the so-called "Taliban Five," a group of senior Taliban leaders who were transferred from Guantanamo to Qatar earlier this year. [See LWJ report, Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl exchanged for top 5 Taliban commanders at Gitmo.]

Mohommod Zahir (internment serial number 1103) is "assessed to be a veteran high-level member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate," according to JTF-GTMO. He is "also assessed to be a weapons smuggler in the Ghazni Province and has possible ties to Afghanistan narcotics trafficking." Zahir "is associated with senior members of the Taliban intelligence and other Taliban officials and Anti-Coalition (ACM) members including Jalaluddin Haqqani." As of 2008, when JTF-GTMO's threat assessment was written, Zahir's associates still held "considerable influence in current Afghan affairs."

The JTF-GTMO threat assessment for Zahir contains descriptions of the files and other evidence recovered in his residence. The materials were key to JTF-GTMO's understanding of Zahir's role.

Some of the documents contained "names and telephone numbers of associates including senior Taliban officials." The "[n]ames and numbers included senior Taliban such as ministers and ACM commanders such as Jalaluddin Haqqani," and listed "contacts within Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the US, and Russia."

Zahir's "notebooks included names, phone numbers, commodities purchases and coordination such as sugar with mention of selling in Washington and mention of Britain, Brazil, Ukraine among others." JTF-GTMO's analysts surmised that the "movement of food and materials noted in the contents of this document appears to be outside the scope of an intelligence official, but could be consistent with an international trading business or modernization programs and possibly includes code for heroin."

A memo found in Zahir's "pocket litter" is addressed to the Taliban's Internal Affairs Ministry Department of Intelligence, and Zahir is identified as the "Chief of Intelligence" in the memo. A second memo found in Zahir's "pocket litter" is signed by "Mullah Mohammad Zahir, Secretary General, Directorate of Intelligence," which was assessed to be Zahir. The second memo is addressed to "His Excellency, Deputy of Economic Affairs, Council of Ministers" and discusses "flights to Saudi Arabia for the annual hajj."

Two "Codan high-frequency (HF) radios" were found in Zahir's home, and JTF-GTMO found this "is unusual for the general Afghan population." However, "Taliban leaders were known to use this equipment" and, in April 2000, Mullah Omar "ordered the collection of all the Codan vehicle radio systems," which were then redistributed "to fifty-two key leaders in the Taliban."

Authorities also found a fax that connected Zahir to the Taliban's intelligence chief, Qari Ahmadullah. In the fax, the "Iranian News Agency" requested Ahmadullah's assistance in providing Osama bin Laden with interview questions related to the 9/11 attacks. JTF-GTMO found that "[n]o direct association" between Zahir and bin Laden had been made, but Zahir's possession of the fax and other documents indicated a "high level of access or trust with" Ahmadullah.

Zahir's career with the Taliban, as recounted by JTF-GTMO, included relationships with various senior jihadists. "After the Taliban gained control of the Ghazni Province in 1997," the JTF-GTMO file reads, Ahmadullah instructed Zahir "to travel with the President of the Security Police, Muhammad Ibrahim, to Kabul...to work in the headquarters of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate." JTF-GTMO identified "Muhammad Ibrahim" as Jalaluddin Haqqani's brother, Muhammad Ibrahim Haqqani.

At one point, Zahir allegedly worked as a "cook and security guard" for the Taliban's director of logistics, and Zahir's boss "reported directly to Abdul Haq Wasiq," the Taliban's deputy minister of intelligence. Wasiq is a member of the so-called "Taliban Five," a group of senior Taliban leaders transferred from Guantanamo to Qatar earlier this year. JTF-GTMO also described Zahir as Wasiq's "subordinate."

Intelligence cited by JTF-GTMO connected Zahir to additional Taliban leaders, including other detainees once held at Guantanamo. DNA tests revealed that Zahir and Gholam Ruhani, who was transferred from Guantanamo to Afghanistan in 2007, "are related and possibly siblings." Ruhani is "an admitted Taliban Intelligence member" and was the "head of Taliban operations and security in Kabul."

JTF-GTMO also found that Zahir worked as an "investigator" for Mohamed Rahim, a senior Taliban intelligence official who was transferred from Guantanamo to Afghanistan in December 2009. The threat assessment for Rahim references debriefings during which Zahir identified Rahim as the deputy director of logistics in the Taliban's intelligence ministry. Zahir claimed to US officials that he "worked closely" with Rahim and "knew him from childhood." Rahim and Zahir were both captured on July 18, 2003 in Afghanistan, perhaps together. Rahim also worked underneath Abdul Haq Wasiq in the Taliban's hierarchy.

The JTF-GTMO file contains references to Zahir's possession of uranium, which, if true, is remarkable. Zahir "was arrested on suspicion of possessing weapons including Stinger missiles and uranium, which detainee's recovered documents indicate was intended for use in a nuclear device." US forces recovered "a small sealed can marked, in Russian, 'Heavy Water - U235 150 Grams'," the JTF-GTMO file reads. It is not clear if this was really uranium, some other substance, or simply a ruse.

During his combatant status review tribunal (CSRT) and administrative review board (ARB) hearings, Zahir tried to distance himself from the Taliban. "I have never been associated with [the Taliban]," Zahir claimed during his CSRT. During the hearings at Guantanamo, Zahir first claimed that he never worked for the Taliban's intelligence ministry, but eventually admitted that he was forced to work as a cook, even though he supposedly didn't know which Taliban department he was working for.

Zahir was confronted with the fax, discovered in his residence, from the Iranian News Agency requesting assistance from Qari Ahmadullah, the Taliban intelligence chief, in getting a series of 9/11-related questions to bin Laden. "I am not aware of the fax," Zahir claimed during one hearing. "I am not aware of Qari Ahmadullah," he continued. "I admitted to these things because in Bagram they beat us with a cable until we admitted to them. I was beaten. I am not aware of anything. I was a teacher and they brought me to this job."

But the officer who presided over Zahir's hearing quickly pointed out that the evidence concerning Ahmadullah's fax "does not refer to something" Zahir admitted, but to "something that was found on you." In other words, the allegation regarding the fax is not tied to any alleged confession by Zahir. When asked to describe his supposed beating, Zahir quickly blamed "a tribe in central Afghanistan" that looks Asian. Members of this tribe supposedly "covered their faces and beat" Zahir. It is clear from the transcript that Zahir's story was not something well-documented, and appears to have been a diversion.

JTF-GTMO concluded that Zahir was in fact a senior Taliban official. Zahir's jihadist career began during the war against the Soviets in the 1980s.

Khi Ali Gul (ISN 928) was "a member of an Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) group named Union of Mujahideen (UOM) with indirect ties to the Haqqani Nework," according to JTF-GTMO's analysts. Gul "was a member and probably [a] leader" of his ACM group, which "conducted an attack against US forces." On Dec. 1, 2002, Gul and "several other Afghans met at his house to plan and execute a rocket attack against" an American base. Later that same day, "six rockets were fired at" the base. Weeks later, Gul was captured by Afghan military forces and quickly transferred to US custody.

JTF-GTMO concluded that Gul held senior leadership roles within the jihadists' ranks during the Taliban's regime and thereafter. Gul "reportedly served as an intelligence chief under the Taliban regime during which he harassed and assassinated Afghan intellectuals," the JTF-GTMO file reads. After the Union of Mujahideen was disbanded, Gul allegedly became an "intelligence officer" in something called the "Gorbaz Mehdi Jihadi Battalion." Many members of this battalion had "ties to known Taliban and/or al Qaeda personnel." While serving in the battalion, Gul "routinely collected information on Afghans who helped US and Coalition forces."

JTF-GTMO found that Gul had a number of other suspicious ties. He "is an associate of Mohammad Nabi Omar," who is one of the so-called "Taliban Five" leaders transferred to Qatar earlier this year. An Afghan military officer identified Gul as "an agent for the ISID of Pakistan." (There is no other detail in the JTF-GTMO file explaining Gul's possible role as a Pakistani agent, however.) And JTF-GTMO found that Gul's "brother remains active in ACM activity."

During his combatant status review tribunal (CSRT) at Guantanamo, Gul denied any wrongdoing. He claimed that he was part of the Karzai government up until his capture and even said he protected sleeping Americans during the battle of Tora Bora.

Gul used colorful language to deny holding any leadership role within the jihadists' ranks, saying that just as you "cannot cover the sun with two fingers" you can't hide the identity of a commander in Afghanistan. And no one knew him as a leader, Gul claimed. Gul argued that he did not work for, or against, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and he denied any connection to Jalaluddin Haqqani. Gul also disputed reports that he had met with Osama bin Laden.

The only role Gul admitted to playing was fighting the communist regime in Afghanistan before it fell to the mujahideen in the 1990s. "I didn't fight directly with Russians [during the jihad against the Soviets]," Gul claimed. "Inside the government, I fought against the communists that were in Afghanistan." During an administrative review board hearing, Gul elaborated: "Yes, I have done jihad. In my province there were no Russians. There was a communist, [our] own communist, and I was fighting them. When the Russians/Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan I stopped being in touch with [any groups]. I had no connection with [any] other groups. When such party or each group started fighting each other, I had nothing to do with them."

JTF-GTMO clearly did not believe Gul's story, concluding that he remained an active leader until his capture in late 2002.

Abdul Ghani (ISN 934) was once charged before a military commission, but the charges were dismissed. This does not indicate that authorities believed the charges were erroneous, as detainees have escaped prosecution in the commission system, which has been plagued by delays and legal challenges, for a variety of reasons.

According to the commission charge sheet, Ghani attacked US forces in Afghanistan in late 2001 and 2002. He allegedly transported and planted "land mines and other explosive devices...for use against US and coalition forces" and "fired rockets at US forces and bases." He was also accused of shooting and wounding an Afghan soldier.

Ghani allegedly cooperated with al Qaeda in executing the attacks. "In or about 2002," the charges read, "Abdul Ghani accepted monetary payments, including payments from al Qaeda and others known and unknown, to commit attacks on US forces and bases."

Additional information concerning Ghani's past can be found in a leaked JTF-GTMO threat assessment. Ghani "has a history of involvement with the Taliban military forces and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks."

During his time in US custody, Ghani "admitted he was involved in at least one rocket attack on US forces at the Kandahar, [Afghanistan] airport in 2002 and is assessed to have launched multiple attacks against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan." Multiple sources "have independently report[ed] his involvement in at least four other attacks against US forces using rockets and possibly mines."

JTF-GTMO also concluded that Ghani was a member of a "40-man Taliban-aligned militia unit established...to conduct assassinations, kidnappings, and ambushes of US and Afghan officials and military forces."

A close reading of the file for Ghani reveals that the information concerning the 40-man unit may have been suspect, as it was sourced to a single other Guantanamo detainee named Mohammed Hashim, who was transferred back to Afghanistan in December 2009. Hashim alleged that this 40-man unit was responsible for assassinating key political figures and plotting to kill others. He also told authorities that the unit "provided security detail for" Osama bin Laden's "convoy in Jalalabad, [Afghanistan] to enable his late 2001 escape from Afghanistan." All of the reporting on this 40-man unit's activities came from Hashim, who "is of an undetermined reliability and is considered only partially truthful," according to JTF-GTMO. No other detainee corroborated his details.

JTF-GTMO thought that Ghani may have been maintaining contact with active Taliban members even as he was detained at Guantanamo. He "received multiple letters from an individual named Abdul Hadi Agha," who revealed he had been in contact with other detainees in his writings. "Abdul Hadi Agha may be identifiable with an active Taliban insurgent leader and commander in Kandahar and Helmand provinces," JTF-GTMO found.

During his combatant status review tribunal (CSRT) at Guantanamo, Ghani was highly confrontational, rejecting the tribunal's authority. He said the tribunal members and the US were the real enemy combatants, as they were bombing Afghanistan. He also denied knowing anything about al Qaeda.

While he did not admit playing any role in the attacks against the Americans in Afghanistan, he did concede that he was a jihadist. "Do you believe in Jihad?" one tribunal member asked him. "Why not? I am a Muslim. We fought Jihad against the Russians."

Shawali Khan (ISN 899) is "an admitted member of the Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with ties to the Anti-Coalition Militias (ACM), and possible ties to al Qaeda's terrorist network and Iranian extremist elements." Khan "conducted terrorist operations against US and Coalition forces" and has "familial ties to a high-level HIG leader who remains active against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan," JTF-GTMO found in its October 2008 threat assessment.

Khan was first recruited to fight by the HIG during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. JTF-GTMO cited some evidence suggesting that Khan briefly served the Taliban in the 1990s, and participated in fighting against the Northern Alliance.

By early 2002, Khan was allegedly part of a cell commanded by his uncle Zabit Jalil, who directed Khan to "place and detonate mines" outside a base near Kandahar. Jalil reportedly received his orders from Mullah Obaidallah, the former Taliban defense minister.

Khan was captured in late 2002 and a search of his home turned up numerous suspicious materials, including an al Qaeda "training manual covering topics such as surveillance, assassination, and interrogation techniques, which is similar to other al Qaeda training manuals found in Afghanistan." Handwritten notes found in the manual mentioned "traditional and untraditional wars" including those using nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Three books of poetry written by a high-ranking bin Laden confidante were also found in Khan's home. However, Khan claimed that he was uneducated except for being able to read the Koran in Arabic, suggesting the manual and poems were not really his.

Jalil, Khan's uncle, remained active in the insurgency long after Khan's arrest. JTF-GTMO described Jalil as the co-leader of a joint HIG and Taliban force. Jalil and his colleague "had the responsibility of maintaining HIG and Taliban connections with the Iranian government." Jalil and his comrade "requested weapons and other supplies from Iran in order to conduct" attacks against US and Coalition forces. JTF-GTMO found that Jalil's cell received some of the support Iran agreed to provide to the insurgency. Jalil also allegedly maintained ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, working to free Taliban prisoners in Pakistan's custody.

Jalil reportedly met with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a longtime al Qaeda and bin Laden ally, in May 2008. Hekmatyar allegedly provided Jalil with "a suitcase containing an unknown amount of US currency."

During his combatant status review tribunal (CSRT) and administrative review board hearing, Khan denied any knowledge of the allegations levied against him and his uncle.

Asmatullah Muawiya (center), from a March 2013 video. Osama bin Laden is to Muawiya's left, and Rasheed Ghazi, the slain leader of the Lal Masjid, is to his right. Image from the SITE Intelligence Group.

The US targeted a dual-hatted Pakistani Taliban leader and al Qaeda commander in one of two drone strikes that took place today in Pakistan's jihadist haven of North Waziristan.

The CIA-operated, remotely piloted Predators or Reapers launched two airstrikes in the Shawal area of North Waziristan, killing nine people, including four "foreigners," a term used to describe members of al Qaeda or other foreign jihadist groups, The New York Times reported. The Shawal Valley is a known haven for a host of jihadist groups, including al Qaeda and a multitude of Pakistani Taliban groups.

The first strike targeted a vehicle as it traveled in the Shawal area, killing four "Uzbeks," a Pakistani security official told the Times. The Uzbeks are likely members of the al Qaeda and the Taliban-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

The second strike targeted "a compound in Kund Sar in the Shawal Valley," where Asmatullah Muawiya was sheltering, the Times reported. Five people were killed in the attack, but it is unclear if Muawiya was among them.

Muawiya is the emir of the Movement of the Taliban in Punjab, which is more commonly called the Punjabi Taliban. He is also known to be the commander of what Osama bin Laden described as one of several al Qaeda military "companies." [See LWJ report, Bin Laden docs hint at large al Qaeda presence in Pakistan].

Muawiya broke with the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan in the summer of 2013 when he decided to halt attacks against the Pakistani government and focus his group's efforts in Afghanistan. The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan claimed to have expelled Muawiya, but the Punjabi Taliban commander denied that he was subservient to the group to begin with. [See Threat Matrix report, Did the TTP 'expel' Asmatullah Muawiya?]

The Shawal Valley, which is administered by Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadar and spans both North and South Waziristan, is a known haven for al Qaeda and other terror groups operating in the region. A number of Taliban, Pakistani, and foreign terrorist groups gather in the Shawal Valley and then enter Afghanistan to fight US, NATO, and Afghan government forces.

The US has now launched 24 drone strikes in Pakistan this year. Six of those strikes, or 25 percent, have taken place in the Shawal Valley, and eleven, or 46 percent occurred in Datta Khel, which is also an al Qaeda and jihadist hub in the tribal agency.

All 24 attacks by the US have taken place since June 11. The US drone program in Pakistan was put on hold from the end of December 2013 until June 11, 2014, as the Pakistani government attempted to negotiate a peace deal with the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, an al Qaeda-linked group that wages jihad in Afghanistan and seeks to overthrow the Pakistani state.

The Islamic State's "provinces" in Egypt and Libya claimed recent attacks in both countries via jihadist supporters earlier today. The group's claims of responsibility were first obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

The Islamic State's Wilayat Sinai, or Sinai province, publicized that its operatives were responsible for the Dec. 23 attack on a natural gas pipeline that runs into Jordan. The organization said the attack was retribution for Jordan's "participation in the war on the Islamic State" in Iraq and Syria.

Wilayat Sinai's claim of responsibility was published in tweets by the Islamic State's supporters. Twitter has repeatedly suspended Wilayat Sinai's accounts, forcing the group to distribute its propaganda through other sites.

The Wilayat Sinai also claimed responsibility for two attacks on Egyptian military vehicles, saying that the personnel in one of them were killed.

On Dec. 24, the day after the gas pipeline bombing, the Islamic State claimed to have shot down a Jordanian warplane in Raqqah, Syria. CENTCOM quickly disputed the Islamic State's account, saying that the group did not shoot down the bomber.

Whatever the circumstances surrounding the downing of the plane, the group captured the Jordanian pilot flying it and is holding him hostage.

Separately, as SITE reports, the Islamic State's Wilayat Tripoli claimed to have detonated a car bomb at the diplomatic security building in Tripoli. Islamic State supporters have posted a photo, seen on the right, that purportedly shows the bombing.

Attacks on Egyptian pipelines first claimed in name of al Qaeda, now the Islamic State

The Islamic State's Wilayat Sinai grew out of Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (ABM). On Nov. 10, an unidentified ABM leader swore allegiance to the Islamic State's emir, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Shortly thereafter, the group was rebranded as an official subsidiary of Baghdadi's enterprise.

Jihadists have executed numerous attacks on pipelines running from Egypt into Israel and Jordan since the political uprising first began in 2011. Initially, ABM's attacks were claimed in the name of al Qaeda and, in turn, al Qaeda's senior leadership praised the group.

In an August 2011 audio message, for instance, al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri lauded the gas pipeline attacks, which ABM claimed as its own. "Not only does the siege of Gaza continue, but also continues the provision of Israel with Egyptian gas at prices lower than the market price," Zawahiri said in the al Qaeda production. "Were gas sold to Israel at a price higher than the market price, it would be a crime. What can [you] then say about this compound crime?!" Zawahiri continued: "I here commend the heroes who blew up the gas pipeline to Israel. I ask Allah to reward them for their heroic act, for they have expressed the anger of the Islamic Ummah against this continuing crime from the reign of Hosni Mubarak to the rule of the Military Council...."

Zawahiri praised other ABM attacks and the group's "martyrs" as well. In January 2014, the al Qaeda leader directed part of his message "to our people in Sinai." A clip from an ABM video, showing a funeral for some of its members, was included in this section of Zawahiri's message.

[For more on the early ties between ABM and al Qaeda, see LWJ report: Al Qaeda's expansion into Egypt.]

However, ABM has suffered significant leadership losses over the previous year. And those losses reportedly led to a schism in the group between its Sinai-based fighters and the organization's Nile Valley leadership.

There have been disputes within ABM concerning the rivalry between the Islamic State and al Qaeda. An alleged ABM statement pledging loyalty to Baghdadi was quickly disavowed in early November, only to have the Sinai-based wing of the group officially swear fealty to the Islamic State leader less than two weeks later.

Citing Western officials "familiar with intelligence reports on the group's internal communications," The New York Times reported that while the Sinai contingent has been in favor of allying with the Islamic State for months, "some of the Nile Valley leadership remains loyal to Al Qaeda in its theoretical disputes and rivalry with the Islamic State."

Recently, a previously unknown group of jihadists in the Sinai rejected ABM's allegiance to Baghdadi, claiming that the Sinai remains open for other jihadists to operate in as well. In addition, Ajnad Misr, another Egyptian jihadist group, appears to be tied to al Qaeda's international network. Ajnad broke off from ABM earlier this year.

Still, a group of jihadists in the Sinai clearly remains loyal to Baghdadi and continues to execute attacks in the Islamic State's name.

A senior Shabaab official, Zakariya Ismail Ahmed Hersi, has been reportedly captured by Somali officials. Hersi "surrendered to the Somali police," the Associated Press reports, citing an anonymous Somali intelligence official. According to CNN, which cites two Somali military officials, the authorities "captured Hersi and his driver without confrontation."

Shabaab formally merged with al Qaeda in February 2012, thereby becoming the international terrorist organization's official branch in East Africa. But Hersi and other top Shabaab officials worked closely with al Qaeda long before the formal announcement.

The US government offered a $3 million reward for information leading to Hersi's capture in June 2012. In announcing the reward, the State Department noted that Hersi served as Shabaab's "chief of intelligence."

Hersi, who is also known as Hassan Abdullah Hersi al Turki, was first designated as an al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist by the State Department in 2004. Foggy Bottom reported at the time that Hersi "has been associated with al Qaeda and has provided support for acts of terrorism."

The UN followed suit, adding Hersi to its al Qaeda sanctions list. According to a biography published on the UN's web site in 2009, Hersi "has maintained links to members of Al-Qaida's East Africa network since 1998." In particular, there is evidence tying Hersi to the al Qaeda operatives responsible for the twin bombings at the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on Aug. 7, 1998.

Hersi was a leader in the Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), another group based in Somalia. When al Qaeda "was preparing to attack the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya" in 1997 and 1998, Hersi "organized" an AIAI "training camp in Ras Kamboni" in support of the operation. "Twenty individuals linked to [Hersi] traveled from Somalia to Kenya to set up a structure to carry out the attack on the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya," the UN found.

The UN would later strengthen its allegation, directly connecting Hersi to the 1998 embassy bombings. In May 2013, the UN amended its designation of Hersi to allege that he was "[b]elieved to have been involved in the attacks on the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998."

Additional information regarding Hersi's longtime al Qaeda ties can be found in a leaked threat assessment authored by Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). The file notes that Hersi, who was part of the Islamic Courts Union at the time, conspired with a senior al Qaeda operative known as Abu Talha al Sudani. The pair helped plot the capture of Kismayo, a key Somali port that was held for a time by Shabaab. Sudani was wanted by the US for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings until his death in 2008.

Hersi joined Shabaab in 2009, but supported the group's operations before officially joining its ranks. In 2008, the UN notes, Hersi "ran a military training camp for" Shabaab "fighters near the Kenya-Somalia border." And as "the officer in charge of Juba Valley," he permitted the training of [Shabaab] forces on territory under his control." Hersi's forces, which were part of the Ras Kamboni brigade, "conducted joint operations with [Shabaab], including the capture of Kismayo in August 2008."

Press reports suggest that Hersi had a falling out with Ahmed Abdi Godane in 2013. Godane led Shabaab until his death in September. Shabaab quickly named Ahmed Umar as Godane's successor. And Umar reaffirmed his allegiance to al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri.

Several jihadist groups operating in Iraq and Syria continue to showcase facilities used to train their fighters. Since Dec. 1, seven new camps have been identified by The Long War Journal. Of the seven, six are in Syria and one is in Iraq. This brings the total number of training camps identified in Iraq and Syria to 64.

The facility in Iraq, called the "Abu Hamza al Muhajir camp," is run by the Islamic State. Located in Fallujah, the camp is named after the former emir of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayyub al Masri (his nom de guerre was Abu Hamza al Muhajir). He headed the group from 2006 to 2010 after its founder, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, was killed in a US airstrike in 2006. Al Masri and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, the previous leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, were killed by US and Iraqi forces in 2010.

The "Cubs of the Caliphate camp" in Syria is also operated by the Islamic State. Photographs of the facility, which was advertised by the jihadist group on Dec. 6, show various children training with weapons, martial arts, and in sharia law. This camp is just the latest in a long list of training centers run exclusively for children in Iraq and Syria. [For more on children's camps in Iraq and Syria, see LWJ report, Jihadists tout training camps for children in Iraq and Syria.]

The Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, released pictures of one of its training camps in Hama province on Dec. 7. The photos, which were released on the group's official Twitter page for Hama operations, show Al Nusrah recruits learning how to storm a building. The Al Nusrah Front is now known to operate two camps in Hama.

The Ansar al Din Front uploaded images of three camps; one which was previously identified and two others that have not been disclosed. The front is a coalition of jihadist groups that was founded in July by the Chechen Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar, the Moroccan Harakat Sham al Islam, the predominately Saudi Katibat al Khadra (which has merged with Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar), and the Syrian Harakat Fajr al Sham al Islamiya. The pictures, uploaded on Dec. 1, show training camps run by Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar in Aleppo, Harakat Sham al Islam in Latakia, and Harakat Fajr al Sham al Islamiya in Aleppo. The Harakat Sham al Islam camp has been previously identified. Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar and Harakat Fajr al Sham al Islamiya previously publicized other camps in Syria. [For more information, see LWJ reports, Harakat Sham al Islam operates training camp in northwest Syria and Jihadist training camps proliferate in Iraq and Syria]

The Imam Bukhari Jamaat, an Uzbek jihadist group which operates in Aleppo province and is an Al Nusrah Front ally, uploaded a video on Dec. 5 to its Vimeo account that details a new training facility. The actual location of the camp is unknown. The video shows the recruits receiving weapons, martial arts, and physical training. The Imam Bukhari Jamaat is known to operate two camps in Syria. In mid November, the Uzbek group swore allegiance to Mullah Omar and the Taliban, and it is likely that Imam Bukhari Jamaat has links to the Taliban and al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which operates in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The IMU also recruits for an Uzbek faction within the Al Nusrah Front.

Jaish al Islam (Army of Islam), a jihadist group that is part of the Islamic Front, released a picture of a training camp in "northern Syria" on its Twitter account on Dec. 23. The exact location of the camp was not disclosed, but it is likely to be situated in Idlib province, the headquarters of the Islamic Front. The Islamic Front is a powerful Islamist coalition that also includes al Qaeda ally Ahrar al Sham. The group, which is led by Zahran Alloush, operates mainly in Damascus. Two other camps operated by Jaish al Islam have been previously identified in Damascus and in Daraa in southern Syria.

Jihadist training camps in Iraq and Syria

Since the beginning of 2012, a total of 64 camps have been identified as being operational at one point in time. Of those camps, 49 are in Syria, and 15 are in Iraq. Eight of these camps are used to indoctrinate and train children. Information on the camps has been obtained from jihadist videos and images, news accounts, and US military press releases that note airstrikes against the training facilities. It is unclear if all of the training camps are currently operational. It is likely that there are training camps that have not been advertised.

The Islamic State operates 30 camps (14 in Iraq, 16 in Syria). The Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, operates or has operated 14 camps inside Syria. Allied jihadist groups run 20 other camps (19 in Syria and one in Iraq); nine of those camps are run by jihadist groups from the Caucasus, two by an Uzbek jihadist group, and jihadists from Gaza, Morocco, and Kazakhstan each run one camp.

In the past, al Qaeda has used its network of camps not only to train fighters to battle in local insurgencies, but also to identify potential recruits for attacks against the West as well as support a host of allied jihadist groups.

An Islamic State sniper gunned down a general in Iran's Qods Force who was advising Iraqi troops and Shiite militias in the battleground city of Samarra in central Iraq.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) announced that Brigadier General Hamid Taqavi was "martyred" while serving in Samara, close to the "shrine of Imam Hassan Askari" on Dec. 27, 2014, Jahan News, a hard-line Iranian media outlet reported. Taqavi was killed by an Islamic State "sniper," ABNA noted.

Taqavi served as an "adviser to the [Iraqi] Army and the popular mobilization of the Iraqi people," a reference to the Shiite militias that fight alongside the Iraqi military. Iran's Qods Force, the expeditionary special operations arm of the IRGC, is tasked with supporting the Iraqi military and Shiite militias, including the Badr Brigade, Hezbollah Brigades, Asaib al Haq (League of the Righteous), and Muqtada al Sadr's Promised Day Brigade (or Peace Brigade). The Shiite militias have been instrumental in reinforcing beleaguered and demoralized Iraqi forces, and have helped retake some areas in Iraq, including Jurf al Sakhar and Amerli.

The IRGC said that Taqavi was "one of the commanders of the Ramazan Base, during the sacred defense," of Iran during the Iran-Iraqi war from 1980-88. The Ramazan Base "was important" to the the Iranians, said Ali Alfoneh, a Senior Fellow at Foundation for Defense of Democracies who specializes on Iran.

"During the war with Iraq, they [the Iranians] directed operations behind enemy lines" in Iraq from the Ramazan Base, Alfoneh said.

Samarra is a key front in Iraq's current war against the Islamic State, and Iran has placed considerable importance on supporting Iraq's military and the Shiite militias operating there. Qasem Soleimani, the commander of Qods Force, has been spotted in Samarra directing military operations. As recently as last month, he was photographed alongside Shiite militiamen in Samarra. The Qods Force commander has also been spotted on other key fronts as Shiite militias continue to battle the Islamic State.

The Al Askari shrine in Samarra is one of the most important in Shiite Islam, and its fall to the Islamic State would be a major blow to Iran. Additionally, Samarra is the linchpin in securing the northern Baghdad Belt. The Islamic State seeks to control the city and others north of Baghdad in order to encircle the capital and lay siege to the Shiite-led government. [For more details on the jihadist group's strategy in Iraq, see LWJ report, ISIS, allies reviving 'Baghdad belts' battle plan.]

The Islamic State has been active in Samarra and in towns north and south of the city. Two weeks ago, the jihadist group routed a Hezbollah Brigades unit near the towns of Yathrib and Tal Gold, just south of Samarra. And in the first week of December, an Islamic State unit overran a Badr Brigade force near Samarra.

The US military confirmed that its aircraft launched an airstrike against a "senior leader" of al Qaeda's branch in Somalia.

"The strike took place in the vicinity of Saakow, Somalia," the Department of Defense said in a statement released today. "At this time, we do not assess there to be any civilian or bystander casualties."

The identity of the Shabaab leader who was targeted by the US warplanes was not disclosed, and it is unclear if the leader was killed or wounded in the airstrike.

"We are assessing the results of the operation and will provide additional information, when appropriate, as details become available," the DoD said.

Shabaab has not released a statement announcing the death of one of its leaders.

Shabaab's new emir, Sheikh Ahmad Umar, who is also known as Abu Ubaidah, is at the top of the US list of high-value targets. Umar replaced Ahmed Abdi Godane, Shabaab's previous emir, who was killed in a US drone strike in early September. Umar reaffirmed his allegiance to al Qaeda and its emir, Ayman al Zawahiri. Shabaab formally merged with al Qaeda in February 2012 but kept its status as an al Qaeda branch a secret for years prior. [See LWJ reports, Al Qaeda advises Shabaab to keep low profile on links, attack US interests; Shabaab formally joins al Qaeda; and Bin Laden told Shabaab to hide al Qaeda ties.]

Today's airstrike took place just four days after Shabaab launched a suicide assault on an African Union base in the capital of Mogadishu. Seven Shabaab fighters, three Ugandan soldiers, and a civilian were killed during the fighting.

Shabaab said the Christmas Day assault on the African Union base was launched to avenge the US airstrike that killed Godane, the group's previous emir, CNN reported.

Two days after the Christmas Day attack on the African Union base, Somali troops captured Zakariya Ismail Ahmed Hersi, Shabaab's former intelligence chief, who is wanted by the US.

US has targeted top Shabaab and al Qaeda leaders in Somalia before

In addition to the September airstrike that killed Godane, the US has targeted other top Shabaab leaders in drone and conventional airstrikes, as well as special operations raids.

On Jan. 26, the US killed Sahal Iskudhuq, a senior Shabaab commander who served as a high-ranking member of the Amniyat, Shabaab's intelligence service, in an airstrike in Barawe, a known stronghold of Shabaab.

US drones killed Anta Anta, also known as Ibrahim Ali Abdi, and two lower-level commanders in a strike on Oct. 29, 2013. Anta Anta was a master bombmaker and suicide operations coordinator for the terror group.

The US also launched a special operations raid that same month. On Oct. 7, 2013 in Barawe, US Navy SEALs targeted Shabaab's external operations chief Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir, who is also known as Ikrima. The Shabaab leader, who was not killed or captured during the raid, was in close contact with al Qaeda's general command in Pakistan and is said to have directed attacks in Kenya. [See Threat Matrix report, Target of SEAL raid in Somalia tied to top al Qaeda leaders.]

The US has launched several operations over the past decade that targeted or killed top Shabaab and al Qaeda leaders in Somalia. Bilal al Berjawi, a British national of Lebanese descent, was killed in an airstrike in January 2012. Berjawi was the senior deputy of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the leader of al Qaeda East Africa who also served as a top commander in Shabaab. Fazul was killed by Somali troops at a checkpoint outside Mogadishu in June 2011.

The US also killed Aden Hashi Ayro and Sheikh Muhyadin Omar in an airstrike in the spring of 2008. Before his death, Ayro was the leader of Shabaab.

Fazul and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, who also commanded al Qaeda East Africa, were also targeted, along with Abu Tala al Sudani, in US airstrikes in 2007 and 2008 during the Ethiopian invasion and occupation of southern Somalia. And Hassan Turki, another senior Shabaab leader who is closely tied to al Qaeda, is thought to have been targeted in a US strike in 2008.

Nabhan was also the target of a US special forces raid in the Somali town of Barawe in 2009. US commandos killed Nabhan and another terrorist during the operation.

Despite a military offensive led by the African Union and backed by the US that began in 2011, Shabaab still controls vast areas of southern and central Somalia. During the offensive, Shabaab was driven from major cities and towns such as Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa, but towns such as Bulobarde and Barawe remain under the terror group's control. The group has weathered the Ethiopian invasion, which began in December 2006 and ousted its predecessor, the Islamic Courts Union. Nearly eight years later, Shabaab remains a capable force in southern Somalia and an integral part of al Qaeda's global network. Additionally, Shabaab has stepped up its attacks in neighboring Kenya.

Ansar al Sharia, an al Qaeda-linked group in Libya, has released a six-minute-long video showing its spoils won during a recent battle against forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar. The group claims to have captured tanks and heavy armaments during a Dec. 26 raid on one of Haftar's camps.

Images of armored vehicles and weapons captured during the jihadists' operations have become commonplace. But the new video includes scenes of two Ansar al Sharia leaders, both of whom are particularly noteworthy.

Wissam Ben Hamid, as shown in the newly released Ansar al Sharia video.

The first is Wissam Ben Hamid, a jihadist who was a key figure in the security failures surrounding the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist attack in Benghazi Libya.

"By Allah's grace, today our heroes have achieved victories...they took these tanks and machines as booty from them and killed the soldiers of tyranny that were here at this axis," Ben Hamid says while standing in front of vehicles captured from Haftar's camp.

In the aftermath of the September 2012 attack in Benghazi, Ben Hamid admitted during press interviews that he was on the scene but did not intervene. He traveled to the airport in Benghazi, where he reportedly met an American security team that was dispatched from Tripoli to provide assistance during the assault on the US Mission and Annex. The security team was mysteriously delayed at the airport for three and a half hours. It is not known if Ben Hamid played a role in the delays.

Ben Hamid also met with State Department officials on Sept. 9, 2012 to discuss security in Benghazi. He portrayed himself as a key security official during the meeting.

Ben Hamid has appeared in a number of Ansar al Sharia videos and photos since earlier this year. Ansar al Sharia fighters were among the coalition of al Qaeda jihadists who overran the US Mission and Annex, killing four Americans in the process.

Ben Hamid's close relationship with Ansar al Sharia raises new questions about his role on the night of Sept. 11, 2012. He is currently a military commander in the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, an alliance of jihadist groups led by Ansar al Sharia.

[For more on Ben Hamid, the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist attack, and Ansar al Sharia, see LWJ reports: Ansar al Sharia ally a key figure in Benghazi security failures and Ansar al Sharia video features jihadist once thought to be US ally in Benghazi.]

Mohammed al Darsi, as shown in the newly released Ansar al Sharia video.

Another speaker in the video is identified as the "mujahid brother" Mohammed al Darsi.

"With Allah almighty's grace, these tanks were taken as booty from the apostates and the tyrants," al Darsi says. "And we tell them, with Allah's permission, we have brought to you youths who have a zeal for death as you have a zeal for life."

Al Darsi goes on to promise that the "infidels" will be defeated in Libya. "We will purge this land, with Allah's permission, from your desecration until the flag of [monotheism] flutters throughout Libya and until the law of Allah rules this land. The days stand between us, remember this phrase, and you will see with Allah, almighty's permission."

The video does not explain who al Darsi is, but he appears to be the same jihadist who was exchanged for a Jordanian ambassador earlier this year.

On April 15, Fawaz al Etan, Jordan's ambassador to Libya, was kidnapped at gunpoint in Tripoli. Just one week later, Jordan released a jihadist named Mohammed al Darsi from prison. Etan was subsequently freed and returned home in May.

Al Darsi was detained in 2006 and charged with plotting to attack Western tourists at the Queen Alia International Airport. In April 2007, along with four of his alleged co-conspirators, al Darsi was sentenced to life in prison by a Jordanian court. A sixth defendant had his sentence commuted to 15 years.

A leaked State Department cable, dated April 26, 2007, recounts details from the sentencing proceeding. As the verdicts were read out loud, according to the cable, the defendants yelled "God is great." They continued: "We're not afraid of your judgment - we won't surrender. Our holy battle will continue until martyrdom."

Some of the convicted jihadists "allegedly told authorities that Al Qaeda in Iraq wanted to claim responsibility for the foiled attack," the US Embassy in Amman reported.

In its Country Reports on Terrorism for both 2006 and 2007, the State Department referred to al Darsi's plot against the Queen Alia International Airport as being "al Qaeda-linked." The 2007 report adds that "hotels in Aqaba and the Dead Sea" were also going to be targeted.

Still more details were reported by The New York Times in a piece ("Militants Widen Reach as Terror Seeps Out of Iraq") published on May 28, 2007.

Al Darsi was imprisoned in Libya for "militant activities" but he was released in early 2006. According to the Times, al Darsi "had one goal: killing Americans in Iraq." He contacted an online recruiter, who arranged to meet him in Damascus, Syria. But instead of waging jihad in Iraq, al Darsi was repurposed to take part in the plot in Jordan.

"A team of militants from Iraq had traveled to Jordan, where they were preparing attacks on Americans and Jews, [al] Darsi said the recruiter told him," according to the Times. (The State Department has said the cell included "Iraqi, Libyan, and Saudi suspects.") The recruiter asked al Darsi if he would join the jihadists and "blow himself up in a crowd of tourists at Queen Alia Airport in Amman." Al Darsi confessed to Jordanian authorities that he agreed to the suicide operation.

Like the leaked State Department cable, the Times account features quotes from the 2007 sentencing hearing in Jordan, including quotes attributed directly to Al Darsi. "God is great!" al Darsi first shouted. And as he was about to be led away, al Darsi said, "I came here to fight against Zionists and occupiers."

The Long War Journal cannot independently verify that the Mohammed al Darsi shown in the Ansar al Sharia video is the same man exchanged for the Jordanian ambassador, but it appears to be the same jihadist. The video footage of al Darsi shows a man who looks very similar to the terrorist convicted in 2007 and ultimately released.

Therefore, the latest Ansar al Sharia video underscores the longstanding ties between North Africa and the jihad in Iraq. Both al Darsi and Ben Hamid have links to Iraq. Ben Hamid reportedly fought in Iraq, presumably for al Qaeda, before returning to Libya to take part in the revolution.

*Oren Adaki, an Arabic language specialist and research associate at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, contributed to this article.

Somalia's National Security Agency said that the US killed the leader of the Amniyat, Shabaab's intelligence service, in yesterday's airstrike in southern Somalia. US officials have not confirmed the claim.

"In a joint operation last night by the Somali national security and the United States, al-Shabaab intelligence chief Abdishakur, also known as Tahlil, who replaced the recently arrested former chief, was eliminated," the National Security Agency claimed in a statement that was released earlier today. The agency also said that two other Shabaab members were killed in the airstrike, but their identities were not disclosed, Al Arabiya reported.

Shabaab has not commented on yesterday's airstrike, nor has the al Qaeda branch announced the death of a senior leader.

The US military, which announced yesterday that it targeted a "senior leader" of the jihadist group near the town of Saakow in southern Somalia, has not commented on the report that the head of the Amniyat was killed. The Department of Defense said yesterday that it was "assessing the results of the operation and will provide additional information, when appropriate." [See LWJ report, US targets 'senior leader' for Shabaab in southern Somalia.]

It is unclear if Abdishakur is the actual leader of the Amniyat; the identity of the emir of Shabaab's intelligence branch remains murky.

Just two days prior to the US airstrike, Somali officials claimed that security forces captured Zakariya Ismail Ahmed Hersi, whom the US had identified in June 2012 as being the leader of the Amniyat. But in 2013 the United Nations had claimed that Mahad Mohamed Ali, who is also known as "Karate," was the emir of the intelligence division. [See LWJ report, Captured Shabaab official previously identified as group's 'chief of intelligence'.]

Shabaab later denied reports that Hersi was the head of its intelligence division, and claimed that he has not been a member of the group for well over a year. Press reports suggest that Hersi had a falling out with Ahmed Abdi Godane in 2013.

The Amniyat is a key organization within Shabaab. It is instrumental in executing suicide attacks inside Somalia as well as in Kenya and other African nations, conducting assassinations, providing logistics and support for operations, and integrating the group's local and regional commands. A top Amniyat official known as "Hassan" is said to have received direct instructions from Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri on training operatives in Africa. [See LWJ report, UN warned of Shabaab ally's 'new and more complex operations' in Kenya, and Threat Matrix report, Zawahiri's man in Shabaab's 'secret service'.]

The Amniyat is also responsible for protecting Shabaab's emir, and in the past has carried out executions for the group's leader. American Shabaab commander Omar Hammmani, senior Shabaab leader Ibrahim al Afghani, and other leaders were executed by the intelligence service on the orders of former emir Ahmed Abdi Godane.

Sanafi al Nasr is sitting on the far left in the picture above.

The al Qaeda leader known as Sanafi al Nasr, who is based in Syria, returned to Twitter yesterday after a month and half absence. He praised al Qaeda's "martyrs," including Adnan al Shukrijumah, a senior al Qaeda operative who was reportedly killed in Pakistan earlier this month.

Shukrijumah had been part of al Qaeda's external operations wing, which plans attacks in the West, for more than a decade. In particular, Shukrijumah was tasked with plotting against targets in North America. He has been tied to a number of plots, including a thwarted terrorist attack against New York City subways in 2009. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda sleeper agent tied to 2009 NYC subway plot.]

A photo posted on Nasr's Twitter feed shows a picture of Shukrijumah from the State Department's Rewards for Justice program. (The photo can be seen on the right.)

Nasr mentions another recently deceased al Qaeda official, whom he identifies as Umar Faruq. A jihadist who uses that name, which is a common nom de guerre, was reportedly killed in a US drone strike on Dec. 7.

However, there was some confusion in Pakistani press reports over the slain al Qaeda operative's identity. Some reports suggested that he was Ustadh Ahmad Farooq, who is the head of al Qaeda's dawa and communications arm in Pakistan. But it does not appear that this is the case, as Nasr's naming of the operative as Umar Faruq further suggests it was a different al Qaeda operative entirely.

In addition, there has been no indication from al Qaeda channels that Ustadh Ahmad Farooq, a high-profile leader, has been killed. [For more on the confusion over Umar Faruq's identity and role, see LWJ report: Al Qaeda commander reported killed in drone strike in Pakistan.]

In another tweet, Nasr commemorates Abu Khalid al Suri, who served as Ayman al Zawahiri's representative in Syria until his death in early February. Nasr repeats a theory, disseminated by online jihadists, suggesting that al Suri was killed by Islamic State fighters under the control of British intelligence.

Among other duties, Nasr (whose real name is Abdul Mohsin Abdullah Ibrahim Al Sharikh) is the head of al Qaeda's "Victory Committee," which is tasked with strategic planning and policymaking for the terror group. And he serves as a high-level strategist for the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, as well.

Nasr is one of the leaders of al Qaeda's so-called "Khorasan Group," which was reportedly planning attacks against Western targets when the US bombed its Syrian bases in September.

All of Nasr's tweets regarding al Qaeda's "martyrs" should be taken with a grain of salt. Earlier this year, al Qaeda leaders reported that Nasr himself had been killed while fighting in Syria. In reality, Nasr was merely wounded and he recovered from his injuries.

Nasr also claimed on Twitter that Muhsin al Fadhli, another leader of the "Khorasan Group," had been killed during the airstrikes in September. But that claim was dubious from the first, and there has not been any confirmation of al Fadhli's death.

Nasr has tweeted sparingly over the past few months. Prior to yesterday, his last tweets were posted on Nov. 13.

Earlier this month, Rustam Asilderov, a senior jihadist in Dagestan, released a video in which he pledged allegiance (bayat) to the head of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Asilderov had been the leader of Vilayat Dagestan, which is the Dagestani province of the Islamic Caucasus Emirate (ICE), an al Qaeda-linked organization that has long fought the Russian government.

Asilderov explained that he would have sworn bayat to Baghdadi sooner, but he was hoping the overall emir of ICE, Ali Abu Muhammad al Dagestani (a.k.a. Aliaskhab Kebekov), would follow suit and swear his fealty to Baghdadi as well.

However, Asilderov finally concluded that the head of ICE was not going to join the ranks of Baghdadi's international followers. So he decided to break off on his own. Asilderov claimed in his video that a "majority" of jihadists in Dagestan share his view and his bayat to Baghdadi was "on behalf of the mujahideen of the Dagestan province."

The move provoked a fierce backlash.

A few days after Asilderov's video, Ali Abu Muhammad released his own. Ali Abu Muhammad's 16-minute video has been posted a number of jihadist websites, including the site for Vilayat Dagestan and the Kavkaz Center, which has also posted excerpts in English.

Ali Abu Muhammad describes Asilderov's move as a "treacherous act," which has forced him to replace Asilderov as the emir of the Dagestan province with another "brother."

"We respected this brother. We accepted him. We did not expect such a treacherous act by him," Ali Abu Muhammad says in reference to Asilderov, according to a translation obtained by The Long War Journal.

The ICE emir says one can "turn a blind eye to many things," but not "treachery," and if Asilderov wanted to fight for Baghdadi then he should have left for Iraq and Syria. Instead, according to Ali Abu Muhammad, Asilderov has "caused a split among the mujahideen."

Ali Abu Muhammad urges the people of Dagestan not to help Asilderov and his followers, as they have "betrayed" their ICE brethren and "defected" to Baghdadi's side. Ali Abu Muhammad challenges Asilderov to a debate concerning who is right, Baghdadi or Ayman al Zawahiri and Mullah Omar, the heads of al Qaeda and the Taliban, respectively.

The ICE head argues that Asilderov lacks basic knowledge of sharia law, so he cannot have an informed opinion one way or another. "This brother does not quote the Koran," or the hadiths, or the "statements by scholars in any of his addresses," Ali Abu Muhammad says. "Is this not enough? Does this not prove and point to the fact that this man lacks basic knowledge [of the sharia]?"

In addition, Ali Abu Muhammad mentions another Dagestani leader who swore allegiance to Baghdadi, but his assessment is more forgiving. "I know this brother as a good man," Ali Abu Muhammad says, adding that this other jihadist should "reconsider his decision."

Ali Abu Muhammad's video was released just a couple of days after another ICE official criticized Asilderov's decision to switch allegiances. Muhammad Abu Usman, ICE's chief sharia judge in Dagestan, released an audio message saying that neither he, nor Ali Abu Muhammad, had been consulted before Asilderov made his announcement. Abu Usman also criticized Asilderov's lack of sharia knowledge.

"As a result," Abu Usman claimed, Asilderov's "decision was adopted at Satan's instigation and this is nothing but following one's passion."

Abu Usman, ICE's top sharia judge in Dagestan, has harshly criticized those who have joined the Islamic State.

In a separate message released earlier in the month, Abu Usman explained that Ali Abu Muhammad "has not allowed anyone to swear allegiance to the Islamic State as far as they accuse Muslims of disbelief, accept killing of Muslims and do not listen to scholars."

Abu Usman's messages have been promoted on Twitter by officials in the Al Nusrah Front, an official al Qaeda branch in Syria that has fought against the Islamic State since last year.

The messages from Ali Abu Muhammad and Abu Usman show that the ICE is clearly concerned about the Islamic State's sway over a number of ICE fighters. It is not clear how many jihadists this entails, but the coming months will undoubtedly shed additional light on the internal dissent.

While Asilderov claims that a "majority" of Dagestani jihadists agree with his decision to join the Islamic State, Kavkaz Center argues that this is not the case.

But other ICE commanders have defected to the Islamic State as well, according to Kavkaz Center.

The defectors can either flee for Iraq and Syria, or attempt to start their own breakaway faction in Dagestan and elsewhere under the Islamic State's auspices.

ICE emir continues to support al Qaeda, Taliban

Ali Abu Muhammad, who succeeded Doku Umarov as the emir of ICE in March 2014, has steadfastly supported al Qaeda and the Taliban throughout the controversy over the Islamic State's rise. He has continued to do so even as some Chechen jihadists, including Abu Omar al Shishani, have risen to prominent positions within Abu Bakr al Baghdadi's organization.

In 2013, Abu Omar al Shishani helped found Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar, or the Army of the Emigrants and Helpers, before officially joining the Islamic State.

Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar, which is led by Chechens but includes other fighters as well, remains loyal to Ali Abu Muhammad. And the group tries to remain neutral in the conflict between the Islamic State and its jihadist rivals in Syria. [See LWJ report, State Department adds Chechen, Moroccan-led jihadist groups to terrorist list.]

In late June, Ali Abu Muhammad released a video in which he discussed the efficacy of suicide bombings and the necessity of avoiding civilian casualties. Ali Abu Muhammad referred to Ayman al Zawahiri as "our leader" in the video and noted that Zawahiri has "urged rebels to avoid places where civilians gather."

The ICE emir was likely referencing the jihadist guidelines issued by al Qaeda under Zawahiri's direction. Al Qaeda is attempting to limit the jihadists' civilian casualties in the Muslim majority world as it tries to build a broader base of popular support.

In September, Ali Abu Muhammad released another video addressing Zawahiri and other leading jihadist ideologues as the "scholars of the ummah," or international community of Muslims. All of the other scholars addressed by the ICE head in the video back al Qaeda in its rivalry with the Islamic State. The other scholars included: Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, Hani al Sibai, Tariq Abd al Halim, and Abu Qatada al Filistini, all of whom have criticized Baghdadi.

Ali Abu Muhammad referred to the "scholars" collectively as "our valued brothers, the loved ones, the delights of our eye." It is likely that he addressed them in these glowing terms as a reply, of sorts, to the Islamic State and its supporters, who have been accused of slandering the veteran jihadist ideologues for not supporting the Islamic State.

"We rely on you in our jihad and follow you as our paragon," Ali Abu Muhammad said, addressing the jihadist leaders. "Therefore, do not forget us in your provision of advice and guidance whenever this is feasible and possible for you."

In late September and early October, Ali Abu Muhammad played a leading role in promoting a jihadist truce initiative in Syria. He joined some of the same ideologues he had praised in publishing "An Initiative and Call for a Ceasefire Between Factions in Syria." The proposed truce aimed to take advantage of the America-led bombing campaign in Syria to promote a ceasefire between the Islamic State and its foes. The Islamic State did not formally agree to such a deal. [See LWJ report, Pro-al Qaeda ideologues propose truce between Islamic State, rivals.]

In their criticisms of Asilderov, both Ali Abu Muhammad and Abu Usman, ICE's top sharia judge in Dagestan, refer to the jihadists' scholarly consensus concerning the Islamic State's "caliphate." They argue that Asilderov and others have ignored the opinions of leading jihadist thinkers in swearing bayat to Baghdadi.

The "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," the official name of the Taliban, released a video that showcases its operations and a training camp in the remote northeastern province of Kunar.

The "Multimedia Branch of Islamic Emirate's Cultural Commission" publicized the hour-long video today on Voice of Jihad, the group's official website. Titled "Epic battles of Kunar," the video features "footage of attacks by Mujahideen on enemy bases and check posts" and also shows "the head of Islamic Emirate for Kunar [sic] walking inside an overrun outpost," according to the Taliban statement accompanying the release.

The video also eulogizes Noor Qasim Sabari, who was killed in a US airstrike in Kunar sometime in the late winter or early spring of 2014. [See LWJ report, Afghan Taliban confirms death of shadow governors for Kunar, Kandahar.]

It is unclear exactly where the Afghan security forces bases are that are shown in the video, or when the attacks took place. The Taliban do display several Afghan soldiers who were captured at a base in Naray.

The Taliban have been active in several districts in Kunar province, most recently in the district of Dangam, which is situated on the border with Pakistan. Afghan officials have claimed that more than 1,000 fighters from the Afghan Taliban, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Lashkar-e-Taiba have been involved in an assault on the district.

In addition to footage of the fighting in Kunar and other standard Taliban propaganda featured in the video (such as claims that Afghan and US forces have been indiscriminately killing civilians), the jihadist group also released video from a training camp in the province. The camp is named after Khalid bin Waleed, a companion of the Prophet Mohammed and military general whose victories helped establish the first caliphate. The Taliban's 2013 spring offensive was also named after Khalid bin Waleed. [See LWJ report, Taliban promise suicide assaults, 'insider attacks' in this year's spring offensive.]

More than a dozen Taliban fighters are shown during training at the rudimentary camp; the trainees are shown marching, exercising, and firing their weapons. The activities are performed in an open field, indicating that the Taliban are not concerned with local security forces or Coalition aircraft.

The Khalid bin Waleed camp is the second training facility highlighted by the Taliban in the past two weeks. On Dec. 18, the Taliban released a video that showed fighters training in Faryab province. [See LWJ report, Taliban publicize training camp in northern Afghanistan.]

For years, the rugged, remote Afghan province of Kunar has served as a sanctuary for al Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and allied jihadist groups. The presence of al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba cells has been detected in the districts of Asmar, Asadabad, Dangam, Ghazibad, Marawana, Nari, Pech, Shaikal Shate, Sarkani, Shigal, and Watahpur; or 11 of Kunar's 15 districts, according to press releases issued by the now-disbanded International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, that have been compiled by The Long War Journal. Numberous al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders have been killed in ISAF raids. [See LWJ report, ISAF raids against al Qaeda and allies in Afghanistan 2007-2013.]

ISAF stopped issuing press releases on its operations against the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, as of June 27, 2013. But local reporting from Afghanistan indicates that all of these groups remain active inside Afghanistan, including in Kunar.

The Islamic State claimed to have breached the perimeter of Camp Habbaniyah in Anbar province, via photographs released over the past several days. The camp, which is a major Iraqi Army (IA) base near the town of Habbaniyah, is one of the last major IA bases in the western province.

The photographs bear the title of Wilayat Fallujah (State of Fallujah), which is one of the Islamic State's proclaimed 20 administrative divisions. Wilayat Fallujah joins two other Islamic State divisions that make up Iraq's Anbar province -- Wilayat Anbar and Wilayat Furat. The pictures were disseminated on Twitter by the jihadist group's supporters after being posted elsewhere online.

The photos in the first set show several rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) being fired at the base and the use of other small arms. In other images, Islamic State fighters are seen fighting behind barriers, presumably near the perimeter of the base. The second set of photos shows more fighters moving near the perimeter, as well as more RPG fire. Two pictures display the inside of the base from the perimeter. Other images detail the use of mortars, as well as anti-aircraft weaponry being fired at circling aircraft.

Fighting in the Habbaniyah area was confirmed in Iraqi press reporting. An Iraqi Army source was quoted in Iraqi media as saying that "Iraqi aviation flew overhead and was able to bomb several Islamic State positions and three [of its] vehicles" during the fighting. That same source also claimed that the military killed 20 Islamic State fighters, but this number cannot independently confirmed. The Iraqi Army has not released a number for its dead or wounded.

According to Shaafaq, the Islamic State attacked the town of Habbaniyah from two sides on Dec. 31, 2014 and deployed a suicide car bomb on a fueling station in the town. Additionally, Shaafaq stated that the Iraqi Army was able to repel an attack on the Habbaniyah base yesterday. However, the National Iraqi News Agency reported yesterday afternoon that fighting was still raging in the Habbaniyah Hills area of the town.

The Iraqi military and allied militias of the Sunni Tribal Awakening have been battling the Islamic State for control of the Fallujah-Ramadi corridor for the past year. Ramadi, the provincial capital, is contested, while Fallujah, the second largest city in Anbar, has been under the control of the Islamic State and allied tribes since January 2014.

Habbaniyah and the towns of Saqlawiya and Khalidiyah, all of which are located in the Fallujah-Ramadi corridor, have been the scenes of heavy fighting during this time.

The nearby Camp Saqlawiya, located in the town of the same name, was overrun late last summer. On Sept. 21, 2014 the Islamic State launched a suicide assault on the base. A suicide bomber driving a captured Iraqi military Humvee was able to penetrate base security and detonate his explosives. In the aftermath of the blast, an Islamic State assault team overran the facility. It has been reported that those in the assault team and those involved in the initial suicide assault were dressed in Iraqi military uniforms. Hundreds of Iraqi Army troops and Sunni tribal militiamen were thought to have been killed in this attack. [For more on the fall of Camp Saqlawiya, see LWJ report, Islamic State overruns Iraqi military base in Anbar.]

In July 2014, the Islamic State ambushed and destroyed an Iraqi armored column in Khalidiyah. During the fighting, the Islamic State fighters destroyed three US-supplied M1 Abrams main battle tanks and also captured several American-made M113 armored personnel carriers.

Images from the first photo set can be seen below:

Images from the second photo set can be seen below