Yesterday, Boko Haram released a second video connected to the mass kidnapping conducted by the group in northern Nigeria's Borno state. On April 14, Boko Haram militants stormed a government school in the middle of the night and kidnapped over 200 girls between the ages of 15 and 18, taking them into the Sambisa forest, where the group has fortified camps.

Nearly three weeks after the kidnapping, Boko Haram released a video in which group leader Abubakar Shekau claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and threatened to sell the girls. The video showed little besides Shekau standing in front of an armored personnel carrier flanked by masked Boko Haram foot soldiers.

The new 27-minute video begins with Shekau seated in front of a green canvas holding an AK-47. In language that alternates between Arabic and Hausa, Shekau again claims responsibility for the kidnapping, and announces: "Those girls who you preoccupy yourself with they have converted to Islam." He further notes that his group will not release the girls, "unless you release our brothers," meaning imprisoned Boko Haram fighters.

After Shekau's 17-minute rant, the video switches to show an outdoor scene in which the camera pans over more than 100 girls. Many of the girls have been identified as those who were kidnapped from the school nearly one month ago. At the back of the group, two girls stand holding Boko Haram's flag.

The girls appear to first recite a collective statement in Hausa and then recite the Koran. They do not appear to show overt signs of physical distress in the video. Most of their bodies are completely covered, however, as they are all dressed head-to-toe in traditional Islamic garb.

Three girls are then interviewed separately in Hausa in the video by someone off-camera. Reportedly, two of them speak of their "conversion" to Islam.

The international response to the events has been slow. Only recently have the United States and other Western countries weighed in on the incident. The US has followed up its May 3 offer of support by launching manned flights over Nigeria to help locate the girls. French President Francois Hollande has called for a summit of African leaders to figure out how to deal with Boko Haram.

Boko Haram, whose name means "Western education is forbidden," was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US in November 2013. Shekau and two al Qaeda-linked Boko Haram leaders were added to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists in June 2012.

The Nigerian government has also indicated willingness to negotiate the girls' release with Boko Haram. Nigeria's Minister of Special Duties Tanimu Turaki reportedly stated today that "[t]he window of negotiation is still open."

The US killed several fighters from the Lashkar-e-Islam, a Taliban-linked group that operates in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in three airstrikes in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar today.

The airstrikes, which are said to have been carried out by the remotely piloted Predators or Reapers, hit three separate locations in Nangarhar's Nazyan district, the Express Tribune reported.

The strikes targeted "Pakistan's banned Lashkar-e-Islam militant group, Afghan Taliban as well as smugglers," according to the Express Tribune. One of the strikes may have targeted a jirga, or meeting, between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. The two groups have clashed recently over local disputes.

Upwards of 10 "militants" were killed and 14 more were wounded, the political agent for Khyber told RFE/RL. The Khyber political agent also said that the district where the strikes took place "has become a sanctuary for fighters from the Pakistani Taliban and the Lashkar-e Islam group."

There has been some confusion over whether the strikes took place in Afghanistan or Pakistan. US drone strikes have not been launched at targets inside Pakistan since Dec. 26, 2013.

The Nazyan district district is just miles from the border of Pakistan's tribal agency of Khyber, which led some news outlets to report that the strikes took place inside Pakistan.

A similar discrepancy over the location of a drone strike arose late last year. A Dec. 13, 2013 airstrike targeted a boat that was transporting al Qaeda and Taliban operatives on the Kabul River. The strike technically occurred in Nangarhar's Lal Pur district, and not in Pakistan. Two al Qaeda operatives, three members of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and two members of the Afghan Taliban were killed in the attack.

The US moratorium on strikes in Pakistan is a "political decision and not based on the lack of targets in Pakistan's tribal areas," a US official told The Long War Journal a couple of months ago. The US agreed to suspend strikes as the Pakistani government has negotiated with the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan.

The Lashkar-e-Islam, which allies with the Taliban, has established its own Taliban-like government in large areas of the Khyber tribal agency, including Bara, Jamrud, and the Tirah Valley. The group provides recruits to battle US and Afghan forces across the border, and has attacked NATO's vital supply line which moves through Khyber. The Pakistani military has targeted the Lashkar-e-Islam during multiple operations since 2008, but has failed to dislodge the group from power.

The International Security Assistance Force admitted that the Lashkar-e-Islam operates in Afghanistan when it announced in 2010 that it captured a Taliban commander who led members of the group.

Ten soldiers and 13 al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula fighters were reported killed today in ongoing clashes between the Yemeni military and AQAP in Shabwa province in southern Yemen. AQAP carried out simultaneous attacks in Azzan and Gol al Rayda in southern Shabwa, two areas the terrorist organization seeks to recapture after losing control and withdrawing from them last weekend.

Yemeni security sources said that since AQAP withdrew from Azzan and Gol al Rayda four days ago, the militants have taken refuge in the Kour mountains, a rugged range straddling the border of Abyan, Shabwa, and Baydha provinces.

The battle for Azzan, a former AQAP stronghold, began with dawn strikes today conducted by the Yemeni air force targeting AQAP vehicles trying to enter Azzan from several different directions. According to military sources, tens of AQAP fighters participated in the fighting in Azzan but the Yemeni military was able to successfully repel the attack. Other sources reported that AQAP withdrew its forces from Azzan after taking control of the main police station in Azzan and seizing weapons from that facility.

AQAP launched a simultaneous attack on a military post in Gol al Rayda, the main military post for the Mayfa'a district in Shabwa, where the remainder of the casualties apparently occurred. Military sources claimed that the Yemeni army was able to repel this attack as well. Local residents in Azzan said some residential houses were damaged as a result of the fighting, and that hundreds of families in Azzan had begun to leave the area. Despite local worries, a Yemeni military officer told Al Madina that the situation in Shabwa is currently "under control."

Arabic media sources reported that during the course of the fighting in Azzan, an adviser to the Yemeni Minister of Defense named Mohsen Hussein Sa'id, identified in other sources as Mohsen Sa'id al Ghazzali, was killed along with four other soldiers. Three soldiers were reported wounded and three AQAP militants were said to have been killed.

A Yemeni military source publicly denied accusations that an adviser to the Minister of Defense was killed in the fighting in Shabwa, and called on Yemeni media agencies to stop broadcasting what he described as "rumors." The allegation comes less than a week after news outlets reported that the Yemeni Minister of Defense, Mohammad Nasser al Ahmed, who is leading the anti-AQAP offensive, narrowly survived an ambush in southern Yemen.

Reports of the number of casualties from the fighting in Azzan and Gol al Raydha were also inconclusive, with some sources claiming that only eight soldiers had died and others reporting that a total of 15 people were killed in clashes today. What is clear, however, is that today AQAP was unable to retake strategically significant territories in Shabwa despite a concerted military effort.

The US Treasury Department today added two "al Qaeda leaders" in Syria to the list of specially designated global terrorists.

One of the two, Abd Al Rahman Muhammad Zafir Al Dubaysi Al Juhni, is a Saudi who sat on al Qaeda's central Shura (advisory) council and served as the group's chief of security "responsible for counterintelligence" before relocating from Pakistan to Syria.

The other is an Iraqi named 'Abd Al Rahman Mustafa Al Qaduli, who joined al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) when it was headed by the now deceased Abu Musab al Zarqawi.

Al Qaduli served as Zarqawi's deputy and assistant, as well as AQI's emir of Mosul in the Iraqi province of Ninewa. He was also previously "AQI's representative to al Qaeda senior leadership in Pakistan," traveling to Pakistan in February 2006 "on behalf of Zarqawi to conduct an interview, which was then to be provided to al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan." The Treasury Department did not provide any additional details about the interview.

Treasury says that Al Qaduli was imprisoned in an unnamed country until early 2012, when he was released and "traveled to Syria to work in a Syria-based" Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) network. He is now a "senior" official in the ISIS.

The ISIS was formerly disowned by al Qaeda's general command in February. The Treasury Department describes Al Qaduli as an al Qaeda leader. But if Al Qaduli remains loyal to the emir of ISIS, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, then he is likely no longer a true al Qaeda leader, but instead part of the terror network's most infamous rogue faction. Treasury says that Al Qaduli "is designated for acting for or on behalf of" ISIS.

Al Juhni part of al Qaeda contingent that relocated to Syria

The Treasury Department's designation of Al Juhni confirms previous reporting about al Qaeda's activities in Syria.

"As of mid-2013," Treasury explains, Al Juhni "had traveled to Syria accompanied by several individuals to participate in the fighting there and was working with counterparts in Pakistan to acquire heavy weaponry and trainers to support al Qaeda efforts in Syria."

Al Juhni is "part of a group of senior al Qaeda members in Syria formed to conduct external operations against Western targets and to mediate tensions between" the Al Nusrah Front, which is al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, and the ISIS, which grew out of AQI.

Various previous reports indicated that al Qaeda sent a contingent to Syria to oversee the group's efforts in the rebellion against Bashar al Assad's forces. For instance, Sanafi al Nasr, who heads al Qaeda's "Victory Committee," has said on his Twitter feed that al Qaeda's senior leaders had dispatched operatives to Syria who were told to embed themselves within the Al Nusrah Front and Ahrar al Sham. Al Nasr himself is one of the senior al Qaeda officials who relocated to Syria.

Ahrar al Sham is an important part of the Islamic Front, which is a coalition of several rebel groups in Syria. A co-founder of Ahrar al Sham was an al Qaeda leader known as Abu Khalid al Suri, who also served as Ayman al Zawahiri's chief representative in Syria until he was killed in a suicide attack in late February. The attack was presumably launched by ISIS.

After relocating to Syria, Al Juhni continued to do the bidding of al Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan. Al Juhni "maintained" his "affiliation with al Qaeda leadership in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan," Treasury says.

Al Juhni's career, as summarized by the Treasury Department, is evidence that al Qaeda maintains a substantial bureaucracy beyond the operational planners who garner most of the attention. In addition to his roles on al Qaeda's shura council and as its chief of security for counterintelligence, Al Juhni previously performed "various administrative duties for al Qaeda, including arranging the payment of funds, passing messages and arranging meetings for senior al Qaeda figures."

Al Juhni "provided logistical support to al Qaeda in Afghanistan" between 2006 and 2009, was responsible for its "communications courier network in Waziristan in late 2008," and was "in charge of al Qaeda administrative affairs for several areas in North and South Waziristan" by mid-2009.

In early 2011, Al Juhni was added to the Saudi Arabian government's list of most-wanted criminals. His al Qaeda roles were recognized by the Saudis at the time. According to Treasury, the Saudis also noted that Al Juhni considered the kingdom "a legitimate field for battle."

The war in Syria has caused the threat from al Qaeda to further evolve. Whereas Al Juhni was once an administrator in South Asia, according to Treasury, today he is part of a group that is targeting the West from Syria.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula released a martyrdom statement for a military commander who was killed in one of several US drone strikes launched last summer following the emergence of a threat of attacks on US diplomatic facilities.

AQAP released the biography of Sarhan Abdullah Ali al Nasi, also known as Khishiman, on May 12 on its Twitter feed, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which obtained and translated the statement.

Khishiman was one of seven people killed in the Aug. 7, 2013 drone strike that took place in the Markha area of Shabwa province. Two vehicles were targeted in the strike. [See LWJ report, US strikes twice in Yemen, kills 11 AQAP operatives in drone attacks.]

Khishiman was killed during a spate of strikes that coincided with a terror warning by the US that led to the closure of diplomatic facilities in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia in July and August 2013. US officials said they had intercepted communications between al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri and Nasir al Wuhayshi, AQAP's leader and al Qaeda's general manager, that indicated a major plot was underway.

Khishiman's path to jihad began sometime before 2007, when he was arrested by the Yemeni government for attempting to travel to Iraq to fight US and international forces, and imprisoned at a jail in Sana'a. While in prison, "he met Sheikh Anwar al Awlaki," the American AQAP ideologue, recruiter, and operational commander who also was later killed in a US drone strike. Awlaki spoke to Khsihiman about "project of jihad" while in jail, and clearly recruited him to join al Qaeda. Awlaki was imprisoned for 18 months between 2006 and 2007 for his involvement in a plot to kidnap the US military attache in Sana'a.

After spending nine months in prison, Khishiman "joined the mujahideen in the Arabian Peninsula," and served as a driver. He later "joined the camps of the mujahideen in Shabwa," where he "participated in a number of specialized courses, including the course of execution in cities and special operations."

Khishiman fought with AQAP during its campaign in 2011 to take control of Abyan province, and was "wounded during the storming of the 25th Mechanized Brigade." That Yemeni brigade was based in Zinjibar, and AQAP laid siege to the unit's base before taking full control of the city.

Qasim al Raymi, AQAP's top military commander and cofounder of the group who is on the US' list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, appointed Khishiman to serve on the group's "Military Committee." That committee is responsible for coordinating AQAP military operations throughout the country.

While on the Military Committee, Khishiman "engaged in special courses in arts of organizational and military administration." Additionally, he served as AQAP's emir for the northern Yemeni provinces of Al Jawf and Saada.

The deputy leader of an al Qaeda-allied jihadist group that is led by commanders from the Caucasus and other former Soviet republics has called for Ukrainian Muslims to wage jihad against the Russia government.

Abdul Karim Krymsky, the deputy emir of Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar (the Army of the Emigrants and Helpers, or Muhajireen Army), said that Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian Muslims should "start on the path of jihad." Krymsky made the statement in a video in which he appeared with Salahuddin Shishani (the Chechen), the emir of the Muhajireen Army.

The video was obtained and partially translated by From Chechnya to Syria, a website that tracks fighters from the Caucasus and Central Asia who are waging jihad in Syria. The video was first published on May 13 by Akhbar Sham, a Russian-language website that promotes the Muhajireen Army.

"You have to open up lands yourselves and defeat the infidels," Krymsky, a Crimean Tatar, says.

"We see now that Muslims, Tatars, who went to Crimea and Ukraine have reached such a level of humiliation while here [in Syria] Muslims are proud and walk around freely and we simply see the difference in that," he continues.

Krymsky then says that fighters in the Crimea who cannot emigrate to wage jihad should do so at home or in "Moscow or Poland." Crimea, a region in Ukraine, was annexed by force by the Russian government this spring.

"I want to say to those brothers, and I am addressing those brothers who remain [in Crimea], that they should feel dignity, so that they can start on the path of jihad," he says. "So if they can't come to the lands of Islam, like Sham [Syria], they can go to Moscow or Poland because the infidels there and here won't rest until they destroyed your religion."

Krymsky also says that Muslims in the Ukraine should follow the example of the Islamic Caucasus Emirate, the al Qaeda-linked jihadist group that fights the Russians in the Caucasus.

The Muhajireen Army is an independent jihadist group affiliated with the Islamic Caucasus Emirate and comprised of hundreds of fighters from the Caucasus and Russia, as well as Syrians. The group is closely allied with the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria; Ahrar al Sham, an al Qaeda-linked group that is part of the Islamic Front; and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham. Earlier this year, the Muhajireen Army released video of one of its training camps inside Syria.

Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr, the leader of Shabaab, al Qaeda's branch in Somalia and East Africa, says Ayman al Zawahiri is "our Sheikh and Emir" in a recent statement that focuses primarily on the "invading enemy Crusaders" in Africa. Additionally, Abu Zubayr says he "fully" supports al Qaeda's goals of supporting Muslim revolutions, liberating Muslim countries, and applying Sharia, or Islamic law. These goals were outlined by Zawahiri in December 2013.

Shabaab released the statement by Abu Zubayr, who is also known as Ahmed Abdi Godane, in a video distributed on jihadist forums on May 14. The video was obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Although Abu Zubayr doesn't address al Qaeda's dispute with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), which was disowned by al Qaeda's general command in February, he does refer to Zawahiri as his emir, says he backs al Qaeda's goals, and echoes Zawahiri's call for reconciliation in Syria. The ISIS is battling the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, as well as other jihadist groups.

Some ISIS supporters have tried to claim that Abu Zubayr's message is pro-ISIS, even though he doesn't mention the group. Earlier this month, the spokesman for the ISIS, Abu Muhammad al Adnani, called for "an official statement from all the branches of al Qaeda in all the regions stating their clear stances" concerning ISIS, its ideology, and its approach to waging jihad. Abu Zubayr's message is not such a statement. And while some individual jihadist ideologues have weighed in on behalf of ISIS since Adnani's message, no branch of al Qaeda has thus far complied with the ISIS spokesman's request.

Abu Zubayr begins his speech by complementing the head of the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda's emir.

"I want to give glad tidings to the Muslim Ummah [Muslim community] in general and in particular, the Mujahideen among them - foremost among them being the Leader of the Believers, Al Mullah Muhammad Omar and our Sheikh and Emir, Sheikh Ayman al Zawahiri," Abu Zubayr says, according to the translation provided by SITE.

Later in his speech, Abu Zubayr notes that Shabaab backs al Qaeda's goals, which were outlined by Zawahiri in a statement called "The Pact for Supporting Islam." The statement was issued in November 2013.

"We fully endorse the contents of the message 'The Pact for Supporting Islam' by the Emir Sheikh Ayman al Zawahiri's- may Allah protect him and keep him firm upon the truth," he said.

Zawahiri's "pact" outlined the "goals for which Muslims must strive, including the implementation of Sharia-based governance, the 'liberation' Muslim lands, and supporting Muslims' revolutions," according to SITE.

Al Qaeda's support for Muslims who are not part of the jihadist movement is a major point of contention between al Qaeda and the ISIS. While al Qaeda has adopted a more pragmatic and revolutionary stance in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, the ISIS has advocated the hardline approach of branding all of those who do not follow their strict interpretation of sharia as apostates.

Finally, Abu Zubayr echoed Zawahiri's recent call for an end to fighting between various jihadist groups. While not explicitly stated, he appears to be referring to the feud between the Al Nusrah Front and allied jihadist groups on one side, and the ISIS on the other.

"Pray to Allah that He unites the ranks of the Mujahideen, reconciles between them, directs them and guides them to that which He loves and is pleased with," Abu Zubayr concluded after a long discussion that was titled "Message to the Mujahideen in Sham [Syria]."

He also called on jihadists in Syria to "respect the leaders of Jihad and its scholars, have good opinion of them and appreciate their rights upon us, for we are all but merely a fruit from the fruits of their Jihad and steadfastness." While Abu Zubayr did not explicitly name the "leaders of Jihad," he is clearly referring to Zawahiri and Mullah Omar, both of whom he praises at the outset of his message.

The Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, has announced the creation of a new school named the Imam al Shafi'i Institute for Islamic Studies. The group is promoting the institute on Twitter. And Abu Sulayman al Muhajir, a senior sharia (Islamic law) official in the Al Nusrah Front who relocated from Australia to Syria last year, is collecting donations for it.

The school will instruct students in the Al Nusrah Front's version of Islamic jurisprudence and the proper way to wage jihad, according to posts on Twitter.

Several advertisements for the school have been posted on Twitter. One such ad, shown below, says that the institute has been set up by Al Nusrah's general sharia committee. "To support please contact Shaykh Abu Sulayman al Muhajir @abushulayman321, a member of the general shar'ia committee of Jabhat al Nusrah," the bottom of the ad reads.

Abu Sulayman became well-known in Australia for his support of the jihad in Syria. But the extent of his involvement in al Qaeda's international network was not publicly understood until he emerged as one of Al Nusrah's leading ideologues.

Abu Sulayman has been a fierce critic of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), which was disowned by al Qaeda's general command in February. In a video released by the Al Nusrah Front on March 17, Abu Sulayman explained that he was appointed to be part of the first mediation attempt between ISIS and Al Nusrah.

In another Al Nusrah video released in April, Abu Sulayman described al Qaeda's structure. Al Qaeda has divided the jihadist endeavor into several regions, with an emir appointed to oversee each region, Abu Sulayman explained.

A second banner advertisement for the institute, seen below, also asks for support and includes a quote from Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyyah, an Islamic thinker who lived in the 13th and 14th centuries. "The foundation of the religion is knowledge and jihad," the quote reads, and jihad has "two varieties." The first is one of combat, "the hand and the spear," while the second is of "argumentation and statement," which "is the better of the two jihads due to the greatness of its utility, the intensity of its sustenance, and the multiplicity of its enemies."

A third banner pictures the English-speaking Abu Sulayman in the lower left-hand corner and says that supporters can contact a member of Al Nusrah's sharia committee to help fund the institute. In addition to Abu Sulayman, at least two other members of the sharia committee are active Twitter users.

Twitter has become an increasingly popular platform for jihadist fundraising. Al Qaeda and associated ideologues use heavily trafficked accounts to drive donations. For instance, Sheikh Abdallah Muhammad al Muhaysini, a popular Saudi cleric who is affiliated with al Qaeda, regularly uses Twitter to collect funds for the jihad in Syria. Muhaysini currently has more than 300,000 followers, while Abu Sulayman has just over 10,000.

Oren Adaki, a research fellow and Arabic language specialist at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, prepared translations used in this article.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham, a former al Qaeda affiliate that operates in Iraq and Syria, recently praised six foreign suicide bombers who were killed in attacks in its "Ninewa Division." The six fighters were from France, Denmark, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.

The Ninewa Division, one of 16 administrative units in the ISIS' Islamic state that spans Syria and Iraq, released statements and accompanying images of the six foreign fighters on its Twitter account. The statements were obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Three of the foreign suicide bombers were from Saudi Arabia, and there was also one each from France, Denmark, and Morocco. The exact dates of the suicide operations were not provided by the ISIS. The accompanying statements provided only a brief description of each foreign fighter and his attack.

The Frenchman was identified as Abu al-Qa'qa' al-Firansi. "He immigrated to al Sham [Syria] days after converting to Islam, and then to Iraq, seeking martyrdom in the cause of Allah," the statement said, according to SITE. He died while attacking "the federal police headquarters in Mosul" armed with a suicide vest and machine gun. The ISIS claimed that he "killed the battalion commander and many among the police elements."

The Danish suicide bomber was identified as Abu Sa'ad al Denmarki. The ISIS said he "mobilized from Denmark to the Islamic State, seeking martyrdom in the cause of Allah." The Danish suicide bomber rammed a car packed with explosives into an Iraqi Army convoy near Mosul.

In the past, the ISIS has announced that two other Danish citizens served as suicide bombers in other divisions.

ISIS touts foreign suicide bombers

The ISIS' divisions have made a point of eulogizing foreign fighters killed in suicide and conventional operations in Iraq. Three other ISIS divisions -- the Baghdad, the Southern [Babil], and the Diyala Division -- have released similar videos over the past three months.

In mid-April, the Diyala Division publicized 26 suicide bombers, of whom at least 24 were foreign fighters. The suicide bombers were from Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Tajikistan, the Russian Republic of Chechnya, and Denmark.

In early April, the Southern Division, which operates in Babil province just south of Baghdad, recognized eight suicide bombers from Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

In early March, the Baghdad Division recognized 30 suicide bombers, of whom 24 were from Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan or Pakistan, Denmark, and the Maghreb. [See LWJ reports, ISIS' 'Southern Division' praises foreign suicide bombers; Dane, Uzbek among 30 suicide bombers eulogized by ISIS; and ISIS' 'Diyala Division' lauds foreign suicide bombers, including Dane.]

The ISIS has identified 16 wilayats, or administrative areas or divisions, in territory under its control or influence in Iraq and Syria. A map of the ISIS' administrative areas, including the 16 wilayats, was published earlier this year. The ISIS map, below, was obtained by The Long War Journal.

Earlier this year, the Anbar Division released two videos of the brutal execution of more than 20 Iraqi soldiers who were captured in Fallujah. The Anbar Division is the largest in Iraq, and one of the most active. The ISIS controls Fallujah and its dam as well as other cities and towns along the Euphrates River Valley. In April, the ISIS held a parade that included captured Iraqi military hardware in Abu Ghraib, a city only two miles outside Baghdad. [See LWJ report, ISIS parades on outskirts of Baghdad.] The Iraqi military has said it launched an offensive to retake Fallujah, but the city remains outside of the government's control.

Editor's note: Below is Thomas Joscelyn's testimony to the House Committee of Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade on al Qaeda's network in Africa and the threat it poses to the US.

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the enduring threat posed by al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is widely assumed that al Qaeda's presence in South Asia does not, in fact, pose an enduring threat to American interests. The slaying of top al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, and more than a decade of war and other counterterrorism operations have supposedly hobbled the organization. However, while I have no doubt that al Qaeda has sustained heavy losses, I do not think that bin Laden's heirs are a spent force. On the contrary, al Qaeda lives.

In the hearing today I am going to build on my previous testimony before this subcommittee last July. During that hearing ("Global Al Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges"), we discussed the structure of al Qaeda and the challenges we face in the future. Today, I wish to emphasize five main points:

1. Al Qaeda is an international network that is comprised of a "general command," regional branches, as well as various other organizations and personalities.

It may seem odd, but more than a dozen years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, there is no commonly accepted definition of al Qaeda. The term "core" al Qaeda is often used, but this concept is a Western invention and imprecisely defined. And the way it is employed does not accurately convey how al Qaeda is structured. When analysts and officials speak of the "core" of al Qaeda, they are generally referring to Ayman al Zawahiri and the lieutenants who surround him in South Asia. Some go even further, arguing that Zawahiri is the only "core" al Qaeda leader left. Such arguments are not based on evidence.

Al Qaeda operates what it calls a "general command," which consists of the organization's senior leadership and their lieutenants, several committees, a Shura (advisory) council of the group's most trusted advisers, as well as a supporting staff that includes, for example, couriers. We regularly see statements issued by al Qaeda's "general command," but few stop to ask what al Qaeda means by this. The "general command" performs various administrative functions, in addition to overseeing the organization's international operations. For instance, al Qaeda's amniyat is part of the group's internal security and counterintelligence apparatus. The amniyat in northern Pakistan is notorious for hunting down suspected spies.

This cohesive organization is not confined to South Asia. Jihadists who are, by any reasonable definition, "core" al Qaeda members are dispersed throughout the world. For example, Nasir al Wuhayshi, who heads al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is as "core" as they come, having served as Osama bin Laden's protégé and aide-de-camp. In addition to serving as the emir of AQAP, Wuhayshi is the general manager of al Qaeda, which is a "core" function in al Qaeda's hierarchy, that is, within the "general command." The general manager of al Qaeda is given broad powers to oversee the organization's operations.

The "general command" of al Qaeda has designated several regions for waging jihad, and an emir is appointed to oversee the organization's efforts in each of these regions. The emir of each region has much latitude in deciding how to organize his group's day-to-day efforts, but he swears bayat, an oath of allegiance, to al Qaeda's overall emir (currently Zawahiri). The emirs of each region report to al Qaeda's senior leadership, including the general manager. What many refer to as al Qaeda's formal "affiliates" are really branches of al Qaeda that have been assigned to fight in these regions. The formal branches of al Qaeda, each designated its own region, are: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), AQAP, the Al Nusrah Front in Syria, and Al Shabaab. All of them have sworn loyalty to Ayman al Zawahiri. In addition to these regions, al Qaeda also maintains facilitation networks in countries such as Iran.

Thus, the brief sketch of al Qaeda I have drawn here is one of a much more cohesive international organization than is often assumed. Like all other human organizations, however, al Qaeda has faced obstacles in trying to hold this network together. For instance, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) was al Qaeda's branch inside Iraq, but the group's emir had repeatedly disobeyed orders from the "general command." This led to ISIS being disowned by the group. ISIS is currently fighting the Al Nusrah Front and its allies in Syria.

In addition to the formal branches of al Qaeda, there are other organizations that are part of al Qaeda's international network even though they have not publicly sworn bayat to the leadership. Indeed, al Qaeda has often hidden its precise organizational relationship with groups that are being groomed for an alliance. Both the Al Nusrah Front and Al Shabaab, now formal branches of al Qaeda, did not make their operational connections to al Qaeda's senior leadership known at first. Al Qaeda also employs multiple brands so as to obfuscate the extent of its influence. In Yemen, for instance, AQAP adopted the name "Ansar al Sharia." This brand name was intended to convey the idea that the group is the true protector and enforcer of sharia law. Other groups calling themselves Ansar al Sharia have been established in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. There are still other groups that have adopted al Qaeda's ideology, but are probably not operationally connected to the "general command" or al Qaeda's branches.

I begin with this overview because the enduring threat of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan extends far outside of the region.

2. Al Qaeda is, at its heart, a clandestine organization, but careful analysis reveals that it has a deep bench of talent from which it draws.

Since its founding in 1988, the organization has attempted to conceal its operations. This has made it difficult to assess some very basic aspects of al Qaeda. The group does not, for instance, publish an organizational chart or make its total roster known. If you watch al Qaeda carefully enough, however, you can see that the group has consistently replaced top leaders lost in the 9/11 wars. In some cases these replacements are not as competent, while in other cases they may even surpass their fallen comrades.

Nasir al Wuhayshi, the aforementioned general manager of al Qaeda, is a seasoned veteran who replaced others in that role after they were killed or captured. Wuhayshi is, by all appearances, an all too competent leader. Still, the American-led counterterrorism effort has certainly disrupted al Qaeda's international network, delivering severe setbacks in some areas. Al Qaeda's problems with ISIS stem, to a large degree, from the fact that the U.S. and its allies took out its predecessor organization's top leadership in 2010. The leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) were loyal to al Qaeda's "general command" but were replaced with leaders who had not been vetted by al Qaeda's senior leaders.

One of the interesting things about the infighting between the ISIS and Al Nusrah is that it has led al Qaeda to identify several leaders who were previously unknown to the public. The leaders were identified because they were called as witnesses against ISIS, relying on their established jihadist pedigrees to give them credibility. Some of these leaders have dossiers that stretch back decades, but no one was talking about them until they appeared on screen. This same phenomenon happens all the time. Al Qaeda leaders who were previously unknown are identified in either the "general command" or the regional branches.

This dynamic leads to a significant epistemological problem. U.S. officials, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, have repeatedly claimed to have decimated al Qaeda after a certain number of leaders of the organization were either killed or captured. Part of the reason these assessments have been flawed is that al Qaeda has a "deep bench" to draw from, both from within its own organization and allied groups. Al Qaeda is constantly in the process of recruiting new talent as well.

In Pakistan and Afghanistan today, al Qaeda likely has a significant cadre of leaders who have not been publicly identified. The roles played by other, publicly identified operatives are not widely understood either. For instance, a cursory review of Vanguards of Khorasan, an al Qaeda publication, reveals numerous leaders who are not regularly discussed.

3. Al Qaeda has always been, first and foremost, an insurgency organization focused on overturning the existing political order in the Muslim world. Al Qaeda's jihadists are terrorists, but they are more than that. They are political revolutionaries who seek power for themselves and their ideology.

As such, most of al Qaeda's efforts since its founding have been focused on fighting "over there," that is, contesting for power in faraway lands. Their early efforts in this regard ended in failure. But today, formal branches of al Qaeda are fighting throughout much of Africa and the Middle East. Consistent with al Qaeda's original vision, these groups are all seeking to win territory, establish Islamic states, and govern according to their radical version of sharia law. They pose a threat to U.S. interests abroad, and part of each of these organizations has either already been devoted to plotting attacks in the West or likely will be. Luckily, most of their attempts to attack the West have thus far failed. But it is always worth remembering that attacking the West has not been al Qaeda's strategic goal. Attacking the U.S. on 9/11, and various plots thereafter, was seen as a tactical step. Al Qaeda believes that by attacking the U.S. and the West, it can lessen Western influence in the Muslim world, thereby destabilizing the existing political order and freeing up the opportunity to wage insurgencies against governments al Qaeda deems un-Islamic. Only a small fraction of al Qaeda's resources throughout its entire history have been devoted to mass casualty attacks in the West. A far greater amount of the organization's resources have been dedicated to fighting "over there."

This basic point reveals another epistemological problem. Some claim that al Qaeda's failure to launch another 9/11-style attack on the U.S. homeland (putting aside smaller attacks that were, at a minimum, inspired by al Qaeda's ideology) means that the group has been strategically defeated. Counterterrorism and intelligence officials deserve a great deal of credit for stopping the next attack. We've gotten lucky on some occasions, too. But, most importantly, al Qaeda is spending far more of its resources fighting "over there" than it is grooming new 9/11-style terrorists. Thus, a word of caution: As al Qaeda has expanded its geographic footprint, it has also increased its pool of potential recruits for attacks in the West. Most the jihadists fighting abroad will remain insurgents, as was the case prior to 9/11. As new talent comes in, however, this opens new possibilities for al Qaeda's attacks on the West. The best, but not the only, example of this today is in Syria. Most of al Qaeda's resources are spent battling Bashar al Assad's forces, as well as fighting the rogue ISIS faction (which could also lash out at the West). But Western counterterrorism officials are rightly concerned that some individuals recruited to fight in Syria will be repurposed for attacks back at home.

4. Al Qaeda operates as part of a "syndicate" in Central and South Asia. In 2010, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described al Qaeda as being part of a "syndicate" in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere in the region. This is an excellent description of how al Qaeda operates. "A victory for one [member of the syndicate] is a victory for all," Gates cautioned. He is right. Gates mentioned groups such as the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, or TTP), as well as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), as belonging to this "syndicate." To this we can add: the Haqqani Network (HQN), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its offshoot the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), among other groups.

I will not recount here how each of these groups is tied to al Qaeda. The archives of The Long War Journal are filled with examples, including those showing how al Qaeda has replenished its ranks from these organizations. However, the Haqqani Network (HQN) deserves a further, albeit brief, mention. The HQN is part of the Taliban alliance and also closely tied to al Qaeda. The relationship between the HQN and al Qaeda at the most senior levels of each organization goes back decades. The HQN has provided safe haven for al Qaeda in northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, even allowing al Qaeda to plot attacks against the West from HQN-controlled territory. Al Qaeda has developed strategic depth in South Asia by partnering with groups such as the HQN.

5. Al Qaeda is still operating in Afghanistan today. Al Qaeda's leader in the Kunar and Nuristan provinces is Farouq al Qahtani. It is well-known that al Qahtani leads al Qaeda's forces and works with the group's allies in these remote areas. But al Qaeda operates outside of Kunar and Nuristan as well. Indeed, one of the documents captured in Osama bin Laden's compound and released to the public shows that the al Qaeda master ordered some of his subordinates to relocate from northern Pakistan to Ghazni and Zabul, as well as Kunar and Nuristan.

One way al Qaeda operates in Afghanistan today is through the Lashkar al Zil, or Shadow Army, which is al Qaeda's primary paramilitary force in the region. As the name implies, al Qaeda is trying to hide the extent of its influence over this group as well as over other allied groups. This makes it difficult to assess the full scope of al Qaeda's operations inside Afghanistan today. Still, consistent reporting shows that al Qaeda's commanders and fighters are pooling their resources with other organizations. Al Qaeda also operates an electronics workshop, headquartered in Pakistan, that develops improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other weapons for use in Afghanistan.

Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions.

A series of military strikes in the tribal agency of North Waziristan has caused a Taliban commander who is favored by Pakistan's ruling class to reconsider his peace agreement with the military and the government.

A spokesman for Hafiz Gul Bahadar, who is considered to be a "good Taliban commander" as he does not advocate attacking the Pakistani state and instead directs his forces to fight in Afghanistan, said that the Taliban group's executive council has met at an undisclosed location to reconsider its peace deal with the government. Ahmadullah Ahmadi, Bahadar's spokesman, told Dawn that his forces "cannot remain silent over [the] bombardment on people."

"The spokesman warned that the government would be responsible for any destruction in case it did not stop the military offensive," Dawn reported.

The Pakistani military launched a series of airstrikes in the Miramshah and Mir Ali areas of North Waziristan last night to punish groups responsible for "various terrorists' acts of IED blasts and suicide attacks in FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas], KPK [the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa], and Karachi," the military's Inter-Services Public Relations branch said in a statement released today on the attacks.

The ISPR claimed that "60 hardcore terrorists including some of the important commanders and foreigners were also killed in the strikes and around 30 were injured" during airstrikes that targeted "terrorist's hideouts in North Waziristan Agency." The reports cannot be confirmed; tribesmen in North Waziristan have claimed that civilians were the targets of the attacks.

An additional 11 "terrorists" and four soldiers, including an officer, are reported to have been killed during clashes in North Waziristan today.

The Pakistani military has launched similar punitive raids against Taliban fighters in North Waziristan this year, but the strikes have not been aimed at Bahadar's group or the Haqqani Network, another Taliban group favored by the Pakistani military and government. Those strikes were directed at the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, which is at war with the Pakistani government, and also targeted allied groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Group.

Background on Bahadar and his ties to terrorist groups

Bahadar, the senior leader in North Waziristan, is known to shelter top al Qaeda leaders and is one of the most powerful Taliban commanders in Pakistan's tribal areas. His forces fight US and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. Bahadar is also allied with and shelters the Punjabi Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Group, the Turkistan Islamic Party, and other terrorist groups that conduct attacks inside and outside of the country.

Bahadar has long been described by Pakistani officials as a "good Taliban leader" as he does not openly attack the Pakistani state and wages jihad against the US and NATO in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government and military have long rebuffed US pleas to conduct an operation against Bahadar and the allied Haqqani Network. In early May, the US ambassador to Pakistan yet again pleaded for Pakistan to take action in North Waziristan.

Bahadar and the Taliban maintain a "peace agreement" with the Pakistani military that allows him to run a state within a state in the remote tribal agency. Bahadar and his commanders have set up a parallel administration, complete with courts, recruiting centers, prisons, training camps, and the ability to levy taxes.

The peace agreement allows North Waziristan to serve as a base for the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan and nonaligned Taliban groups, as well as the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Group, and a host of Pakistani terror groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Punjabi Taliban.

Bahadar wields considerable power in North Waziristan. In July 2011, a spokesman for Bahadar claimed that there were no "militants" in North Waziristan, and that Bahadar's Taliban faction has lived up to its terms of a peace agreement with the Pakistani military. But, as documented here at The Long War Journal numerous times, Bahadar provides support and shelter for top al Qaeda leaders as well as terrorists from a number of Pakistani and Central Asian terror groups, including the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan.

Bahadar's Taliban subgroup is a member of the Shura-e-Murakeba, an al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban-brokered alliance that includes the Haqqani Network, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and the Mullah Nazir Group, another "good Taliban" group in South Waziristan. Mullah Nazir, the group's former emir, was killed in a US drone strike in early 2013.

In June 2012, Bahadar suspended polio vaccination programs in North Waziristan in protest against the US drone strikes in North Waziristan. Bahadar has objected to the US drone strikes in the past. On Nov. 12, 2011, Bahadar suspended meetings with the government and threatened to attack the Pakistani state if it continued to allow the US to conduct attacks in areas under his control.

The US has conducted numerous airstrikes against terrorist targets in areas under Bahadar's control. Of the 354 drone strikes that have taken place in Pakistan's tribal areas, 99 of the strikes, or nearly 28 percent, have occurred in areas directly under the control of Bahadar. Numerous al Qaeda leaders have been killed while being sheltered by Bahadar. [See LWJ reports, Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2014, and Senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed in US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2014, for more information.]

The Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, has rejected a "revolutionary covenant" recently issued by a number of other prominent Syrian rebel groups.

The covenant was released by the Islamic Front, which is a coalition of several militant organizations, and four other insurgent groups on May 17. The text was clearly intended to address fears in the West about the role of extremists fighting Bashar al Assad's regime and allied forces.

The rebels' covenant began by promising that their "revolutionary work" is "derived from our authentic religion, staying away from fundamentalism and radicalism."

The authors of the statement went on to promise "fair trials, away from any acts of revenge or retaliation" for captured regime officials.

The covenant listed the Syrian regime and its "mercenaries from Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah," as well as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), as legitimate "military targets," but stated that "military actions will be limited to the Syrian territories."

Although the covenant says the insurgents "welcome the opportunity to communicate and cooperate with regional and international parties," the signatories portrayed their efforts as being nationalistic.

"Our revolutionary forces rely in their military operations on Syrian elements only, and believe that the military and political decisions in the revolution should be entirely Syrian, rejecting any type of affiliation to foreign entities," the covenant reads. The rebel groups added that they seek to preserve Syria's "territorial integrity" and reject "any project aiming at dividing these territories."

The Al Nusrah Front's rejection

The Al Nusrah Front begins its rejection of the covenant (described as the "charter of revolutionary honor") by complaining that Al Nusrah was not consulted before its release. "Everyone knows that the most prominent problems of the jihadi battlefields, which the clerics have warned about, is the absence of consultation and the exclusivity of decision," Al Nusrah's statement reads.

The al Qaeda branch then offers nine reasons for rejecting the charter, arguing that its nationalistic focus is not rooted in the proper religious principles. The document "propagate[s] the spirit of citizenship and belonging to the land and the homeland, and this is in violation to what the texts of revelation determined regarding the brotherhood of faith irrespective of country, nationality, color, and the like," Al Nusrah argues.

Al Nusrah objects to the statement's "lack of clarity" and "precision," its promise to limit the excesses of the fighting without also decrying negligence in the duty to wage jihad, and its general appeal to religious authority without offering specific references to Islamic texts and teachings.

The pledge to try Assad regime officials also violates sharia law, Al Nusrah says. The "severe apostates have no other choice in Islam beside the sword, and the tyrants of the regime ... are among the people of great apostasy that Islamic law has commanded to kill whenever possible."

The Al Nusrah Front finds the charter's provision concerning assistance from external actors to be open-ended and ill-defined. "This was said but no names were specified." Nor was the position of the unnamed external parties in question made clear with respect to Islam and "Muslims throughout the world." And the charter does not explicitly state "the manner of said cooperation and meeting and the conversations taking place therein," Al Nusrah adds.

Al Nusrah says that the rebel groups' pledge to "seek to establish a state of justice, law, and freedom in isolation from" external "pressures and dictates" is suspicious and evidence that such "pressures and dictates" have already influenced the wording of the document. This is likely Al Nusrah's way of saying that the charter was intended to appease foreign fears. The only type of state that is acceptable inside Syria is one established on the "sovereignty of sharia" and not secularism or democracy, the al Qaeda branch says.

And, finally, Al Nusrah rejects the covenant's recognition of the "diverse social fabric and ethnic and sectarian denominations" fighting in the rebellion. Al Nusrah argues that "the manner in which the religion of Allah deals with groups, religions, and sects varies from one sect to another and it is similarly determined by the people of knowledge [i.e., jurists and clerics] that equating all of them [the different sects] is not allowed."

Differences of opinion among allied organizations

No other insurgent organization is named in the Al Nusrah Front's response. Not even the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), which has been disowned by al Qaeda's general command, is named, even though the covenant says that the ISIS is a military target on par with the Assad regime.

The Al Nusrah Front and allied organizations have been fighting ISIS for months. One of the groups that is closest to Al Nusrah is Ahrar al Sham, which plays a leading role in the Islamic Front. Ahrar al Sham's decision to sign the covenant, as part of the Islamic Front, may therefore reveal a difference of opinion between the two groups. However, Ahrar al Sham leader Hassan Abboud has said on Twitter that founding an Islamic state in Syria is still his group's goal.

Both Al Nusrah and Ahrar al Sham have received support from al Qaeda's senior leadership. Sanafi al Nasr, a top al Qaeda operative who relocated to Syria from South Asia, has said that al Qaeda dispatched operatives to assist both organizations. Abu Khalid al Suri, who served as Ayman al Zawahiri's chief representative in Syria until he was killed in late February, was also a founding member and leader of Ahrar al Sham.

How the covenant impacts the relationship between the two groups, if at all, remains to be seen. The Al Nusrah Front was careful to say in its response that while the signatories were wrong to endorse such "objectionable material," it does not deny their "virtue."

Oren Adaki, an Arabic language specialist and research associate at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, contributed translation assistance for this article.

The United Nations has added Boko Haram to its al Qaeda sanctions list, citing the Nigerian group's ties to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and prolific terrorist acts. The move comes more than one month after Boko Haram kidnapped over 200 girls, thereby gaining international infamy.

Boko Haram "has maintained a relationship with" AQIM "for training and material support purposes," the UN's sanctions page reads. AQIM is one of al Qaeda's several regional branches and the group's emir, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (a.k.a. Abdelmalek Droukdel), has sworn bayat (an oath of allegiance) to al Qaeda's senior leadership.

The UN says that Boko Haram has "gained valuable knowledge on the construction of improvised explosive devices from AQIM." In addition, a "number of Boko Haram members fought alongside al Qaeda affiliated groups in Mali in 2012 and 2013 before returning to Nigeria with terrorist expertise."

The UN also cites a November 2012 statement made by the terrorist group's leader, Abubakar Shekau, in which he "expressed Boko Haram's solidarity with al Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan, Iraq, North Africa, Somalia and Yemen."

In a previous statement, issued in July 2010, Shekau praised al Qaeda and offered his condolences for the "martyrdom" of al Qaeda's two top leaders in Iraq. "Do not think jihad is over," Shekau said. "Rather, jihad has just begun. O America, die with your fury."

US government already recognized relationship between AQIM and Boko Haram

The UN's recognition of Boko Haram's ties to AQIM are hardly surprising given that the US government has repeatedly pointed to the relationship.

In June 2012, the State Department designated three individual terrorists, including Abubakar Shekau. The two other jihadists designated, Khalid al Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kambar, "have ties to Boko Haram and have close links to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," State reported.

One year later, in June 2013, the State Department announced a $7 million reward for information leading to the capture of Shekau. At the same time, similar rewards were offered for leaders in AQIM and the groups' offshoots. The "Rewards for Justice" page for Shekau says that he has issued statements "expressing solidarity with al Qaeda and threatening the United States." The same page reads: "There are reported communications, training, and weapons links between Boko Haram, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al Shabaab, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP], which may strengthen Boko Haram's capacity to conduct terrorist attacks."

Like AQIM, Shabaab and AQAP are formal branches of al Qaeda and have sworn an oath of allegiance (bayat) to Ayman al Zawahiri. The National Counterterrorism Center's web page for Shekau includes the same language connecting Boko Haram to the three al Qaeda groups.

In November 2013, the State Department designated Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organization. The designation cited Boko Haram's "links to" AQIM and responsibility "for thousands of deaths in northeast and central Nigeria over the last several years including targeted killings of civilians."

The US government has continued to cite Boko Haram's ties to AQIM since it was designated. In the State Department's annual Country Reports on Terrorism, published on April 30, 2014, Foggy Bottom again noted that Boko Haram "at times has received assistance, including funds and training, from" AQIM.

Contacts with Boko Haram reportedly found in bin Laden's files

According to several US intelligence officials, hundreds of thousands of documents and files were recovered during the raid on Osama bin Laden's safe house in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in early May 2011. To date, the US government has released only 17 of them, plus a handful of videos, to the public. According to US intelligence officials with knowledge of the documents, some of the files that remain in the government's possession catalog al Qaeda's dealings with the Nigerian group.

On April 27, 2012, the Washington Post reported that bin Laden's files "show that through his couriers, bin Laden was in touch not only with al Qaeda's established affiliates but also with upstarts being groomed for new alliances. Among them was Nigeria's Boko Haram, a group that has since embraced al Qaeda and adopted its penchant for suicide attacks."

Two days later, on April 29, 2012, the Guardian (UK) ran its own account explaining the contents of the files. "Bin Laden appears to have been in direct or indirect communication with [the] Nigerian-based militant group Boko Haram as well as many other militant outfits," the Guardian reported. "As with the Taliban, the question of whether Boko Haram ... is in touch with al Qaeda or one of its affiliates has been hotly debated by analysts." Nonetheless, "documents in the cache show that leaders of the Nigerian group had been in contact with top levels of al Qaeda in the past 18 months."

Just days later, on May 3, 2012, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point released just a small cache of files (the aforementioned 17) from bin Laden's compound. None of the files dealt with the contacts between al Qaeda's senior leadership and Boko Haram described by the Guardian and the Washington Post, even though at least some of these same documents were originally slated for release.

It is not publicly known what bin Laden's files say, precisely, about Boko Haram's relationship with al Qaeda's senior leaders. But as the US government and now the UN have both recognized, the Nigerian group is working in concert with al Qaeda's branches.

Note: Parts of this article were previously published at The Weekly Standard.

The Afghan Taliban overran a district center in the remote northern province of Badakhshan and captured 27 government officials. A local militia commander and an Afghan intelligence official are among those captured during this week's assault.

The Taliban began the assault on Yamgan district on May 19 as part of "Operation Khaibar," this year's spring Taliban offensive, the jihadist group stated in a press release on its website, Voice of Jihad.

According to the Taliban, "the warden of the prison, Mano, an Arbaki commander, Abdul Bain, the assistant of NDS and other top level puppets are among this captured."

"Mujahideen also captured 25 Kalashnikov rifles, 3 P.K heavy machine guns, 2 rocket-propelled grenades," the Taliban continued.

Afghan officials confirmed that 27 security and government officials were captured, and said another 13 officials, including the district governor, have retreated to a hilltop, The New York Times reported.

The district remains under Taliban control and Afghan forces have delayed an operation to oust the Taliban.

"Due to inclement weather conditions in the area, security forces have been unable to regain the territory and have temporarily halted the assault," Badakhshan security chief Fazludin Ayar told Ariana News.

The once-peaceful province of Badakhshan has become increasingly unstable over the past several years, as the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have exerted their influence in the remote northeastern area. The province was transferred from ISAF to Afghan control at the end of January 2012.

The Taliban have taken control of districts in Badakhshan two other times since the end of last summer. In September 2013, the Taliban overran the Wardoj district center, prompting an Afghan military operation to retake the government complex. Shortly after the government claimed Wardoj was cleared, the Taliban ambushed an Afghan police convoy, killing 23 police officers and capturing more than 20. The Taliban denied that they were driven from the district.

Also in September 2013, the Taliban seized control of the Karan wa Munjan district center in Badakhshan. Shortly after the Taliban seized the district, Afghan security forces claimed to have regained control of Karan wa Munjan.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan presence in Badakhshan

ISAF conducted eight raids against the IMU in Badakhshan between September 2011 and June 2012, and another in August 2010 that targeted a Taliban operative who aided "foreign fighters," according to ISAF press releases compiled by The Long War Journal. The last reported operation against the IMU in the northern province took place on June 18, 2012; an IMU commander was killed and several fighters were captured. The IMU is known to have a presence in the districts of Argo, Faizabad, Kishim, Shahr-e-Buzurg, Surkh Rod, and Yaftal-e Sufla. In June 2013, ISAF ceased issuing daily operational reports that detailed raids against al Qaeda and allied groups such as the IMU.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a key ally of al Qaeda and the Taliban, and has been involved in supporting their operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan and plotting attacks in Europe. The IMU is known to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan and has integrated into the Taliban's shadow government in the north [for more information on the IMU, see LWJ report, IMU cleric urges Pakistanis to continue sheltering jihadis in Waziristan].

Shabaab, al Qaeda's branch in East Africa, launched a suicide assault today against Somalia's parliament building in its latest attack in the capital of Mogadishu. The suicide assault took place just two days after Shabaab vowed to step up attacks in Mogadishu.

The Shabaab suicide assault team detonated a car bomb at one of the gates to Somalia's parliament building. The blast took place in front of a mosque, according to Garowe. The car bomb was followed by a suicide bomber and a team of gunmen who entered the compound and attacked Somali and African Union forces guarding the compound, Reuters reported.

Shabaab forces battled the Somali and African Union forces for hours before being killed. Ten Somali soldiers and policemen and seven Shabaab fighters died during the shootout. Fourteen people, including four members of parliament, are said to have been wounded during the fighting.

Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab claimed the attack at the parliament building.

"We are behind the suicide bombing, explosions and the fighting inside the so-called Somali parliament house," he told Reuters. "We killed 30 from the AU (African Union) and from the various forces of the so-called Somali government," Abu Musab claimed.

Today's assault on Somalia's parliament took place just two days after Ali Mohamed Hussein, or Ali Jabal, Shabaab's commander in Banadir, a region that includes Mogadishu, threatened to step up attacks in the capital. Hussein made the claim on Radio Andulus, Shabaab's radio station that continues to broadcast, Garowe reported.

Shabaab has been making a push to regain control of areas of the capital after being ousted during an African Union and Somali offensive that began in 2012.

In the past, Shabaab has shown it can penetrate security at the heavily protected areas in the capital and carry out deadly attacks. AMISOM, Somali government and military officials, and nongovernmental organizations have been the targets of Shabaab suicide assaults and bombings. In one such incident, in September of 2012, three suicide bombers attacked Somalia's president and Kenya's foreign minister as they were speaking at a hotel in Mogadishu.

In June 2013 a Shabaab suicide team struck at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) compound in Mogadishu. Several UNDP employees were killed and Shabaab briefly took over the compound.

In February of this year, Shabaab launched two suicide bombings and assaults. On Feb. 14, a suicide bomber killed seven people in an attack that targeted a United Nations convoy as it traveled through Mogadishu. And on Feb. 21, a suicide assault team killed several soldiers while attempting to storm the presidential compound, which is close to parliament.

Shabaab has also executed suicide attacks outside Somalia's borders. In July 2010, a double suicide attack in Kampala, Uganda killed 74 people. It was carried out by a suicide cell called the Saleh ali Nabhan Brigade, which is named after the al Qaeda leader who served as Shabaab's military commander before he was killed in a US special operations raid in September 2009.

In September 2013, a Shabaab suicide assault team took control of the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya for four days before being killed by Kenyan security forces. Shabaab's assault team killed 63 people during the attack.

Although Shabaab abandoned Mogadishu, Kismayo, and other large cities in Somalia after a combined African Union, Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Somali offensive, it still controls several major towns and cities along the coast between Kismayo and Mogadishu, including Jilib and Baraawe, as well as other rural areas throughout the country.

Shabaab and its Kenyan branch, the Muslim Youth Center, formally joined al Qaeda in February 2012. The east African terror groups were closely tied to al Qaeda for years prior, however; Shabaab leaders had openly proclaimed their allegiance to al Qaeda long before the official merger.

Al Qaeda and its branches and allies have carried out numerous suicide assaults such as the one in Somalia today in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, and Niger.

In a three-page statement released online, al Qaeda head Ayman al Zawahiri again discusses the infighting between jihadist groups in Syria. Zawahiri's missive is addressed to the six jihadist ideologues who called on him to offer specific critiques of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), which was disowned by al Qaeda's general command in early February.

The ideologues called for Zawahiri's statement in mid-April. The al Qaeda emir's reply is dated May 3, but was not released by As Sahab, al Qaeda's propaganda shop, until May 24.

In his new statement, Zawahiri refers to a message he released in early May entitled, "Testimonial to Preserve the Blood of Mujahideen in al Sham." Zawahiri explained in that message that the ISIS' leaders, including the ISIS chief Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, had sworn bayat (an oath of allegiance) to al Qaeda. Some ISIS supporters and officials have claimed that the group was not an official branch of al Qaeda, despite the fact that ISIS openly referred to Zawahiri as its emir. Zawahiri's message served as a rebuttal in which he offered several examples showing that ISIS and its predecessors treated Zawahiri as their leader.

Zawahiri summarizes his previous message in his new one. "I said that the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) was a branch of al Qaeda, and that its emir and soldiers had upon their neck a pledge of allegiance to al Qaeda and its emir, Sheikh Usama bin Laden, may Allah have mercy on him, and then upon my weak self, and it had been repeated by them often," Zawahiri says, according to a translation by the SITE Intelligence Group.

"I had mentioned some examples of this, and I will give you another," Zawahiri continues, citing an Oct. 23, 2012 message from Abu Bakr al Baghdadi that begins with the words, "To our Emir, Sheikh Dr. Abu Muhammad Ayman al Zawahiri, may Allah preserve him: Peace be upon you, and Allah's mercy and blessings."

According to Zawahiri, Baghdadi went on to address Zawahiri as "'our blessed Sheikh,'" saying "'we are a part of you, and we are from you and for you, and we owe it to Allah that you are the caretakers of our affairs and you have upon us the right of listening and obeying as long as we live.'" Baghdadi's message made it clear that his group owed its obedience to Zawahiri, who also cited this statement by the ISI emir: "'Your advice and reminding us what is right upon us, and your commands are obligatory upon us, but the issues may sometimes require some clarification due to us living the reality of the events in our field. Therefore, we hope that your heart would widen to hear our viewpoint, but the matter after that is for you, and we are nothing but arrows in your quiver.'"

After citing Baghdadi's October 2012 message, Zawahiri goes on to recount how he ordered the ISIS to return to Iraq and continue its work as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Baghdadi disobeyed this command, however.

In his latest message, Zawahiri again says that Baghdadi and his subordinates should return to the jihad in Iraq. The al Qaeda emir also says that the pledges of allegiance Baghdadi has collected as emir of the ISIS "are null pledges, because they arose from a direct violation of my command as his direct emir," according to SITE's translation.

Zawahiri also reiterates his call for the establishment of an independent sharia court capable of mediating the disputes between the jihadist factions.

Four suicide bombers, including three foreigners, who conducted an attack in Syria. Photograph courtesy of the SITE Intelligence Group.

A "correspondent" for the Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, said that three foreign fighters and a Syrian national conducted a complex suicide assault in conjunction with Suqour al Sham in Idlib. Suqour al Sham is a member of the so-called moderate Syrian opposition to President Bashir al Assad.

The "Idlib Correspondent" for the Al Nusrah Front posted on Twitter on May 25 that three foreign fighters and a Syrian carried out a joint suicide attack using vehicles in the province of Idlib, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which obtained and translated the tweets and photographs of the suicide bombers. The exact date, the location of the attack, and the identities of the suicide bombers were disclosed, SITE noted.

It is unclear how many of the suicide bombers were members of the Al Nusrah Front and which belonged to Suqour al Sham.

The report that the Al Nusrah Front conducted a joint operation with Suqour al Sham is interesting, as it highlights al Qaeda's continuing alliances with supposedly moderate Syrian rebel groups. Suqour al Sham is one of six brigades that make up the Islamic Front, which recently issued a statement purportedly rejecting extremism and the involvement of foreign fighters in the Syrian civil war.

The Islamic Front's founding document, which was released in November 2013, declared that its primary aim is to "topple the Assad regime ... and build an Islamic state," with sharia, or Islamic law, as the basis of governance. The Islamic Front also said that "the Muhajireen," or emirgrants, "are our brothers" and vowed to support the jihad.

American rumored to be one of the suicide bombers

An "English-speaking Twitter user" known as "Abu Muhajir," whose identity and affiliation is unknown, published a photograph of the four suicide bombers and claimed that the foreign fighters are from the United States, the Maldives, and "Turkistan," likely a reference to Central Asia or western China. Abu Muhajir identified the bombers as Abu Hurayra al Muhajir, Dada'ullah al Muhajir, and Abu Turab al Muhajir, and the Syrian was identified as Abu Rish al Ansari. The term "al Muhajir" means "the emigrant," or foreign fighter.

Abu Muhajir's account is unconfirmed and has not been corroborated by the Al Nusrah Front or Suquor al Sham.

US intelligence and law enforcement officials contacted by The Long War Journal said they were aware of the report that an American participated in a suicide attack in Syria with the Al Nusrah Front and Suqour al Sham, but could not confirm it.

If an American did carry out a suicide attack in Syria, it would be the first confirmed suicide bombing by an American in Syria, and just the fourth such attack known to have been carried out by an American. Three Americans are thought to have executed suicide attacks in Somalia with Shabaab, al Qaeda's branch in Somalia and East Africa.

Americans are known to have waged jihad in Syria with al Qaeda; with its rival offshoot, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham; and with Ahrar al Sham, an al Qaeda-allied jihadist group that is part of the Islamic Front. Among them are Abu Muhammad al Amriki, Eric Harroun, Amiir Farouk Ibrahim, and Nicole Lynn Mansfield. On Feb. 4, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, told Congress that more than 50 Americans are thought to be waging jihad in Syria and are among 7,500 foreign fighters in the country. [See LWJ report, 'American' jihadist in Syria pictured with dangerous ISIS commanders.]

A well-known Yemeni journalist with connections to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Abdul Razzaq al Jamal, today posted a eulogy issued by the terrorist group to his Facebook page honoring fallen commander Ali bin Lakraa' al Kazimi al Awlaki. The eulogy claimed that Awlaki was injured "during the American bombardment of the Mahfad area in Abyan in late Jumadi al Akhir," referring to the US drone strikes targeting the Mahfad district on April 20.

The Yemeni media first reported the death of Awlaki, also known as Abu Maryam, in Mahfad on May 1.

The eulogy specified that during the time of the American drone strikes in late April, Awlaki was in Mahfad accompanied by "a group of his tribesmen" in order to "rescue their Muslim brothers who subjected to an American strike at that time." After his injury, Awlaki was cared for by his AQAP "brothers" but eventually succumbed to his wounds. Shortly before his death, Awlaki apparently wrote a letter to his tribe, encouraging them to continue along the path of jihad and in support of sharia, or Islamic law.

Awlaki is described in the AQAP statement as a "pearl of his people" who worked in support of the weak, oppressed, and orphaned, and who also fought as a "mujahid" against "the enemies of Allah."

The statement also calls the Awlaki tribe, a powerful clan in southern Yemen that has spawned a number of AQAP militants, "honorable" and lists other mujaheddin who have emerged from its ranks. This list includes Anwar al Awlaki, a US cleric and AQAP ideologue and operational commander who was killed in a US drone strike in 2011, as well as Fahd al Quso al Awlaki, who was killed by the US in another drone strike in 2012. Quso was wanted by the US for his role in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole and the attempt to detonate an airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.

The eulogy ends with a message to the "Crusader enemies," warning them that AQAP will be unrelenting in Yemen despite fierce American and Yemeni efforts. "Our ancestors fought you till they restored from you what you took from the country," it concludes. "We will not relent nor resign till we drive out the Cross and liberate the country, restore sharia to rule and Islam to prevail, and justice to spread."

Awlaki's death highlights a continuing trend of the US targeting local AQAP commanders and fighters who are battling against the Yemeni government. This trend was first identified by The Long War Journal in the spring of 2012 [see LWJ report, US drone strike kills 8 AQAP fighters, from May 10, 2012].

This contradicts a US Department of Justice white paper that claimed that the drone program will target only those AQAP operatives who "present an 'imminent' threat of violent attack against the United States."

An American was one of four suicide bombers who took part in a recent coordinated assault in Syria, according to an Al Nusrah Front sharia official who is active on Twitter.

On May 25, the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, announced that the joint attacks had been launched in conjunction with another rebel group, Suqour al Sham. A rumor circulated on Twitter that one of the four suicide bombers was an American, but there was no official confirmation from either of the groups responsible for the attacks.

In an update earlier today, Abu Sulayman al Muhajir tweeted the picture above and gave the jihadist's name as "Abu Hurayra Al-Amriki," meaning "the American." The accompanying text reads, "Performed a martydom operation in Idlib, Jabal Al-Arba'een. May Allah accept him."

Abu Sulayman would presumably be in a position to know the assailant's nationality and identity. He became one of the top sharia officials in the Al Nusrah Front after relocating from Australia to Syria last year. Prior to his move, Abu Sulayman became well known for his attempts to drum up support for the jihad in Syria. In a video released by the Al Nusrah Front in mid-April, Abu Sulayman displayed knowledge of al Qaeda's inner workings and organizational structure.

Still, American officials contacted by The Long War Journal have not confirmed the bomber's identity. If he is in fact an American, then the attack in Idlib is the first known instance in which a jihadist recruit from the US took part in a suicide operation in Syria.

Pictures and videos from the coordinated suicide bombings have been promoted by a Twitter feed maintained by the Al Nusrah Front in Idlib, Syria. The video below, posted by the Al Nusrah Front on May 25, appears to show the truck driven by Abu Hurayra being loaded with explosives and then detonated.

That same day, the Al Nusrah Front's Twitter feed for Idlib posted the picture below of the same truck, saying that multiple tons of explosives had been loaded into it. The driver's alias was given as Abu Hurayra al Muhajir, or "the Emigrant." Thus, the Twitter feed indicated only that Abu Hurayra had emigrated to Syria, but not that he was an American.

Similarly, the Al Nusrah Front Twitter feed for Idlib posted images of the other three vehicles used in the suicide operations. One of the other drivers was a Syrian. And the remaining two were also reportedly foreign fighters, with one being from the Maldives and the other described as from "Turkistan," likely a reference to Central Asia or China.

Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, an influential jihadist ideologue who is jailed in Jordan, has purportedly issued a statement denouncing the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) as a "deviant organization." Maqdisi's statement, published in both Arabic and English, is being promoted on social media by the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria.

Maqdisi has long been critical of the ISIS, which was disowned by al Qaeda's general command in February after multiple attempts to reconcile the group with the Al Nusrah Front and other jihadist organizations failed. In his new statement, Maqdisi provides more detail about his own alleged involvement in the mediation efforts, saying that he was in contact with al Qaeda head Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, who is the emir of the ISIS.

"Perhaps you know that we have exhausted our efforts to be involved in mediation, as have other noble people, scholars, and Mujahideen," Maqdisi writes, adding that "we communicated with those concerned in the dispute and the infighting, and amongst them was [Abu Bakr] al Baghdadi."

"I advised him [Baghdadi] privately and advised his [organization] publicly," Maqdisi claims. The ideologue writes that he was also in contact with the ISIS' religious officials and he has "documented evidence of these correspondences, which exposes their fraud, their 'beating around the bush' and their lies when dealing with the leaders of Jihad, as well as other traits, which are not fitting for Mujahideen."

The jailed cleric says he even "responded to some of the transgressions of their [the ISIS] official spokesman, [Abu Muhammad] al Adnani, as much as I was able to release from prison, even though his transgressions and reckless [talk] does not deserve to be responded to, more than this."

While he was reaching out to the ISIS, Maqdisi was communicating with al Qaeda's senior leadership as well.

"I also wrote to our beloved brother, the Sheikh, the Commander, the Mujahid Ayman al-Zawahiri (may Allah protect him), and I put him in the picture regarding my efforts at a reconciliation initiative or adjudicating between" the ISIS and the Al Nusrah Front, Maqdisi continues. Maqdisi claims he told Zawahiri that he "would authorize some of [his] closest students to carry this out."

In early May, Zawahiri again called for reconciliation between the groups, repeating his longstanding demand that the ISIS fight solely in Iraq and that it comply with the decisions of a common sharia court capable adjudicating between the ISIS and its rivals. In mid-May, Adnani, the ISIS spokesman, responded by blaming Zawahiri for the infighting in Syria and rejecting the al Qaeda master's mediation plan.

Maqdisi says he witnessed this exchange and the ISIS "clearly state their refusal to the adjudication instructed by the Commander, Sheikh al Zawahiri."

Maqdisi argues that the ISIS has repeatedly "disobeyed the orders of their leaders and head scholars," including Zawahiri. The ISIS' "religious officials have been transgressing their limits with our leaders and scholars," Maqdisi charges, and this is "especially [true] with our beloved brother Sheikh Ayman al Zawahiri."

Some ISIS officials have claimed that their organization was not bound to follow al Qaeda's orders, and that the ISIS pledged only to support al Qaeda. The jailed ideologue scoffs at the notion that the ISIS did not have a binding oath of allegiance (bayat) to Zawahiri. After jihadists rebutted the ISIS' claims in this regard, Maqdisi says, the ISIS' leaders "began to justify their sin and their transgression against the Mujahideen, as well as their rebellion against their leaders and their rejection of the advices of their leaders, under the guise that al Qaeda has deviated from the path of Jihad."

Because the ISIS has "shut every door that was open for reconciliation," Maqdisi argues, he was forced to issue his rebuke. After declaring the ISIS a "deviant organization," Maqdisi lists a number of the group's supposed offenses, including the "unlawful" spilling of Muslim blood.

Maqdisi then calls on all Mujahideen to adopt his denunciation of the ISIS and for jihadist websites to stop posting the group's statements. "I also call upon the members of [the ISIS] to join the ranks of the Al Nusrah Front, giving bayat to its leaders," Maqdisi writes.

In its online propaganda battle with the ISIS, the Al Nusrah Front and its allies have relied on statements from Maqdisi and Abu Qatada, among others, to undermine the ISIS' legitimacy. The ISIS has countered by relying on figures such as Maqdisi's brother, who is reportedly located in South Asia.

Both Maqdisi and Abu Qatada (who is also a leading jihadist ideologue) are imprisoned in Jordan, and their ability to communicate with the outside world, assuming their statements are genuine, raises questions about the circumstances of their confinement.

After all, Maqdisi claims from behind bars that he was able to write to the most wanted terrorist on the planet, Ayman al Zawahiri.