Image that accompanied Abu Bakr al Baghdadi's audiotape announcing the creation of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The flag was originally al Qaeda in Iraq's banner, but has been adopted by other al Qaeda affiliated and associated groups. Image from the SITE Intelligence Group.

The emir of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (also known as Abu Dua), has announced a new brand for his organization's efforts: the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant." The new name replaces all previous brands used by al Qaeda's affiliates in Iraq and Syria, including the Al Nusrah Front.

Al Baghdadi's announcement came in an audio message which was released online on April 8. The message was first obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Al Baghdadi confirms that the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's chief fighting force inside Syria, has always been a creation of his terrorist organization.

"It's now time to declare in front of the people of the Levant and world that the al Nusrah Front is but an extension of the Islamic State of Iraq and part of it," al Baghdadi says.

The Al Nusrah Front's leader, Abu Muhammad al Julani, is one of al Baghdadi's subordinates. "We deputized al Julani, and he is one of our soldiers, and with him a group of our sons, and we pushed them from Iraq to the Levant so as to meet our cells in the Levant," al Baghdadi explains, according to SITE's translation.

"We laid for them plans, and drew up for them the policy of work, and gave them what financial support we could every month, and supplied them with men who had known the battlefields of jihad, from the emigrants and the natives," al Baghdadi continues.

Al Baghdadi says that al Qaeda did not announce the Al Nusrah Front's al Qaeda origins in the past "due to security reasons."

Message confirms State Department designation

Al Baghdadi's new message confirms the details set forth in a designation released by the US State Department on Dec. 11, 2012. The State Dept. announced at the time that the Al Nusrah Front was simply "a new alias for AQI" and that the group "has sought to portray itself as part of the legitimate Syrian opposition while it is, in fact, an attempt by AQI to hijack the struggles of the Syrian people for its own malign purposes."

The State Dept. explained the relationship between the Al Nusrah Front and AQI in much the same way that al Baghdadi does. Al Baghdadi "is in control of both AQI and al Nusrah," State said, and he "issues strategic guidance to al Nusrah's emir, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, and tasked him to begin operations in Syria."

Al Qaeda's use of brands

Al Qaeda has long used multiple brands to mask its operations, as AQI did in Syria with respect to the Al Nusrah Front.

Al Qaeda's choice of brand name can also reflect how the organization views allied organizations, as well as its current prospects in a specific geographic venue. In that vein, al Baghdadi explains that AQI's evolution began with its first emir Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who established his group, "Tawhid Wal Jihad," inside Iraq. Al Baghdadi points out that Zarqawi's organization used the same name inside Afghanistan.

Contrary to some accounts, Zarqawi already had substantial links to al Qaeda at this time. For instance, Saif al Adel, a top al Qaeda leader, has confirmed in his writings that he managed al Qaeda's relationship with Zarqawi. Al Qaeda supported Zarqawi's camps in western Afghanistan prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, al Adel has written.

When Zarqawi formally swore bayat (an oath of allegiance) to al Qaeda, al Baghdadi continues, Zarqawi changed his organization's name to al Qaeda in Iraq, thereby "tying" it "to the global circle of jihad." Interestingly, al Baghdadi says, Zarqawi "knew how much this pledge [to al Qaeda] would cost the Sunni people in Iraq, and how much it would cost his mujahideen sons and brothers."

The calculation Zarqawi and al Qaeda made with respect to Iraq is similar to the one made by al Qaeda-affiliated groups elsewhere. A document recovered in Osama bin Laden's Pakistani compound shows, for example, that al Qaeda's CEO told Shabaab to hide its al Qaeda ties in order to avoid additional international scrutiny. The document confirmed previous reporting by The Long War Journal. Only months later, in February 2012, did Shabaab and al Qaeda announce their formal merger. Similarly, a document authored by the emir of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and recovered in Mali, revealed that his wing of al Qaeda sought to hide its global jihadist aims.

Even after adopting al Qaeda's brand, however, affiliate organizations may adopt new names reflecting their on-the-ground objectives. To this end, al Baghdadi says AQI united with other jihadist groups inside Iraq under the "Mujahideen Shura Council" (MSC) umbrella. The same name has been adopted by al Qaeda-linked groups elsewhere.

Zarqawi "extended his hands to those who were in the field from the working groups...and made it [a] condition of unity not to lay down their arms, no matter what was the nature of the tyrannical government that would be formed," al Baghdadi says. AQI then "gave up the name of al Qaeda that frightened the enemies of Allah, which had global weight and was tied to the Sheikh of the Mujahideen Osama bin Laden...and also the other groups gave up their names" to fight as part of the MSC.

But AQI's evolution did not end there. Zarqawi's successors relaunched al Qaeda's effort once again, under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Al Baghdadi says that the ISI "created cells" in the Levant "that are limited to preparation and supply, waiting for the chance to continue the path of highness that must continue." These cells joined with Abu Muhammad al Julani and his men to create the Al Nusrah Front.

But today, al Baghdadi says, all of the previous brands used by al Qaeda in the region, including the Al Nusrah Front, "disappear from our use, and become part of our blessed jihadi history like their predecessors."

They now fight under a unifying name, the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant."

Echoing Zawahiri's call for unity, creation of Islamic state in the Levant

Just two days before al Baghdadi's audio message was released on jihadist forums, As Sahab, al Qaeda's official propaganda arm, released a lengthy speech by Ayman al Zawahiri. Al Qaeda's emir called for jihadists in the Levant to forge an Islamic state.

"Do your best to make the fruit of your jihad, Allah permitting, a jihadi Islamic State that spreads justice and consultation, and protects the rights and has conscience," Zawahiri advised, according to a translation prepared by SITE. Such a state should become "a brick in the structure of the return of the rightly-guided Caliphate on the methodology of the Prophet," Zawahiri said.

Zawahiri also heaped praise on the Islamic State of Iraq, saying it was a bulwark against the West's designs.

AQI's announced creation of a new brand, the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant," is entirely consistent with Zawahiri's advice.

Banner of the Al Nusrah Front. Image from the SITE Intelligence Group.

The head of the Al Nusrah Front in Syria, Abu Muhammad al Julani, has released an audio recording renewing his organization's allegiance to al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri.

Al Julani confirms many of the details set forth in a message from the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, just two days ago. Namely, al Julani verifies parts of al Baghdadi's explanation of how al Qaeda in Iraq spawned the terror network's Syrian arm. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda in Iraq, Al Nusrah Front emerge as rebranded single entity.]

But in an interesting twist, al Julani rejects al Baghdadi's call for al Qaeda's affiliates in Iraq and Syria to operate under a common name, the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant."

In his response to al Baghdadi, al Julani swears allegiance directly to Ayman al Zawahiri.

"This is a pledge of allegiance from the sons of the al Nusrah Front and their supervisor general that we renew to the Sheikh of Jihad, Sheikh Ayman al Zawahiri, may Allah preserve him," Julani says, according to a translation provided by the SITE Intelligence Group. "We give a pledge of allegiance for obedience in good and bad in emigration and jihad and not to dispute with our superiors unless we see clear disbelief about which we have proof from Allah."

Al Julani is eager to "let people know" that the Al Nusrah Front's leadership "had no knowledge" of al Baghdadi's announcement "other than what they heard in the media." Al Julani continues: "If the attributed speech is true, then we weren't consulted or issued requests."

Al Julani clearly thinks that al Baghdadi's announcement was premature. "The [Al Nusrah] Front's banner will remain as-is, without changing anything, despite our pride in the [Islamic State of Iraq's] banner and those who carried it and sacrificed their blood for it from among their brothers," SITE's translation reads.

The head of the Al Nusrah Front explains that "postponing" an announcement of the relationship with al Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq was not "due to weakness," but instead owed to his group's cautious approach to implementing sharia law.

Al Julani is keen to avoid the mistakes al Qaeda made in the past and his organization is pursuing "sharia-compliant policies that suit the reality of the Levant and upon which the decision-making people in the Levant agreed from among the Front's leaders and its students," as well as other "factions" and "honorable sheikhs."

Al Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq lost much of its support from the populace after it was too zealous in its implementation of harsh laws. Al Julani wants to avoid the same mistakes in Syria.

Allegiance to al Qaeda "central"

Al Julani's decision to "renew" his organization's allegiance to Zawahiri is an interesting one. It suggests that he previously swore fealty directly to Zawahiri, and wasn't solely receiving orders from al Qaeda in Iraq. This is consistent with some press reporting based on Western intelligence officials' understanding of how the Al Nusrah Front operates.

In December 2012, for instance, the German daily newspaper Die Welt reported that Zawahiri's "contact in Syria is Abu Muhammad al Julani, the Jabat al Nusrah leader."

Last month, The Wall Street Journal reported that US "counterterrorism officials" have seen "a growth in communications among operatives from al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda in Iraq and al Qaeda's central leadership in Pakistan." In addition, these unnamed officials said that "growing numbers of al Qaeda fighters" are traveling "from Pakistan to Syria to join the fight" with al Nusrah.

A key part of the Wall Street Journal's reporting, which may have a direct bearing on Al Julani's new statement, followed: "The ties to al Qaeda's central operations have become so significant that US counterterrorism officials are debating whether al Nusrah should now be considered its own al Qaeda affiliate instead of an offshoot of al Qaeda in Iraq, as it has generally been viewed within the US government, according to a person familiar with the debate."

The timing of this reporting is especially intriguing. The US intelligence officials cited in The Wall Street Journal account highlighted the Al Nusrah Front's direct ties to al Qaeda "central" in Afghanistan and Pakistan as indicative of a push, perhaps from within the group or al Qaeda's most senior leaders, to declare the group a new al Qaeda affiliate and not just an outgrowth of al Qaeda's operations inside Iraq.

Just weeks later, a debate between the Al Nusrah Front's leader and the head of al Qaeda in Iraq concerning this very same topic has bubbled to the surface.

US counterterrorism officials and al Qaeda operatives are, ironically enough, having the same debate over the Al Nusrah Front's place in the al Qaeda pecking order.

Al Julani's new statement makes it clear that whether the Al Nusrah Front is its own al Qaeda affiliate or still under the command of al Qaeda in Iraq, it is certainly an al Qaeda operation.

Important details confirmed, despite differing accounts

Al Julani is respectful of al Baghdadi, calling him the "honorable sheikh," even as he rejects al Baghdadi's rebranding of al Qaeda's efforts in Iraq and Syria. And while al Julani tells the story of Al Nusrah's rise a bit differently, he still confirms many of the important details that al Baghdadi set forth.

For example, al Julani says that al Baghdadi agreed "to a project that we presented to him to help our weak people in the Levant." This sounds as if al Julani was the proactive agent in laying the ground work for the Al Nusrah Front, even if he was reticent, as he claims, to leave Iraq before sharia law was fully implemented.

In his statement two days ago, al Baghdadi said he had to "push" al Julani and his comrades into the Levant. "We laid for them plans, and drew up for them the policy of work, and gave them what financial support we could every month, and supplied them with men who had known the battlefields of jihad, from the emigrants and the natives," al Baghdadi claims, according to SITE's translation.

Note the difference: In al Julani's telling, he is presenting the "project" to al Baghdadi and the al Qaeda in Iraq hierarchy. In al Baghdadi's version, it was the other way around. Al Baghdadi and his men "laid for them plans" and "drew up for them the policy of work."

Al Julani is clearly eager to soften al Baghdadi's claim of credit. When explaining why the Al Nusrah Front did not want to be "hasty" in announcing its relationship with al Qaeda in Iraq and the establishment of an Islamic state, al Julani says the following:

Moreover, the Islamic State in the Levant is built by the hands of everyone, without excluding any of the main people among those who participated with us in jihad and fighting in the Levant from among the jihadi factions, the authentic Sunni Sheikhs, and our emigrant brothers, not to mention excluding the leaders of the Al Nusrah Front and its Shura [Council].

This has a very different ring to it than al Baghdadi's top-down claim of responsibility for the Al Nusrah Front's success.

Despite these differences, al Julani confirms important details in al Baghdadi's account. He says al Baghdadi "gave us half of the [Islamic State of Iraq's] money, despite the days of difficulties through which they were passing, and he placed his complete trust in me and deputized me to make the policies and the plan, and supported me with some brothers," whom Allah "blessed" despite "their little numbers."

It requires speculation to divine the intent behind al Julani's words. But he has clearly rejected al Baghdadi's rebranding for al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. And al Julani says his boss is Ayman al Zawahiri.

Perhaps al Baghdadi's "deputy" no longer thinks of himself as a subordinate to al Qaeda in Iraq's leadership.

Major Toryalai Najibi (L) and Captain Said Aga Mahammadi of the 2/1/205 ANA based in Panjwai district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

Panjwai district in Kandahar province is home to four separate indigenous security forces: the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), and the Afghan Local Police (ALP). Of these entities, the ANA's Second Kandak (battalion) of the First Brigade, 205th Corps arguably most represents the face of the central Afghan government. The 2/1/205 ANA have maintained a consistent presence in Panjwai for five years, whereas the ANCOP, a relatively well-trained and equipped national police service, has units that rotate in for short tours in the district. The officers of the AUP, another technically national police service, are currently headed by a police chief with local tribal ties that can place him at odds with other leadership figures in the district. Finally, the ALP is a truly local movement, consisting of minimally trained area men who have opted to fight the Taliban.

The ANA are outsiders -- the force includes many ethnicities that predominate in northern Afghanistan (i.e. Tajiks and Uzbeks) -- a makeup which sets them apart from the Pashtun-dominated local police forces, as well as the Pashtun citizenry of Panjwai. This distinction has drawbacks and benefits. The Afghan soldiers don't possess quite the local knowledge and intelligence sources maintained by the police (although their longtime presence in the area has mitigated this issue), but they are widely assessed as being better educated and trained, and their outsider status distances them from the tribal politics that influence local civilian leaders and cops. After the Americans, the ANA might resemble the closest thing to an honest broker in Panjwai.

US advisers to the 2/1/205 ANA and members of the American infantry units that partner with them on patrol offer mixed, though hesitantly positive ratings of the Afghan soldiers. Shortly after US forces with the 4-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team rotated into the district in late November, they faced a difficult transition period: a December directive from higher US command mandated that the Americans would no longer augment the Afghan Army with fuel or other logistical help. Forced to suddenly rely on the Afghan Ministry of Defense's shaky requisitions system, the Afghan soldiers were significantly challenged for about three weeks. But then things started to click, and soon the ANA were obtaining their own fuel, food, and most essential supplies without US assistance.

Logistical issues remain. It is difficult for the Afghan soldiers to obtain parts for vehicle maintenance, for example. But the ANA have started to operate independently and with greater competence -- at least when they decide to do so. Despite their improved capability, the soldiers of the 2nd Kandak opt out of a regular patrol schedule about 20 percent of the time, according to a number of Americans, and recently did so for two consecutive partnered patrols between April 7 and April 9. The reasons typically cited for a refusal to operate include holidays, weather, bureaucratic excuses, and sometimes just because the Afghan soldiers "don't feel like it." While some Americans offer a dim view of this inconsistency, some of the same individuals, at other times, have been genuinely impressed with the ANA: "I've seen them get out there and do crazy operations, be really aggressive," remarked one US infantryman.

On March 28, the ANA, along with police forces, led Operation Baz ("Hawks") 1392, a major clearing operation across eight villages in the western horn of Panjwai. Over five days of searches and disruption patrols, the ANA found and disabled 10 IEDs; killed three insurgents while losing one Afghan soldier; and found a large cache consisting of 30 IEDs, 100 pounds of homemade explosives, two bicycles, two radios, two bags of batteries used in IEDs, and five plastic AK-47s used for weapons training by insurgents.

The Long War Journal interviewed Major Toryalai Najibi, the 2nd Kandak's executive officer, and Captain Said Aga Mahammadi, the unit's 'Battle Captain' (operations officer) just after the completion of the Baz 1392 operation. Mahammadi is a methodically-spoken 50-year-old from Kapisa province who has spent 30 years with the Afghan Army in its Soviet-affiliated and post-2001 forms. Najibi is a gregarious 43-year-old from Logar province who has been a self-described "freedom fighter" since he was 17; this stretch includes 12 years with the present Afghan Army and before that, service with the Mujahedeen who fought the Soviets and then the Taliban. As Najibi pointed out with a smile, the latter experience put him on opposing sides of a war with his current Battle Captain many years ago.

The Long War Journal's interview with Major Najibi and Captain Mahammadi follows.

The Long War Journal: Can you tell me a little bit about your recent operation (Baz 1392) - how did it go and what was its goal?

Battle Captain Said Aga Mahammadi: The second Kandak is responsible for all of western Panjwai, and it conducts a number of different operations throughout the year. Basically, every time we conduct an operation it's based on intel that we receive on enemy depots, enemy activities, enemy manpower, and enemy weapons caches, if available, and from that we put together our operational plans. This is how the most recent operation was conducted.

We had a very successful operation. The participants were the Afghan Army, Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan Local Police, and the Afghan National Civil Order Police. They were all combined forces that participated in this operation.

LWJ: And what did the operation accomplish?

Captain Mahammadi: We were able to get some of the weapons caches and also some of the training sites of the Taliban. We set up in the villages and we were able to get a hold on the area and remove the insurgents. And we sent a report to our higher commanders about the results we achieved.

LWJ: How does the ANA work with the AUP, ALP, and ANCOP? Do they work well, are there any issues?

Captain Mahammadi: Since the beginning the ANA have taken a leading role in any operation, so for any operation to take place, the [uniform] police, the local police, and ANCOP are supposed to coordinate their plans with us. So far, we haven't had any problem with them and I can say we have a great relationship.

LWJ: It is a perception among Western advisers in Afghanistan that there are sometimes cultural tensions between the Afghan Army units and local civilians [in Pahstun areas] because of a different ethnic makeup. Do your soldiers get along with local civilians, or is there a resistance to the Army because many of the soldiers are ethnically different?

Captain Mahammadi: In the beginning when the ANA was formed, there were some of these problems because the ethnicities of most of the people who backed the new government were from the north (of Afghanistan) and we had some problems in the south when we came to Pashtun areas. But right now we have some soldiers who are from neighboring provinces who speak the [Pashtun] language of the local people, and now we don't have any problems with the locals here.

Executive Officer Major Toryalai Najibi: The local people used to think whoever is with the ANA are Americans, because the Americans are operating here. But right now I think the people appreciate us even more than the local police here, and I'll tell you the reason: the ANA soldiers will never take any of people's property; they will never unlawfully kill anybody; they will not fire on anyone unless fired upon; and ANA soldiers and staff are better educated and have better relationships with tribal leaders and the elders of the villages.

In Kandahar, eight different languages are spoken, each tribe has a different dialect and they have disagreements between themselves. I'm from Logar province, Captain Mohammadi is from [Kapisa], and Captain [Bert] Hughes [points to an American adviser] is from America; we don't have any problems with each other. But in Kandahar province they are all from here and they have problems among themselves, [including] the DGOV (district governor) the DCOP (district chief of police), whoever is in security and all the government staff who are from this province itself.

So the problem here is really a tribal one; for example, the Alikozai tribe has problems with the Popalzai tribe, so there is a lot of intertribal conflict. It's been about 10 years I've been here doing my duty ... with the Americans. I see all these tribal conflicts, but the [local citizens] don't really have any problems with us. I think it would be good if people from other areas [traveled] to do their jobs [in new areas].

LWJ: So you're saying that the ANA serves as an honest broker between the tribes; because they don't have the tribal ties they can be neutral?

Major Najibi: Yes, we are just like American forces; we don't touch anybody's money, we don't really care what tribe someone is from, who their elder is, we aren't influenced by those [tribal] issues that they have among themselves. If someone shows us a good face, we make sure that we show them a good face in return. If they shoot at us, we will certainly shoot back at them.

LWJ: Is there a flip side to that benefit of being an outsider? Because the ANA are not from around here, maybe the civilians are hesitant to talk to outsiders?

Major Najibi: I don't think so. I think we have better relationships with the locals than the police who are originally from this area. I think Captain Hughes is also aware of this, because we are really good people and we are really treating [the local population] well. I don't think an ANA soldier at any given time is going to do anything unlawful toward the people, I think if you get out with us and ask the locals about the ANA, they are all going to tell you positive things about us. Please ask the locals if we have ever unlawfully entered their property, if we have ever taken any of their belongings, or if we have ever disrespected the tribal elders of their villages.

LWJ: I have heard positive things about the ANA from [your American advisers], the district governor, and civilians who live near the Panjwai district center [and the Zangabad area]. The other side of that question is what problems do local people have with the police that they don't have with the ANA?

Major Najibi: Whenever we go on duty, we have our own fuel, we have our own ammunition, we get our salary paid on time, we get our food delivered on time for our soldiers, and we don't have any problems. I think the police don't get paid enough, they don't get enough food for their soldiers from their commanders, and they aren't well supplied, so they are forced to take [these resources] from people's homes.

LWJ: There have been problems with police forces in certain parts of Afghanistan that are so significant that local citizens wind up hating them more than the Taliban. In other sections, the problems [with corruption] are milder, and people work with the police [despite taxation]. How much of a problem do you think corruption is here, and do you feel that the local people will work with the police?

Major Najibi: I think in Kandahar the problem is different. Captain Hughes is from America and he doesn't know any Taliban, I'm from a different province and I don't know the locals here, but the local police know who belongs to the Taliban. They know who is active in the insurgency and who is not. And that is why the Taliban is so against them and tries to kill so many of them; to make it unable for them to pass this information to other forces. Right now that's why the Taliban is on the hunt for the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and in every place they can find them they will kill them. They are also telling the tribal elders and others in the villages that they should prevent anyone from joining the local police. The Taliban ... is threatening the local elders to disrupt the relationship between the ALP and the locals because they fear the ALP.

LWJ: How is security in Panjwai now and how has it been trending?

Major Najibi: Right now I think security is great in Panjwai. I don't know if you guys are aware, but a few days ago the [Taliban's] shadow district governor was killed. [See LWJ report, US special operations forces kill Panjwai shadow governor.]

LWJ: Yes. Why has [security] been [improving]?

Major Najibi: I think there are a few reasons. One of them is that the DCOP's (district chief of police Lt. Col. Sultan Mohammad) forces are increasing in Panjwai, another is the increase in the Afghan Local Police in several different areas, a third reason I can give you is our (ANA) operations jointly and [independently] with ISAF support, and another reason is the locals are aware of where the Taliban gets their support from, and that's why they are backing the government right now. A little while ago the Taliban captured two civilian engineers that were building roads and they killed them at (the village of) Garandai. After they killed them they hung them from the trees and shot them a few times. And right in front of the bodies, they placed seven IEDs for us.

During a shura, the district governor asked us to remove the bodies from the site. When we went there we were hit three times by a Taliban ambush, but finally we were able to neutralize all of the IEDs, fight with the Taliban, and get the bodies out of there. People are now worried that the Taliban kills more civilians than soldiers because they can't fight against armed people; that's why they kill civilians. And now people are really angry about this. They also see other provinces being developed, schools being opened, health system is being emplaced, and they see that even though their President (Hamid Karzai) and their king is from this province, it is still undeveloped and the illiteracy rate is still high. So they are becoming aware that this is all thanks to the insurgency.

LWJ: I understand that this may sound like a simple question, but can you explain to me who the enemy is, and why they are fighting?

Major Najibi: The enemies are Pakistanis and Iranians and there are some people that we have files on who we know come from Pakistan to fight here. The Taliban's shadow district governor who was just killed, we know that just a week ago he came from Quetta, Pakistan.

LWJ: But Panjwai is considered the birthplace of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, so obviously some of the insurgency is based here. What percentage of the insurgency is local, even if it is currently controlled from Pakistan?

Major Najibi: I think it's 50/50; in 10 people, five are from Pakistan and five are locals from Panjwai. But it is the clerics in Pakistan that encourage the people because of religion to fight against the ANA because we are working with the Americans, and they feel the Americans are fighting against Islam. The Taliban enjoyed power here for a while, and they are still dreaming about getting that power back, and having the same regime they had in the past.

But I think the local people are the enemies of the Taliban. I think the ratio for government support is 80 percent for the government, 20 percent against. And I think that the 20 percent is also being influenced under the propaganda of the enemy. The Taliban are also encouraging people to plant poppy, and a few days ago when we went to destroy poppy fields, [people] were shooting at us. I think the Taliban is encouraging people to plant the poppy so they make extra income, and thus back the Taliban. But otherwise, in our religion, opium is forbidden and cultivating poppy is also forbidden, according to our Koran.

[Note: poppy, though illegal, remains a common crop in southern Afghanistan. Its continuing ubiquity stems from its lucrative yield, ease of cultivation, and limited resources for and selective application of eradication efforts, the latter often due to official corruption]

LWJ: How is your relationship with the Americans, and how are you operating in conjunction with them?

Major Najibi: The same way we are sitting side to side, we are also operating in conjunction with them, side to side.

LWJ: But as the Americans are drawing down and pulling back, how much is the ANA working with the Americans at this point compared to in the past?

Major Najibi: Right now the Americans are just providing blocking positions during operations, and also providing air support.

LWJ: It is my understanding that in the past the ANA has had trouble getting their own fuel and other logistical support from their own government systems. It's also my understanding that the Americans have withdrawn support of this nature and that the ANA have found ways to get these resources. How have you managed to obtain these resources?

Major Najibi: Right now we don't have any problems; we get our salaries, ammunition, food, and supplies on a weekly basis.

LWJ: And do you think this supply is sustainable past 2014, when you are on your own?

Major Najibi: The world community has promised they will keep it this way and we hope it is sustained the same way. President [Barack] Obama has promised that some American forces will remain past 2014 and they will not leave Afghanistan. Also the American [Congress] said that you won't withdraw from Afghanistan and as long as your soldiers can remain, they will remain here.

LWJ: What about your own government? For example, I've spoken to the district governor, and he has very low financial support from the government in Kandahar City and Kabul; is there greater support from the Afghan Ministry of Defense to the Afghan Army, and is it a priority to project [force] into Kandahar province long term?

Major Najibi: We don't have any problems, sir. On a monthly basis 24,000 liters of fuel gets distributed to us, and we distribute it among our bases here in Panjwai. Every month the soldiers get paid for their job and soldiers get to go on leave that they accrue, and we manage to cycle our companies every once in a while. The police forces have their own problems, but we don't have any problems with salary, phone cards, or anything.

LWJ: As the Americans pull back, two resources the ANA do not have the ability to replace are helicopters, such as those used for medevac, and the reconnaissance and surveillance resources. How does the Afghan Army plan to cope with the loss of these resources?

Major Najibi: We recognize that there are problems but we think that with the withdrawal of Americans, the government is going to step by step, little by little increase the size of ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) in general, and there shouldn't be any problem, even with few Americans remaining here in the country.

LWJ: Do you get any support here in Panjwai from the Afghan Air Force helicopters, such as the Mi-35 (Hind) and Mi-17 (Hip) helicopters that are based out of Kandahar Airfield?

Major Najibi: They are all expired and not mission capable. [See LWJ report from 2010, Soviet workhorses, ISAF training form the backbone of a developing Afghan Air Force]

LWJ: In [the news] we have heard a great deal about insider attacks, or "green-on-blue" [Afghan on American] attacks. How much of an issue has that been in Panjwai and the wider Kandahar [province,] and how do you prevent such attacks?

Major Najibi: It's been about 10 years for me working with Americans and personally, I have not witnessed any green-on-blue attack. In about 80 to 100 kandaks of ANA there were no suspicious people or activities among them. But lately some of the people who have been influenced by others conduct those attacks. But this kandak has been here for the past five years in Panjwai and not one single attack or attempt has occurred here.

LWJ: That seems like a long time for one national unit to be based in an area, is this normal?

Major Najibi: It's not normal, but they decided to leave this kandak here because during this time we came to know the area, we know the enemy's activities, and we know what type of IEDs they use and where they put them. And that's why I think if they bring a new kandak in here, they are going to take a lot of casualties.

LWJ: I heard about a scenario involving a civilian janitor here on the base who tried to fake a Koran desecration. Can you explain to me what happened? And does this happen often, when insurgents try to exploit cultural tensions?

Major Najibi: [laughing] To answer your question, the problem is because of the Americans, but please don't write that. [more laughter] I'm just joking with you ... because it was the Americans who brought the contractors here to clean the trash cans and the restrooms. Also, the contractor was a native from Kandahar. And this guy, whether he was threatened, encouraged, or paid by the Taliban, [decided] to do it himself. We took care of it.

The Americans arrested those two people, brought them to Kandahar Airfield and returned them to Zangabad after the investigation was complete. I arrested them, tied them together, and let them go but I told them, 'Even if the Americans ever decide to let you come back inside this base, I won't.' I think their intent was to disrupt the relationship between us and the Americans. I also tasked our intelligence officer to do a background check on everyone who enters the camp and to get a guarantee letter from one of the members of the Kandahar provincial council for anyone who comes to work at Zangabad.

LWJ: Regarding the local uprising that had started in [the village of] Peshinagan and spread to [the] Sperwan [area]: How widespread is it and how did it start?

Captain Mahammadi: The people in this area are really bothered by the fighting and the pressure from the Taliban. Also they are not happy with how the Taliban treat them. Finally they became united, and 13 villages around Zanganbad rose up against the Taliban and backed the government forces. The following villages: Peshinagan, Korozai, Sapozai, Alikozai, and other villages like that.

LWJ: Is it sustainable? For example, there has been another, similar uprising in Andar, another part of Afghanistan, but there are reports that the Taliban have come back and are crushing the uprising ....

Captain Mahammadi: I don't think that this will occur here because we are in very close contact with the locals and we are supporting them. Any time the Taliban tries to attack them or wants to bother civilians, we will be there in a short time to back them. Also, another solution would be if government starts reconstruction programs here, for example potable water [projects], road construction, new schools, and health clinics; that will keep the people away from the insurgents and with the government.



Bill Ardolino's forthcoming book Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheikhs, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda, which tells the story of the tribal Awakening in 2006-2007 that changed the course of the Iraq War, will be published by Naval Institute Press on May 15. The book has received a 'starred' review from Publishers Weekly. All of the author's proceeds from the first edition will benefit the Semper Fi Fund for injured service members.

A wanted spokesman for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has announced the death of a German IMU fighter who was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan last October. The German, who was identified as Ahmed, was eulogized by Yassin Chouka, another German who serves as a senior IMU operative and propagandist.

Chouka announced Ahmed's death in a "video produced by the IMU's media arm, Jundallah Studio, and posted on a jihadist website on March 18, 2013," according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which obtained and translated the video. In the video, Ahmed is repeatedly described by Chouka as "the King of Setterich," a reference to Ahmed''s home town in Germany. Chouka is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and has announced the death of Germans in Pakistan in the past.

According to Chouka, Ahmed "died with two other mujahideen on 10 October 2012 in a drone attack." The strike took place "on the day following his completion of explosives training."

The US is known to have carried out a drone strike on Oct. 10, 2012 in the town of Hurmuz in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan. Five "militants" were reported to have been killed in the strike, but their identities and affiliations were not disclosed at the time.

Ahmed "was identified by German intelligence" on April 11 and confirmed to have been killed, Florian Flade, a reporter for Die Welt told The Long War Journal.

Ahmed entered Pakistan "three years ago," according to Die Welt.

Once in country, he "participated in training camps and military seminars of the mujahideen, and he spent his hours in ditches and specialized with his close friends in operations against the apostate Pakistani army," according to Chouka.

The video showed footage from one such operation, an attack in Zangara in South Waziristan in June 2011. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan often teams up with the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan to attack the Pakistani military in South Waziristan. The group also has a strong presence in northern Afghanistan, where it has integrated its operations with the Afghan Taliban. NATO special operations forces routinely target the IMU in northern Afghanistan.

The Mir Ali area of North Waziristan is a known terrorist haven for al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and its offshoot, the Islamic Jihad Group, and a host of foreign and Pakistani terror groups. The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan as well as fighters from Hafiz Gul Bahadar's Taliban group also operate in Mir Ali. The area hosts training camps for suicide bombers, IED makers, and military units.

The US has conducted numerous strikes in the Mir Ali area. Since Sept. 8, 2010, several Germans and Britons have been reported killed in Predator strikes in the Mir Ali area. The Europeans were members of the Islamic Jihad Group and the Ismalic Movement of Uzbeksitan. The jihadists are believed to have been involved in an al Qaeda plot that targeted several major European cities and was modeled after the terror assault on the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. The European plot was orchestrated by Ilyas Kashmiri, the al Qaeda leader who was killed in a US drone strike in June 2011.

The US has targeted al Qaeda's top leaders and its external operations network, as well as the assortment of Taliban, Pakistani, and foreign jihadist groups operating in the region. The strikes have mostly been confined to a small kill box consisting of North and South Waziristan. Of the 336 strikes recorded since 2004, 319, or 95%, have taken place in the two tribal agencies.

The US has launched just 11 drone strikes in Pakistan so far this year, according to data compiled by The Long War Journal. The last strike took place on March 21.

The number of strikes in Pakistan has decreased since the peak in 2010, when 117 such attacks were recorded. In 2011, 64 strikes were launched in Pakistan, and in 2012 there were 46 strikes.

This past week Afghan and Coalition special operations forces conducted five raids targeting the al Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in northern Afghanistan. The five raids reflect a significant increase in raids targeting the terror group, with 18 such operations reported so far this year. And while the Coalition is willing to discuss operations against the IMU, it refuses to discuss al Qaeda and its presence in the country.

Thursday, ISAF reported operations on April 9 and April 10 that targeted senior insurgent leaders with ties to both the Taliban and the IMU.

On April 9, Afghan and Coalition forces killed "a number" of insurgents while searching for an insurgent commander in the Burkah district of Baghlan province. ISAF could not confirm if the targeted senior leader was among the dead insurgents but did tell The Long War Journal he was an Afghan national of Uzbek ethnicity and that there were "indications of Uzbek involvement." ISAF said the target was the "second-highest ranking insurgent" in the district and was responsible for "recruiting and training Afghans in insurgency operations." He also targeted Afghan officials for kidnappings and assassinations and "played a significant role in linking Taliban and IMU fighters in Baghlan." Demonstrating the closeness of the IMU and Taliban, the targeted commander worked as a mediator and operation coordinator between the two terror groups. The April 9 raid was the fifth operation against the IMU in Baghlan province this year.

On April 10, special operations forces conducted another raid targeting a senior commander with ties to both the IMU and the Taliban; this operation was conducted in Balkh province, to the south of Mazari-Sharif in the Sholgarah district. The target was "the highest ranking Taliban official in Sholgarah district," according to the ISAF press release. He has ties to other local Taliban commanders who are responsible for attacks against Afghan and Coalition forces in the province. The commander also "manages the weapons distribution chain" for local insurgent cells, and is known to collect taxes to fund Taliban operations. Two insurgents were detained, but it is unclear if the targeted leader was among them. The Sholgarah operation is the first conducted against the IMU in Balkh province this year.

And yesterday, ISAF reported that it captured "a senior Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader" who "is believed to be in charge of a cell of insurgents responsible for improvised explosive device operations against Afghan and Coalition forces throughout Balkh province." The raid took place on April 11 in the Burkah district in Baghlan.

Last week began with the captures of two IMU facilitators during two separate raids in Ishkamish district, Takhar province, a hotspot for IMU activity in the north.

The IMU continues to launch successful suicide attacks in the north this year, including the assassinations of the Afghan parliamentary speaker's father and brother on March 13. Al Jazeera reported on April 10 that the IMU is increasing its support in Takhar province. In the report, an Afghan general comments that "for the past three years, the IMU has become stronger in the north." The report also specifically mentions al Qaeda's presence in the region, something ISAF has been unwilling to discuss.

ISAF comments on operations against the IMU, but not al Qaeda

Following the fourth raid last week, The Long War Journal inquired with ISAF about the reasons for the increased targeting of the IMU this year. ISAF responded by saying that intelligence operations, as well as "the start of the "fighting season," have led to the recent spate of raids against the IMU.

"[T]he start of the spring fighting season has created opportunities to target insurgent networks throughout the country," an ISAF official told The Long War Journal. "Afghan and Coalition forces have comprehensive intelligence operations that allows us to continually apply pressure to insurgent networks and disrupt operations up through their leadership. Every successful operation creates new opportunities to have a positive effect against insurgent networks known to target innocent Afghans."

But when asked about the presence of al Qaeda and its operations in eastern Afghanistan, a senior ISAF public affairs official declined to provide information.

"ISAF Joint Command won't be able to support your request regarding the presence of AQ," Lieutenant Colonel Richard Spiegel, the Chief of Public Affairs for ISAF Joint Command, told The Long War Journal on April 7.

An inquiry as to why ISAF was unable to answer questions about al Qaeda's operations in eastern Afghanistan went unanswered.

ISAF has announced only two raids against al Qaeda in Afghanistan so far this year, compared to 18 such operations against the IMU. The raids that targeted al Qaeda this year took place on Jan. 23 and Jan. 24 in Kunar province. Al Qaeda is known to maintain a strong presence in Kunar province, despite numerous special operations forces raids that have targeted the group's network over the years.

US intelligence officials told The Long War Journal that although ISAF may not be reporting on the raids against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, the group remains entrenched in the country, specifically in the north and east.

"Al Qaeda is entrenched in Nuristan and Kunar," one official said. "We've failed to dislodge them. And in the east, in P2K (Paktia, Paktika, and Khost), Ghazni, Wardak, and Logar, al Qaeda continues to operate alongside the Haqqani Network. In Nangarhar, al Qaeda operates with the Hizb-i-Islami Khalis and the Tora Bora Military Front."

Another official despaired that the withdrawal of Coalition forces in 2014 will herald a resurgence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

"Al Qaeda won't be returning to Afghanistan, it is already there. The question is: How much resources will al Qaeda devote to the country? With new theaters for al Qaeda opening in places like Syria, Mali, and North Africa, the demand for resources will be spread. But Afghanistan remains a key theater for al Qaeda, which can draw on resources in Pakistan and Central Asia. This is why groups like the IMU are important to al Qaeda."

The US killed four "militants" in a drone strike in the jihadist hub of Datta Khel in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan. The strike today is the first reported by the US in Pakistan in 23 days.

The CIA-operated, remotely piloted Predators or the more deadly Reapers fired a pair of missiles at a compound in Datta Khel earlier today. Four "militants" were killed in the strike, Pakistani intelligence officials and a local shopkeeper told AFP. The compound that was targeted caught fire after the strike and the bodies of those killed were badly burned.

The exact target of the strike was not disclosed. No senior al Qaeda or Taliban commanders or operatives are reported to have been killed.

Today's strike is just the first this month. The last strike, which also occurred in Datta Khel, took place on March 21. In that airstrike, four "suspected militants and their harborers" were said to have been killed.

The US has launched just 12 drone strikes in Pakistan so far this year, according to data compiled by The Long War Journal. The number of strikes in Pakistan has decreased since the peak in 2010, when 117 such attacks were recorded. In 2011, 64 strikes were launched in Pakistan, and in 2012 there were 46 strikes.

Datta Khel area is a terrorist hub

The Datta Khel area, where today's strike took place, is administered by Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Taliban commander for North Waziristan. Bahadar provides shelter to top al Qaeda leaders as well as terrorists from numerous Pakistani and Central Asian terror groups.

Datta Khel is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. While Bahadar administers the region, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadist groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to operate a command center in Datta Khel. Some of al Qaeda's top leaders, including Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, have been killed in drone strikes in Datta Khel.

Despite the known presence of al Qaeda and other foreign groups in North Waziristan, and requests by the US that action be taken against these groups, the Pakistani military has indicated that it has no plans to take on Hafiz Gul Bahadar or the Haqqani Network. Bahadar and the Haqqanis are considered "good Taliban" by the Pakistani military establishment as they do not carry out attacks inside Pakistan. In June 2012, Bahadar banned polio vaccinations in North Waziristan in protest of US drone strikes.

Bahadar and the Taliban maintain a "peace agreement" with the Pakistani military that allows him to run a state within a state in the remote tribal agency. Bahadar and his commanders have set up a parallel administration, complete with courts, recruiting centers, prisons, training camps, and the ability to levy taxes.

The peace agreement allows North Waziristan to serve as a base for the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan and nonaligned Taliban groups, as well as the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Group, and a host of Pakistani terror groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Punjabi Taliban.

Bahadar wields considerable power in North Waziristan. In July 2011, a spokesman for Bahadar claimed that there were no "militants" in North Waziristan and that Bahadar's Taliban faction has lived up to the terms of its peace agreement with the Pakistani military. But, as documented here at The Long War Journal numerous times, Bahadar provides support and shelter for top al Qaeda leaders as well as terrorists from a number of Pakistani and Central Asian terror groups, including the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan.

Bahadar's Taliban subgroup is a member of the Shura-e-Murakeba, an al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban-brokered alliance that includes the Haqqani Network, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and the Mullah Nazir Group in South Waziristan.

In June 2012, Bahadar suspended polio vaccination programs in North Waziristan in protest against the US drone strikes in North Waziristan. Bahadar has objected to the US drone strikes in the past. On Nov. 12, 2011, Bahadar suspended meetings with the government and threatened to attack the Pakistani state if it continued to allow the US to conduct attacks in areas under his control.

The US has conducted numerous airstrikes against terrorist targets in areas under Bahadar's control. Of the 337 drone strikes that have taken place in Pakistan's tribal areas, 95 of the strikes, or 28 percent, have occurred in areas directly under the control of Bahadar. [See LWJ report, Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2013, for information on US airstrikes.]

The US has targeted al Qaeda's top leaders and its external operations network, as well as the assortment of Taliban and Pakistani jihadist groups operating in the region. The strikes have mostly been confined to a small kill box consisting of North and South Waziristan. Of the 337 strikes recorded since 2004, 320, or 95%, have taken place in the two tribal agencies.

Coalition and Afghan special operations forces captured a senior leader from the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba during a raid today in the southeastern Afghan province of Ghazni. Additionally, special operations forces killed an "insurgent leader" who supported foreign fighters during an operation yesterday in the northeastern province of Kunar.

The "senior Lashkar-e-Taiba leader" and "a number of other insurgents" were captured in the district of Andar in Ghazni, the International Security Assistance Force stated in a press release. ISAF did not identify the nationality of the leader or the "other insurgents" captured during the raid.

The Lashkar-e-Taiba leader "planned and participated in multiple attacks against Afghan and Coalition forces throughout Kunar, Kandahar and Ghazni provinces" and "was actively planning a high-profile attack at the time of his arrest."

He also "is known to have links to multiple foreign fighters." ISAF often uses the term 'foreign fighters' to describe members of al Qaeda and other affiliated foreign terror groups that operate in Afghanistan. ISAF told The Long War Journal today that it "cannot confirm any ties" between the Lashkar-e-Taiba leader and "al Qaeda affiliation with foreign fighters."

The Andar district in Ghazni is a known Taliban and al Qaeda hub in the southeast. Since August 2008, the US military has conducted eight raids against al Qaeda cells in Andar, according to military press reports compiled by The Long War Journal. Senior Taliban and al Qaeda foreign fighter facilitators are known to operate in the district. Last September, the governor of Ghazni said the Taliban were bringing in "foreign militants" into the province, and the deputy chief of the Ghazni provincial council said that a large number of Pakistanis are currently fighting in Ghazni [see LWJ report, 'Foreign militants' still present in Ghazni].

Also, ISAF announced that it killed an "insurgent leader" who was identified as Rauf during a raid in the Asadabad district in Kunar province. Rauf "facilitated funding for foreign fighters and coordinated operations between the Taliban and other insurgent groups," ISAF stated. He also served as "an operational planner responsible for coordinating attacks on Afghan and coalition forces in multiple provinces throughout Afghanistan."

ISAF told The Long War Journal that it "cannot confirm any ties" between Rauf and "al Qaeda affiliation with foreign fighters."

Kunar province is a known haven for al Qaeda. Special operations forces have killed multiple senior al Qaeda commanders in Kunar, while the terror group is known to have established training camps there. Al Qaeda also directs operations in Afghanistan from Kunar.

Although ISAF declined a recent request by The Long War Journal to discuss al Qaeda and its operations in Afghanistan, US intelligence officials have said the group remains active in the country [see LWJ report, ISAF operations against IMU in 2013 at highest rate since war's start].

Raids against the Lashkar-e-Taiba in Afghanistan

The Lashkar-e-Taiba is known to have a presence in several of Afghanistan's provinces, including, Kunar, Nuristan, Nangarhar, Wardak, Laghman, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kabul, and Kandahar.

Four other raids reported by ISAF have targeted the Lashkar-e-Taiba's network since the beginning of July 2010. ISAF operations against the Lashkar-e-Taiba's network have taken place in Kunar, Nangarhar, and Wardak, and ISAF noted in today's press release that the captured commander operated in Kandahar.

In July 2010, ISAF noted an "influx of Lashkar-e-Taiba fighters into the province" of Nangarhar, in two separate press releases that announced the capture of Taliban commanders who helped members of the Pakistani terror group enter the country. The July 2010 announcements by ISAF were the first acknowledgements that the Lashkar-e-Taiba was operating in Afghanistan.

In November 2010, ISAF captured the commander of "a cell of approximately 50 foreign fighters" which consisted of "Arab and Pakistani al Qaeda operatives, possibly members from Lashkar-e-Taiba, as well as members of the Haqqani Network from North Waziristan."

And in June 2012, ISAF killed two senior Lashkar-e-Taiba commanders in an airstrike in Kunar. One of them was Khatab Shafiq, the Lashkar-e-Taiba senior leader in the province who "established multiple insurgent training camps in eastern Afghanistan." The other was Ammar, who led an attack network in Kunar. Both Lashkar-e-Taiba commanders were linked to al Qaeda.

Background on the Lashkar-e-Taiba

The Lashkar-e-Taiba has been linked to numerous complex attacks in eastern Afghanistan and in Kabul. Its fighters are believed to have worked with the Haqqani Network, run by Siraj Haqqani, to carry out attacks on Indian targets in Kabul.

Lashkar-e-Taiba fighters have fought alongside al Qaeda and the Taliban in multiple engagements against US and Afghan forces in the east, including the deadly assault on the US combat outpost in Wanat in Nuristan province in July 2008. More than 400 enemy fighters launched the coordinated attack. In the fierce fighting at Wanat, nine US troops were killed, 15 US soldiers and four Afghan troops were wounded, and the post was nearly overrun. Although US forces ultimately defeated the attack, they withdrew from the outpost days later.

The terror group is known to have run training camps in Kunar and Paktia provinces up until the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Lashkar-e-Taiba also currently operates camps in Pakistan in Mansehra, Sindh, Punjab, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan's military and its Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate support Lashkar-e-Taiba as part of Pakistan's so-called strategic depth against rival India.

The terror group, which is backed by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate and the military, and sheltered by the government, essentially runs a state within a state in Pakistan. The sprawling Muridke complex in Punjab houses "a Madrassa (seminary), a hospital, a market, a large residential area for 'scholars' and faculty members, a fish farm and agricultural tracts. The LeT also reportedly operates 16 Islamic institutions, 135 secondary schools, an ambulance service, mobile clinics, blood banks and several seminaries across Pakistan," the Southeast Asia Terrorism Portal reported.

Over a period of years, the Lashkar-e-Taiba has established an organization that rivals Lebanese Hezbollah. The group succeeded in providing aid to earthquake-ravaged regions in Kashmir in 2005 while the Pakistani government was slow to act. Lashkar-e-Taiba is active in fundraising across the Middle East and South Asia, and has recruited scores of Westerners to train in its camps. The most well-known Western recruit is David Coleman Headley, an American citizen who helped scout the deadly November 2008 Mumbai terror assault and also plotted attacks in Europe.

Like al Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Taiba seeks to establish a Muslim caliphate in southern and central Asia. Lashkar-e-Taiba has "consistently advocated the use of force and vowed that it would plant the 'flag of Islam' in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi," according to the Southeast Asia Terrorism Portal. Also, like al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba practices Wahhabism, the radical Islamist school of thought born in Saudi Arabia.

Lashkar-e-Taiba has an extensive network in southern and southeast Asia. After the Mumbai terror assault in November 2008 that killed 165 people, a senior US military intelligence official described the group as "al Qaeda junior," as it has vast resources and is able to carry out complex attacks throughout its area of operations. "If by some stroke of luck al Qaeda collapsed, LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) could step in and essentially take its place," the official told The Long War Journal in November 2008.

The relationship between al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba is complex, the official noted. "While Lashkar-e-Taiba is definitely subordinate to al Qaeda in many ways, it runs its own network and has its own command structure. The groups often train in each others' camps, and fight side by side in Afghanistan."

The US government designated Lashkar-e-Taiba as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2001. The Pakistani government banned the group in January 2002, but this did little to shut down its operations. The group renamed itself the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and has conducted business as usual.

Hafiz Saeed, the emir of Lashkar-e-Taiba, and several other leaders have been added to the US's list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists. In May 2012, the US added Saeed to the Rewards for Justice program, and offered $10 million for information leading to his arrest and prosecution. Saeed continues to operate openly Pakistan, and is often feted by Pakistani politicians and the media.

The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan denied that it executed yesterday's bombings at the finish line of the Boston Marathon that killed three people, including an 8-year-old boy, and wounded 144 more, some seriously.

"We believe in attacking US and its allies but we are not involved in this attack," Ihsanullah Ihsan, the top spokesman for the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, told AFP. "We have no connection to this bombing but we will continue to target them wherever possible."

The Movement of the Taliban had been quick to claim credit for the failed Times Square bombing on May 1, 2010. Within hours of attempting to detonate a car bomb in the heart of New York City, the Pakistani Taliban sent two videotapes to The Long War Journal , one of its emir, Hakeemullah Mehsud, and another of Qari Hussain, a trainer of suicide bombers, claiming the attack. Months later, the Pakistani Taliban released a videotape of Hakeemullah Mehsud talking with Faisal Shahzad, the operative who built and attempted to detonate the car bomb.

No group has claimed credit for yesterday's bombing at the Boston Marathon.

The two blasts near the finish line of the marathon occurred within seconds of each other. The bombs were detonated some 50 to 100 yards apart on the same side of the street as runners were crossing the finish line.

Officials said that three people were killed in the blasts, at least 144 were wounded; 17 are said to be in critical condition and 25 more are seriously hurt. Some of the injuries are severe; more than a dozen amputations have been reported.

There are conflicting reports about unexploded explosive devices that were recovered. Some reports say that upwards of five such devices were found, while others say none were found. The bombs are said to have been made with gunpowder and packed with materials to maximize injuries.

There are also conflicting reports about a third, possibly related incident, which occurred over an hour later, at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Dorchester, a few miles away. It has been described variously as a fire and an explosion, and authorities have not definitively ruled out a connection to the Marathon bombings.

Local and federal agencies are still gathering clues on the perpetrators of the bombings. A law enforcement advisory has been issued that warned police to be on the lookout for a "darker-skinned or black male" with a foreign accent. The man was seen with a backpack and was attempting to gain access to a secured area just minutes prior to the bombings.

Additionally, a 20-year-old Saudi citizen who was wounded in the blast is currently being questioned by the FBI and is a person of interest, according to reports. Authorities have searched his apartment but police have not said if evidence linking him to the attack has been found.

The US killed five "militants" in a drone strike today in an area of Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of South Waziristan. The strike is the second reported by the US in Pakistan in the past four days.

The CIA-operated, remotely piloted Predators or the more deadly Reapers fired a pair of missiles at what was described by AFP as "a base of the TTP," or the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. Five "militants" were killed in the strike and two more were wounded, Pakistani intelligence officials said. The Taliban "base," which was located in the village of Sararogha, was leveled in the airstrike.

No senior al Qaeda or Taliban commanders or operatives are reported to have been killed in the attack.

The village of Sararogha has been a stronghold of the al Qaeda-linked Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. In the past, Waliur Rehman, the head of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, is said to have directed operations from the village. Although the Pakistani military claimed it liberated Sararogha during an offensive that began in the fall of 2009, the fact that the US launched a drone strike in the village today indicates it is far from being under the control of the security forces.

An infamous peace agreement between the Pakistani military and Baitullah Mehsud, the founder of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, is named after Sararogha, as the agreement was signed in the village. The Sararogha Accord, which was reached in 2005, called for the military and the Taliban to end attacks on each other. The Taliban were not required to reject al Qaeda or stop sheltering its leaders and operatives, nor did the pact require the Taliban to lay down their arms. The truce remained in place until the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan announced its formation in 2007 and declared war against the state.

The strike in South Waziristan is the first in the tribal agency since Feb. 8, when the drones killed two Arabs who were identified as Sheikh Abu Waqas, a Yemeni explosives expert, and Abu Majid al Iraqi; four Uzbeks, who were likely from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; and a Taliban member.

In early January, the US launched three strikes in South Waziristan and killed two top Taliban leaders. On Jan. 6, the US killed Wali Mohammed, a commander in the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. Three days prior, the US killed Mullah Nazir, a self-professed al Qaeda commander who led another Taliban group in the western part of South Waziristan that is not affiliated with the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and several of his staff. And on Jan. 2, US drones killed five "militants" in an area under Nazir's control.

Today's strike is the second in Pakistan this month. The last strike, which occurred in the neighboring tribal agency of North Waziristan, took place on April 14. In that airstrike, five "militants" were said to have been killed.

The US has launched 13 drone strikes in Pakistan so far this year, according to data compiled by The Long War Journal. The number of strikes in Pakistan has decreased since the peak in 2010, when 117 such attacks were recorded. In 2011, 64 strikes were launched in Pakistan, and in 2012 there were 46 strikes.

The US has targeted al Qaeda's top leaders and its external operations network, as well as the assortment of Taliban and Pakistani jihadist groups operating in the region. The strikes have been confined mostly to North and South Waziristan. Of the 338 strikes recorded since 2004, 321, or 95%, have taken place in the two tribal agencies.

The US launched a pair of drone strikes against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula today in a remote area in central Yemen, according to reports. The strikes are the first recorded in the country since the end of January.

The remotely piloted Predators or the more deadly Reapers attacked two separate targets in the Oussab al Ali area, which was described by The Associated Press as a mountainous region "located in the middle of three provinces of central Damar, southern Ibb and eastern Hodeida."

The first strike killed four AQAP fighters as they were driving a vehicle in the area, Yemeni intelligence officials told AP.

The second strike killed Hamed Radman, who was described as an "influential al Qaeda member" who "played a role in recruitment." A Yemeni witness in the area said that US drones were deployed over the village where Radman was killed for three days before striking.

Today's strikes are the first reported in Yemen since Jan. 23, when six AQAP fighters were killed in an attack in Sana'a province. The US launched three other strikes in Yemen in January. Two such attacks took place in Marib province on Jan. 19 and Jan. 21; two Saudis are reported to have been killed in the Jan. 19 attack. In another strike, on Jan. 22, the US killed four AQAP fighters in a strike on a vehicle in Al Jawf province in northern Yemen.

Over the past 10 months, the US has begun to target AQAP outside of the traditional strongholds of Abyan and Shabwah provinces in the south. Of the 27 strikes against AQAP since the beginning of June 2012 that have been recorded by The Long War Journal, only four have hit AQAP in Abyan and Shabwah. The other 23 strikes have targeted AQAP operatives in the provinces of Aden, Al Baydah, Al Jawf, Hadramout, Marib, Saada, and Sana'a (it is unclear if today's strikes took place in Damar, Ibb, or Hodeida). Of the 18 strikes that were conducted between January 2012 and the end of May, 10 occurred in Abyan and Shabwah.

In 2012, the US launched 42 drone strikes in Yemen against AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia. The previous year, the US launched 10 drone and air strikes against the al Qaeda affiliate.

Although five senior AQAP operatives were killed in strikes in Yemen in 2012, the group's top leadership cadre remains intact. In January, the Yemeni government claimed that Said al Shihri, the deputy emir of AQAP, died following an attack last fall; AQAP has not confirmed his death, however, and recently released a statement that hinted that he may be alive.

The US has targeted both senior AQAP operatives who pose a direct threat to the US, and low-level fighters and local commanders who are battling the Yemeni government. This trend was first identified by The Long War Journal in the spring of 2012 [see LWJ report, US drone strike kills 8 AQAP fighters, from May 10, 2012]. Obama administration officials have claimed, however, that the drones are targeting only those AQAP leaders and operatives who pose a direct threat to the US homeland, and not those fighting AQAP's local insurgency against the Yemeni government.

For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2013.

Samir Hatour. Image from the SITE Intelligence Group

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan released a martyrdom tape today praising a German member who was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan over a year ago. The German, who was identified as Samir Hatour and was also known as Abu Laith, was killed by US drones in a strike in Makeen, South Waziristan, on March 9, 2012.

The IMU martydom tape, which is titled "The Martyr Abu Laith, The Lion with a Rock-Hard Creed," was first released by Jundallah Studio, the IMU's propaganda arm, on March 18. The SITE Intelligence Group obtained a copy of the video and provided a translation.

The video is narrated by Yassin and Mounir Chouka, two senior IMU leaders and propagandists who are also German citizens. Yassin, who is also known as Abu Ibrahim, and Mounir, who is also known as Abu Adam, were added to the US's list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists in January 2012 [see LWJ report, US adds IMU, IJU operatives to list of global terrorists, for more details on the Chouka brothers].

"After a 40 day deployment in South Waziristan, on the morning of 9 March 2012, which was a Friday, Abu Laith [Hatour] went to his family, and on the way, the car in which he was along with three other mujahideen was fired upon by an American drone and the brothers died as martyrs," Yassin said.

The US is known to have launched a drone strike on March 9, 2012 that killed 13 "militants," including several foreign fighters. A house and a vehicle were targeted in the strike [see LWJ report, US drones kill at least 13 in South Waziristan strike]. Makeen is in an area under the control of Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, who is closely allied to al Qaeda and the IMU.

Hatour's death was first reported killed in April 2012. The German press identified him as "Samir H." The IMU statement confirms the reports of his death.

Hatour was from the German city of Aachen, according to Yassin.

"He grew up as the son of a Tunisian man and a converted German woman, and he spent his youth in a city that had all the criteria to be a center for unbelief, a society in which no one is ashamed in the daylight to {unclear}... gambling, prostitution, and being a cat's leap to the coffee shops in Holland," Yassin claimed, according to SITE.

Hatour traveled to Saudi Arabia and studied at the Islamic University in Medina "and with thousands of students from all over the world the Islamic Shariah." He then spent some time in Egypt, where he was recruited to wage jihad in Pakistan.

"One day in the winter of 2009, Abu Laith's phone rang and words reached his ears about a path to jihad," Yassin claimed. To get to Pakistan, Hatour started a business that dealt with Pakistani products, then used the business as cover to enter the country.

Yassin held up Hatour as "a counter-argument" against the common narrative that jihadists are from poor, uneducated backgrounds.

"[H]e was a graduate, very successful in life, and he was an Islamic student in Medina and later in Egypt, and he was specialized in the Arabic language and professionally translated Islamic literature into German," Yassin said.

Other IMU operatives also featured in martyrdom video

A number of prominent IMU members as well as a trainer and fighters praised Hatour. Among them are Abu Dher Azzam, the top mufti or religious scholar for the IMU; Russian IMU commander Abdul Hakeem; a military trainer identified as Khaled Qutaiba; and a Tunisian fighter who is known as Abu al Walid al Tunisi.

The videotape also included "[p]ictures and clips of seven slain German fighters" who were identifed as "Abdul Ghaffar (AKA Eric Breininger) from Neunkirchen, Abu Safiyya from Bonn, Miqdad from Essen, Cuneyt Ciftci from Ansback, Farooq from Bochum, Abu Askar from Hamburg, and Ahmed from Setterich," SITE reported.

Ahmed, a Moroccan who lived in Germany, was praised by the IMU last month. He died in a drone strike in October 2012. Miqdad was killed while fighting US forces in Baghlan, Afghanistan in 2011. Breininger, who was wanted by Germany for plotting to attack US forces in 2008, was killed while fighting the Pakistani military in 2010. Abu Askar was killed in a US drone strike in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan in 2010. And Cuneyt Ciftci was killed while conducting a suicide attack on NATO forces in Afghanistan in 2008 (he was listed as an Islamic Jihad Union fighter, which is an offshoot of the IMU).

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is closely allied to al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban. The group fights in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, it has closely integrated its operations with the Taliban in the north. ISAF routinely targets the IMU in raids in the Afghan north; 18 such operations have been recorded by ISAF so far this year.

Germans IMU fighters have been captured in Afghanistan. In July 2010, Ahmed Siddiqi, a German from Hamburg, was captured in Kabul. Siddiqi, who disclosed the al Qaeda plot to carry out Mumbai-styled terror assaults in Europe, had trained in Pakistan and fought in Afghanistan. And on May 9, 2011, ISAF captured a "Germany-based Moroccan al Qaeda foreign fighter facilitator" in Zabul in southeastern Afghanistan.

The manhunt for one of the two chief suspects in this week's Boston Marathon bombings has continued throughout the day. And as the younger of two brothers is pursued by authorities, analysts are looking to social media pages for clues about their motivations.

Tamerlan Tsarnaev, 26, was killed in the middle of night. The Associated Press and NBC News have reported that he is believed to have traveled abroad for six or seven months last year, flying from New York City to Russia. The details of Tamerlan Tsarnaev's life and travels remain wide open, as the story has evolved throughout the week.

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, 19, remains at large, having evaded law enforcement officials for the better part of a day. Other possible accomplices may be on the run as well.

According to various media reports, the Tsarnaev family is from Chechnya, or at least the Caucasus.

Journalists and counterterrorism analysts have pointed to a few social media pages that appear to have been created by the Tsarnaevs. Any analysis of these pages is fraught with difficulty, as fake Twitter accounts and other pages have been created since the brothers were first publicly identified by name.

As BuzzFeed has reported, one YouTube page appears to have been created by Tamerlan Tsarnaev. The video includes a link to a video titled, "The Emergence of Prophecy: The Black Flags From Khorasan."

The video deals with a key part of jihadist mythology: That one of the most significant battles fought against the "infidels" will take place in the Khorasan, a geographic area that includes parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

The Khorasan is considered by jihadis to be the place where they will inflict the first defeat against their enemies in the Muslim version of Armageddon. The final battle is to take place in the Levant - Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. Mentions of the Khorasan have begun to increase in al Qaeda's propaganda.

This alone, of course, does not make the brothers al Qaeda operatives. If the YouTube page was Tamerlan Tsarnaev's, then the video, along with other posts, indicates at least a level of sympathy for the jihadist ideology.

The SITE Intelligence Group reports that one of the playlists on the YouTube page was titled "Terrorists." The videos in the playlist have been taken down, but SITE says more than one of them is "related to Dagestan" and were initially uploaded to YouTube by the "Vilayat Dagestan," indicating jihadists disseminated the videos.

The investigation into the Tsarnaevs and their possible ties abroad continues.

Parts of this account were first reported at The Weekly Standard.

A civilian looks at a DOK-KING MV-4 Mine Clearance System during a US Army patrol in the Zangabad area of Panjwai district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan on April 9. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

On April 7, the members of Third Platoon of Comanche Company, 4-9 Infantry set out from Forward Operating Base Zangabad on a reconnaissance and security patrol of the area. They were headed into a village the men had dubbed "Bringallzai" (its real name is Korozai), the nickname a mishmash of the surnames of Sergeant First Class Eric Brew, the platoon sergeant, and First Lieutenant Aubrey Ingalls, the platoon leader.

The soldiers left the main gate of the FOB, walked down a paved road for roughly 100 meters, and cut onto a dirt path that wove through the characteristic terrain of Panjwai district: grape fields riddled with symmetrical ridges and deep irrigation ditches, a series of mud-walled qalats, a Pashtun graveyard flying colorful flags honoring the dead, and a gorgeous sea of red and white poppy blossoms. The men walked in a rigid, single-file line to minimize their chances of stepping on a buried mine. And they were led through the rural maze by a large robot.

An Afghan farmer observing the US patrol through the pathways of his compound shot the remote-controlled, tank-treaded machine a quizzical look. A row of heavy flails dangled from an adjustable scoop on its front, capable of churning the soil for bombs. "Please don't damage the fields ... please don't damage the walls to my house with that," the farmer asked the Americans through an interpreter.

When the man was asked what kind of crops he was growing, he mentioned "wheat and grapes," ignoring the large, illegal poppy field adjacent to his home. When specifically asked about the poppies, the farmer dismissively said, "Some poor people grow that." Finally, when pressed by this reporter about whether the illicit field had escaped eradication by the government because of payoffs to Afghan security forces, he replied coyly, "I'm not sure, but [the growers] might pay to the Afghan National Army or the Afghan Uniform Police." The conversation ended with his declaration that security in the area is good and getting better.

A few minutes later, a sustained volume of small arms fire erupted about 500 meters to the northeast of the patrol. The bullets weren't directed at the soldiers, so the men merely paused to listen or looked curiously through their scopes, and called the nearby gunfight in on the radio. "Wrath," the air support element consisting of one Apache and two Kiowa helicopters orbiting overhead, speculated, "Maybe they're shooting at us." As it turned out, the insurgents had another target: a checkpoint manned by officers with the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) had been engaged from a treeline about 150 meters away, and the Afghan cops returned fire at the insurgents. Another American unit traveling through the area stumbled upon the engagement, and quickly joined in with their weapons.

In some areas of operations, in some conflicts, a contact with insurgents merely 500 meters distant might stimulate nearby US platoons to maneuver on the enemy. But not that day, and not in Panjwai: 3rd Platoon wasn't certain about the nature of the gunfire, in an area manned by four different Afghan security forces; no one had called for assistance; moving quickly through the rows of grape fields filled with crumbling mounds and deep holes is difficult; and the district is littered with explosive booby traps. Charging headlong after mysterious gunfire through fields and pathways that have not been carefully cleared of mines is a poor proposition in Kandahar.

Members of Third Platoon of Comanche Company, 4-9 Infantry and local civilians react to the sound of a firefight taking place about 500 meters away on April 7. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

Ambushed

Nearly five months before, on Dec. 10, 2012, a US patrol conducted by 3rd Platoon of Bayonet Company, 1-38 Infantry was leaving the village of Loi Kola in the Sperwan area of Panjwai district when bullets began cracking over the formation. According to an after-action narrative, the unit and its Afghan Army partners "began taking accurate and sustained small arms fire from a grape hut and subsequent tree line approximately 150 meters to the south." When the soldiers reacted toward available cover, Staff Sergeant Wesley R. Williams stepped on a buried pressure-plate IED. The explosion amputated both of his legs and caused catastrophic injuries to the remainder of his lower body. Two nearby soldiers were also seriously injured by shrapnel and the blast wave, and an Afghan soldier elsewhere in the patrol was hit in the fusillade of enemy machine gun fire.

The platoon continued to react. Various soldiers along the line returned fire at the suspected source of the attack, while two men, Private First Class Breilan A. Rosenberg and Staff Sergeant Russell A. Ho, distinguished themselves with their actions. Rosenberg, the platoon's Line Medic, heard the cries of "Medic!" and ran 150 meters to the front of the formation. Under "heavy, accurate and sustained" fire from AK-47s , RPGs, and at least one PKM light machine gun, he assessed the four casualties, and "rapidly applied three tourniquets, one inguinal pressure dressing and additional lower abdominal packing to [Staff Sergeant] Williams'... pelvic region."

Meanwhile, Staff Sergeant Ho, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team leader, also ran to the front of the line with his "Minehound CIED (Counter IED)" detector to assess the nature of the explosion and clear the area of secondary bombs. While still under enemy fire, "Ho single handedly cleared over 200 square meters in the initial push to treat the casualties and recover sensitive items." The staff sergeant, "on his own initiative," then led his fellow soldiers out of their static position as he swept his detector back and forth over the ground, clearing a path to a landing zone for a medevac helicopter.

Once there, he cleared the LZ and the area surrounding the landing site, including several fighting positions that would allow his fellow soldiers to protect the aircraft. The medevac successfully landed after several aborted attempts under fire, and Ho took the point position of the patrol once again, leading his platoon to link up with supporting forces. Rosenberg and Ho would subsequently be awarded the Bronze Star Medal with Valor device for their actions. But despite the heroic efforts, as well as those of the medevac helicopter crew, Staff Sergeant Williams succumbed to his wounds after arriving at Kandahar Airfield.

The events of Dec. 10 illustrate some of the tactical challenges faced by US and Afghan soldiers in Kandahar province. Buried mines litter the fields and footpaths of Panjwai district, as the Taliban attempt to both attack and shape the operations of their opponents. Since the unit's arrival in late November, soldiers with the 4-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Tacoma, Wash. have suffered 2 soldiers killed and 17 wounded in combat incidents, many very seriously, with multiple amputations. All but two of the casualties have been the result of pressure-plate IEDs, with the majority of those targeting foot patrols.

An explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) soldier briefs the platoon on their movement prior to a patrol on April 9. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

The minefields of southern Afghanistan

All conflicts and areas of operation have characteristic threats. In Iraq, the roadside bomb and the suicide car bomb rose to prominence. The early years of the war in Afghanistan were characterized by many more stand-up gunfights and other direct fire attacks, before the planted bomb know-how migrated from other theaters of the Long War to make IEDs more common. All of these techniques, along with rocket fire and suicide vehicle bombs, remain prominent in most portions of the country.

But the IED is the weapon of choice for the insurgency. In 2012, there were "nearly 15,000 IED incidents in Afghanistan, causing about 1,900 U.S. casualties," according to Pentagon reporting. This figure represents an 80% increase in two years. And the fight in southern Afghanistan after the 2009 US surge of forces has been dominated by a very specific insurgent bomb technique: the pressure-plate IED, a.k.a. mine, mainly intended for foot patrols. Vehicles are still attacked with suicide car bombs and larger pressure-plate IEDs, but the vast majority of the hidden bombs target dismounted soldiers. The result has been a large number of dismemberments and deaths as ISAF forces grappled with a steep learning curve while adapting to the tactic.

The post-surge mines that popped up in Helmand and Kandahar provinces were comprised of crude but effective materials: a wood box connected to a detonator and a yellow water jug filled with homemade explosives. US electronic countermeasures can defeat "remote-control IEDs" set off with a cell phone or other broadcast signal. And opting to place a similar remote control bomb with a physical "command wire" is a riskier proposition for insurgents; the wires are subject to being spotted, and someone has to stick around on the other end of the electric fuse to man the explosives.

As a result, the Taliban rely heavily on the pressure-plate trigger mechanism buried under the soil. When a soldier, Marine, or random civilian steps on one of the traps, a rectangular wood box bows, two metal contacts complete an electrical circuit, and the explosives detonate. Sometimes insurgents simply sprinkle the bombs along well-traveled pathways in hopes of scoring a casualty. Other times, the mines are accompanied by an ambush with small arms fire. The aim, as occurred during the fight in Sperwan on Dec. 10, is to drive forces into natural movements toward cover or maneuver, at which point US and Afghan troops can stumble into minefields.

US forces quickly made common sense adaptations to these attacks: they began patrolling in "Ranger file" - a single line in which each man attempts to replicate the footsteps of the soldier to his front; they augmented the patrols with bomb-sniffing dogs; and they began employing one or more handheld detectors in patrol formations. The most recent evolutions in counter-mine tactics that have risen to prominence also include powerful aerial reconnaissance assets and "leg sav[ing]" battlefield robots. Despite these and other counter-IED advancements, and the more than $20 billion spent to develop them, the bombs remain a persistent threat and an economical tactic for the Taliban.

An Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) officer learns to use a bomb detector during a US tutorial at a police checkpoint in Panjwai. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

Detectors

One of the quickest adaptations to the threat of buried bombs was the adoption of metal detectors wielded by soldiers staged redundantly in any patrol formation. Personnel trained in the use of these machines sweep them carefully back and forth before themselves, and the devices will often, but not always, acquire a "hit" on pieces of metal used in the bombs, typically the batteries or metal contacts.

The technology has undoubtedly saved many lives and limbs. But as has inevitably been the case over more than a decade of conflict, insurgents have attempted to adapt to the technique; they have started using components that evade the metal detection. The latest class of US technology has in turn one-upped this adaptation with the "VMR-2 Minehound" and "VMC-1 Gizmo" detectors, devices that concurrently sweep for metal parts and minerals or use a "ground penetrating radar" to scan for suspicious objects underneath the surface.

When a hit occurs, if a soldier is sure that the area is seeded with a bomb, the trap is typically disarmed or an explosive ordnance disposal troop detonates it in place. (In Helmand province, hurriedly trained young lance corporals used to riskily dig up and cut the wires to the bombs themselves; many Afghan troops still do this.) Sometimes a hit by the detector is equivocal, and US forces simply avoid stepping on the area. This guidance - copying the steps of compatriots and skirting potential trouble spots - is dubbed "staying on the path of life" by soldiers in Kandahar.

These techniques are effective but not foolproof. It is always possible for the minehounds to miss bombs, or for someone to step slightly out of line, pressing on an unlucky spot untouched by the machines and the footfalls of several men in front of him. The detonation of a bomb typically results in death or catastrophic dismemberment for the stepper, and shrapnel and concussion injuries for those closest to him.

A number of Afghan soldiers and policemen are being trained in the use of the detector technologies, but trainers in Panjwai were unclear on how many of the machines will be left with the indigenous troops as US troops withdraw. And teaching the local forces isn't always easy. During a recent US seminar conducted at an Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) checkpoint in Panjwai, one of the cops seemed to enthusiastically absorb the lesson, while two other students were far "too stoned" on hashish cigarettes to become competent. Even without detectors, the Afghan troops, especially the Afghan Local Police native to the area, maintain an advantage the Americans don't have: intimate knowledge of the local terrain.

"The ALP can spot IEDs just like that," according to one US soldier, snapping his fingers for effect.

Private First Class Dustin Byrd and "Sassy" check a car for explosives in the village of Korozai. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

Dogs

The US military has also adapted to the evolving IED threat by increasing the use of highly trained bomb-sniffing dogs. Breeds typically used in the detection work include the Labrador retriever, German and Dutch Shepherds, and the Belgian Malinois. Handlers walk the dogs in the front portion of a patrol and the animals sniff the ground above a potential bomb, responding "passively" (stopping and looking at an area) if they smell explosives. On the April 7 patrol, "Sassy" the yellow Lab was also directed to sniff two cars suspected as vehicle-borne-IEDs; the dog's nose made the task infinitely quicker and less intrusive than a physical search by humans.

The canine soldiers, like their human counterparts, vary in skill, personality, and responses to combat situations. Sassy is rated well by her trainer, but the dog, like many bomb-sniffing canines in Afghanistan, can develop problems on long patrols.

"She's pretty good ... when she conducts searches in a training exercise she does it perfectly," explained Private First Class Dustin Byrd, Sassy's handler. "But sometimes when she's on a long patrol and she gets hot and tired, she loses [focus]."

The dogs also have varied responses to stress. Some animals get spooked by gunfire and explosions, eventually developing post-traumatic stress disorder, while others handle combat with aplomb. "Oogie," a black European Labrador Retriever assigned to another unit in Panjwai, is rated as unusually professional and unflappable by the soldiers who work with him. Gunfights and detonations "don't bother him" explained Oogie's handler, Sergeant Jacob Cozort, as they waited outside a tribal shura conducted at an American base near the village of Mushan in late March. Minutes later, a distant explosion outside the base's walls illustrated Cozort's point: Oogie briefly cocked his head toward the rumble, seemed to consider it for a millisecond, and nonchalantly returned to affectionately pressing his body up against any and all nearby humans.

A drawback to the dog's warrior persona occurred earlier in the deployment, however, when Oogie scored his first confirmed kill during a patrol -- on a local sheep. The American soldiers used Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to reimburse a local farmer for the slain animal, to the tune of $148.

On an April 9 patrol by Third Platoon, Comanche Company, 4-9 Infantry in Zangabad, Sassy the Golden Lab made a similar attempt, bucking at the end of her leash when a herd of goats approached the patrol. Byrd restrained the dog, but not before the animals were spooked into an adjacent poppy field. Three young goat herders took the situation in amused stride, despite the fact that they were forced to scamper into the tall stalks after their charges.

Sassy bucks at a herd of goats while Private First Class Dustin Byrd restrains her. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

"The Baby"

Troops have employed possibly the ultimate evolution of counter-mine efforts in the US war in Afghanistan with the recent adoption of the large, remote-controlled robots that are capable of cutting a path through difficult terrain. One soldier on the April 9 patrol in Zangabad was astonished when he recently encountered the vehicle in Afghanistan, recalling how he had first come across it years ago in a video game.

"In 2008, I was playing Ghost Recon Advanced Warfighter, and I remember dragging that thing around the map thinking, 'Yeah right, the Army will never have anything like this,'" said First Lieutenant Andrew Alcocer, of Headquarters Company, 1-36 Infantry, before he accompanied the 4-9 Infantry patrol as a detachment. "And then I go on my first patrol with these guys, and they're like, 'Hey, bring up the Baby.' I said, 'What's the Baby?' And around the corner, here it is."

The DOK-KING MV-4 Mine Clearance System has been a game changer in the US-Taliban tactics race over anti-personnel mines. The heavy flails dangling from the front scoop or the weight of the treads set off the trigger pressure on most bombs designed to target people, and the heavy tread marks left behind offer soldiers a clear path to follow on patrol. In addition, the remote control behemoth serves as quick, mobile cover in the event of a firefight; it can turn 360 degrees on a pivot to switch directions; and it can carry much of the weapons, food, extra ammunition, and other heavy equipment that soldiers take with them on a foot patrol.

"The Baby" occasionally gets stuck, typically if an operator drives it off a decline or into a muddy ditch with deep water, but its intermediate size and powerful treads allow it to fit through most of the narrow passageways of Afghan compounds, and the machine comes equipped with robotic arms that can assist in recovery from a ditch. All the robot requires is a relatively flat surface.

"We can't always have, especially with some of the routes we go on, the benefit of RCP (route-clearance packages): big, huge, professional engineer [equipment] out here," said Alcocer. "So this thing, for just a platoon-sized element, the way you can just cut up and dig through trails for us real fast, it's invaluable. Plus, you can throw on the ammo, the water for a quick resupply. It's great."

"It's a leg saver," chimed in another soldier.

A US Army Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) blimp. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

Air power

Just prior to 3rd Platoon's departure for the reconnaissance patrol on April 9, one of the soldiers swore under his breath. When asked what had bothered him, he pointed up and replied, "Look: the blimp is coming down."

Sure enough, one of the large white Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) blimps that serve as the Americans' most trusted reconnaissance resource was slowly lowering toward the ground. Though the sky was clear, the weather report anticipated difficult storms later in the day, and the blimp, and its all-seeing cameras, was being pulled down as a precaution.

The insurgents are keenly aware of the blimps' powers of observation, and sometimes take shots at them in a bid to remove the US advantage, but with rare success. More often, insurgents attack US and Afghan forces when a blimp is out of commission due to weather or maintenance. Making matters worse on April 9, the two to five attack helicopters that typically circle over Zangabad (usually two Kiowas and one Apache) were also mysteriously absent, possibly due to "red air" (poor flying conditions). The distant roar of an unseen fighter jet maintained some degree of comfort.

In the end, the patrol passed uneventfully. But the soldier's reaction to the loss of air assets and his anticipation of a Taliban attack are indicative of the advantage this advanced technology now affords US troops in the latter stages of the war. In addition to limiting gunfights or complex sneak attacks on US bases, the reconnaissance has proved to be a big advantage in the counter-IED battle.

"To make [the pressure-plate IEDs] work, you need batteries," explained Colonel Michael Getchell, the commander of 4-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and the top US officer in Panjwai. "We [do] see [the batteries] with our metal detectors, but we actually see them with our balloons, because [the insurgents] don't have enough batteries. You can't turn the IED on and leave it on, or your batteries are going to die. So you gotta go back and forth to it. Some will turn them in the late afternoon, so [US forces] don't do night operations, and then turn them off in the morning, so the local population can go to market, go to school. Others will turn them on in the morning and turn them off at night."

US airborne reconnaissance, especially the blimps, enables US personnel to spot insurgents planting or tending the power supply on one of the mines. The ability to identify these locations has given US forces a leg up in the IED tactics race in Panjwai, according to Getchell, at least for now. But as US forces draw back and Afghan soldiers and cops take the lead, it remains unclear whether these significant benefits afforded by US aerial reconnaissance will persist after withdrawal in 2014. In the meantime, US troops continue to provide the overwatch to their Afghan counterparts, in addition to blocking positions, quick reaction help, and helicopter medevac services.

"I'm not pushing with my guys in [western Panjwai]. The Afghan forces are pushing in there," said Getchell. "This is the first fighting season that the ASF (Afghan Security Forces) are going to be not just in the lead but responsible for their success. We are going to be overwatch, let them succeed, let them fail a little bit, let them stumble, but don't let them fall. Because if you let them fall, that can give the enemy some momentum that's hard to reverse."

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula confirmed that a local commander thought to be involved in an attack on the US Embassy in Sana'a was killed in a drone strike last November. The terror group accused a father and son of planting a tracking device on the commander's vehicle that allowed the unmanned US strike aircraft to hunt him down.

In a statement released on jihadist forums on April 18, AQAP announced that Adnan al Qadhi, a commander who operated in the capital of Sana'a, and Sheikh Abu Radwan were killed in a drone strike. The statement was obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Al Qadhi and two of his bodyguards, Rabiee Lahib and Radwan al Hashidi, who appears to be Sheikh Abu Radwan, were first reported killed on Nov. 8, one day after the US launched the airstrike in a village just south of Sana'a [see LWJ report, US drone strike near Yemeni capital kills AQAP commander, 2 fighters].

Al Qadhi is thought to have been involved in the 2008 bombing at the US Embassy in Sana'a, according to Yemeni journalist Nasser Arrabyee. Al Qadhi "was a lieutenant colonel in the Yemeni army before he joined Al Qaeda," Arrabyee reported. He was arrested after the 2008 Embassy bombing, but freed due to his connections with Yemen's top leaders. Al Qadhi's family is from the same village as then President Ali Saleh, and al Qadhi served in a unit under Ali Muhsin, a powerful Yemeni general who helped bring Saleh to power.

AQAP said al Qadhi and Abu Radwan were "martyred by American missile guided by a chip planted on Sheikh Adnan al Qadhi."

"A few days after their martyrdom, Allah enabled the mujahideen to get hold of the spy responsible," AQAP continued.

Video of a father and his young son admitting to planting a "chip" on al Qadhi's vehicle was then shown. The father said that four Yemeni military officers paid him to have his son place the tracking device on al Qadhi.

AQAP then tried and convicted the father in a sharia, or Islamic, court for "the killing of Sheikh Adnan al Qadhi and Sheikh Abu Radwan (may Allah accept them), by exploiting the innocence of his young son Barq and deceiving him to plant two electronic chips on Sheikh Adnan al Qadhi, which guided the American planes to identify his location and kill him with directed missiles."

The Yemeni terror group did not indicate the punishment that would be meted out. However, in the past, AQAP beheaded three "spies" for planting tracking chips to guide US drones to their targets [see LWJ report, AQAP's Ansar al Sharia executes 3 US 'spies'].

Additionally, AQAP announced that the four Yemeni military officers, identified as "Major Gen. Abdallah Hamuud al-Jabry, Major Khalid Ghleis, Major Khali al-'Awbali, and Adjutant Jawwaas," are "wanted for justice." AQAP routinely assassinates Yemeni military and intelligence officials.

The US launched a drone strike against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula today in central Yemen, killing two AQAP operatives. The strike is the third recorded in the country in the past six days.

The remotely piloted Predators or the more deadly Reapers launched several missiles at a compound in the Wadi Abida area of Marib province, Yemeni officials told AFP.

Tribal officials then said that two Yemeni troops and another AQAP fighter were killed during clashes that followed. "A cache of weapons was found at the site" of the strike, according to Reuters.

No senior AQAP operatives or leaders are reported to have been killed in today's strike.

The strike in Marib is the third recorded in Yemen over the past six days. On April 17, US drones struck twice in the Oussab al Ali area, a mountainous region located between the provinces of Damar, Ibb, and Hodeida. An AQAP leader known as Hamed Radman and four fighters are reported to have been killed on April 17.

Over the past 10 months, the US has begun to target AQAP outside of the traditional strongholds of Abyan and Shabwah provinces in the south. Of the 28 strikes against AQAP since the beginning of June 2012 that have been recorded by The Long War Journal, only four have hit AQAP in Abyan and Shabwah. The other 24 strikes have targeted AQAP operatives in the provinces of Aden, Al Baydah, Al Jawf, Hadramout, Marib, Saada, and Sana'a (it is unclear if the April 17 strikes took place in Damar, Ibb, or Hodeida). Of the 18 strikes that were conducted between January 2012 and the end of May, 10 occurred in Abyan and Shabwah.

The US has launched eight drone strikes in Yemen so far this year. In 2012, the US launched 42 drone strikes in Yemen against AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia. The previous year, the US launched 10 drone and air strikes against the al Qaeda affiliate.

Although five senior AQAP operatives were killed in strikes in Yemen in 2012, the group's top leadership cadre remains intact. In January, the Yemeni government claimed that Said al Shihri, the deputy emir of AQAP, died following an attack last fall; AQAP has not confirmed his death, however, and recently released a statement that hinted he may be alive.

The US has targeted both senior AQAP operatives who pose a direct threat to the US, and low-level fighters and local commanders who are battling the Yemeni government. This trend was first identified by The Long War Journal in the spring of 2012 [see LWJ report, US drone strike kills 8 AQAP fighters, from May 10, 2012]. Obama administration officials have claimed, however, that the drones are targeting only those AQAP leaders and operatives who pose a direct threat to the US homeland, and not those fighting AQAP's local insurgency against the Yemeni government.

For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2013.

Vilayat Dagestan, a jihadist group that is part of the Caucasus Emirate, an al Qaeda-linked group operating in the North Caucasus, has issued a statement on the Boston Marathon bombings.

The group released the statement on its main website earlier today, citing "speculation" in the press that one of the bombers "could be affiliated with the mujahideen of the Caucasus Emirate, in particular, the mujahideen of Dagestan." The statement has been translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

The organization's statement references Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of two brothers responsible for the bombings, who reportedly traveled to Dagestan and Chechnya last year.

Vilayat Dagestan does not deny any connection to Tsarnaev, nor does it say that he was known to them prior to the bombings. Instead, the group says that it is "at war with Russia" and "not fighting against the United States of America."

Moreover, Vilayat Dagestan says that if the US government is "really interested in discovering the true organizers of the explosions in Boston, without being complicit in a Russian show, they should focus on the involvement of the Russian special services in the event."

US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal say that a number of jihadist groups based in the Caucasus and Chechnya are being investigated. However, the investigation is still in its earliest stages and it is not yet known whether any of them played a role, directly or indirectly, in the Boston bombings.

It is far too early to draw any firm conclusions one way or the other, these officials say.

According to NBC 4 New York, Tamerlan Tsarnaev left New York for Russia on Jan. 12, 2012 and returned on July 17.

Subsequent reports indicate that Tsarnaev traveled to Dagestan and Chechnya during those months and it is this trip that has drawn suspicion.

In August 2012, one month after returning to the United States, Tsarnaev posted a page on YouTube. Videos disseminated by Vilayat Dagestan were among the jihadist propaganda and messages posted by Tsarnaev.

By itself, of course, this does not mean that Tsarnaev became associated with the group during his 2012 trip to Dagestan. US intelligence and counterterrorism officials are currently attempting to build a dossier of Tsarnaev's overseas connections, including any possible ties to Vilayat Dagestan, according to authorities contacted by The Long War Journal.

Warning from Russian government

Vilayat Dagestan's attempt to blame the "Russian special services" for the Boston bombings is inconsistent with the available evidence on Tamerlan Tsarnaev's sympathies and ideology.

In early 2011, the Russian government warned the FBI about Tsarnaev's suspected ties to Chechen terrorists. The FBI issued a statement concerning this warning late last week.

The FBI said it was informed by a "foreign government" that Tsarnaev "was a follower of radical Islam and a strong believer, and that he had changed drastically since 2010 as he prepared to leave the United States for travel to the country's region to join unspecified underground groups." This government requested additional information from the FBI on Tsarnaev.

The FBI added that its review of the available evidence at the time "did not find any terrorism activity, domestic or foreign, and those results were provided to the foreign government in the summer of 2011." The statement concludes: "The FBI requested but did not receive more specific or additional information from the foreign government."

The Washington Post and other press outlets have reported that the warning "came from the Russian government," which was "concerned about Tsarnaev's potential ties to Chechen terrorists."

It is not known if the Russian government had any specific information tying Tsarnaev to terrorists.

The evidence that has come to light since the Boston bombings shows that Tsarnaev was at least sympathetic to the jihadists' anti-Russian cause. It is not known if there was more to the sympathies.

In its statement on the Boston bombings, Vilayat Dagestan says that "by the order Doku Umarov, the Emir of the Caucasus, it is prohibited to carry out strikes on civilian targets." But terrorists acting under Umarov's orders have struck civilian targets repeatedly in the past.

The United Nations reports, for instance, that Umarov was one of the "main organizers" of the deadly Beslan school siege in early September 2004 and the attacks on Moscow metro stations in March 2010.

At this point, the inquiry into Tamerlan Tsarnaev's background and activities is wide open. The possibility that he made contact with any one of several groups remains under investigation. It is also possible that he had no substantive ties to these jihadist organizations.

Abu Ubaydah Abdullah al Adam, a senior al Qaeda leader who serves as the intelligence chief for the terror group, is reported to have been killed in a recent US drone strike in Pakistan's tribal areas. The report is unconfirmed, and al Qaeda has not issued an official statement regarding al Adam.

Two jihadists, identified as Al Wathiq Billah and Barod, posted on Twitter on April 20 that al Adam was killed in a US drone strike in North Waziristan, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which obtained the tweets. Barod "indicated he was killed that day," according to SITE.

No drone strikes were reported in Pakistan on April 20, but an attack was reported on April 17 in South Waziristan. The last US drone strike reported in North Waziristan took place on April 14 in the Datta Khel area, which is a known haven for al Qaeda's top leaders. Several senior al Qaeda leaders and military commanders have been killed in drone strikes in the Datta Khel area.

The two jihadists' claims that al Adam was killed in a drone strike are not official confirmation that he is indeed dead. Al Qaeda has not released an official martyrdom statement announcing his death.

US intelligence officials involved in the targeting of al Qaeda's network in the Afghan and Pakistan region who were contacted by The Long War Journal would neither confirm nor deny the reports of his death, but said they are aware of the reports.

One intelligence official said that al Adam "is on the target list" and is considered to be a "very dangerous operative."

"He is essentially al Qaeda's intelligence and internal security chief," the US intelligence official said. He "appears to have replaced" Mohammad Khalil Hasan al Hakaymah, who is better known as Abu Jihad al Masri, the former al Qaeda intelligence chief who was killed in a US drone strike in 2008.

Several US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal refute the steady stream of press reports that al Qaeda's leadership is "shattered" and "broken."

"While [al Adam] is not a household name, he is in the top tiers of al Qaeda's leadership cadre," one official said. "He demonstrates that al Qaeda continues to field a deep bench of leaders and operatives who can be called when their predecessors are taken out."

In the Afghan-Pakistan theater, al Qaeda has often tapped the plethora of allied Pakistani jihadist groups to fill leadership voids caused when US drones kill off what one US official has described as al Qaeda's "legacy leaders," the leaders with several decades of experience working inside al Qaeda. Additionally, there are numerous leaders and operatives like al Adam who may not be "famous" like other al Qaeda leaders but who still play a critical role in the organization.

Al Adam served in al Qaeda prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 attack on the US, and is linked to some of al Qaeda's most notorious leaders.

A US intelligence official said that al Adam had worked for Abu Zubaydah (senior al Qaeda leader and operations chief, captured in Pakistan in 2002); Abu Hamza Rabia (external operations chief, killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan in 2005); and Atiyah Abd al Rahman (general manager, killed in a US drone strike in 2011).

In an article in Vanguards of the Khorasan, al Adam claimed he had served with Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the former emir of al Qaeda in Iraq, long before he opened a front against the US in Iraq in 2003. Al Adam said he had befriended Zarqawi at an al Qaeda training camp in Jalalabad in Nangarhar, well before the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001. He also claimed he had hosted Ayman al Zawahiri at his home in Afghanistan sometime in the 1990s. While al Adam's claims may seem fanciful, his account was published by Vanguards of the Khorasan, which is al Qaeda's official magazine intended for internal use.

Al Adam is a Palestinian and was raised in Saudi Arabia.

The writings and speeches of al Adam

Al Qaeda has released on several jihadist forums numerous statements, writings, and audiotapes of al Adam that focused primarily on security and intelligence issues as well as the Arab Spring. Additionally he has published martyrdom statements and articles at Islamic Turkistan Magazine, a magazine produced by the al Qaeda-linked Turkistan Islamic Party.

Writing under the name Abu Ubaydah al Maqdisi, al Adam appeared in the introductory issue of Vanguards of the Khorasan, published in November 2005. In that edition he published a martyrdom statement. He also wrote martyrdom statements in the 3rd, 7th, 9th, 13th, and 19th editions of Vanguards of the Khorasan. In the 7th and 9th editions, he eulogized Zarqawi and Rabia, respectively. In the 19th edition, published on Sept. 12, 2012, al Adam wrote about Osama bin Laden's legacy and the Arab Spring.

In 2008, a lengthy book titled "Martyrs in a Time of Alienation" was published by al Adam under the name Abu Ubaydah al Maqdisi. The book provides biographies of 120 al Qaeda fighters killed during fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Among those listed are Zakariya al Sabbar, a member of the Hamburg Cell that furnished several key hijackers and leaders for the Sept. 11, 2001 attack, and Abu Hamza Rabia.

In 2010, al Adam released a series of audiotapes titled "The Terrorism Industry" that advised jihadists on security and intelligence issues. In the tapes, he recommended that jihadists take hostages for ransom, and noated that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Afghan Taliban have been very successful doing this. He also said that jihadists must be prepared to kill hostages if there is a risk they will be lost. He also urged jihadists to conduct attacks on the US and the United Kingdom.

In one of the tapes, al Adam noted that he was a lieutenant to Abu Zubaydah, who had charged him with maintaining al Qaeda's relationship with tribesmen in Pakistan's tribal areas. Al Adam distributed al Qaeda funds to Pakistani tribesmen to win their support. Al Adam said that he had traveled with Abu Zubaydah to Pakistan following the overthrow of the Taliban after the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.

Al Adam also provided advice to al Qaeda affiliates on how to maintain relationships with local tribes and clans in areas where the affiliates hope to impose sharia, or Islamic law. In July 2012, he wrote "Awakening Councils of Apostasy and the Means to Stop it" to address the rise in local opposition to al Qaeda and jihadist movements. His practical advice included: respecting the local religion and customs; imposing sharia in phases as opposed to quickly and ruthlessly (as al Qaeda has done in Iraq and Mali); refraining from excessively taxing the locals; and, at times, showing mercy to those being punished.

In August 2012, al Adam waded into the sectarian aspect of the Syrian civil war when he advised Sunnis to execute Alawites, a Shia minority sect that supports President Bashir al Assad.

"For true Muslims this combating sect that is protected by arms and power can only be met with the sword alone," al Adam said in a statement that was released on the Ansar al Mujahideen Network and obtained by The Long War Journal. "Therefore, dear Sunni Muslim brother, do not consult anyone about killing Alawites and looting their properties; it is a right and a duty to defend the repressed Sunnis in the land ...."

Shortly afterward he issued another article clarifying that statement, saying that only Alawites responsible for killing Sunnis should be killed. But he then said, "Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of this infidel sect is currently fighting Muslims."

In January 2012, al Adam released a book titled "The Worthy Outcomes and Gains of Washington and Manhattan Raids" under the name Abu Ubaydah al Maqdisi. The book's introduction was written by Mustafa Abu Yazid, al Qaeda's former general manager who was killed in a US drone strike in 2010.

In that book al Adam called the suicide bomber "the Islamic deterrent weapon" and "a strategic option for deterring the transgressors." He then noted that after the Sept. 11 attacks on the US, the use of suicide bombers proliferated in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Al Adam's last known public statement was released in February 2013, and titled 'Message to the New Jihadists."

In that statement, which was obtained by The Long War Journal, he said that al Qaeda is fighting "primarily an intelligence security war."

"Its victor is who scores strategic hits against the vital key structures of the other party," he continues. He then advises "the newcomer, to the jihadist fronts scattered all over the world," to practice basic fieldcraft. He says that new jihadists must: maintain secrecy and tell no one of their intent; ensure that they have proper security when entering new battlefields; rely on established smuggling routes to enter new countries but remember that smugglers often work with government forces; and avoid communications with relatives while in countries where waging jihad or while in neighboring countries.

In addition to his publications in al Qaeda's official media outlets, al Adam has written written at least five articles for Islamic Turkistan Magazine, the official magazine of the al Qaeda-linked Turkistan Islamic Party, which is based in Pakistan's tribal areas and also wages jihad in Afghanistan. He issued biographies for slain fighters in the August 2011 edition and the April and June 2012 editions, as well as an article on the Pakistani military in the August 2011 edition and the importance of unity in the April 2012 edition.

Coalition and Afghan special operations teams killed a senior Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader who coordinated operations with the Taliban and directed suicide operations in Balkh province. The raid that targeted the IMU leader is the 20th reported by ISAF against the al Qaeda-linked group so far this year.

The IMU leader who was killed during the April 20 raid in the Balkh district in the province of the same name was identified as Feda Mohammad, the International Security Assistance Force noted yesterday in a press release.

ISAF said that Mohammed, who is also known as Omari, has "a long history of planning attacks against civilians and Afghan and coalition forces."

"Prior to Afghan New Year's celebrations in March, Mohammad coordinated a failed attack against public gatherings, specifically targeting the Balkh provincial governor and other government officials with suicide bombers," ISAF said.

The IMU leader also executed "coordinated operations between IMU and Taliban networks, and has extensive experience facilitating the movement of improvised explosive devices throughout the area," ISAF said in a press release that first announced the raid on Saturday.

The IMU has integrated its operations with the Taliban in the Afghan north and maintains its base of support across the border in Pakistan. IMU leaders have served in the Taliban's shadow government in the north.

The IMU remains entrenched in northern Afghanistan despite years of persistent operations against the terror group. Several senior IMU leaders, including two of the terror group's top commanders for Afghanistan, have been killed since ISAF stepped up operations against the terror group in the summer of 2010.

The IMU also operates in eastern Afghanistan, but so far this year, all of the raids against the group have occurred in the north. Based on a study by The Long War Journal, this year the majority of operations targeting the IMU have occurred in neighboring Baghlan and Kunduz provinces (six each), while four have occurred in Takhar, and two in Balkh, and one in Jawzjan.

Early 2013 has seen the highest rate of operations against the IMU so far in the war. Last week there were six raids, which resulted in the death of Mohammed, and the capture of one senior IMU commander and two facilitators. When asked about the increase in operations, ISAF told The Long War Journal that the start of the Afghan fighting season and intelligence gains were the cause.

A screen shot of the header of Chiheb Esseghaier's Linkedin page, which includes an image of al Qaeda's banner. The image has since been removed. Source: Linkedin/The Long War Journal.

Canadian police officials have linked the plotting of two Muslim men to destroy a Toronto passenger train to al Qaeda's network inside Iran. The two suspects, neither of whom are Canadian citizens, were taken into custody yesterday and are facing terrorism charges. One of the suspects had placed an image of al Qaeda's banner in a social media site. The image has since been removed.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Assistant Commissioner James Malizia said yesterday that the two suspects, identified as Chiheb Esseghaier, of Montreal, and Raed Jaser, of Toronto, received "support from al Qaeda elements located in Iran" in the form of "direction and guidance." Their plot called for the destruction of a train bound from the US to Canada, in an effort to sow terror and harm the economies of both countries.

Esseghaier, a doctoral student at the Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique, has a bachelors degree in Industrial Biology and a masters degree in Industrial Biotechnology, according to his Linkedin page. He lists Nanotechnology as one of his "Skills & Expertise." He attended college in Tunis and is thought to be a Tunisian.

Before the image was taken down sometime last night, Esseghaier's Linkedin page displayed in image of al Qaeda's black flag. This flag was first used by al Qaeda in Iraq but has been adopted by other al Qaeda affiliates.

Iran denies links to al Qaeda, but links are well established

Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's Foreign Minister, said the claims of the Canadian police linking the plotters to al Qaeda in Iran were "ridiculous."

"If the news that you are announcing is true, this is the most hilarious thing I've heard in my 64 year [sic]," Salehi said, according to the Iranian Students' News Agency.

He also described al Qaeda in Iran as "a new fake issue and a really ridiculous word."

Iran's ties to al Qaeda are well documented, however. In recent years, the US government has added several Iran-based al Qaeda leaders and operatives to its list of specially designated global terrorists, and even noted a "secret deal" between the Iranian government and al Qaeda.

In January 2009, the Treasury Department designated senior al Qaeda members operating in Iran. The January 2009 designation included Mustafa Hamid, the father-in-law of top al Qaeda operative Saif al Adel; Saad bin Laden, one of Osama's sons, who was later killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan; Muhammad Rab'a al Sayid Al Bahtiyti; and Ali Saleh Husain.

Treasury described Hamid as "a senior al Qaeda associate who served as a primary interlocutor between al Qaeda and the Government of Iran." During the 1990s, Hamid "reportedly negotiated a secret relationship between Osama Bin Laden and Iran, allowing many al Qaeda members safe transit through Iran to Afghanistan." Hamid also "passed communications between Osama bin Laden and the Government of Iran." In late 2001, Hamid negotiated with the Iranians to relocate al Qaeda families to Iranian soil. Saif al Adel, Hamid's son-in-law, was among them. Al Adel has been wanted since late 1998 for his involvement in al Qaeda's embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

According to the 2009 designation, Saad bin Laden "facilitated the travel of Osama bin Laden's family members from Afghanistan to Iran" beginning in late 2001. He also "made key decisions for al Qaeda and was part of a small group of al Qaeda members that was involved in managing the terrorist organization from Iran."

In July 2011, the Treasury Dept. designated an al Qaeda leader known as Yasin al Suri along with five other terrorists who operate from Iranian soil to move funds and recruits from Iran's neighboring Gulf countries to South Asia and elsewhere. Al Suri's network assists not only senior al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, but also al Qaeda in Iraq.

The Treasury Dept. said that al Suri's network operates as part of a "secret deal" between al Qaeda and the Iranian government. In December 2011, US authorities announced a $10 million reward for information leading to al Suri's capture.

Also included in the July 2011 designation was Atiyah Abd al Rahman, who commanded al Qaeda in northern Pakistan. Rahman was killed one month later, in a US drone strike in August 2011. The Treasury Dept. noted that he "was previously appointed by Osama bin Laden to serve as al Qaeda's emissary in Iran, a position which allowed him to travel in and out of Iran with the permission of Iranian officials." Rahman had received safe haven inside Iran after the Sept. 11 attacks.

In February 2012, the Treasury Dept. designated the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) "for its support to terrorist groups." Al Qaeda and its affiliate, al Qaeda in Iraq, are among the terrorist groups supported by the MOIS, which is Iran's chief intelligence agency.

"Today we have designated the MOIS for abusing the basic human rights of Iranian citizens and exporting its vicious practices to support the Syrian regime's abhorrent crackdown on its own population," Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen explained in a press release. "In addition, we are designating the MOIS for its support to terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, al Qaeda in Iraq, Hizballah and HAMAS, again exposing the extent of Iran's sponsorship of terrorism as a matter of Iranian state policy."

The MOIS is assisting al Qaeda in a variety of ways. According to Treasury, the "MOIS has facilitated the movement of al Qaeda operatives in Iran and provided them with documents, identification cards, and passports."

In addition, the MOIS has "provided money and weapons to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)...and negotiated prisoner releases of AQI operatives."

Iran also supports the Taliban

Treasury has also noted Iran's support for the Taliban, as in August 2010 it added two top Iranian Qods Force commanders to its list of specially designated global terrorists, for directly providing support for the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan.

General Hossein Musavi is the commander of Qods Force's Ansar Corps, "whose responsibilities include IRGC-QF activities in Afghanistan," the Treasury stated. "As Ansar Corps Commander, Musavi has provided financial and material support to the Taliban." Colonel Hasan Mortezavi is described as a senior Qods Force officer who "provides financial and material support to the Taliban."

Qods Forces' Ansar Corps is the command that is assigned to direct operations in Afghanistan. The Ansar Corps is based in Mashad in northeastern Iran. Al Qaeda is known to facilitate travel for its operatives moving into Afghanistan from Mashad, and also uses the eastern cities of Tayyebat and Zahedan to move its operatives into Afghanistan [see LWJ report, Return to Jihad].

Iran's support for the Taliban can be seen in Coalition and Afghan military operations against the Afghan terror group. Coalition and Afghan forces targeted Iranian-supported Taliban commanders in at least 14 raids in western Afghanistan between June 2009 and February 2011, according to Coalition press releases compiled by The Long War Journal. ISAF inexplicably stopped reporting on raids against Iranian-supported Taliban commanders in early February 2011; LWJ's queries to ISAF on this subject have gone unanswered [see LWJ report, Taliban suicide assault team kills 36 Afghans in western city].

The Turkistan Islamic Party, an al Qaeda-affiliated terror group, has released a video that shows young children firing weapons while at a training camp in Pakistan.

The video was released by Islami Awazi, a propaganda arm of the Turkistan Islamic Party. A clip of the video was published on the LiveLeak video website.

In the video, the children, some of whom appear to be no older than six, are shown firing handguns, AK-47 assault rifles, and a PKM machine-gun from various positions. At one point, 13 children are seen on line, firing AK-47s while standing and lying down.

As the children fire their weapons, the black flag of the Taliban and a light blue banner used by the Turkistan Islamic Party can be seen flying in the background.

The video is similar to others released by allied jihadist groups such as the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, the Islamic Jihad Group, and a jihadist alliance called the Fedayeen-i-Islam. All of these groups are known to run camps in North and South Waziristan that train children.

The Turkistan Islamic Party operates in China as well as Central and South Asia and is thought to have scores of fighters in Pakistan's tribal areas and in Afghanistan. TIP fighters have been killed by Coalition forces in Afghanistan and by US drone strikes in Pakistan. Abu Ubaydah Abdullah al Adam, a senior al Qaeda leader who serves as the terror group's intelligence chief, has written several biographies for TIP fighters killed in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The group's leaders also hold senior positions in al Qaeda. Abdul Haq al Turkistani, the slain former leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party, was a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. And Abdul Shakoor al Turkistani, who was rumored to have been killed in a drone strike last year, is also thought to have been appointed to the Shura Majlis, in addition to being designated commander of al Qaeda forces in the tribal areas.

Prior to the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Abdul Haq ran a training camp for his recruits at al Qaeda's camp in Tora Bora in Afghanistan's Nangarhar province [see LWJ report, The Uighurs in their own words]. He later reestablished camps for the Turkistan Islamic Party in Pakistan's lawless, Taliban-controlled tribal areas. Twenty-two Turkistan Islamic Party operatives were ultimately captured and detained at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility; since then, 17 of them have been released or transferred to allied governments, and five have been approved for release but have refused resettlement in volunteer countries.