This image released on Dec. 25, 2012 by Sahara Media shows Abdel Mejid Abou Zeid, a top al Qaeda leader who served as the deputy to Yahya Abu Hammam, the head of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's operations in the Sahel region of North Africa.

French President François Hollande issued a statement confirming the death of Abdel Mejid Abou Zeid, a top al Qaeda commander who served as the deputy to Yahya Abu Hammam, the head of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's operations in the Sahel region of North Africa.

Abou Zeid was killed "during combat led by the French military in the Ifoghas Mountains in northern Mali at the end of February," Hollande said in a statement today, according to France24. Hollande described Abou Zeid's death as "a milestone in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel."

Terrorists from AQIM, Ansar Dine, and the Movement for the Oneness and Jihad in West Africa fled to the Ifoghas Mountains after being pushed out of the towns in northern Mali by French troops in an operation that began in January. French and Chadian forces have pursued the al Qaeda-linked groups in the Ifoghas Mountains; Chadian forces have suffered significant casualties during heavy fighting. France was forced to intervene in Mali after the jihadist alliance launched an offensive into central Mali and advanced on the capital, Bamako, in the south.

It is unclear how France confirmed Abou Zeid's death. It was reported that a DNA test was being run to identify whether the corpse thought to have been Abou Zeid's was indeed his. AQIM has not released a statement to confirm or deny Abou Zeid's death.

Before his death, Abou Zeid commanded the Taregh Ibn Ziyad brigade, an AQIM military unit which operates throughout Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and southern Algeria. He was the top deputy of Yahya Abu Hammam, a wanted AQIM commander. Zeid's brigade is responsible for the beheading of the British hostage Edwin Dyer in May 2009. Algerians, Mauritanians, Malians, and Moroccans are known to fight with both Hammam and Zeid.

The status of Mokhtar Belmokhtar is still unclear. Chad's president claimed that Belmokhtar was killed in late February, but he may have been confused with Abou Zeid. Belmokhtar is the commander of the al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam, or Those who sign with Blood Brigade, which led the bloody terrorist assault against the In Amenas gas facility in southeastern Algeria in mid-January. Belmokhtar split with AQIM in December, but, according to his spokesman, still maintains communications with Ayman al Zawahiri and fights alongside AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine.

For more more information, see Long War Journal and Threat Matrix reports:

Conflicting accounts emerge over AQIM leader's reported death
Confusion reigns in confirming deaths of senior AQIM leaders in Mali
Chadian forces claim raid killed top Algerian jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar
Belmokhtar claims Algerian raid, slaying of hostages for al Qaeda
US adds senior AQIM commander to terrorist list
Analysis: Al Qaeda central tightened control over hostage operations

A suicide bomber killed 22 people, including 17 Pakistan paramilitary soldiers, in an attack yesterday in the main town of Miramshah in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.

The suicide bomber rammed a water tanker packed with explosives into a checkpoint manned by the Tochi Scouts of the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary formation that operates in northwestern Pakistan, according to Geo News. The Inter-Services Public Relations, the military's public affairs branch, confirmed that "17 security forces personnel embraced shahadat (martyrdom)" in the attack.

The checkpoint was close to a mosque as well as buildings that housed the Frontier Works Organization, a construction and engineering arm of the Pakistani Army, Dawn reported.

No group has claimed credit for the attack. The Miramshah area is controlled by both the Haqqani Network and Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the top Taliban commander in North Waziristan. A host of allied terror groups such as al Qaeda, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and the "Punjabi Taliban," a conglomerate of Punjabi jihadists from groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-a-Jhangvi, operate in Miramshah.

Bahadar and the Haqqani Network maintain a truce with the Pakistani military and the government, but attacks against security forces and government officials are common. In January, four soldiers were wounded in an IED attack in the Mir Ali area.

Although the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan is blamed for most of the attacks in North Waziristan, Bahadar's forces and those of the Haqqani Network have broken the truce and attacked Pakistani forces in the past. Pakistan refuses to conduct an operation to clear the area of the Haqqanis' and Bahadar's forces, despite the fact that they are in violation of the truce by attacking security forces, sheltering al Qaeda and the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, running a parallel administration to govern the remote tribal agency, and launching attacks against NATO and Afghan forces across the border in Afghanistan.

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The Al Nusrah Front, which is al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, and allied rebel groups overran a military base and several checkpoints in southern Syria. The victories put the Al Nusrah Front in control of an area that borders both Israel's Golan Heights and Jordan.

A group of fighters led by the Al Nusrah Front overran "air defense Base 38 near the town of Saida, on the road linking Damascus to Amman," after laying siege to the base for 16 days, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported yesterday. A senior Syrian officer was among several soldiers killed during the raid. A graphic video of the officer, who was shot in the face, was shown on YouTube.

Earlier in the week, "fighters loyal to Al Nusrah Front, Al Yarmuk Brigade, Al Mutaz Billah Brigade and others took control of Al Rai military checkpoint," east of the town of Sahem al Golan in Dara'a province," the Observatory reported.

"The fighters seized the site after regime forces retreated. The 25-kilometer area located between the towns of Muzrib (near the Jordanian border) and Abdin (in the Golan) is now out of regime control."

The Al Nusrah Front and the Al Yarmuk Brigade also took control of military checkpoints in Jelin and al-Elan in Dara'a "after violent clashes and siege that lasted several days," the Observatory reported. "Many regular soldiers were killed, the rebels have taken over several pieces of military equipment, weapons and ammunition."

The Al Nusrah Front, which is estimated to have more than 10,000 fighters and often serves as the vanguard for rebel military operations throughout the country, has overrun several major military bases throughout Syria. Additionally, the Al Nusrah Front controls much of western Syria, including the provincial capital of Raqqah and a major dam on the Euphrates River.

In Dara'a, Al Nusrah is commanded by Iyad al Tubasi and Mustafa Abd al Latif Salih. Al Tubasi, who is also known as Abu Julaybib, is the brother-in-law of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the former leader of al Qaeda in Iraq who was killed in 2006. Salih, who is also known as Abu Anas al Sahhaba, also accompanied Zarqawi in Iraq and served as a recruiter for the terror group. Both commanders were reported to have been killed earlier this year, but Al Nusrah released a statement denying the reports of their deaths.

The Nusrah Front has been active in Daraa, and has claimed five suicide attacks in the town since the end of June.

Adnan Rasheed (unmasked) is pictured with members of his "death squad." Image from the SITE Intelligence Group.

A Pakistani jihadist who escaped from prison during a Taliban jailbreak last spring appeared in a video in which he threatened to assassinate Pervez Musharraf, the former President of Pakistan who has recently returned from self-imposed exile. The jihadist, Adnan Rasheed, said he formed an assassination team and plans to attack Musharraf.

Rasheed appears on a video with Ihsanullah Ihsan, the spokesman for the Movement of the Taliban Pakistan, who is wanted by the Pakistan government. The video was produced by Umar Studio, the media arm of the Movement of the Taliban Pakistan, and obtained from a Facebook page by the SITE Intelligence Group.

In the video, Rasheed, who speaks in both English and Urdu, is shown training a group of fighters who have supposedly been assigned to assassinate Musharraf.

Rasheed says the "death squad" is split up in groups of "fedayeen, sniper team, special assault team, and close combat team." The term 'fedayeen' is often used to describe suicide bombers.

"Musharraf, you can see this death squad around me. We warn you to surrender yourself to us, otherwise we will hit you from where you will never reckon," Rashid says in English while surrounded by his team.

Rasheed issues the threat to Musharraf as he is surrounded by his "death squad." Fifteen men wearing masks and military uniforms are seen armed with RPGs, sniper rifles, and assault rifles.

Musharraf returned to Pakistan yesterday and said he is seeking to return to politics. He left Pakistan in April 2009 after resigning the presidency in August 2008. Pakistan's Supreme Court was planning impeachment hearings just before Musharraf resigned. Upon his return, Musharraf was photographed with a protective vest that is visible underneath his clothing.

Rasheed is a longtime jihadist associated with al Qaeda

Rasheed has a history with Musharraf. He is a Pakistani terrorist who was involved in the Dec. 14, 2003 assassination attempt against then-President Pervez Musharraf. A member of the Pakistani Air Force, Rasheed was sentenced to death for his role in the assassination attempt. While in prison, Rasheed owned several cell phones and frequently communicated with journalists. He also got married while in prison and fathered a child.

Rasheed worked for Amjad Farooqi, the Pakistani terrorist who engineered the two assassination attempts against Musharraf in December 2003 at the behest of al Qaeda leader Abu Faraj al Libi; Farooqi is suspected of involvement in other terror attacks as well. Farooqi was a member of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan; the Harkat-ul-Ansar and its successor, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen; Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami; and Jaish-e-Mohammed. He served as a close aide to Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the leader of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. In addition, Farooqi served as the group's representative to al Qaeda's International Islamic Front, which issued the 1998 fatwa that declared war on the US.

On April 15, 2012, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan launched a successful operation to free Rasheed and nearly 400 prisoners, including an estimated 200 Taliban fighters and jihadists, being held at a prison in Bannu. The operation was directed by Hakeemullah Mehsud, the emir of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Waliur Rehman Mehsud, the group's emir for South Waziristan. More than 150 fighters assaulted the prison. Rasheed was later featured in a videotape celebrating the jailbreak.

Since Rasheed has been freed from prison, the Taliban have featured him in several propaganda tapes. Most recently, on Jan. 29, Rasheed appeared in a joint Taliban and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan video that announced the formation of of the Ansar al Aseer, a unit tasked to free jihadist prisoners and support their families. The video also featured Yassin Chouka, a wanted German commander in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; and Abdul Hakeem, a Russian IMU member.

A Taliban suicide assault team killed five Afghan policemen in an attack on a police headquarters in the eastern province of Nangarhar today. The Taliban claimed credit for the attack.

The suicide assault team targeted the Quick Reaction Force headquarters in the provincial capital of Jalalabad early in the morning. The attack began as a suicide bomber, identified by the Taliban as "Naqibullah," rammed a vehicle packed with explosives into the main gate of the QRF headquarters. The blast breached the gate and allowed seven other heavily armed Taliban fighters to enter the compound. The Taliban fighters were said to be "wearing uniforms similar to those worn by the US-led NATO Coalition," according to TOLONews.

Three of the Taliban fighters are said to have detonated their vests, while the other four engaged the police for more than an hour before being killed in the firefight. Eight Taliban fighters and five policemen were killed, and seven civilians were wounded during the attack.

The Taliban took credit for the attack on their website, Voice of Jihad, and claimed that 40 "puppet" Afghan security personnel and 15 ISAF soldiers were killed. ISAF has not reported any casualties. The Taliban, who routinely inflate the casualties of NATO and Afghan forces killed or wounded in their operations, often refer to Afghans who work with the Coalition as "puppets."

The Taliban routinely carry out suicide assaults, or "storming operations," on ISAF and Afghan bases. The last such attack in Nangarhar took place on Dec. 2, 2012, when a suicide assault team wearing US military uniforms attacked Forward Operating Base Fenty, a large airbase in the province. Nine Taliban fighters, three Afghan security guards, and four civilians were killed in the attack.

Taliban leadership in eastern Afghanistan

The Peshawar Regional Military Shura, one of the Afghan Taliban's four major commands, directs activities in the eastern Afghan provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman, Nuristan, and Kunar, as well as in northern Afghanistan. Sheikh Mohammed Aminullah is thought to currently lead the Peshawar Shura. Aminullah, who is also known as Fazeel-a-Tul Shaykh Abu Mohammed Ameen al Peshwari, replaced Abdul Latif Mansur sometime in early 2011.

Aminullah is closely tied to al Qaeda. According to the United Nations Sanctions Committee, which added Aminullah to its list in 2009, he runs the Ganj Madrassa, or religious school, which he has used to recruit and provide support for al Qaeda. Aminullah has also furnished suicide vests to al Qaeda and Taliban suicide bombers, and paid the families of the terror groups' so-called martyrs.

Three of the Taliban's four regional councils are now run by leaders who are closely linked to al Qaeda [for more information on the Taliban's Quetta and regional shuras, see LWJ report, The Afghan Taliban's top leaders].

A Taliban group known as the Tora Bora Military Front operates in Nangarhar and has been behind a series of deadly attacks in the province. The Tora Bora Military Front is led by Anwarul Haq Mujahid, the son of Maulvi Mohammed Yunis Khalis. The father was leader of the Hizb-i-Islami Khalis, and was instrumental in welcoming Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan after al Qaeda was ejected from Sudan in 1996. Coalition special operations forces targeted Hizb-i-Islami Khalis leaders in Nangarhar at least two times in 2011.

Pakistan detained Mujahid in Peshawar in June 2009. Prior to his detention, Muhajid served as the Taliban's shadow governor of Nangarhar.

Mujahid was inexplicably released from Pakistani custody last year. On Feb. 8, 2011, Mujahid spoke at the funeral of Awal Gul, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee who was captured by US forces in 2002 and died at the facility of natural causes on Feb. 1, 2011. Gul was a Taliban commander in Nangarhar province who had allegedly been entrusted by Osama bin Laden with $100,000 to aid al Qaeda operatives fleeing Afghanistan to Pakistan in late 2001. [See LWJ report, Tora Bora Military Front commander speaks at funeral of former Gitmo detainee.]

Nangarhar is a strategic province for both the Taliban and the Coalition. The province borders the Pakistani tribal agency of Khyber, where the Lashkar-e-Islam and the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan are active. The majority of NATO's supplies pass through Khyber and Nangarhar before reaching Kabul and points beyond.

Sources:

8 bombers, 5 police killed in Jalalabad attack, Pajhwok Afghan News
Militants attacked police headqarter in Jalalabad, Khaama
Suicide Bombers Attack Nangarhar Police HQ, Killing 5, TOLONews
Jalalabad clashes ended with all 8 bombers killed, Ariana News
Martyr attack hits enemy headquarter in Jalalabad city; 55 Nato-puppet cowardly troops killed, Voice of Jihad

On the same day that Tunisia's prime minister accused Abu Iyad al Tunisi of being "deeply involved" in violence and arms trafficking, Ansar al Sharia Tunisia released this message from its leader threatening the Ennahda government.

In an interview published by Le Monde on March 26, Tunisian prime minister Ali Larayedh reiterated his criticisms of the Salafi jihadists who have grown stronger throughout his country. Ali Larayedh accused Ansar al Sharia and its leader Seifallah Ben Hassine (a.k.a. Abu Iyad al Tunisi), in particular, of spreading violence. "Abu Iyad is deeply involved in issues of violence and arms trafficking," Larayedh claimed.

Authorities tried to arrest Abu Iyad after the Sept. 14 assault on the US Embassy in Tunis, which he is accused of orchestrating, Larayedh explained. But the Ansar al Sharia leader was surrounded by supporters and bystanders at the Al Fatah mosque in Tunis, making it impossible to arrest him easily. Larayedh claimed that Abu Iyad "fled in disguise."

Within hours of Le Monde's interview being published online, Ansar al Sharia Tunisia's official Facebook page noted the prime minister's comments with disapproval. The group also posted a short message from Abu Iyad that is addressed as an "Urgent Letter to the Wise [Men] of Ennahda."

Abu Iyad first cites a Quranic verse that reads, "Those unto whom men said: Lo! the people have gathered against you, therefore fear them. But (The threat of danger) increased the faith of them and they cried: Allah is Sufficient for us! Most Excellent is He in Whom we trust!"

Directing his ire at Ennahda's leadership, Abu Iyad then warns, "To your wise men we say: Keep your sick [or diseased] ones from us, or we will direct our war against them until their downfall and their meeting with the dustbin of history... Know that we will not delay in saying that the answer is what you see, not what you hear... If you do not rectify your situation."

Abu Iyad's letter can be interpreted as a thinly-veiled condemnation of Ali Larayedh and other Ennahda leaders whom Ansar al Sharia Tunisia finds to be insufficiently pure. Furthermore, Abu Iyad seems to be asking Ennahda's "wise men" to purge its ranks.

Another Facebook page named the Talaba Revolution also posted a link to Larayedh's Le Monde interview along with a picture portraying the prime minister as a vampire. The Talaba Revolution Facebook site is not officially part of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia's online propaganda network, but it does regularly post the group's messages and clearly supports Abu Iyad's agenda.

The Talaba Revolution Facebook page posted a link to Larayedh's Le Monde interview along with this image portraying him as a vampire.

Ansar al Sharia Tunisia has previously denounced the prime minister. On its Facebook page earlier this year, the organization posted a video of a television interview with Larayedh shortly after he was charged with forming a new cabinet. "I say it clearly that if the security of the Tunisians today and tomorrow requires detaining [individuals], I will not hesitate," Larayedh said in the video.

Ansar al Sharia took this as a threat and issued a response to Larayedh that read, "And we repeat what Sheikh Abu Iyad, may God protect him, has already said to you: 'Stick to your home and your room, and know your level. I swear by God that even though we do not have material force, our power is derived from God, the Lord of all creation. I swear if you do not learn a lesson from the escaping tyrant [a reference to deposed Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali] you will be made a lesson too, just like him.'"

An "inevitable confrontation"

Ali Larayedh has spoken in the past of an "inevitable confrontation" with Tunisia's Salafists, and Le Monde wanted to know if this is still his opinion. "It has already taken place and will continue to occur, on an ad hoc basis," Larayedh said.

There is a Salafist faction "that advocates violence and terrorism," Larayedh continued. "There is no dialogue with those who are at war with society."

Other Salafists "at the moment...do not use violence," Larayedh said, but "we are against their vision of society." He is "confident that Tunisians will not opt for such a project."

Several issues are exacerbating tensions between Larayedh's government and the Salafists, including Abu Iyad's group.

A significant number of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia members were detained after the Sept. 14 assault on the US embassy in Tunis. Salafists were again detained after the assassination of Chokri Belaid, a popular leftist politician, on Feb. 6. It was after Belaid's murder, which rocked Tunisian society, that Larayedh succeeded Hamadi Jebali as prime minister.

During his Le Monde interview, Larayedh said that some "accomplices" of Belaid's murderer have been arrested, and that Tunisian authorities have identified the chief suspect, who remains at-large, as "a man in his thirties." Belaid's assassin "is part of the Salafst movement," Larayedh explained, and "he attends their cultural events and mosques."

Larayedh hinted at the possibility of a deeper conspiracy behind Belaid's death. "But have these men acted alone or on behalf of a group [that is] internal or external to Tunisia?" Larayedh asked rhetorically. "This is what we are now trying to determine."

Another issue increasing tensions is the seizure of arms. "Where are the many weapons seized in recent months in Tunisia?" Le Monde asked. "Since several months ago, the Ministry of Interior has been working on weapons trafficking networks," Larayedh answered. "Violent groups have wanted to benefit from them and have stored these weapons with the idea of using them one day in Tunisia or elsewhere."

Larayedh then offered a potentially ominous observation: "For the moment, there are more weapons seizures than armed actions." It is particularly interesting, given this context, that he accused Abu Iyad of being involved in "arms trafficking."

Another voice weighed in on events inside Tunisia just as the war of words between Larayedh and Abu Iyad was heating up. During an interview aired on Tunisian radio, Gen. Carter Ham, the chief of US Africa Command, said that "it is very clear to me that al Qaeda intends to establish a presence in Tunisia." However, Ham added, the Ennahda government is "committed to doing everything it can to prevent al Qaeda from establishing a presence."

Abu Iyad's Ansar al Sharia Tunisia took note of Ham's comments. In a Facebook posting several hours after the release of Abu Iyad's letter to Ennahda, the group posted a picture of Ham with a caption claiming there will soon be a "US intervention on the pretext of combating terrorism under the auspices of the puppet government."

The "puppet government" is, of course, Larayedh's Ennahda-led coalition.

Abu Iyad al Tunisi has long-standing ties to al Qaeda.

Steve Miller, a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and Lisa Lundquist, editor of The Long War Journal, contributed research to this report.

A commander from the Russian Caucasus known as Abu Omar al Chechen has formed Jaish al-Muhajireen wa Ansar, or Army of the Emigrants and Helpers, and integrated several Syrian fighting units into the ranks. Abu Omar was the commander of the Muhajireen Brigade, which fights alongside al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, the Al Nusrah Front.

The creation of the Army of the Emigrants and Helpers was announced on March 26 by Kavkaz Center, a propaganda arm of the Islamic Caucasus Emirate, an al Qaeda-linked jihadist group in Russia's Caucasus.

"In March 2013, a unit of Mujahideen of Kataeb al Muhajieen, or Brigade of Emigrants, under the command of Abu Omar al Chechen was joined by several brigades of Syrian Mujahideen, including Kataeb Khattab, or the Brigade of Khattab, and Jaish Muhammad, or the Army of Muhammad, after which it was decided to reorganize the structure of Kataeb," Kavkaz Center reported.

"As a result, Jaish al Muhajireen wa Ansar, or the Army of Emigrants and Helpers, was created," Kavkaz Center continued.

The Army of Emigrants and Helpers "is fighting primarily in the province of Aleppo." Kavkaz Center describes the group as "one of the most prominent groups in the Syrian Jihad."

Kavkaz Center claimed that the Army of Emigrants "has more than 1,000 Mujahideen, Muslim volunteers from different countries, including the Caucasus Emirate," who "are fighting under its banner." The claim appears to be true; just one week ago, a Swedish fighter known as Abu Kamal As Swedee was reported to have been killed while fighting with the Muhajireen Brigade.

A video showing Syrian jihadists swearing an oath of loyalty to Abu Omar al Chechen, who is seen in the background, was also published on YouTube. Hundreds of jihadists are seen in the video, and some are flying al Qaeda's flag.

In the video, another commander, who is identified as "Emir Saifullah" said, "We came here to establish God's law .... We have a purpose: to establish sharia [Islamic law], God's law."

Saifullah also said that no distinctions should be made between the different theaters of the jihadists' war.

"To us, there is no difference between Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Caucasus, any place," he said.

Another video shows the takeover of a military base in Handara in Aleppo. Again, al Qaeda's banner is shown flying in the background.

Chechen jihadists in Syria

Abu Omar al Chechen first appeared in a videotape that was released by Kavkaz Center on Feb. 7 [see LWJ report, Chechen commander leads Muhajireen Brigade in Syria]. He was seen surrounded by 19 heavily armed fighters and seated behind al Qaeda's flag.

"Chechen fighters," often described as fighters from the Caucasus and southern Russia, have been spotted on the Syrian battlefield for months. In October 2012, a group of "Chechen emigrants" is known to have fought, along with an element from the Free Syrian Army unit, under the command of the Al Nusrah Front to take control of a key Syrian air defense and Scud missile base in Aleppo. The Long war Journal speculated at the time that the group included members of the Islamic Caucasus Emirate [see LWJ report, Al Nusrah Front commanded Free Syrian Army unit, 'Chechen emigrants,' in assault on Syrian air defense base].

The Muhajireen Brigade is known to have participated in two other major assaults against Syrian military bases since the October operation in Aleppo.

In mid-December, the Muhajireen Brigade teamed up with the Al Nusrah Front to overrun the Sheikh Suleiman base, or Base 111. Arab and Central Asian fighters are reported to have participated in the battle.

And in mid-February, the Al Nusrah Front, together with the Tawhid Brigade and the Muhajireen Brigade, stormed the base of the Syrian military's 80th Regiment (or Brigade), which is situated near the main airport in Aleppo in eastern Syria.

Doku Umarov, the emir of the Islamic Caucasus Emirate, has praised the "mujahideen" in Syria as well as the fighters from the Caucasus. In November 2012, Umarov released a speech on the Kavkaz Center website that addressed the jihad in Syria.

"I appeal to the brothers, and I want to stress that we, the Mujahideen of the Caucasus, pray for you, make Dua [supplication to Allah], ask Allah to help you with His angels, that Allah helps you in every way,' he said.

In the speech, Umarov warned the Syrian jihadists not to "replace the regime of Bashar al-Assad, using Turkish, or Saudi, or Egyptian, or American, or English money, with another idol under the guise of democracy."

Umarov was added to the US's list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists in June 2010. The US added the Islamic Caucasus Emirate to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in May 2011.

A former American soldier who admitted to fighting for al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria has been arrested and charged with "conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction outside of the United States." Harroun's arrest and his account of his short time of fighting for the Al Nusrah Front highlights some of the terror group's close links to the Free Syrian Army, the so-called secular fighting force that is being backed by the US.

Harroun, a Muslim convert known in Syria as "the American," fought for both the Al Nusrah Front for the People in the Levant, al Qaeda in Iraq's affiliate in Syria, as well as the Free Syrian Army. He appeared in a videotape that was released earlier this month that showed him at the scene of a downed Syrian helicopter.

The FBI arrested Harroun two days ago at Dulles International Airport in Washington, DC after he cleared customs. He "conducted a voluntary interview of Harroun in a non-custodial setting" after entering the US, according to an affidavit that was released yesterday. Harroun was also interviewed three times in March at the US Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. In the interviews, Harroun admitted to fighting for the Al Nusrah Front.

The affidavit stated that "while he was fighting with the al Nusrah Front in Syria, he knew that the al Nusrah Front had been designated by the United States as a terrorist organization." He claimed that members of the Nusrah Front were perplexed about the US's designation of the group, as it "was primarily made of non-Syrians."

Harroun noted that he "could identify al-Nusrah Front members because they had black flags sewn onto their clothing and drove in vehicles bearing black flags." Members of the Al Nusrah Front are routinely seen in propaganda videos flying al Qaeda in Iraq's distinctive banner.

Harroun entered Turkey in November 2012, met with handlers from the Free Syrian Army, and then entered Syria in early January. After entering Syria, he was issued weapons by the Free Syrian Army, and within days, "engaged in a joint attack with the Al Nusrah Front on a Syrian army encampment."

"As part of the attack, vehicles bearing black flags transported al Nusrah fighters to locations near the camp," the affidavit said. The Nusrah and FSA fighters broke off the attack after about 20 minutes, and he "jumped into the back of an Al Nusrah Front truck, which took him to an Al Nusrah Front camp."

Harroun claimed he was "treated like a prisoner" but quickly gained the trust of the Al Nusrah Front fighters. He was then "assigned to a five-man fire team" and then "accepted as a member of the group because he had proven himself in battle." He also served as a member of a RPG team (this would become the basis for US government's charge of conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction).

Harroun admitted to fighting for the Al Nusrah Front "for approximately 25 days and that he estimated that he had engaged in seven to ten battles" while with them. He also said that fighters seen with him in the video titled "American Fighter' Vows Death to Assad" were members of the al Qaeda group, and he identified several of them.

Although Harroun was fighting for the Al Nusrah Front, he re-entered Turkey on Feb. 10 after a member of the Free Syrian Army requested that he go there to obtain weapons.

The Free Syrian Army and the Al Nusrah Front are known to have conducted several joint military operations in the past. The two groups have teamed up to overrun Syrian military bases and conduct other attacks. The Al Nusrah Front often takes command of the operations as their fighters are considered to be better organized, trained, and led.

Despite that fact that the Free Syrian Army and the Al Nusrah Front conduct joint operations in Syria, the US government will begin to provide millions of dollars in aid to help Syrian rebel groups govern areas under their control. The money is being funneled to the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Supreme Military Council "to provide concrete, nonlethal support to the Free Syrian Army," the US State Department announced on Feb. 28. The president of the Syrian Opposition Coalition opposes the US's designation of the Al Nusrah Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Colonel Riyad al Assad, the founder of the Free Syrian Army and one of its top commanders, described the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, as "our brothers in Islam," and commended the terror group for its prowess on the battlefield. The US government is currently supporting the Free Syrian Army with nonlethal military aid despite the fact that the Free Syrian Army backs the Al Nusrah Front and fights alongside it on the battlefield.

Riyad made the comments in an undated interview that was uploaded on YouTube on March 26. A transcript of the interview was obtained by The Long War Journal. Riyad was wounded last week in a bombing in Deir al Zour, a contested city on the Euphrates River in eastern Syria that is poised to fall under the control of the Al Nusrah Front.

When asked by the interviewer about his opinion of the Al Nusrah Front, he said the group's "members are our brothers and they are Sunnis fighting against the regime."

"They are our brothers in Islam. It is not our fault that Sunnis are fighting against the regime," he continued.

Riyad then indicated that the Free Syrian Army provided direct support to the Al Nusrah Front.

"We have offered martyrs and other things and, accordingly, nobody should blame us for this matter," he said. "The Al Nusrah Front has proved that it is proficient in fighting and has treated the people very nicely."

Riyad then that said the Al Nusrah Front "thus far have not done anything wrong to anybody," disregarding the facts that the group has executed suicide attacks that have killed civilians and enforces a harsh form of sharia, or Islamic law, in areas under its control.

"They might have some ideological thoughts over which we differ, but the majority of the people are looking with admiration toward the Al Nusrah Front ," he continued.

Riyad's statements are similar to those of Ahmed Moaz al Khatib, the head of the Syrian Opposition Coalition. Just one day after the US added the Al Nusrah Front to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, al Khatib urged the US to drop the designation, citing "ideological and political differences."

"The decision to blacklist one of the groups fighting the regime as a terrorist organization must be re-examined," al Khatib said in December 2012.

"We can have ideological and political differences with certain parties, but the revolutionaries all share the same goal: to overthrow the criminal regime" of President Bashar al-Assad, al Khatib continued.

The US will provide $60 million in direct aid to the Syrian Opposition Coalition and "will look for opportunities to work with the ... Supreme Military Council ... to provide concrete, nonlethal support to the Free Syrian Army," the US State Department said on Feb. 28.

District Governor Hajji Faizal Mohammad greets US Army officers and an interpreter before a land shura in Panjwai district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

Bill Ardolino is currently embedded with US soldiers from the 4-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team in Panjwai, Afghanistan.

"Property ownership is a human right," argued a grey-bearded Afghan in a black turban, wagging his finger at a roomful of Afghan government officials, US military personnel, and village elders gathered in the Panjwai district headquarters. "It is also a law of Afghanistan. But before that, it is a human right."

The civil servant was making the Jeffersonian case in a bid to get someone to pay for the use of local property housing International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat outposts and checkpoints. The Americans and Afghan government officials had called a shura on March 25 to broach the issue and to explain that the facilities and the land they sit on were to be turned over to Afghan security forces. Not much was achieved during a circuitous discussion: the Afghan civilians repeated their claims to reimbursement, while US military personnel asserted that there was little they could do beyond documenting that a meeting took place.

"The land is going to the ANA (Afghan National Army)," explained one US representative. "It's a decision made by GIRoA (the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) and not us."

The unresolved shura and the confusing lines of authority illustrate some of the challenges for local governance in Panjwai. A recent grassroots uprising against insurgents presents a unique opportunity for ISAF and the Afghan government to strike a blow against the Taliban in a district considered the birthplace of the extremist movement. But the durability of improved security may depend on whether an often fractious network of tribes spread throughout numerous villages can come together and sublimate their discontent into support for the government that opposes the insurgency.

The obstacles to governance here are steep. As in many portions of Afghanistan, official government has an inconsistent and sometimes nonexistent track record. The district government in Panjwai has limited authority and almost no financial support from the provincial and national governments that would allow it to undertake development or employment projects. Nearly all applicable resources come from private aid, international governmental agencies like USAID, and the US military. This tepid support from the government in Kabul and the provincial capital of Kandahar City calls into question whether district officials will maintain enough influence to capitalize on the recent security developments as the withdrawal of US support accelerates.

At the center of this bureaucratic maelstrom sits Hajji Faizal Mohammad, whose yearlong tenure as district governor presents a case study in trying to accomplish a lot with very little. Hailing from Mushan village in western Panjwai, the 56-year-old served as a district civil servant for eight years before being appointed governor. Prior to the arrival of US forces in Afghanistan, he held unofficial sway as a land owner and elder of his Ishakzai tribe during the "difficult ... time of the Taliban."

The DG seems to walk a precarious line between enthusiastic endorsement of his American benefactors and the political language necessary for reconciliation. Some of Mohammad's artful statements indicate keen awareness that less committed current and former members of the Taliban will need to be reintegrated, given the group's influence in Panjwai. Yet despite his attempts at outreach to local insurgents (and his survival of at least one assassination attempt), the DG seems unafraid to publicly declare his appreciation of US and international support.

His closest American partner speaks highly of the gregarious DG, whose easy smiles and jokes project a grandfatherly aura that distracts from his calculated persona common among effective politicians.

"He truly cares for his people and is constantly seeking ways to take care of them," assessed Major George Plys, the officer in charge of the Panjwai district headquarters, and Mohammad's principal US adviser. "Regardless of the support he gets from his own country." Another American, without providing any examples specific to Mohammad, offered a more cynical assessment, and one that is routine for Westerners working in Afghanistan: "No one" in a leadership position is free from certain forms of corruption common to Afghan society, he asserted. "It's part of their culture." Nevertheless, overall US assessments of the governor are positive, and some are enthusiastic.

The Long War Journal's interview with the district governor follows.

The Long War Journal: Why did you decide to stand up and become a district governor?

District Governor Hajji Faizal Mohammad: I personally didn't want to be a district governor, but my people wanted me to be a DG. The people of my village have always wanted me to take care of their problems. They requested me to the provincial governor because I have eight years in the government and I've always been a trustworthy person who takes care of their problems in the shura. Whatever decisions we made in the past in the shuras, I was impartial, so I have a lot of supporters. People wanted me to be a district governor, not me. [he laughed]

[Note: American biographical sketches of Mohammad somewhat contradict this assessment, analyzing that he "lobbied hard to become the new DG after the assassination" of his predecessor. These same documents also regard the governor as an "ardent and vocal supporter" of security efforts, and outline that he "has articulated three goals: to extend governance to western Panjwai; to promote education and employment opportunities to young people; and to make health services readily available."]

LWJ: How has security in Panjwai been lately, and how has it been trending for the past year?

DG: Until like 2004, once ISAF was here, everything was OK, the Taliban were in their houses, the area was safe. But starting in 2004 to 2006, security started [declining], the Taliban started laying IEDs everywhere and it was very dangerous.

LWJ: And why did that change happen?

DG: Because the people who were in the government started torturing the Taliban. The Taliban were sitting in their homes and the government used to go ... beat them, take their rifles and abuse them really bad. So they had no choice but to fight against the government, and so they started becoming friends with Pakistan; relationships with Pakistan started [developing] back and forth.

LWJ: You think the government cracking down on the Taliban caused the Taliban to resurge in this area?

[The interpreter interjects]: Yes.

DG: But the last five or six months [security has] become normal, better.

LWJ: Why have things improved recently?

DG: Every day, people start to trust the government, people start following the law, they respect the people of the villages. We have a different [quality of] and more intelligence; we have the NDS [Afghan National Directorate of Security] now, we have the AUP [Afghan Uniform Police], we have established the army, and the people trust them.

LWJ: Which of these security forces are the most effective in the district?

DG: The Afghan Army (ANA), because of the training they get, they respect people. Everywhere people love the ANA because they never harm the villagers. Second would be ANCOP (Afghan National Civil Order Police), then the AUP (Afghan Uniform Police; a national police service) and then ALP (Afghan Local Police, akin to local militias integrated with the police force). So it all depends on the training, the education level.

LWJ: Have there been problems with the [Afghan Local Police] shaking people down for money or taking other resources from locals?

DG: Unfortunately that happens. Whenever the ALP get trained, at graduation we always give them advice, talk to them [about it], but unfortunately we have issues with it, with the ALP. They just have no education. But even if they do something wrong, the villagers come and complain to us, and we will question that person [accused policeman] and we will follow the law and detain them. ..... [E]ven now there are some policemen detained for not following the law.

LWJ: Does the district chief of police [Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Mohammed] assist in these [anti-corruption] efforts?

DG: In some things, [Lt. Col. Mohammad] is very serious, he is doing a good job. Some other things are negative, I am not for it. But some things are good, [like efforts] against the enemy; he is very serious against the enemy. Wherever we tell him the enemy is and to do operations, he has no problem. But there are little issues we have, but they can be resolved.

LWJ: Explain to me who the enemy is ... I realize that answer may seem obvious to you, but explain to outsiders who the enemy is; are they Taliban, are they ideological [insurgents], are they criminals? Who are they?

DG: You all know better than us. Pakistan is the biggest enemy of Afghanistan, and then it's Iran. We've said it 10 times, we've said it a hundred times, but those two countries don't want Afghanistan to be an independent country. The district chief of police does a great job, especially during this period with security. It's okay to open your arms to the people and welcome them, but also you have to be ready to protect your bag, because they could attack you. The enemy will try to reintegrate with you when he is weak, but when he is strong, you have to be prepared to be attacked.

LWJ: But is the enemy here fighting and planting bombs for money, [in the name of] Deobandi [Islamic] ideology, to expel infidels, the Americans -- why are they doing it?

DG: It has nothing to do with Islam. The Americans, the ISAF (international security forces) they have never stopped us from practicing our religion or disrespected us, or anything. Right now you see me in my traditional clothes with my turban. When it's time to pray, the Americans respect me; they sit or they go outside and let me finish my prayer. [The actions of the insurgency] make the name of Islam bad. These people are not really Muslims, because it's not written in Islam that you should plant IEDs, do suicide attacks, and kill innocent people.

LWJ: But what about the youth who come from madrasas in Pakistan and blow themselves up? Don't they have a perception that they are doing it for [religion]?

DG: Their brain is not working right. They train them over there, that's why they use the younger generation, they start on them at a very young age, they tell them ... to 'go blow yourself up to go to paradise. That Afghanistan is taking over.' In Pakistan they brainwash the younger generation and send them over here, but that has nothing to do with Islam.

LWJ: I heard you speak at the shura about reintegration programs regarding the youth. Do you find that there is a big split in the ages of local insurgents, young vs. old, and what are your reintegration programs like?

DG: There are three categories of Taliban: the first one, he really doesn't have a job, he's not really a Talib, they just gave him a radio. He does it for work, to get some kind of income. Then there is another category that they are against our government. And the third [category] is terrorists; there is no way they will come back to our side because they have been trained by Pakistan. You can't trust them, whenever they get a chance they will [attack]. But the younger generation, like his age [points to a man in his mid-twenties], if we can find them jobs, an opportunity for a paycheck they might come to our side. It depends. If the government gives them seed (for farming) and listens to their voice, it's possible. We need to put a lot of pressure on Pakistan to leave Afghanistan alone. If Pakistan wouldn't interfere with us, I promise you, in one month this country could get better.

LWJ: How has the support of the Afghan government to the local population been? It's my understanding that you don't operate [as district governor] with a traditional budget from the government, and that a lot of the resources you're distributing come from foreign aid. [Can you describe] how the government has provided resources and how you see this trending?

DG: To be honest, the Afghan government started with nothing. From army to police, we didn't even put our flag up. So there was nothing before the Americans and ISAF. Then we got paved roads, schools, colleges, embassies everywhere and it's all because the Americans were supporting us. The way I see it right now, our government doesn't provide much for the people, everything is done because of ISAF. Nothing is possible, from education to road projects to anything [without ISAF].

I think in the future there will be [Afghan government] projects ..., but everything now, it's like we have to beg for it from our own government. What can I say about the future? I wish I could tell you that our government is going to do this ... hopefully it will be better, hopefully we will have different programs like health clinics, agriculture, but I can't say I could do these things, I don't have [any resources]. Even the recent uprising of the people [against the Taliban], I didn't have anything to give to them. ISAF and the Special Forces [US Green Berets] had to give them resources. The only good thing [the government did] was to open the schools, but even then it was ISAF that helped us. Clinics, medication, it is because ISAF provided it.

LWJ: You've mentioned the uprising that's taken place and started in [the] Zangabad [area of Panjwai], can you tell me how this came about?

DG: Since I've been district governor, I've taken 46 trips to different villages in Panjwai, and most of the trips my American friends have gone with me to make sure and promise people that security will get better. Every time I went to those villages, I told people that security was only possible if you want it, I need your support, you need to help us and be on our side. Finally the people realized it, how important it is. We opened a total of 12 schools, and that's because the people are tired of it, they wanted change.

LWJ: What are they tired of?

DG: They lost their family members, they lost legs. The Taliban forced them to let them come to their houses any time and they were forced to feed them. The Taliban planted IEDs on their farms, in front of their houses, they lost children, they couldn't do anything. They were forced. So we opened their arms to them, and they trusted the government.

LWJ: Regarding trusting the government -- everyone farms around here, and a lot of those people cultivate poppy [for cash], but opium is illegal. How do you reconcile not upsetting the people by taking their livelihood vs. enforcing the law?

DG: In Islam it is not allowed to grow opium. Even if it is one benefit to make money, there are ten other things that hurt people. So people have to understand that, and that it's the law. The other thing is that the biggest income source for the terrorists is poppy, so the people don't really have any other option but to listen and follow the changes.

[Note: While poppy farming and the opium trade do constitute a significant revenue stream for the insurgency, some intelligence assessments have indicated that foreign support of the global jihad is a greater source of insurgent funding.]

LWJ: What are the major tribes here, and do tribal politics make it difficult to keep the people united in this uprising?

DG: Noorzai is a big one, Ishakzai, Alokozai and [Popalzai]. These are the main ones, and of course there are smaller tribes. Tribal politics are very important; everything runs through the tribes in Afghanistan. A long time ago, each tribe had its own malik (representative), and whatever that leader said, that's it. In the time of the Russians, they tried to destroy all of the maliks, but they still play a big role in Afghanistan.

LWJ: What do local civilians think of the American forces? And I ask this in the context of the murders that took place in the two villages west of here that are attributed to Staff Sergeant Robert Bales. What is local opinion about that [event] and Americans in general?

DG: Those are, of course, very horrible memories, thinking back about that time. The people were very horrified, they couldn't believe it. But [given] all of the eight years of Americans helping us, supporting us, in shuras, we always mention they are here for peace, and to help us and support us. [The incident] kind of changed the mindset of people in thinking about the Americans in Kandahar, and especially in Panjwai. But, you know, most people started understanding that that was only one person that committed a horrible crime like this. We tried to explain it to them after it happened, that this was ... just one person, it was not all Americans. We always say that it was very bad what happened, people were hurt and the enemy was happy. The enemy wanted everyone to demonstrate.

I'm glad that I was the second or third person who arrived in the area and I talked to the shura members. I went to the compound where the 13 family members were killed and burned, especially the children. I talked to the villagers, most of them thought it was more than one person, and we tried to explain to them that that's not how it was, it was only one person. We told them that the American was mentally ill, and that [the killings] are not what Americans do, that's not what they are here for. And there were also a lot of incidents where Afghans shot at innocent Americans, including soldiers. Does this mean all the Afghans and all the Americans are bad? No. It happens.

All the villages around here, it's surprising, but they are happier for Americans to come instead of their own Afghan government forces and police, because the Americans don't steal from them, they don't beat them up or torture them. The Americans have more education and understanding, and they respect their culture. That was just one incident, and people realize that it was a crazy person, and we explained that most all Americans are here for peace.

LWJ: I have spoken with a number of local citizens and it seems that the general [belief] is still that it was more than one person [who committed the crime], but I do agree with you that most people [I have spoken to] have contextualized that it does not [represent] all Americans, and many say they have moved on. Have people really moved on?

DG: Yes, they have moved on. They've opened a school there, they've had Afghan local police training there ....

LWJ: Belembai? [one of the villages where the murders took place]

DG: Yes, Belembai. So they've been back there and things are better. They've also had poppy eradication there, so there aren't really problems. People understand.

LWJ: Is the security situation improved here? And the uprising, is it sustainable? [Especially] as the Americans are pulling back from the combat outposts and various bases?

DG: It's important that the people keep on trusting us, and we welcome them, listen to them, and support them. We do need support from our Interior Ministry to have some kind of program for those people who are on our side now. Any kind of support, projects to help them in different ways. If we had a budget, we could help them; right now I don't have much. But we have the Afghan Army, the Afghan Police, and they will continue security in this area. We have heard from the Taliban in Pakistan now, that they are worried about the uprising happening here in Panjwai, and they will continue sending insurgents here to try and destroy the security. I have hope, but we still need a lot of support from the Afghan government.

I hope that America will stay and keep its promises and that it doesn't leave the Afghans completely alone. We don't want the past to be repeated [after assistance against the Soviet Union], with the Taliban taking over. It's important that you stay on our side and support us. Don't completely leave Afghanistan.

Bill Ardolino's forthcoming book Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheikhs, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda, which tells the story of the tribal Awakening in 2006-2007 that changed the course of the Iraq War, will be published by Naval Institute Press on May 15. All of the author's proceeds from the first edition will go to the Semper Fi Fund for injured service members.

US special operations forces have killed Abdullah Wakil, the Taliban's shadow governor for Panjwai district in Afghanistan's Kandahar province. The insurgent commander was gunned down yesterday during a nighttime/early morning air assault specifically targeting him in the village of Perozi in central Panjwai.

Wakil and at least six other insurgents opened fire on US special operations forces while attempting to flee the village. The US troops, who had already been inserted by helicopter, returned small arms fire, killing Wakil and one of his bodyguards; five other insurgents surrendered and were captured before they could escape the area. The death of Wakil comes shortly after one of the shadow governor's "close associates," possibly his "brother," was apprehended by a platoon of US soldiers while visiting an Afghan Local Police (ALP) checkpoint in the Sperwan Gar area on March 25.

US soldiers with the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team in Panjwai have been chasing Wakil since their arrival last November, and it is estimated that he has been the Taliban's shadow governor for more than a year. "He was the head honcho, as far as 4-9 was concerned," said First Lieutenant Jeff Browne, the tactical intelligence officer for 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, which is responsible for the western portion of the district.

Wakil's network is known to have executed a number of asymmetrical suicide attacks in both Panjwai and Kandahar City and he was also the area's "operations liason back to [the Taliban's] Quetta [Shura]," added Browne. The Taliban shadow governor was also believed to have been behind the assassination of Panjwai's previous district governor, Sayed Fazuldin Agha, a little more than a year ago. Agha, who was responsible for reconciling a number of Taliban commanders with the government, was a highly influential official, and his death was viewed at the time as a significant setback for ISAF and Afghan government efforts in Kandahar. He was killed in a suicide attack.

US military personnel in Panjwai anticipate that the death of Wakil will disrupt the ability of the local insurgency to conduct "asymmetric operations" or "high profile attacks in the area" at the start of the fighting season for a short time prior to the appointment of the shadow governor's replacement.

"I think the impact is to be determined," said Lieutenant Colonel James Dooghan, commander of the 4-9 Infantry. "[When] any senior Taliban leader is killed, it does cause disruption of their ability to be cohesive in their operations. His death should disrupt [insurgent operations] in the horn of Panjwai. How long that's going to occur remains to be seen, and it depends on the capability of those who are appointed to replace him, because they are always going to be replaced."

The killing of Wakil is another setback for the Taliban in Panjwai, occurring on the heels of a grassroots security movement in the Sperwan and Zangabad areas that has injected manpower and intelligence into the local security forces' campaign against the insurgents over the past two months. The district shadow governor is also the second high-level Taliban commander killed in Kandahar province within the past 48 hours. Hafez Hekmatullah, the "director of assassinations" for the Taliban's shadow governor of Kandahar province, was killed by Afghan police along with two of his bodyguards in the Maruf district, also on Sunday. Hekmatullah was responsible for the high-profile assassination of Khan Mohammad Mujahid, the Kandahar Provincial Police Chief, two years ago.

[Note: This report was updated with the correct spelling of First Lieutenant Browne's last name. He was incorrectly referred to as 'Brown' in a previous version.]

Al Qaeda commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Image from Sahara Media.

The leader of the al Qaeda-linked Movement for Tawhid [Unity] and Jihad in West Africa has denied reports that wanted jihadist military commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar was killed in Mali in early March. A spokesman for Belmokhtar's unit also denied he was killed. Belmokhtar, who is said to have direct communications with al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri, was reported to have been killed during a joint French and Chadian military operation in a mountainous region in northern Mali.

Hamad el Khairy, the head of the MUJAO's sharia, or Islamic law committee said that reports of Belmokhtar's death and the deaths of several other top jihadist commanders are "merely unfounded lies" and have "no basis of truth." Khairy, who was added to the US's list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists in 2012, made the statement to the Nouakchott News Agency on April 1. The Nouakchott News Agency report was obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Khairy also denied media reports that hundreds of jihadists have been killed since France invaded Mali to halt the takeover of the country by three al Qaeda-linked groups in mid-January.

"What they said about the killing of 600 mujahideen is an unfounded lie," he said according to SITE. "What is being said is merely media propaganda."

Khairy also said that "there is no difference between" al Qaeda and MUJAO, claiming that "these are just names."

The spokesman for the al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam, or Those who sign with Blood Brigade, which is commanded by Belmokhtar, also denied reports that group's emir was killed. Al Hasan Ould Akhlil, who is also known as Julaybib, the spokesman, also denied reports that large numbers of the group's fighters were killed.

The Chadian president and the military insisted that Belmokhtar was killed in counterterrorism operation in the Ifoghas Mountains in northern Mali on March 2. Pictures were shown that were said to have been the corpse of Belmokhtar, however French officials refused to confirm his death. France did confirm the death of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb commander Abdel Mejid Abou Zeid, who was killed in a raid in the Ifoghas Mountains in late February.

Background on Belomakhtar

Belmokhtar has been tied to jihadists in North Africa and Central Asia. He waged jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s, and fought in Algeria's civil war in the 1990s with the al Qaeda-linked Armed Islamic Group and its successor, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which renamed itself al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2007. AQIM is al Qaeda's affiliate in North Africa.

In 2003, the United Nations designated Belmokhtar as a global terrorist for his activities on behalf of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. He was also convicted in absentia by Algerian courts for criminal acts including terrorism in 2004, 2007, and 2008.

Although Belmokhtar split with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in December 2012, he still conducts joint operations with the group. Belmokhtar later created the al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam, which led the bloody terrorist assault against the In Amenas gas facility in southeastern Algeria in mid-January. Belmokhtar claimed the attack in the name of al Qaeda.

Belmokhtar reports directly to al Qaeda's central leadership, according to his spokesman. Al Qaeda central tightened its control over AQIM's hostage operations in late 2010. [See LWJ report, Analysis: Al Qaeda central tightened control over hostage operations].

On April 2, the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC), an al Qaeda-linked group, claimed credit for two rocket attacks against Israel. According to the first statement, which was released by the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center to jihadist forums as well as the Center's Facebook and Tumblr pages, the attack was in response to the death of Hamas' Maisara Abu Hamdiyeh.

Abu Hamdiyeh died of esophageal cancer on Tuesday at Beersheba's Soroka Medical Center in Israel. A press release from Hamas praised Hamdiyeh for "training the Mujahideen" since 1989 and working tirelessly "to supply the Mujahideen with weapons and explosives." He was sentenced to life in prison in 2002 for attempted murder, among other charges.

The statement from the MSC, which was obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, said that "when the Muslim prisoners increase in the prisons of the brothers of pigs and monkeys, there is no room for statements of condemnation or denouncement that don't even deserve the ink with which they are written. We must follow the command of Allah to defend the weak and deter the aggression of the disbelievers and the criminals."

According to the MSC, it fired two rockets towards the Nir Oz kibbutz in the Eshkol Region Council at 3:20 p.m. on April 2. However, an IDF spokesperson said those rockets landed short of Israel in Gaza. Approximately five hours later, the MSC fired three more rockets towards Israel, according to a second statement released by the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center on April 2. At least one of those rockets landed in the Eshkol Regional Council.

In response to the rocket fire, the Israeli Air Force struck a couple of targets in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli airstrikes were the first in Gaza since the end of Operation Pillar of Defense in late November 2012.

In addition to claiming responsibility for the attack, the first statement from the MSC also called on Hamas to release Salafi jihadists currently being held in prisons in Gaza. "In the event of any treacherous escalation that the criminal Jews might carry out, we demand from the reasonable people in the Hamas Movement to pressure their government security agencies to release the Salafist Jihadist mujahideen who are held unjustly in their prisons," the statement said.

Last week, Hamas forces reportedly arrested two Salafi jihadists in Zawaida, raided the home of a member of the Popular Resistance Committees, and kidnapped a Salafi jihadist in Rafah. Press reports suggest that the two jihadists in Zawaida were connected to the MSC, which took credit for a rocket attack on Israel on March 21. On March 30, the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center warned on its Facebook page that preparations were being made by Hamas to launch a mass campaign of arrests against Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip.

Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem

The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC) is a consolidation of a number of Salafi jihadist groups operating in the Gaza Strip including, but not limited to: Tawhid and Jihad Group in Jerusalem, and Ansar al Sunnah. Sheikh Anas Abdul Rahman, one of the group's leaders, has said that the group aims to "fight the Jews for the return of Islam's rule, not only in Palestine, but throughout the world."

The MSC has taken responsibility for a number of rocket attacks against Israel, as well as the June 18, 2012 attack that killed one Israeli civilian. The group said that the attack was "a gift to our brothers in Qaedat al Jihad and Sheikh Zawahiri" and retaliation for the death of Osama bin Laden. In early February 2013, the MSC released a martyrdom video branding one of the terrorists killed in the June 2012 attack as an al Qaeda "martyr."

On Oct. 22, 2012, the MSC released a 32-minute-long video detailing some of its rocket attacks against Israel and threatening to "fight you [Israel] as long as we hold...weapons in our hands."

In November 2012, the group carried out joint rocket attacks with the Army of Islam. Following the institution of a ceasefire that ended Israel's Operation Pillar of Defense, the MSC said that they were not truly a party to the ceasefire.

In 2012, the Israeli Air Force targeted a number of MSC members. On Oct. 7, the IDF killed Tala'at Halil Muhammad Jarbi, a "global jihad operative," and Abdullah Muhammad Hassan Maqawai, a member of the MSC. Maqawai was likely a former member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. On Oct. 13, Israel killed Abu al Walid al Maqdisi, the former emir of the Tawhid and Jihad Group in Jerusalem, and Ashraf al Sabah, the former emir of Ansar al Sunnah, in an airstrike. The two men were said to be leaders of the MSC.

A Taliban suicide assault team stormed a courthouse in western Afghanistan today in an attempt to free Taliban prisoners who were on trial.

The Taliban assault team, estimated at between six to nine fighters, penetrated security at the courthouse in Farah City by dressing in Afghan National Army uniforms and fooling the guards at the checkpoints. Four of the heavily armed Taliban fighters, some who were wearing suicide vests, dismounted a truck and attacked the courthouse, while two of fighters detonated explosives on the vehicle. The four Taliban fighters then entered the complex and engaged in a firefight with police.

Reports on the number of casualties have varied from eight to 44 killed and more than 90 wounded during the Taliban assault. According to the BBC, 34 civilians and 10 Afghan security personnel, and nine Taliban fighters were killed during the attack. Several judges and court officials are said to be among the wounded.

The Taliban took credit for the suicide assault in Farah City, and also claimed they freed the 15 Taliban prisoners who were being transferred for trial. Afghan officials denied that the Taliban fighters were freed, and said they remain in custody.

Today's suicide assault is the first in Farah province since May 17, 2012, when a four-man Taliban suicide team attacked the governor's compound. Six policemen, a civilian, and all four Taliban fighters were killed in the attack.

The Taliban routinely carry out suicide assaults, or "storming operations," on ISAF and Afghan bases. The last such attack took place on March 26, when a suicide assault team hit an Afghan police headquarters in Jalalabad in Nangarhar province. One of the most successful Taliban suicide assaults took place at Camp Bastion in Helmand province in September 2012. The Taliban destroyed six USMC Harriers and badly damaged two more, and also killed the squadron commander and a sergeant during the attack.

Today's attack in Farah also took place just two days after ISAF aircraft killed nine "militants," including "Iranian and Arab fighters," in the province, according to Pajhwok Afghan News. Iran, by means of its Qods Force Ansar Corps, is known to sponsor al Qaeda and Taliban groups in western and southern Afghanistan [see LWJ report, Iranian Qods Force commanders linked to Taliban: US Treasury and Treasury targets Iran's 'secret deal' with al Qaeda]. ISAF officials have also directly linked Qods Force to several of the Taliban commanders.

ISAF has targeted Iranian-supported Taliban commanders in at least 14 raids in western Afghanistan between June 2009 and February 2011, according to Coalition press releases compiled by The Long War Journal. ISAF inexplicably stopped reporting on raids against Iranian-supported Taliban commanders in early February 2011; LWJ's queries to ISAF on this subject have gone unanswered [see LWJ report, Taliban suicide assault team kills 36 Afghans in western city].

Sources:

Afghanistan courthouse attack 'kills 30 people', BBC
Explosion and gunbattle in Farah leaves 11 killed, 70 injured, Khaama Press
12 dead in Farah court attack, Pahjwok Afghan News
Militant attack kills 8, wounds 72 in Afghanistan, Taliban claims responsibility, Xinhua

A banner dedicated to Abdullah Azzam al Qahtani that has appeared on multiple jihadist Facebook pages.

The fate of a Saudi who once served as an al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader and proposed a terrorist attack against the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa has garnered significant attention on jihadist social media sites this week.

Abdullah Azzam al Qahtani, who was captured on May 3, 2010, was scheduled to be put to death by Iraqi authorities this week, according to the jihadist sites. Four AQI leaders were put to death on April 1. And jihadists are making online pleas for supporters to pray for al Qahtani.

The banner seen at the top of this article was uploaded to the Facebook page for Al Nusra Media, which regularly publishes material disseminated by Ansar al Sharia Egypt, an al Qaeda-linked group. The banner was also posted on other jihadist sites, including a Facebook page named the Talaba Revolution, which regularly carries propaganda disseminated by another al Qaeda-linked group, Ansar al Sharia Tunisia.

Al Qahtani was first arrested just weeks after AQI's two top leaders were killed on April 18, 2010. AQI emir Abu Ayyub al Masri and the leader of AQI's Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Omar al Baghdadi, were killed during a joint Iraqi-American raid.

According to the Associated Press, authorities found a note authored by al Qahtani at the home where al Masri and al Baghdadi were killed. The note reportedly detailed al Qahtani's nascent plot against the 2010 World Cup.

During an interview with the AP shortly after his arrest, al Qahtani admitted that AQI considered attacking the soccer tournament.

"We discussed the possibility of taking revenge for the insults of the prophet by attacking Denmark and Holland," al Qahtani said. "If we were not able to reach the teams, then we'd target the fans."

Al Qahtani pointed out that the World Cup is an "important event" and he thought it would be easier to strike the Europeans abroad than in their home countries.

AQI considered targeting Danes in response to the publication of cartoons portraying the prophet Mohammed in a negative light. The AP also reported that AQI wanted to attack Dutch citizens "in part due to an anti-Islam film made by right-wing Dutch politician Geert Wilders." Such "perceived insults to Islam" were al Qahtani's stated pretext for AQI's terror plotting abroad.

Al Qahtani's plan appears to have been in the earliest stages of development at the time he was arrested. Iraqi officials noted that AQI had not yet taken any concrete steps, such as acquiring bombmaking components, to move the plot closer to fruition.

Ties to senior al Qaeda leadership

Citing Iraqi officials, the AP added: "The plot still needed approval from the al Qaeda chain of command, specifically second in command, Ayman al Zawahiri." At the time, Zawahiri was the deputy to Osama bin Laden. Zawahiri took over as al Qaeda emir after bin Laden was killed in May 2011.

Iraqi officials directly linked al Qahtani to al Qaeda's central leadership. The Telegraph (UK) published quotes from Major General Qassim Atta, a senior security official in Baghdad, concerning al Qahtani's ties to Ayman al Zawahiri.

Al Qahtani "participated in the planning of a terrorist act in South Africa during the World Cup," Maj Gen Atta said, according to the Telegraph. "He was in contact with the terrorist Ayman al Zawahiri to organize the plan hatched by al Qaeda."

The terrorists al Qahtani served under inside AQI were reportedly in contact with Zawahiri as well.

After al Masri and al Baghdadi were killed in April 2010, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki told the press that the AQI leaders had been in contact with both bin Laden and Zawahiri.

"During the operation computers were seized with e-mails and messages to the two biggest terrorists, Osama bin Laden and [his deputy] Ayman al Zawahiri," Maliki said, according to BBC News.

Al Masri was particularly close to Zawahiri, having served under the al Qaeda chieftain since the 1980s, when Zawahiri led the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). American officials trumpeted the deaths of AQI's senior leaders, along with other high-profile kills and captures in 2010, as a possible deathblow to AQI.

Since late 2011, however, the group has experienced a resurgence. While falling short of its pre-surge capabilities inside Iraq, AQI has added significantly to its membership rolls and greatly increased its operational tempo. AQI has also spawned a whole new al Qaeda affiliate, the Al Nusrah Front in Syria.

A common cause

Protesting the imprisonment inside Iraq of detainees from around the Middle East and North Africa has become a fairly common cause for online jihadists. Recruits from a number of countries flocked to Iraq during the peak of the war and continue to make their way to Iraq and, even more so, to neighboring Syria today.

Al Qahtani reportedly first traveled to Iraq in 2004 and worked his way up AQI's hierarchy, becoming a leader for the terrorist organization in Baghdad prior to his arrest. While al Qahtani's plot against the World Cup never got off the ground, Iraqi officials say he was responsible for a string of attacks inside Iraq's capital prior to his arrest.

Today, al Qahtani's cause is championed in the jihadists' online world. The banner shown above was published on a Facebook news page for Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, an organization that regularly honors "martyrs" who have died in Iraq and Syria. In its Facebook post, the group says al Qahtani went on a hunger strike to protest his confinement and tells supporters not to be stingy with their prayers in his honor.

A US soldier and an Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) officer stand guard during a shura in the Panjwai district government headquarters. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

The jarring ring of a secure American military telephone interrupted an early evening interview with Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Mohammad, the Panjwai district chief of police (DCOP). Major Patrick Harty, Mohammad's principal US Army adviser, took the call from his cross-legged position on the floor of the Afghan cop's claustrophobic sitting room. After a brief conversation, Harty instructed an interpreter to notify the police chief of a developing situation: a US platoon out of Combat Outpost Sperwan Gar in the central portion of the district had tracked a known insurgent "high value target" to an Afghan Local Police (ALP) checkpoint. The US soldiers wanted to arrest the man but there was a problem.

The target -- who was suspected to be a brother or close associate of the Taliban's shadow governor for the district -- wasn't trying to slip through the checkpoint or attack it; rather, he was visiting the local cops on a social call. The Americans had contacted the police chief seeking his permission in order to preempt any resistance that could ignite if they swooped in to make an arrest.

"If he is dangerous, then take him," the police chief said with a dismissive, almost irritable wave of his hand.

It wasn't that simple. A few minutes later, another phone call interrupted the interview. An interpreter with the US soldiers had overheard the Afghan cops say that they would shoot the Americans if they tried to take the insurgent. After two more phone calls, Pashto and English translations, and hurried negotiations culminating in the police chief personally instructing the Afghan local police checkpoint commander to "give him to the Americans," the insurgent was finally apprehended and taken back to the US combat outpost. The drama only intensified, however.

Lt. Col. Mohammad also instructed the ALP checkpoint commander to head over to the US combat outpost to settle any remaining issues with the American company commander. The Afghan cop briefly complied, then stormed back to his vehicle, slamming its door and driving away. The police chief ordered him back once again. And as the Afghan cop resumed his debate with the US company commander at an entry control point to the American combat outpost, one or more of the Afghan policemen back at his checkpoint opened fire on the American base.

A few "pot shots" emanating from an AK-47 cracked from the ALP checkpoint and hit at the foot of one of the US guard towers. According to Harty, soon afterward a PK medium machine gun manned by insurgents took advantage of the chaos, opening up on both the US base and another local police checkpoint. Finally, an Afghan Army unit joined the fray, silencing the insurgent attack with small arms fire directed at the source of the Taliban machine gun.

Days later, Harty asserted that the issue had been resolved and "now everything is good." But not before noting one more bit of drama: members of the Afghan police checkpoint in question threw rocks at the vehicle of Lieutenant Colonel Chad Sundem, the battalion commander who oversees all US forces in the eastern half of the district, including the combat outpost at Sperwan Gar.

Green-on-blue

The wild shots taken by the Afghan police officers at an American combat outpost in Sperwan, which will likely never make it into any official statistics on insider attacks, are indicative of the kind of tensions that complicate American advisory efforts in Afghanistan. Since Jan. 1, 2008, a total of 75 insider or "green-on-blue" attacks have been reported against International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel in Afghanistan, killing 130 personnel and wounding 148 more [see LWJ report, Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data].

US military officials initially claimed that the overwhelming majority of attacks were the result of brewing cultural tensions between ISAF and Afghan personnel and that only about 10 per cent were caused by Taliban infiltration of the Afghan security forces. US Marine General John Allen, then the senior ISAF commander in Afghanistan, later revised the estimate of Taliban infiltration or instigation to about 25 percent in an August 2012 statement.

In Panjwai, there have been no officially reported green-on-blue attacks or casualties since the arrival of the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team in the district in late November. But there have been incidents that shed light on the dynamics that underlie insider attacks: Taliban infiltration or coercion (with some incidents culminating in "green-on-green" -- Afghan on Afghan security forces -- fatalities), cultural and operational tensions between Western and Afghan forces, and the simple confusion inherent to fighting an asymmetric war.

Green-on-green assassination

The fact that a close associate of the Taliban's recently killed district shadow governor paid a visit to an Afghan Local Police (ALP) checkpoint on the evening of March 25 raises natural suspicions that some of the local cops are in league with the insurgents. And given that the ALP is a minimally trained citizen militia of local men with extensive family ties to the area, it is certainly the force with the most opportunity for Taliban infiltration. Further, it seemed apparent to the Americans that the wanted insurgent was an acquaintance, friend, or family member of one or more of the cops stationed at the checkpoint. But there is another angle beyond any suspected collaboration between insurgents and the local cops.

It is also possible that the "high value target" was attempting to ingratiate himself with Afghans at the checkpoint in order to conduct reconnaissance or assassination. Harty notes that this has been "a common occurrence in the past several months," with at least two reported insider killings of Afghan police officers in Panjwai since November. Prior to one attack in early January, a visitor had befriended the cops at an ALP checkpoint and successfully petitioned them to become a local policeman. According to an Afghan police sergeant, the recruit was considered a loyal member of the unit before he slipped sleeping pills into a pot of chai; once the men at the checkpoint were unconscious, the infiltrator shot and killed the checkpoint commander, stole a number of weapons, and then made a clean getaway.

"The policeman was working with the ALP for three months, but he was trained by the insurgents to infiltrate and no one knew it," explained Sergeant Niamatullah, commander of another Afghan Uniform Police checkpoint east of the Sperwan area. "He was very nice to the policemen, to the commander of the checkpoint and then during the night he picked up his gun when everyone was asleep and shot the commander. Then he stole weapons and took them to the insurgents. No one could stop him."

In another incident at a different checkpoint in Sperwan, an infiltrator who had been a cop for two years suddenly and simply took an opportunity to shoot a checkpoint commander before also making his escape. Niamatullah and other members of the police force considered this incident especially surprising.

"We didn't know his heart, what he had decided to do," explained the sergeant. "But whenever he faced combat he shot at the enemy, so we had no clue he was bad. Then at night he picks up a gun shoots the commander and runs away."

It is sometimes hard for the Afghan personnel, and exponentially more difficult for the Americans, to tell when members of the Afghan security forces are in league with an insurgent like the one who visited the ALP checkpoint near COP Sperwan Gar on March 25, or when an infiltrator is using local ties to gather intelligence or position himself for an insider attack. Afghan forces attempt to vet the individuals who join their ranks, but it is impossible to guarantee an individual's intent, especially in light of the rapid recruitment associated with building a local militia from the area's recent grassroots uprising against the Taliban.

Anger at a COP

Before the green-on-blue "pot shots" on March 25, tensions between American and Afghan forces had previously flared around Combat Outpost Sperwan Gar in mid-December, barely two weeks after the arrival of the soldiers with 1-38 Infantry. On a chilly winter day, eight Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) bringing food to one of their checkpoints petitioned the Americans to travel through the US outpost instead of around it; the ground to either side of the base was often sown with mines. The US soldiers agreed, but the Afghan policemen failed to clear their weapons before transiting through the base and they asked the Americans for fuel along the way. When the local cops returned from delivering the food and again asked to pass through the US facility, their request was denied until they agreed to clear all of their weapons. According to one US soldier, they refused the "simple" request and a standoff ensued.

After several radio calls from Afghan cops to their headquarters, followed by unsuccessful hails from US headquarters personnel to the Americans at the combat outpost, the AUP unit lost patience and decided to go around the base, using a road that "is only 100 meters to the side of the COP, and maybe a couple hundred meters across it," according to one soldier. As the policemen circumnavigated, they were ambushed by insurgents. One Afghan cop was hit by small arms fire. And when the Americans at the combat outpost opened up on the insurgents in return, the Afghan police officers positioned in the crossfire thought the US soldiers were firing at them. Despite subsequent efforts by Americans to render aid to the mortally wounded Afghan policeman, they were blamed by the AUP for killing one of their men.

As the commander of the Afghan Uniform Police Security Forces Advise and Assist Team (SFAAT), Major Harty was quickly dispatched to the district headquarters police compound to resolve the issue. He recalls passing by "50 or 60" angry policemen, many of them armed, standing in the station's courtyard. Upon entering a sitting room, he encountered the police chief, his executive officer, and eight "loaded and locked" Afghan policemen. The police chief at the time (who was replaced by Lt. Col. Mohammad in January) was described as a timid man who hailed from outside Panjwai; he simply looked at the floor while Major Hajji Lala Amadullah, his more assertive executive officer, loudly berated the American adviser for the events that had led to the death of the policeman.

Harty recalls patiently allowing Amadullah to vent his anger over the course of a multi-hour meeting. Eventually, the American raised his own voice in response:

"We're sacrificing ourselves for your safety and security as well," he argued, pointing out that, just days prior, the US unit in question had suffered heavy casualties in the same area.

On Dec. 10, Third Platoon from Bayonet Company, 1-38 Infantry out of COP Sperwan Gar took fire from insurgents after entering an area littered with buried bombs. When the Americans reacted toward cover, Staff Sergeant Wesley R. Williams stepped on a pressure plate IED. He and two other US soldiers were severely injured by the blast, and an Afghan soldier was wounded by insurgent machine gun fire. Despite aid rendered under heavy fire by Private First Class Breilen A. Rosenberg, the platoon's line medic, and a helicopter medevac to Kandahar Airfield (after four attempted landings, also under fire), Williams succumbed to his wounds.

Harty's argument about shared sacrifice and the venting that had preceded it defused the situation. The Afghan-American tensions abated, for a time.

A planted Koran

In addition to operational conflicts, there are steep cultural pitfalls for Westerners operating in Afghanistan. Attempts by insurgents to capitalize on these issues pose an omnipresent threat. The highest profile example has been the attempted disposal of copies of the Koran by US personnel at Bagram Airbase in February 2012. The outrage and countrywide riots that ensued after the perceived insult to Islam resulted in the deaths of at least 11 people, including two US military personnel. Oddly enough to Westerners, local sentiment in Panjwai seems far less forgiving of the US military's unintentional affront to the Islamic holy book than the massacre of 17 of civilians attributed to US Staff Sergeant Robert Bales last March. [See LWJ report, Taliban incite Afghans to kill 'Crusaders' over Koran burning.]

Insurgents are keenly aware of these sensitivities, and sometimes attempt information campaigns and false flag operations to stoke tensions. A recent example occurred in mid-February at Forward Operating Base Zangabad, a US facility in a still kinetic portion of Panjwai district. An Afghan civilian sanitation worker was recorded by surveillance assets as he neatly placed a copy of the Koran in a trash dumpster near the border of the US and Afghan Army portions of the base. The worker then began to loudly proclaim that he had discovered the holy book in the trash, arguing that his American employers had defiled it.

US personnel headed off a significant crisis by showing their Afghan National Army (ANA) counterparts surveillance footage of the worker placing the Koran in the trash. "We have a good rapport with the ANA," and "[they] didn't buy it," said Captain Thomas Beecroft, a US public affairs officer with 4-9 Infantry.

Nevertheless, seven civilian workers immediately quit their jobs. Another group of workers subsequently left their positions after an investigation cleared the Americans of any wrongdoing. This had been the second time an Afghan worker had tried to stage a fake Koran desecration at FOB Zangabad, and attempts by insurgents to stimulate protests against foreign forces remain a threat.

"The enemy is trying to use different tactics ... their intent was to disrupt our relationship with the Americans," said Major Touryalay, the executive officer for the 2nd Kandak, 1st Brigade, 205th Corps. of the Afghan Army, the unit that is based at FOB Zangabad. "I tasked our intelligence officer to do a background check on everyone who enters the camp, and also to get a guarantee from a member of the Kandahar provincial council in order to work here. All of this is to prevent future problems like this."

Confusion

The war in Panjwai, as elsewhere in Afghanistan, remains fraught with cultural tensions, attempts at insurgent information operations and infiltration, and simple confusion on the battlefield. Another small crisis ignited on March 27, when a US Special Forces ODA (Operational Detachment Alpha) team opened fire on a group of Afghan policemen who said they were conducting poppy eradication at night.

This latest incident was resolved after a flurry of radio calls culminated in the dispatch of Apache helicopters that identified the policeman via their superior vantage and night optics. The district police chief traveled to the scene the following day to address the issue in a long meeting with the green berets. Discernment in the battlefield can be especially problematic in the case of Afghan local or uniform policemen who do not always wear their uniforms; but Major Amadullah, the district executive officer, assured the Americans that his men were dressed in their police garb that night.

"Look at me," he said to Harty. "Have you ever seen me not in my uniform?"

Guardian Angels, Sentinels, and stupid jokes

The American security measures used to combat insider attacks consist of the use of "Guardian Angels" and "Sentinels," personal security detachments that watch over each US engagement with Afghan leaders and personnel. Sentinels are comprised of at least two soldiers who face outward, establishing a perimeter to keep watch on any personnel who may want to attack a meeting or other event. The Guardian Angels are inward-facing security: soldiers who constantly monitor the US personnel who are conducting any engagement, as well as the posture and demeanor of their Afghan counterparts.

Other security measures include guarded and physical segregation of Afghan and American personnel who share secured bases, and the typical practice of Afghan elements taking point when conducting joint patrols. The physical arrangement makes sense as Afghan forces assume the lead in security operations and greet the local population. It is also more difficult to execute a successful green-on-blue attack when US troops are staged to the rear of their Afghan partners, though patrols still sometimes include different Afghan elements mixed throughout the formation.

Of all the standard security measures, one of the most effective counters to insider attacks that result from cultural and operational tensions is the establishment of basic rapport. Contrary to the image presented by green-on-blue statistics, Afghan-American relationships are not always marked by fearful tension, cultural antipathy, and confused or angry gunshots in the dark. Many troops and police officers manage to maintain cordial and even friendly relationships with their foreign counterparts.

"The vast majority of the [Afghans] are trustworthy, they're not going to pull a weapon on you," explained First Lieutenant Ben Cummings, commander of 2nd Platoon, Bayonet Company, 1-38 Infantry. "It's just that one oddball, or the guy that went on leave and got threatened [if he didn't] come back and ... take some shots at Americans. And usually when they shoot at Americans, they shoot at ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) as well. It's rarely just attacking Americans."

The US Guardian Angels who accompanied Major Harty to a meeting with AUP executive officer Amatullah on March 27 kept an eye out for threats, but they also spent time socializing with the police officer's personal security guards. Loud laughter could be heard through the door to Amatullah's quarters during the meeting, and handshakes, stilted English and Pashto, and even a couple of high-fives and man hugs marked the Americans' departure from the police compound.

"We have a pretty good relationship [with the cops] around here," explained one of the US soldiers afterward. "We don't have many problems."

First Lieutenant Cummings, who continues to work with Afghan security forces in another portion of the district, echoed the assessment:

"For the most part, it's easy to work with [Afghans], you just walk in and they're happy to see you, happy to talk with you," the platoon leader explained. "[But the Afghan cops are] usually hesitant to go on patrol with you, unless you have a really good relationship with them, and that just comes with time ... if you go in there and sit down and have a conversation with them every day."

Bill Ardolino's forthcoming book Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheikhs, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda, which tells the story of the tribal Awakening in 2006-2007 that changed the course of the Iraq War, will be published by Naval Institute Press on May 15. All of the author's proceeds from the first edition of the book -- which has received a 'starred' review from Publishers Weekly -- will benefit the Semper Fi Fund for injured service members.

During an operation in the northern province of Baghlan on April 3, Afghan and Coalition special operations forces arrested another leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The raid was the 13th operation this year targeting members of the al Qaeda-linked terror group inside Afghanistan. Based on a study by The Long War Journal, ISAF operations to kill or capture high-value targets from the IMU are at their highest frequency in the war.

According to the International Security Assistance Force, the unnamed IMU commander, who was captured in Baghlan's Burkah district, led a "cell of insurgent fighters" in multiple attacks on both Afghan and Coalition security forces. ISAF would not disclose further information on the fighters in his cell but did tell The Long War Journal that the leader was an Afghan national of Uzbek ethnicity and that "there are indications of Uzbek involvement." The captured leader is also accused of "training potential fighters in insurgency operations," and served a key role in IMU intelligence and IED operations in Baghlan province.

Burkah district has been a persistent stronghold for the IMU. So far this year, three other raids have been conducted in the district targeting IMU leadership. The last raid was on Feb. 9, when another IMU leader who oversaw intelligence for the group and provided safe haven for insurgent fighters, including members of the Taliban, was captured.

Kunduz district in the northern province of Kunduz has also seen four raids already this year targeting high value IMU targets. The last reported raid targeting an IMU member in Kunduz province took place on March 25 in the district, and resulted in the capture of an IMU leader.

And in the Iam Sahib district of Kunduz province, a suicide bombing killed the father and two brothers of the speaker of the lower house of Afghanistan's parliament, Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, on March 13. The next day the governor of Kunduz condemned the attack, saying "the attackers come from abroad and it has global roots, so we will be always face these disasters if they are not completely destroyed."

A few days later, ISAF confirmed to The Long War Journal that on March 15 they had captured an IMU suicide attack coordinator who was behind the Iam Sahib attack. The operative, who was said to have been planning an attack on ANSF forces at the time he was captured, was identified as an Uzbek. As with the April 3 raid, ISAF said of the March 15 raid that "there are indications of Uzbek involvement."

It is not clear why ISAF has increased efforts against the IMU this year, but it could reflect a more active IMU. Afghan and Coalition forces have been conducting raids against the IMU in north Afghanistan for years, but have been unable to stem their operations.

Background on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a key ally of al Qaeda and the Taliban, and supports operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as plots attacks in Europe. The IMU is known to fight alongside the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and has integrated into the Taliban's shadow government in northern Afghanistan. [For more information on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, see LWJ report, IMU cleric urges Pakistanis to continue sheltering jihadis in Waziristan.]

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan fighters often serve as bodyguards for top Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda leaders. Apart from its operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the IMU has stepped up attacks in Central Asian countries as well. In September 2010, the IMU took credit for an ambush that killed 25 Tajik troops, and also threatened to carry out further attacks in the Central Asian country.

The IMU has claimed credit for numerous suicide assaults in Afghanistan, including the May 19, 2010 attack on the US military airbase in Bagram, the Oct. 15, 2011 assault on the Provincial Reconstruction Team base in Panjshir, and the Oct. 29, 2011 suicide attack that targeted an armored bus in Kabul.

The IMU has been a prime target of special operations forces in Afghanistan. Last year, special operations forces conducted at least 38 raids against the IMU; in Badakhshan, Baghlan, Faryab, Logar, Helmand, Kunduz, Takhar, and Wardak, or eight of Afghanistan's 34 provinces; according to ISAF press releases compiled by The Long War Journal.

In October 2012, the US Treasury Department added Qari Ayyub Bashir, the "head of finance" for the IMU, to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Bashir also serves as a member of the group's shura, or executive council. Identified as an Uzbek national, Bashir is based out of Mir Ali, in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan. As the IMU's lead financier, he provides financial and "logistical" support for IMU operations in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and fundraises from outside the region.

Last spring, ISAF killed the two previous IMU leaders for Afghanistan, in raids just a few weeks apart in Faryab province. [See LWJ report, Special operations forces kill newly appointed IMU leader for Afghanistan, for more information.]

Additionally, the US has targeted the IMU's leaders and network in Pakistan's tribal areas. US drones have killed the last two emirs of the IMU. On Aug. 4, 2012, the IMU announced that its emir, Abu Usman Adil, was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan, and named Usman Ghazi as the new leader of the al Qaeda-linked terror group. Adil had succeeded Tahir Yuldashev, the co-founder of the IMU, who was killed in a drone strike in September 2009.

Adil is credited with increasing the IMU's profile in Pakistan and Afghanistan after the death of Yuldashev, US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal. Whereas Yuldashev had been content with confining the group's operations largely to Pakistan's tribal areas, Adil pushed to expand operations in northern and eastern Afghanistan, as well is in the Central Asian republics.

The Taliban claimed credit for a suicide attack in southeastern Afghanistan today that killed three Coalition soldiers and two civilian personnel who worked for the Zabul Provincial Reconstruction Team.

According to both the Taliban and Afghan officials, the suicide bomber targeted Zabul Governor Ashraf Nasiri's convoy in the provincial capital of Qalat. The provincial chief of police said the convoy was struck as it traveled to a school, while the Taliban said they targeted the convoy as it was headed to "a gathering of foreign invaders to visit a newly constructed hospital near the enemy PRT building."

The International Security Assistance Force confirmed that three soldiers and "two coalition civilians" were killed "following an improvised explosive device attack in southern Afghanistan," according to a press release. ISAF did not provide the identities or nationalities of those killed.

The US State Department later confirmed that one of its personnel, along with a Department of Defense employee and three US soldiers were killed after their convoy was attacked. Four more State personnel were wounded in the blast.

Several Afghans were wounded in the attack; the governor's car was damaged but he escaped the attack unhurt.

The Taliban claimed credit for the attack in a statement released at Voice of Jihad, the group's website, which is published in English, Pashto, Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi. The Taliban identified the suicide bomber as "Munir, from the same province's Khak Afghan district," and claimed that "13 invaders were killed and 9 others wounded whereas 1 guard of the governor was also killed with 2 others suffering injuries." The Taliban routinely exaggerate the number of Coalition and Afghan personnel killed in Taliban attacks.

Today's suicide attack is the second of its kind in a remote area of Afghanistan in four days. On April 3, a Taliban suicide assault team killed 44 Afghans in an attack on a courthouse in the southwestern province of Farah.

Taliban, al Qaeda maintain a presence in Zabul

Zabul province remains contested despite the surge in US forces that began in 2010. Last month, Mohammad Daoud Gulzad, the High Peace Council representative in Zabul province, claimed that "there are six districts which are not controlled by the government." There are nine districts in Zabul. And, last September, government officials said that the Taliban were forcing the closure of most of the schools in the province.

The province borders the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, which serves as a safe haven, training center, and recruiting base for the Taliban.

Al Qaeda is also known to maintain a presence in Zabul, and ISAF has targeted al Qaeda operatives in the province. During one such raid in Zabul, on May 8, 2011, Coalition and Afghan special operations forces killed 10 al Qaeda fighters, including one from Saudi Arabia and one from Morocco, and captured a "Germany-based Moroccan al Qaeda foreign fighter facilitator." Security forces also "found passports and identification cards from France, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia amongst ten insurgents killed during the operation."

Zabul was even mentioned by Osama bin Laden in late 2010 as an ideal fallback position for al Qaeda operatives seeking to escape the US drone strikes in North and South Waziristan. Kunar, Nuristan, and Ghazni provinces were also considered to be safe for al Qaeda members, according to one of the documents seized from his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

Screenshot of new Facebook page for supporters of Salafi jihadists imprisoned by Hamas.

Supporters of Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip are increasing their protests against Hamas both online and in public as some Salafi jihadists begin hunger strikes to protest their imprisonment by Hamas.

On April 5, a new Facebook page opened for relatives of Salafi jihadists currently imprisoned by Hamas. As of the evening of April 6, the page had only 285 "likes," but its statements have been promoted on the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center Facebook page, which has existed since August 26, 2012, and on jihadist forums.

The Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, is "the official source for releases from the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) in the Environs of Jerusalem," an al Qaeda-linked group.

On April 5, the new Facebook page released a statement announcing that relatives and supporters of imprisoned Salafi jihadists in Gaza were planning to organize a demonstration on April 6 "to protest the practices of [Hamas] against our righteous sons who are subjected to torture, humiliation and abuse."

On April 6, the protest took place in Rafah; however, according to Agence France Presse, only about 30 people attended before Hamas forces dispersed the demonstration. While AFP said the rally was dispersed without incident, the group released a statement claiming that a couple of the protesters were detained and a journalist was attacked.

Photos of the Salafi protest on April 6 in Rafah.

In a separate statement, which was shared by the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center, the group accused Hamas of imprisoning Salafi jihadists for "many months without any charge or trial." The statement further called on Hamas to immediately "release our sons who suffer injustice and harassment," because they are Salafists.

In addition, it called on Hamas to stop its smear campaigns, arrests, and general persecution of Salafists in the Gaza Strip. The group also accused Palestinian factions and organizations of being "complicit" in Hamas' persecution of Salafi jihadists, due to their "shameful silence."

The statement concluded by saying that the group plans to take further action and will not cease its campaign until Hamas releases imprisoned Salafi jihadists.

In addition to these statements, Sheikh Hossam al Jazzar of the Ibn Baz Islamic Charity condemned Hamas' recent arrests of Salafi jihadists. In a statement published on his Facebook page on April 5, al Jazzar said that the arrests "only serve the interests of the Jews." Al Jazzar himself was summoned for questioning by Hamas in September 2012. And on April 6, Sheikh Nael Mosran similarly called on Hamas "to stop the arbitrary arrests of Salafi youth," in a statement published on his Facebook page.

Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip have long complained about Hamas' targeting of their members. In February, Abdullah Jihad al Ashqar (a.k.a. Abu al-Muhtasib al Maqdisi), an official in the MSC, slammed the arrests of Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip by Hamas. According to al Ashqar, after Abu al Walid al Maqdisi and Ashraf al Sabah, leaders of the MSC, were killed in an air strike by the Israeli Air Force in October 2012, Hamas eased up its pressure on Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip.

In fact, in early December, Hamas reportedly released Abu Hafs al Maqdisi, the leader of a Salafi jihadist group known as Jaish al Ummah (Army of the Nation). But after a few months, "the policy of detaining returned, as did pursuing, kidnapping, and storming homes, and then capturing and torturing in the prisons of the so-called domestic security agency," al Ashqar contended.

Last September, Hamas reportedly arrested over 20 Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip. In response, Abu Abdul Muhajir, a leading Salafi jihadist in Gaza, denounced Hamas for its "unjustified" campaign against Salafi jihadists. A couple months later, Sheikh Anas Abdul Rahman, an official in the MSC, similarly complained that "there is no relationship between the Salafi Jihadis and Hamas and its government, except for through security prosecutions and within prisons."

More recently, the MSC called on "the reasonable people in the Hamas Movement to pressure their government security agencies to release the Salafist Jihadist mujahideen who are held unjustly in their prisons."

Hamas recent campaign against Salafi jihadists

Over the past couple weeks, Hamas has carried out a number of arrests of Salafi jihadists, according to jihadist communiqués. In late March, Hamas forces reportedly arrested two Salafi jihadists in Zawaida, raided the home of a member of the Popular Resistance Committees, and kidnapped a Salafi jihadist in Rafah. Press reports suggest that the two jihadists in Zawaida were connected to the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC), which took credit for a rocket attack on Israel on March 21.

On March 30, the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center warned on its Facebook page that preparations were being made by Hamas to launch a mass campaign of arrests against Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip.

In the past week, the campaign appears to have intensified in response to rocket attacks by the MSC against Israel. According to the MSC, the rocket fire was in response to the recent death of Maisara Abu Hamdiyeh, a Hamas operative. Hamdiyeh, whom Hamas praised for supplying "the Mujahideen with weapons and explosives," died of esophageal cancer at an Israeli hospital on April 2.

On April 2, the MSC claimed to have fired five rockets from Gaza toward Israel. On the same day, Hamas forces reportedly arrested a Salafi jihadist near Rafah.

The following day, the MSC said it had fired six additional rockets toward Israeli territory. Following the rocket attacks, a Salafi jihadist was reportedly detained by Hamas forces near Khan Yunis. The statement from the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center, which announced the arrest, accused Hamas of carrying out an "extensive campaign" against Salafi jihadists in Gaza.

Despite these allegations, Hamas' Interior Ministry recently denied that it has made arrests in recent days for "resistance against the occupation [Israel]." A spokesman for the Interior Ministry said, "[o]ur security apparatus is part of the resistance and does not arrest anyone who resists the occupation. On the contrary, we encourage resistance."

Israeli media outlets have recently reported, however, that Hamas is under heavy pressure from Egypt to quell the rocket fire into Israel and arrest those responsible. And according to the Al Quds newspaper, Hamas recently relayed a message to Israel via Egypt claiming that since the rocket fire, it has tried to control the situation by tightening border areas, calling on factions to abide by the ceasefire that ended Operation Pillar of Defense, and arresting Salafi jihadists responsible for the rocket attacks.

A suicide bomber detonated his explosives-packed vehicle in central Damascus today, killing 16 people and wounding more than 140. The suicide attack is the second in the Syrian capital in two weeks.

The blast took place "near the Central Bank carpark by the Saba' Bahrat square and Shahbandar square," according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which closely monitors the civil war in the country. The group reported that "[t]he dead were mostly civilians, 12 civilians, and there were 4 killed who were from the regular forces."

SANA, the Syrian state-run news agency, described the attack as a "terrorist bombing" and said that it took place in "a crowded area near Salim Bukhari school, Buaeir Mosque and residential buildings."

Today's attack is the third suicide bombing in the Syrian capital in 18 days. The last attack, on March 26, killed three people. The previous suicide attack in Damascus, on March 22, killed Mohammad Said Ramadan al Bouti, a senior Sunni cleric who was a mouthpiece for President Assad.

While no group has claimed credit for the suicide attack in Damascus, it was likely executed by the the Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria.

The Al Nusrah Front has claimed credit for 57 of the 70 suicide attacks that have been reported in Syria since December 2011, according to a tally by The Long War Journal (note that multiple suicide bombers deployed in a single operation are counted as part of a single attack). So far this year, 17 suicide attacks have been reported in Syria; Al Nusrah has claimed credit for 14 of them.

The Al Nusrah Front is one of the most effective groups fighting the government of President Bashar al Assad. It is estimated to have more than 10,000 fighters, and often serves as the vanguard for rebel military operations throughout the country. The Al Nusrah Front has overrun several major military bases throughout Syria. Additionally, the Al Nusrah Front controls much of western Syria, including the provincial capital of Raqqah and a major dam on the Euphrates River. It also controls a section of the border with Jordan and the Israeli-controlled Golan. The Al Nusrah Front has imposed sharia, or Islamic law, in Aleppo and in western Syria.