The Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, has posted pictures and a video on its official Twitter feeds showing a Lebanese soldier who has defected to the jihadists' cause.

The soldier (seen in the photo above) is identified as Mohammad Antar and his military identification is displayed during the video. While sitting and holding his weapon, Antar delivers a speech for the camera. He is flanked by two Nusrah Front fighters and the group's black banner is draped in the background.

Al Nusrah is using the video of Antar in its ongoing propaganda campaign against Iran and Hezbollah. The al Qaeda group is seeking to further provoke Sunnis in Lebanon into a sectarian conflict against Shiites and the Lebanese government.

"I'm the soldier Mohammed Antar from the Rafik Hariri International Airport's guard platoon," the soldier says in Al Nusrah's video. "I announce my defection from the Lebanese army which is supporting the tyrants and defending the 'party of Satan' [Hezbollah]," he adds.

Antar says he has joined Al Nusrah in order "to defend the Sunni community" against Hezbollah and the Lebanese army. He accuses the latter of mistreating Syrian refugees in Arsal. Fighters from the Al Nusrah Front fought against Lebanese forces in Arsal this past summer.

The Al Nusrah Front has repeatedly tried to portray itself as the defender of the refugees, as well as Lebanon's Sunni civilians.

The themes in the brief video of Antar are consistent with other Al Nusrah Front productions. Earlier this month, Al Nusrah released a video showing its raid on a Hezbollah outpost in the town of Brital, which is close to the border with Syria.

Al Nusrah is holding a number of Lebanese soldiers and security officials captive, and the group is using its hostages in its anti-Iran, anti-Hezbollah messaging.

In a statement released on one of its Twitter feeds on Sept. 29, the Al Nusrah Front claimed that Lebanon's general security services had agreed to turn over 10 Syrian refugees to Bashar al Assad's regime. The implication was that Lebanon's security officials are colluding with Assad against Sunnis.

"We warn of a deal that has been reached and of its ramifications on the general security services and its chief, who is under the sway of the Iranian party," meaning Hezbollah, the statement reads. Lebanese officials quickly denied Al Nusrah's allegations.

The Lebanese government is "steered by the Iranian party [Hezbollah]," Al Nusrah continued in its Sept. 29 message, and the people need "to stop this government in its tracks."

Antar's defection to the Al Nusrah Front is not the first time that a Lebanese soldier has renounced his military service. In July, Al Nusrah promoted the defection of another soldier in a video posted online.

Al Nusrah is portraying Antar and other defectors as men who want to defend their fellow Sunnis against the Iranian axis. Al Nusrah will likely continue to promote Lebanese defectors in its propaganda.

The US reportedly killed a senior leader in the newly formed al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent as well as a Taliban commander who serves under Hafiz Gul Bahadar in a pair of drone strikes today in Pakistan's tribal agencies of Khyber and North Waziristan.

In the first strike, CIA-operated remotely piloted Predators or Reapers fired several missiles at a compound in the village of Chancharano Kandaw in Khyber's Tirah Valley, The Express Tribune reported.

Sheikh Imran Ali Siddiqi, who is also known as Haji Shaikh Waliullah, was among the four people killed in the airstrike. Two others were wounded. Usama Mahmood, the top spokesman for AQIS, confirmed that Siddiqi was among those killed, The Express Tribune noted. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent was formed on Sept. 3 and includes elements of some of Pakistan, Afghansitan, and India's most prominent jihadist groups.

The Tirah Valley has served as a haven for senior al Qaeda and other jihadist leaders in the past. In December 2010, the US killed Ibn Amin, the commander of the Tora Bora Brigade, one of six formations in al Qaeda's Lashkar al Zil or Shadow Army, in one of three drone strikes that month.

In the second of today's strikes, the US killed Taliban commander Muhammad Mustafa and three other "foreigners" as they traveled in a vehicle in the village of Maraga in the Shawal Valley in North Waziristan. Mustafa served under Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the senior Taliban leader in North Waziristan who is favored by Pakistan's military and government despite his ties to terrorist groups, according to Dawn.

The Shawal Valley, where today's strike took place, is administered by Bahadar, who provides shelter to senior al Qaeda leaders as well as terrorists from numerous Pakistani and Central Asian terror groups.

The valley spans both North and South Waziristan and is a known haven for al Qaeda and other terror groups operating in the region. A host of Taliban, Pakistani, and foreign terrorist groups gather in the Shawal Valley and then enter Afghanistan to fight US, NATO, and Afghan government forces. [See LWJ report, US launches another 2 drone strikes in North Waziristan, for more information on the Shawal Valley.]

The US has carried out 16 drone strikes inside Pakistan this year; all 16 have taken place since June 11. The US drone program in Pakistan was put on hold from the end of December 2013 up until June 11, 2014 as the Pakistani government attempted to negotiate a peace deal with the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, an al Qaeda-linked group that wages jihad in Afghanistan and seeks to overthrow the Pakistani state.

Seven of the 16 strikes have taken place since Oct. 5. Five of the strikes have taken place in North Waziristan, one in South Waziristan, and the other in Khyber. The recent surge in drone strikes indicates the US is hunting one or more senior al Qaeda leaders. Sheikh Imran Ali Siddiqi, the AQIS leader, and Muhammad Mustafa, the Taliban commander, are the first two high value targets reported killed in the seven most recent strikes.

The Islamic State has released a new video, titled "Blood of Jihad," which features new recruits undergoing training in Iraq's Ninewa province. The total number of recruits shown in the video is more than 100.

US military tents as well as weapons are being used in the training camp, the video makes clear. Each recruit appears to be equipped with either an AK-47, an RPG, or a PK machine gun.

Throughout the video, the recruits undergo live-fire training, weapons training, hand-to-hand combat training, and instruction on how to extract a wounded or dead fighter from a firefight. Before the video ends, an Islamic State ideologue gives a fiery speech to the recruits.

The video is just the latest in many multimedia releases showing Islamic State training camps in Iraq and Syria. Last week, the jihadist group released photos showing the graduation of fighters from the "Shaykh Abu Omar al Baghdadi" training camp in Kirkuk.

The Islamic State has also released images of two other camps in Iraq and Syria. In July, it published photos of another training camp in Ninewa province. Before that, in May, the group announced the existence of the Zarqawi Camp, which is named after the slain founder of al Qaeda in Iraq, on the outskirts of the Syrian capital of Damascus.

Since Aug. 7, when the US air campaign against the Islamic State began, the US has targeted multiple Islamic State training centers in Iraq and Syria in 11 airstrikes. Islamic State training camps were hit in US airstrikes in Mosul on Sept. 18; Raqqah, Abu Kamal, Dier al Zour, and Hasakah on Sept. 22; Raqqah on Sept. 27; Manbij on Sept. 29; again in Raqqah on Oct. 3 and Oct. 8; and near Kobane on Oct. 10. This latest video serves to tout the Islamic State's training infrastructure despite these airstrikes.

Training camps in Iraq and Syria

Jihadist groups in both Iraq and Syria have promoted the existence of various other training camps this year.

In mid-March, the Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, al Qaeda's branch in Syria and a rival of the Islamic State, announced that it is running two training camps in Syria. Its Ayman al Zawahiri Camp was located in the city of Deir al Zour and is named after al Qaeda's current emir (the Islamic State currently controls the city and it is likely this camp is now abandoned). The other camp, whose location was not disclosed, is called the Abu Ghadiya Camp and is named after the leader of the al Qaeda in Iraq facilitation network that was based in eastern Syria. Abu Ghadiya was killed in a US special operations raid in eastern Syria in the fall of 2008. Two days ago, the Al Nusrah Front released pictures from another training camp in Syria, this one located in Idlib province. [See LWJ report, Al Nusrah Front released photos of training camp in northwestern Syria.]

In the beginning of April, the Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar (Army of Emigrants and Supporters, or Muhajireen Army), a group of foreign fighters led by commanders from the Caucasus, released video of its training camp in Aleppo province. The video included footage of a bomb-making class.

And in June, an Uzbek jihadist group known as the Imam Bukhari Jamaat released a video of its training camp in Syria. The camp is thought to be located in Aleppo province. The group is allied with the Al Nusrah Front and Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar.

These photos and videos of training camps are reminiscent of others released by al Qaeda from the network of camps in Afghanistan during the 1990s. Al Qaeda used camps such as Khalden and Al Farouq to churn out thousands of foreign fighters who fought alongside the Taliban in the 55th Arab Brigade. But al Qaeda also selected graduates of the camps to conduct attacks in the West, including the Sept. 11, 2001 operation against the US.

Iraqi and Syrian towns and cities seized by the Islamic State and its allies. Map created by Patrick Megahan and Bill Roggio for The Long War Journal. Click to view larger map.

The Islamic State has killed the top police commander for Anbar province, in an IED attack today in a village that is home to the anti-jihadist Awakening in Ramadi. The assassination is the latest blow to Iraq's beleaguered security forces in the western province.

General Ahmad Sadak al Dulaymi, Anbar's police chief, was patrolling the village of Albu Risha when the Islamic State targeted his convoy with two IEDs, or improvised explosive devices, earlier today. The police general and three bodyguards were killed in the attack, according to The New York Times.

Iraqi security forces imposed a province-wide curfew after Sadak was assassinated, All Iraq News reported.

General Sadak is the latest senior security official to be assassinated in Anbar. In early June, an Islamic State suicide bomber killed Mohammed Khamis Abu Risha, a top commander in the Anbar Awakening, an anti al Qaeda and Islamic State tribal force, in an attack in Ramadi. Mohammed Khamis commanded hundreds of Awakening fighters. He was also was the nephew of Ahmed Abu Risha, the leader of the Anbar Awakening and the Albu Risha tribe. [See LWJ report, ISIS suicide bomber kills Anbar Awakening leader.]

Ahmed and his family have been the targets of multiple ISIS suicide and conventional attacks over the years. Ahmed's brother, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who founded the Awakening in 2006, was killed in a suicide attack in September 2007.

In the past, the Islamic State has capitalized on the assassination of senior security officials in Anbar to expand its control in the province. The Islamic State's initial takeover of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi, the provincial capital of Anbar, in January 2014 was preceded by a decapitation attack on the leadership of the 7th Iraqi Army Division, which is based in Anbar. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda suicide team kills Iraqi general, 17 officers.]

The 7th Division's commander and the commander of the 28th Brigade were among the 18 officers who were killed after three suicide bombers attacked them in a home in the remote western town of Rutbah on Dec. 21. Less than two weeks after the attack, the Islamic State launched its offensive in Anbar.

Today's assassination in Anbar is the latest in a series of setbacks for Iraq's security forces in the province. Within the past several weeks, the Islamic State has routed an armored column in Albu Aytha, just north of Ramadi; overrun Iraqi bases in Saqlawiyah and Alsigir north of Fallujah; and taken control of the town of Hit, which is just west of Ramadi, and surrounding areas. [For more details, see LWJ reports, Islamic State seizes Hit, assaults Iraqi military headquarters in Anbar, Islamic State ambushes Iraqi military column near Ramadi, Islamic State overruns Iraqi military base in Anbar, and Islamic State photos detail rout of Iraqi Army at Camp Saqlawiya.]

The Islamic State has made these recent gains despite US and allied airstrikes that are supporting Iraqi forces in Anbar. Since Aug. 7, when airstrikes by the US-led coalition in Iraq began, the US has launched 50 airstrikes against the Islamic State in Anbar province, according to data compiled by The Long War Journal and Qualitative Military Edge.

The Islamic State holds most of Anbar province, with the exception of Fallujah and its dam. Half of Ramadi is said to be under Islamic State control, and an Iraqi official recently said the Islamic State controls all of the areas outside the provincial capital.

Berlin: There is a growing sense among leading German politicians that the Federal Republic's preoccupation with the NSA surveillance scandal should not overshadow the pressing need to confront the Islamic State.

"German worry over Islamist attack eclipses spy scandal," Bloomberg News headlined its Oct. 8 report on the issue. A new reality appears to be sinking in. Roderich Kiesewetter, a Bundestag deputy from Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union and a former army colonel, was quoted as saying, "In the German public, there is more of an awareness that our intelligence services need information to confront these terror threats."

Some German politicians from powerful opposition parties, the Greens and the Left Party, have called for US airstrikes on Islamic State positions near the besieged city of Kobane in northern Syria. This call has come despite the Greens' and the Left Party's traditional anti-Americanism and hardline anti-intervention policies.

According to German authorities, an estimated 450 German Muslims have gone to fight against the Syrian regime. Most of the 450 sought membership with Islamic State. Roughly 40 women and a 13-year-old boy are among those who have departed for Syria. Die Welt provides a helpful systematic breakdown of "German Jihadists in Syria."

A spokeswoman for Germany's intelligence agency told this writer that the government cannot track individuals traveling to Turkey because the country does not require visas. European jihadists frequently use southern Turkey as an entry point into Syria.

Germany's interior ministry is struggling to modernize its counterterrorism policies. On Oct. 2, Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere acknowledged, "The situation has changed over the last few months." Germany outlawed Islamic State activities in September. In the same month, a Frankfurt court started the trial of 20-year-old Kreshnik Berisha for membership in the Islamic State; it is the first terrorism trial of an Islamic State member in Germany. Berisha, who was born in Germany to Kosovan parents, was arrested in December 2013.

De Maiziere stressed the need for more sophisticated surveillance mechanisms to track Islamist combatants. He cited revocation of passports and identity cards as ways to combat terrorism.

German officials are tangled up in knots over Islamic State. While they recognize the threat, there has been little appetite over the years to clamp down on jihadist networks in the country. In short, Berlin's lax policies toward terrorist groups have contributed to its Islamic State crisis.

It is worth recalling that Hezbollah's so-called political wing is legal in the country. According to Germany's national domestic intelligence report covering 2013, and published in June 2014, Hezbollah has 950 active members in the Federal Republic. There are also roughly 6,300 radical Islamists in Germany who are supporters of the Sunni branch of Salafism, Interior Minister de Maiziere said last week. Many of these Salafists are connected to the ideologies of al Qaeda, Shabaab, or the Islamic State.

Germany's latest domestic intelligence report described the growth of Salafists as the most "dynamic Islamic movement" in Germany.

An estimated 150 radical Islamists have returned from the Middle East war theater to Germany. In recent days, the battle for the northern Syrian town of Kobane, where Islamic State fighters are carrying out an assault on Kurdish civilians and fighters, has had repercussions in Germany. On Oct. 7, pro-Islamic State Muslims fought Kurds in the city of Hamburg, resulting in 14 people being injured and 22 arrests. The police used water cannons to disperse the street battle [see video from Online Focus].

In an eye-popping report last week, Germany's ARD television station stated that over the years authorities allowed -- and even encouraged -- the travel of German Islamists to foreign countries. The policy appeared to be a kind of "export of terror" designed to reduce the risk domestically. "Persons who are dangerous and could launch attacks are brought outside of the country," a government official said.

"Germany is on the way to be world champion in terrorism export," one commentator wrote in Die Welt newspaper in 2010. The author was not referencing the green light from German authorities for jihadists to leave for the Afghanistan and Pakistan war theaters, but rather the sheer number of radical German Muslims departing for conflict zones. The ARD report helps to explain why so many radical German Islamists have enjoyed unrestricted movement.

The chief destination for German jihadists now is to fight in Syria, Die Welt reported last week. German intelligence agencies also believe that jihadists who were based in terror camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan are now in Syria or on their way there. Pakistani jihadist networks -- ranging from al Qaeda to the Taliban to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan -- have attracted German Muslims to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The large number of Germans gave rise to so-called "German colonies" in the region.

According to German security information obtained by Die Welt, the German-Moroccans Yassin and Mounir Chouka and their wives, Nele Ch. and Luisa S., as well as Seynabou S. from Hamburg, along with children, relocated from Pakistan to Syria. It is unclear if the terrorists made it to Syria. Some of the group's children were born in terror camps in Pakistan. While in Pakistan, the Choukas joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Now, they have declared allegiance to Islamic State.

The Choukas, who are originally from the western German city of Bonn, motivated Arid Uka, a 24-year-old radical Islamist and Kosovo native who worked at Frankfurt's airport, to murder two American airmen and wound two others in March 2011. Uka was sentenced to life in prison but Germany's liberal judicial system may release him after 18 years of prison time.

Another German jihadist, former rapper Denis Cuspert a.k.a. singer Deso Dogg, is said to be in Syria and has been linked to both the Islamic State and al Qaeda's Al Nusrah Front. Germany plans to submit his name for inclusion in the UN's sanctions list, Der Spiegel reported on Oct. 5.

While issuing rhetorical support for strikes on Islamic State, the Merkel administration decided not to join US president Barack Obama's airstrike coalition in Iraq and Syria to knock out Islamic State fighters and sites. Merkel did, however, send military arms to the Kurds and military personnel to train the Kurdish fighters.

It is unclear why President Obama chose not to twist Germany's arm to join his anti-Islamic State airstrike coalition. Commentators in Germany believe the Merkel administration could do much more to stem Islamic State violence. In a late September commentary in Germany's mass circulation paper Bild, the headline screamed, "All Talk, no action!"

Benjamin Weinthal reports on European affairs for The Jerusalem Post, and is a Berlin-based research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow Benjamin on Twitter @BenWeinthal

The Taliban ambushed an Afghan military convoy in the once-peaceful northern province of Sar-i-Pul today, killing more than 20 security personnel and capturing a handful more.

The ambush took place in the Laghman Valley in Sar-i-Pul province, Abdul Jabbar Haqbin, the provincial governor, told news agencies in a press conference today. Taliban fighters launched their ambush from the mountains as a combined police and military convoy moved through the area, which is near Sar-i-Pul City, the provincial capital.

The Taliban killed 22 policemen and soldiers and captured eight more. Eight additional security personnel were wounded during heavy fighting. Twelve vehicles were "totally destroyed," the governor said.

Haqbin also claimed that "23 Taliban rebels including their commander Mullah Nadir have been killed" during the fighting.

The governor is likely referring to Mullah Mohammad Nadir Haqjo bin Merza Raheem, who in 2009 was identified as the Taliban's shadow governor for Sar-i-Pul. A Mullah Nadir was captured by Afghan forces sometime in 2010.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for today's attack in Sar-i-Pul on their website, Voice of Jihad.

"The prolonged clash resulted in the death of 40 hireling gunmen [Afghan soldiers and police] with 13 others wounded and 6 captured alive by Mujahideen as well as 6 enemy vehicles wrecked," the Taliban said.

The Taliban reported that only one of their fighters was "rewarded with martyrdom" while two others were wounded during the fighting. The jihadist group did not report the death of Mullah Nadir or any other senior Taliban leader.

The Taliban also claimed to have seized "8 enemy pickup trucks, 4 APCs [armored personnel carriers], 2 logistics trucks and a Crane truck ... along with 15 PKM machine guns, 3 Dshck [DShK] heavy machine guns, 3 RPG launcher, a sniper [rifle], 3 mortar launchers, 8 rifles and other equipment."

Sar-i-Pul province is a known stronghold for the Taliban and the allied Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is closely linked to both the Taliban and al Qaeda. As US forces began to "surge" in the Afghan south in 2010, the Taliban began to expand their operations in Sar-i-Pul and other northern provinces. By late 2010, between 500 to 600 Taliban and foreign fighters, including "some Arab, Uzbek and Pakistani militants," were reported to be operating in the province, particularly in the district of Kohestanat.

In early 2011, the International Security Assistance Force noted the location of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan-linked suicide camps in both Sar-i-Pul and in the neighboring province of Samangan when it announced that a raid targeted "a key power player" in the Afghan north.

ISAF said at the time that the targeted jihadist "is assessed to have ties to foreign fighter facilitation and suicide training camps operating in Sar-i-Pul province," and personally commands an estimated 60 Taliban fighters. ISAF uses the term "foreign fighters" to describe al Qaeda operatives and members of affiliated terror groups operating in Afghanistan.

The IMU-linked commander was not captured, and both the IMU and the Taliban continue to maintain a presence in Sar-i-Pul and elsewhere in the Afghan north.

In the past several days, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has carried out and claimed credit for four separate attacks in Yemen's eastern Hadramout province. These operations, which took place between Oct. 9 and Oct. 13, include a suicide bombing and the assassination of a high-ranking military official and have resulted in the deaths of about 40 Yemeni soldiers.

AQAP's increased terrorist activity in Yemen comes in the context of the ongoing Houthi rebellion rocking the country. AQAP has declared an open war against the Shiite Houthis and has stepped up its attacks against both the rebels and the Yemeni military, whom AQAP accuses of colluding with the Houthis.

AQAP claims credit for Oct. 9 Hadramout suicide bombing

On Oct. 11, a Twitter account affiliated with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released a statement claiming credit for the Oct. 9 attack on a military checkpoint in eastern Hadramout province that was carried out simultaneously with a suicide bombing in Sana'a. The Hadramout attack took place at a military checkpoint on the outskirts of Mukallah, the provincial capital.

At the time, a military source in the area claimed that an AQAP suicide bomber killed 10 soldiers when he detonated a car bomb at a checkpoint near the town of Buroom at the western entrance to Mukallah. Medical sources reported that following the attack, four additional Yemeni soldiers were found dead at the site and six others died from their wounds, raising the casualty figure to 20 soldiers. AQAP fighters also reportedly set fire to several vehicles and a small building at the checkpoint. Other sources reported that the AQAP fighters managed to seize two military vehicles and a tank during the course of the assault.

The AQAP statement released on Oct. 11 claimed that the attack on the "Houthi-turned-army" claimed the lives of 37 Yemeni soldiers. The statement clarified that the assault began with a suicide bombing carried out by Muwwahed al Qayfi, who detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at a military checkpoint in the Ghabr region of Hadramout's coast. AQAP claimed that this initial explosion killed 20 Yemeni soldiers and wounded 17 others, and also noted that a group of soldiers fled the scene by boarding boats on the Arabian Sea.

Additional AQAP attacks in Hadramout on Oct. 11

AQAP also claimed credit for two additional attacks in Hadramout province on Oct. 11 that killed three Yemeni soldiers, including a colonel in Yemen's Political Security Organization (PSO).

According to Arabic media outlets, the first attack on Oct. 11 targeted a military convoy belonging to the 135th brigade traveling through Hadramout's historic Shibam city. An AQAP statement released the same day claimed that AQAP fighters ambushed a Special Forces convoy in Shibam with an improvised explosive device (IED) at 11:30 am. The statement alleged that the Special Forces soldiers were in the process of garrisoning the al Houta - Shibam expressway in advance of the arrival of a military force coming from the city of Seyoun. A separate AQAP statement released on Oct. 13 claimed that this operation killed six Yemeni soldiers.

Initial reports of the second attack, which took place in the city of al Shihr in Hadramout on the evening of Oct. 11, claimed that it was carried out by "militants believed to belong to al Qaeda." Armed fighters riding a motorbike shot and killed Abdo Khamees Abd al Mawlaa,a retired colonel in Yemen's Political Security Organization (PSO), near his house in the city before fleeing the scene.

An AQAP statement released shortly after the attack claimed that mujahideen shot al Mawla in the al Majoura neighborhood in central al Shihr, resulting in his immediate death before he could be taken to a hospital. The statement also denied media reports claiming that al Mawla was a retired colonel and emphasized that he was employed by the Political Security Organization "till the date of his death."

Both AQAP statements regarding the two Oct. 11 Hadramout attacks boasted that "for four months, Hadramout has witnessed increased operational activity by Ansar al Shariah against units of the Yemeni Houthi-turned-army which inflicted exorbitant human and material losses." The statement following al Mawla's assasination also claimed that many Yemeni soldiers are actively spreading rumors of their leaving the military in order to avoid AQAP assassinations, which have increased in recent years.

AQAP attacks Yemeni military in Hadramout on Oct. 13

On Oct. 13, AQAP claimed credit for yet another attack targeting Yemeni soldiers at a military patrol in the al Ghurfa region of Hadramout province. The AQAP statement released that day claimed that the mujahideen planted an IED on the road linking the cities of Seyoun and al Houta in the Hadramout Valley. The explosive was allegedly detonated at 8:30 a.m. and targeted a Yemeni military armored vehicle traveling along the road. The statement did not provide any details about the numbers of casualties or wounded, but said "a number of soldiers in the Yemeni military" were killed and that a number of others were wounded.

Sirajeddine Zurayqat has called on Sunnis in Lebanon to fight Hezbollah. This image, along with his call to arms, was posted on Zurayqat's official Twitter feed.

The leader of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB), an al Qaeda-linked group, has called on Sunnis in Lebanon to attack Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed terrorist organization.

Sirajeddine Zurayqat, who has been reportedly named the new emir of the AAB, called for the anti-Hezbollah attacks in a series of posts on his official Twitter feed on Oct. 13. The tweets have also been collected into a single statement from the AAB leader.

Zurayqat addresses "our youth in Tripoli," saying they should strike Hezbollah fighters and positions, not the Lebanese Army. Hezbollah is the "puppet master" behind the Army and Lebanon's security services, Zurayqat writes, and it is Hezbollah that has turned the government against the nation's Sunnis.

"Therefore, strike the puppet master and do not get preoccupied with the tools. If the head is broken, the hands become paralyzed," Zurayqat argues in a tweet translated by The Daily Star. "You have [Hezbollah's] centers, checkpoints, supply lines, leaders and members across Lebanon. Kill them and avenge the children of Lebanon and Syria."

The AAB leader also argues that Hezbollah has been Israel's "loyal guard" since 1996. He attempts to recast the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel as "nothing more than breaking the rules of engagement." By failing to continue with the war, Zurayqat says, Hezbollah has provided international legitimacy for Israel's existence.

Zurayqat's words are intended to undermine public perceptions of Hezbollah as an effective anti-Israeli fighting force. Ironically, Iran and other allied groups have done more to fight Israel than the AAB or any other al Qaeda-backed group. But the AAB and other al Qaeda-allied groups have claimed responsibility for smaller attacks on Israel, including during the conflict this past summer.

Zurayqat's call to fight Hezbollah is consistent with the anti-Iranian propaganda campaign being waged by the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria. Al Nusrah operates in Lebanon and has called upon Sunnis in the country to rise up against the Lebanese government, Hezbollah and their Iranian-backers.

Both Al Nusrah and the Islamic State, a former branch of al Qaeda, have fought against Lebanese forces and Hezbollah. There are even persistent reports indicating that Al Nusrah and the Islamic State have conducted joint operations in Lebanon despite their bitter rivalry in Syria.

In August, Al Nusrah and the Islamic State took a number of Lebanese servicemen hostage, killing several of them after the negotiations to free them stalled. The Al Nusrah Front has blamed Hezbollah and Iran for the failure to reach a deal that would free the captives. And Al Nusrah has used its hostages in videos that are intended to sway public opinion in Lebanon against the government and Hezbollah.

In September, Zurayqat addressed the Lebanese hostages in an audio recording that was released online. He blamed the men for joining the Lebanese Army, saying "if you fight the Sunnis there is nothing between you and us except the sword." According to Al Akhbar, Zurayqat threatened, "The mujahideen took Iraq in days, and in days they can be in the center of Beirut too."

The AAB has conducted attacks against Iranian interests in Lebanon. In November 2013, the group claimed credit for twin suicide attacks outside of the Iranian embassy in Beirut. Nearly two dozen people, including an Iranian cultural attache, were killed and more than 150 others were wounded in the blasts.

Al Qaeda leader Ahmed Abdulrahman Sihab Ahmed Sihab, who is also known as Abdulrahman al Sharqi, from a tweet by a jihadist from the Islamic State.

Jihadists linked to the Islamic State reported that a wanted Bahraini citizen who served as a leader in al Qaeda's external operations branch has been killed. The al Qaeda leader is on the US list of specially designated global terrorists for training "members of al Qaeda in terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures."

Two known supporters of the Islamic State tweeted on Oct. 13 that Ahmed Abdulrahman Sihab Ahmed Sihab, who is also known as Abdulrahman al Sharqi, was killed. The tweets were obtained and translated by The Long War Journal. The date and location of Sihab's death were not disclosed by the two jihadists.

"May Allah accept him [Sihab] and have mercy upon him and let him reside in the vast gardens," one of the jihadists tweeted.

Sihab's death has not been officially confirmed. Al Qaeda has not released a statement announcing his death, nor have leaders who are on social media stated that he has been killed.

One of the Islamic State jihadists claimed that a "spy" who "placed the chip" that allowed Sihab to be found, presumably by the CIA, "was arrested" and "executed." If true, this would indicate that Sihab was killed in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. The same jihadist claimed that Sihab survived a previous drone strike along with Abdullah al Adam, al Qaeda's former intelligence chief who was later killed in a drone strike in April 2013.

Before his death, Sihab was "appointed in charge of the foreign work [operations] for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, which made America search for him and vigorously!" the same jihadist tweeted.

A member of al Qaeda's external operations council

The term foreign operations is used to describe what is also known as al Qaeda's external operations branch, which directs attacks against the US and its allies.

Sihab was known to plan terrorist attacks and train al Qaeda members for external operations. The US State Department, in its July 17, 2012 designation of Shihab, said he "has been publicly charged [in Bahrain] with planning terrorist attacks as a member of al Qaeda."

"Sihab has trained members of al Qaeda in terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures," the designation continued.

At the time of his designation as a global terrorist by the US, American intelligence officials told The Long War Journal that Sihab is "an extremely dangerous individual, one we would like to get our hands on." [See LWJ report, US adds Bahraini citizen to terror list for serving as al Qaeda trainer.]

It is unclear if Sihab was a the overall leader of al Qaeda's external operations council, which in itself is part of al Qaeda's military council, or one of several council members.

In February, The New York Times reported that Abdullah al Shami, the nom de guerre for an American citizen, was "one of al Qaeda's top planners for operations outside Pakistan, including plots against American troops in Afghanistan." In March, CNN reported that al Shami "may now be heading that group's efforts to plan external attacks."

Another American, Adnan Shukrijumah, is also known to be a member of al Qaeda's external operations council and is said to be the group's operations chief in North America. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda sleeper agent tied to 2009 NYC subway plot.]

Sihab's death reported by Islamic State fighters

The reports of Sihab's death by Islamic State fighters, who claimed he was "a lover of the Islamic State and its soldiers," is interesting, and may be explained by the fact that at least one of the jihadists is known to be a Bahraini citizen. There is no indication that Sihab joined the Islamic State.

The Bahraini jihadist who tweeted about his death said that Sihab "was a preacher of the monotheistic [tawhid] method in #Bahrain and he graduated students who became soldiers of the Islamic state."

The final rift between al Qaeda and the Islamic State did not occur until March of this year, when al Qaeda's General Command disowned the group. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the Islamic State's emir, refused to follow Ayman al Zawahiri's order to quit the jihad in Syria for Iraq and reconcile with the Al Nusrah Front, which is al Qaeda's official branch in the Levant. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda's general command disowns the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham.]

Sihab likely taught jihadists who were part of al Qaeda's network in Iraq and Syria, and at least some of his trainees then sided with the Islamic State after its fallout with al Qaeda.

Local officials in Yemen's southern Shabwa province reported that an American drone strike killed four al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) fighters today including a local emir. Today's strike is the first reported in Yemen in nearly three weeks.

The strike, which was launched by remotely piloted Predators or Reapers, targeted a vehicle traveling in the town of Bani Assaf in the Gol al Rayda district of Mayfa'a in Shabwa province, according to reports. Locals claimed that all the passengers in the vehicle were killed and that among the dead was an AQAP commander named Mahdi Badas, who also went by the nom-de-guerre Abu Hussein.

As commonly occurs following reports of a US drone strike in Yemen, the Yemeni Ministry of Defense claimed that the strike was carried out by the Yemeni air force. The ministry confirmed that AQAP commander Mahdi Badas was killed in the strike and described him as the "AQAP emir in Shabwa province." The Yemeni military does not possess the capability to accurately target moving vehicles.

Shabwa has long served as a stronghold for AQAP fighters, and they are thought to be still active in the area despite a Yemeni offensive to root out the group from the southern provinces in late April. For instance, as recently as Oct. 14, AQAP carried out two attacks in Shabwa targeting both the local, pro-government Popular Committees and the Yemeni military, killing a Yemeni Army brigade commander.

Today's strike is the first reported by the US in Yemen since Sept. 26. Two AQAP operatives were reported killed in the strike in the northern province of Al Jawf.

The previous strike, on Sept. 25 in Shabwa, reportedly killed Adel Hardaba, an AQAP commander, and Muhader Ahmad Muhader, a leader in Ansar al Sharia, AQAP's political front.

The US has launched 20 strikes in Yemen so far this year. The US ramped up its air campaign in Yemen in 2009, and has launched 103 air and cruise missile strikes in the country since the program was expanded. Prior to 2009, the US launched one airstrike, in 2002, against al Qaeda in Yemen.

The US continues to target AQAP, which is considered to be one of al Qaeda's most dangerous branches, despite the virtual collapse of the Yemeni government. Shia Houthi rebels, who are not friendly to the US, have taken control of Sana'a, the nation's capital, and the cities of Hodeidah and Dhamar over the past several weeks. The US has relied on the central government and Yemeni military and intelligence service to provide political support and targeting information to strike at AQAP's network.

On Oct. 14, the Shiite Houthi rebels who have posed a challenge to Yemen's central government made sweeping military gains in the country, seizing the significant port city of Hodeidah on the Red Sea coast as well as the central city of Dhamar. These gains come less than a month after the Houthi's swift seizure of Sana'a on Sept. 22 following days of massive protests in the capital.

Arabic media sources claimed that the Houthi rebels took over the coastal city of Hodeidah without any resistance from the Yemeni authorities. Hodeidah, located abot 220 kilometers west of Sana'a, is the fourth largest city in the country as well as a strategically significant port city on the Red Sea. The city is also home to the country's largest oil refinery. Some Arabic sources speculated that the takeover of Hodeidah strengthens suspicions that the rebels are in need of a port city presumably to ensure access to more weapons and supplies.

The takeover reportedly began the previous day, on Oct. 13, when Houthi fighters wearing military uniforms began spreading out into the city and its surrounding areas. By Oct. 14, Houthi fighters could be seen consolidating their power along all of the main roads in the city. The rebels also managed to seize control of the city's airport and main military base and were seen concentrating their forces in these vital locations. Some reports also suggested that the Houthis besieged an ammunition storage facility close to the city and captured it prior to launching their advance.

Eye witnesses in Hodeidah claimed that the Houthi fighters set up checkpoints at the main entrance to the city as well as on its main streets. Reports also emerged that the rebels have raided the residence of Brigader Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a prominent Yemeni military figure who has been outspoken about his opposition to the Houthis.

In conjunction with their takeover of the Hodeidah, Houthi rebels also reportedly increased their presence in the city of Dhamar in central Yemen, manning at least 6 military checkpoints, including at the entrances to the city and in front of government buildings. As was the case in Hodeidah, no resistance from the Yemeni authorities was reported.

With the increased Houthi control over Hodeidah and Dhamar on Oct. 14, the rebels control large swaths of the Yemeni north. They have successfully extended their control south from their strongholds in Sa'ada and Amran to Sana'a in late September, and their increased checkpoints in Dhamar brings them even further south. The Houthi advance west to Hodeidah effectively cordoned off a lion's share of northwest Yemen.

The Houthis, who have been at war with the Yemeni government since 2004, have been strongly opposed to one of the central tenets of Yemen's National Dialogue Conference that concluded in January 2014. Namely, the Houthis reject a federal system in Yemen which would divide the country into six regions and would also link Sa'ada province, the Houthis' home base and stronghold, with Sana'a. By increasing their influence in large sections of northwestern Yemen, the Houthis are attempting to redraw the regional borders to their liking and creating facts on the ground to bolster their argument for the Yemeni north to be designated its own region.

While the Houthis have been on the advance, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been capitalizing on the security vacuum and increasing its operations in the country. Only a day after the Houthis staged a lightning-fast sweep of Sana'a on Sept. 22, AQAP released a scathing sectarian diatribe, declaring an open war against the Houthis and calling on fellow Sunnis to take up arms. Since then, AQAP has escalated its terrorist activity throughout Yemen. The group has carried out attacks in nearly half of Yemen's 21 provinces, targeting both the Houthis and the Yemeni military, which AQAP accuses of collusion with the rebels. AQAP is even using the term "the Houthi-turned-army" (al-jaysh al-mutahaweth) in its propaganda, in a bid to galvanize popular support against the Yemeni military.

AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmood posted this image of Sheikh Imran Ali Siddiqi on his official Twitter feed on Oct. 11. Mahmood confirmed that Imran had been killed in a US air strike.

Usama Mahmood, the spokesman for al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), announced on Oct. 11 that a veteran jihadist named Sheikh Imran Ali Siddiqi (a.k.a. Haji Shaikh Waliullah) had been killed in a US drone strike. On his official Twitter feed, Mahmood explained that Imran had been waging jihad since 1990 and that he was a member of the AQIS shura council at the time of his death.

Imran's career provides insight into the makeup of al Qaeda's newest branch.

Ayman al Zawahiri and other al Qaeda officials announced the creation of AQIS in early September, explaining that it was two years in the making. Mahmood said in his own statement at the time that AQIS was formed by gathering together "several jihadi groups that have a long history in jihad and fighting."

While al Qaeda did not specify which groups agreed to join the umbrella organization, its messages provided some clues. Mahmood listed a number of "martyrs" who had paved the way for AQIS' creation. The fallen jihadists served in several al Qaeda-linked groups, and the implication of Mahmood's praise was that these organizations, or at least elements from them, had been folded into AQIS.

Some of the jihadists mentioned by Mahmood worked for Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which has been closely allied with al Qaeda since well before 9/11 and maintains active training camps inside Afghanistan to this day.

Imran's jihadist career began in HUM. After the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Imran formed an offshoot of the group named Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Almi (HUMA), which has been tied to several attacks against Western interests in Pakistan.

Imran, Muhammad Hanif (Imran's deputy), and some of their subordinates were also suspected of plotting to kill Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf on April 26, 2002. According to contemporaneous Pakistani press reports, they planned to detonate a remote-controlled explosive device packed inside a car near Musharraf's motorcade. The device failed to ignite and Musharraf was spared.

Imran and Hanif were arrested in July 2002 and later sentenced to ten years in prison for their terror roles. In addition to the plot to kill Musharraf, they were suspected of orchestrating an attack on French engineers and the US Consulate in Karachi. Some of the charges were later dropped.

After Imran was freed from prison, he was quickly integrated into al Qaeda's ranks, becoming one of AQIS' top officials.

HUMA and al Qaeda

Imran's HUMA has longstanding ties to al Qaeda.

HUMA's parent organization, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), is led by Fazle-ur-Rahman Khalil. Osama bin Laden counted Khalil among his most trusted allies. Khalil was one of the several jihadist leaders who signed bin Laden's infamous 1998 fatwa declaring war against the US. In late September, the US Treasury Department added Khalil to the government's list of specially designated global terrorists. Treasury specifically referenced Khalil's personal relationship with bin Laden and support for al Qaeda's operations. [See LWJ report, US adds Harakat-ul Mujahideen's emir to terrorism list.]

Published accounts differ as to whether Imran's HUMA was really a new entity, or simply a front for HUM in the post-9/11 world. Regardless, HUMA's leaders had their own ties to al Qaeda.

In 2004, Pakistani officials arrested a HUMA member named Kamran Atif after a shootout between the jihadists and the police. Atif was identified as one of the principal conspirators responsible for the attempted assassination of President Musharraf in April 2002.

A memo prepared by Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) in May 2004, less than two weeks after Atif's arrest, contains intelligence collected from Atif by Pakistani authorities. The JTF-GTMO memo was authored as a threat assessment for Mohammad Ilyas, a Pakistani then held in Cuba who was suspected of being "one of the recruiters and leaders at the Mansehra Jihad Training Camp located at Mansehra, Pakistan." The "training camp is controlled by the Harakat-ul-Mujahidin al-Alami (HUMA) organization," JTF-GTMO found.

Seeking to place Ilyas' jihadist role into context, JTF-GTMO's analysts noted:

Kamran Atif, a terrorist who was recently arrested by the Pakistani Crime Investigation Department (CID) Police revealed that HUMA has links with Al-Qaeda and that HUMA and AQ are "in complete contact with each other."

JTF-GTMO went on to describe HUMA as a "Tier 1 terrorist target" for the US government. Organizations placed in this category are "terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests."

Under Imran's leadership, HUMA had proven its intent and capability to strike US interests on June 14, 2002, nearly two years before the JTF-GTMO memo was written. On that day, a car bomb killed twelve and wounded dozens more at the US Consulate in Karachi. There are conflicting accounts as to whether or not a suicide bomber was responsible. But Pakistani investigators told the press that the car blown up outside of the American diplomatic facility was the same one Atif and his HUMA co-conspirators had used in their failed attempt to kill Musharraf.

American and Pakistani officials were initially confused as to the identity of terrorist organization responsible for the US Consulate bombing. A previous unknown group calling itself al Qanoon (or "the law") claimed responsibility the attack in a handwritten message faxed to leading news organizations. "America and its allies and its slave Pakistani rulers should prepare for more attacks," the statement read, according to press accounts at the time. "This bomb attack is just a beginning of al Qanoon's jihad operation in Pakistan."

Officials suspected that the name "al Qanoon" was simply a cover employed by al Qaeda and its allies. For example, on June 15, 2002, the morning after the attack, CNN ran a segment titled, "Is Al Qanoon Connected to al Qaeda?" The "highlight" published in the transcript of the segment reads: "In Washington, the State Department suspects Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network had a hand in yesterday's bombing attack in Pakistan, for which a previously unknown group named Al Qanoon claimed responsibility." The State Department's suspicion did not fade away. In its annual report on terrorism for 2002, State noted that al Qaeda or al Qanoon "is possibly responsible."

Foggy Bottom suspected that al Qaeda was behind another attack that involved HUMA operatives just weeks earlier.

On May 8, 2002, a car bomb struck a bus carrying French naval engineers in front of the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi. Ten French workers and 2 Pakistanis were killed, while another 19 (11 French nationals and 8 Pakistanis) were wounded. In its year-end report on terrorism for 2002, the State Department found that al Qaeda "is probably responsible." According to some accounts, the Sheraton attack was the first suicide attack utilizing a vehicle in post-9/11 Pakistan.

French investigators later posited that the May 2002 attack was actually orchestrated by Pakistani intelligence officials. The theory is based on the idea that French officials had been paying bribes and kickbacks to their Pakistani counterparts as part of a submarine deal. When the French discontinued the payments, the theory goes, Pakistani officials decided to exact retribution in the form of a car bombing.

A simpler explanation seems more likely. We cannot rule out the possibility that some current or former Pakistani officials assisted HUMA in its attacks. However, such support is consistent with deep seeded opposition to the American-led "war on terror," which was new at the time. Significant parts of the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment continued to sponsor the jihadists even after Musharraf decided to provide some support to the US-led war effort. And corruption has not been identified as a proximate cause of HUMA's attack on the US Consulate, which occurred just weeks after the French workers were killed.

Others see the attacks on Western interests as part of al Qaeda's post-9/11 scheming. In Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero, Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal write that "HUMA is part of Al Qaeda's larger strategy to establish like-minded groups in Pakistan in order to force the Pakistani government to withdraw its support for the war on terror."

The authors point to strong connections between al Qaeda and HUMA. HUMA's "top leadership" was reportedly "trained at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan," they write. HUMA's financier was also connected to al Qaeda at the highest levels. The HUMA paymaster, a jihadist named Saud Memon, was identified as al Qaeda's top financier in Pakistan prior to his death in 2007. Memon is most notorious for his role in the killing of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has confessed to killing Pearl in Memon's home.

Al Qaeda's hidden hand

Al Qaeda often hides its influence over other jihadist organizations. For instance, al Qaeda masked the extent of its relationships with groups such as Shabaab in Somalia and the Al Nusrah Front in Syria, both of which eventually announced their allegiance to al Qaeda's senior leadership. Indeed, at first, al Qaeda instructed both groups not to advertise their connections.

Imran's HUMA, while not as big as either Shabaab or Al Nusrah, appears to have been similarly situated. HUMA's attacks against Western interests prefigured the launch of AQIS in important ways.

Early press reports portrayed the new al Qaeda branch as being focused primarily on India. But Mahmood, the AQIS spokesman, has bristled at these reports in his tweets, saying that while al Qaeda does seek to "liberate" India's Muslims it is also intent on fighting the Pakistan military. Mahmood portrayed the Pakistani armed forces as being "puppets" of America.

It is not surprising, therefore, to learn that Imran agreed to officially join al Qaeda's new venture. AQIS' goals are the same as those pursued by Imran and his men more than a decade ago. AQIS' first two claimed attacks were intended to undermine Pakistani assistance for the US in the fight against al Qaeda and like-minded jihadist groups.

And there is another operational similarity between Imran's HUMA and AQIS. Both have relied on current or former Pakistani servicemen to carry out their plots. HUMA's plan to kill President Musharraf in April 2002 allegedly involved a jihadist who had served in Pakistan's Rangers, an elite paramilitary force. AQIS has claimed that its attempt to hijack two Pakistani ships in September involved insiders who served in the Pakistani Navy.

While Imran has now perished in a drone strike, some of his top subordinates in HUMA reportedly carry on. It is likely that at least some of them are now part of AQIS as well.

The Islamic State has released two separate photo collections detailing its presence in Ramadi, the provincial capital of Anbar. More than half of Ramadi is said to be under the control of Islamic State.

The photographs were disseminated on Twitter by Islamic State supporters after being posted elsewhere on the Internet. The jihadist group has taken to releasing its propaganda via its supporters on Twitter as the majority of its official accounts are continuously being suspended by the social media site.

The photos bear the title of Wilayat Anbar, one of the Islamic State's 18 declared provinces.

The first set of photographs shows Islamic State technicals, or armed pickup trucks, moving along a road into Ramadi. The photographs are taken in the 7 Kilo area, a neighborhood on a highway west of Ramadi, near the Ramadi West Train Station. Other photos detail the group moving in convoys to the city, with at least four heavily armed technicals present. Islamic State fighters are also photographed while manning a checkpoint in the 7 Kilo area to keep track of who is entering and leaving the city.

The second set of photographs details the Islamic State giving a "tour" of an Iraqi military base in Albu Aytha, an area just north of the city, that has been abandoned. The Islamic State, in these pictures, refers to the base as having been "liberated". The group had previously routed an Iraqi armored column and taken control of a police station more than two weeks ago.

The photographs show many destroyed and burned out vehicles, such as Humvees, M113 armored personnel carriers, what appears to be an AMZ Dzik (a Polish infantry mobility vehicle used by the Iraqi Army under the designation "Ain Jaria 1"), and several Ford F-350 pickup trucks. The jihadists are seen inspecting what is salvageable and what can be left behind. The last picture shows the Islamic State blowing the base up after leaving.

Ramadi is currently being besieged by the Islamic State. The jihadist group is said to control 60 percent of the city. The southern districts of Al Tam'im, Mua'almim, Thubat, and 5 Kilo, in addition to the 7 Kilo and Albu Aytha areas west and north of the city are either contested or under Islamic State control. Iraqi security forces are said to be concentrated at the Anbar Operations Command Center, which is north of the Euphrates River.

The Iraqi military claimed yesterday that it repelled an assault by the Islamic State. Several days ago, the military announced that it was preparing to launch an operation to clear the jihadist group from Ramadi. However, the military has suffered setback after setback in Anbar over the past two months.

Recent gains by the Islamic State in Anbar province

The Islamic State has had success in consolidating its control of much of Anbar during an offensive over the past two months.

Most recently, on Oct. 2, the Islamic State took control of Hit, which is just west of Ramadi. A member of the Anbar provincial council has been quoted by Reuters saying that, "ninety percent of Hit has been overrun by militants." Witnesses reported that "scores" of heavily armed fighters are patrolling the town and the Islamic State's black flag is flying over several government buildings, including the mayor's office and the police station. Two days after Hit fell, the Islamic State occupied a military base outside of the city that was abandoned by Iraqi troops.

As the group was assaulting Hit, it also launched attacks nearby at the Anbar Operations Command and Al Asad Airbase. Iraqi troops are said to have "repulsed an attack" on the Anbar Operations Command just north of Ramadi, NINA reported. [See LWJ's report, Islamic State seizes Hit, assaults Iraqi military headquarters in Anbar]

On Sept. 30, the Islamic State successfully ambushed an Iraqi military column in the Abu Aytha area north of Ramadi. And a few weeks ago, just north of Fallujah, the jihadists overran Camp Saqlawiya and took control of the nearby town of Alsigir. Fallujah has been under the control of the Islamic State since the beginning of January. [For more details, see LWJ reports, Islamic State ambushes Iraqi military column near Ramadi, Islamic State overruns Iraqi military base in Anbar, and Islamic State photos detail rout of Iraqi Army at Camp Saqlawiya.]

Also this week, the Islamic State assassinated the top police commander for Anbar province via a roadside bomb attack in a village that is home to the anti-jihadist Awakening in Ramadi. General Ahmad Sadak al Dulaymi, Anbar's police chief, was patrolling the village of Albu Risha when the Islamic State targeted his convoy with two IEDs, or improvised explosive devices, earlier today. The police general and three bodyguards were killed in the attack.

The Iraqi military in Anbar province is currently in disarray. The Iraqi Army has moved in units from outside of Anbar after the Islamic State rendered most of the 7th Division, which is based in the province, combat ineffective. Some of the replacement units, including armored battalions form the 8th Mechanized Division, have been routed in subsequent fighting. Additionally, the government has deployed Shia militias in the overwhelmingly Sunni province in an attempt to bolster the beleaguered Iraqi military and police units.

The Islamic State has been able to operate freely and effectively in this area despite US and coalition airstrikes against the group in Anbar province. Since Aug. 7, when airstrikes by the US-led coalition in Iraq began, the US has launched 52 airstrikes against the Islamic State in Anbar province, according to data compiled by The Long War Journal and Qualitative Military Edge. These airstrikes have helped the Iraqi military to defend the Haditha Dam, but were ineffective in preventing Hit or areas in and around Ramadi from falling to the Islamic State.

Photos from the the 7 Kilo area of Ramadi:

Photos from the base in Albu Aytha:

AQAP fighters set fire to a military vehicle at the Qasimiya checkpoint in al Adayn directorate, Ibb province, Yemen (Source: Twitter)

As the Houthi rebels continue their military advance throughout much of northern and central Yemen without any indication of resistance from the Yemeni authorities, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has increasingly clashed with the Shi'ite rebels that it deems "apostates."

A day following their seizure of the port city of Hodeidah and the central Yemeni city of Dhamar, on Oct. 15 Houthi rebels attempted to expand the area under their control further east to the city of Radaa in Bayda province, the site of increased AQAP activity in recent months. As the Houthis began taking control of the areas surrounding Radaa, clashes broke out between the rebels and AQAP fighters, killing at least 10 people. The Houthis already have a growing presence in Bayda province, but their advance on Radaa, in western Bayda, seemed to be halted by the AQAP defensive.

AQAP also claimed credit for the assassination of a Houthi colonel in Sana'a on Oct. 15. In a statement released the same day, AQAP said that its fighters targeted Colonel Ali Zayd al Dhari with no less than 13 bullets in the Sa'awan district of Sana'a during the afternoon hours. The AQAP statement clarified that in addition his military role, al Dhari was a prominent Houthi leader.

Earlier in the day, Houthi fighters were seen amassing further west in the city of Ibb, about 150 kilometers south of the capital Sana'a. Reports claimed that the city's governor and his aides received the Houthi rebels, yet another indication that the Yemeni government is incapable of slowing the Houthi advance. Following an agreement with the governor, the Houthis began consolidating their power by setting up checkpoints in the city on Oct. 15 and were seen in large numbers throughout Ibb. Later in the day, Houthi fighters were seen on the outskirts of the city of Taiz, even further south than Ibb, apparently preparing for a further military expansion.

However, the next day reports emerged of an agreement reached between the Houthis and the Security Council in Yemen temporarily delaying the rebel advance on Taiz city. Despite this agreement holding off the Houthi's southern expansion, the rebels continued to expand their territory in the north. Authorities in Hajjah province bordering Saudi Arabia met with a Houthi delegation and agreed to hand over the entire province to its fighters. Subsequently, Houthis increased their presence throughout the province and even began manning the Harad border crossing with Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis' arrival in Ibb brings the Houthi advance extremely close to Yemen's southern provinces which have long served as AQAP strongholds in the country. In response to the Houthi's seizure of Ibb, AQAP launched an offensive in the al Adayan directorate in southwestern Ibb province during the night of Oct. 15. According to an AQAP statement, the jihadists carried out coordinated attacks on security, military, and governmental centers in the al Adayn region and reports indicated that AQAP fighters managed to seize control of the area temporarily.

On Oct. 16, AQAP released another statement claiming that its fighters had withdrawn from the al Adayn directorate after holding the city for about 9 hours. The statement clarified that the intention of the attack on al Adayn was to "foil the Houthi plan to control it." AQAP claimed that the attack was launched after the terrorist group received confirmed reports that local authorities were planning to hand over the city to the Houthis, as had occurred earlier in the day in the city of Ibb.

During the operation, jihadists stormed the city from four directions and carried out various attacks on targets throughout al Adayn. AQAP claims its fighters attacked the security directorate in the city, killing 3 soldiers and wounding others, including the security director, Abdallah al Halimi, and his son. The AQAP statement also mentions that fighters launched an attack on the al Qasimiya checkpoint and succeeded in seizing various weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles, after soldiers fled the scene.

The Houthi military campaign in Yemen and AQAP's response have gained momentum following the rebels' sweep of Sana'a on Sept. 22. A day later, AQAP declared an open war against the Houthis and called on fellow Sunnis to take up arms. These latest developments point to the possibility of increased clashes between AQAP and the Houthis and add to the growing concerns of the possibility of an all out sectarian war between Shi'ites and Sunnis in Yemen.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a branch of al Qaeda's international organization, has issued another statement denouncing the US-led bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria. The group once again calls on rival jihadist factions, including the Islamic State and its rivals, to come together against their common enemies in the West.

The Islamic State, headed by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, has been warring with the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, and other jihadist organizations since last year.

AQAP and other al Qaeda-allied ideologues are portraying the air strikes as part of a "Crusade" against Islam and, therefore, they argue that the jihadists must set aside their differences for now. They are pushing this theme on social media and in their official messaging.

The AQAP message, a "Statement Regarding the Crusader Coalition," was posted on Twitter earlier today and first translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

"Within the Crusader war on Islam, the global coalition waged a fierce campaign on the mujahideen in Iraq and Sham [Syria], and especially our brothers in the Islamic State, where there was bombardment and killing without respect for sanctities," AQAP's message reads. Now that "the enemy" knows that the airstrikes won't work, AQAP argues, the West is beginning to "talk about ground campaigns."

"And on this occasion, we assert our support to our brothers against the global Crusader campaign, and we are with their enmity against this campaign," AQAP's jihadists write.

The group goes on to argue "that it is forbidden to participate in their war [referring to the campaign of the West and its allies in the Middle East] under the pretext that they [the Islamic State] are Kharijites [extremists], and they are not that." AQAP means that it is impermissible for jihadists to fight Abu Bakr al Baghdadi's Islamic State on behalf of the Western-led coalition, even if the Islamic State's rivals believe that Baghdadi and his subordinates have attacked their fellow Muslims and rejected other widely-recognized jihadist authorities.

"We advise all the mujahideen to forget their disputes and to stop the infighting among them, and to be diligent in pushing away the Crusader campaign that targets all," AQAP's jihadists write, according to SITE's translation.

AQAP concludes by calling on anyone who can to strike the US "militarily," "economically," or in the media because the Americans are the "leaders of this war and the foundation of this campaign."

Since the beginning of the US-led bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria this past summer, al Qaeda has attempted to use the intervention as a cause for reconciling the opposing jihadist factions. Even if a full reconciliation is not possible, al Qaeda's branches and closely allied ideologues argue that the strikes should at least serve as the basis for a truce.

AQAP and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a joint statement in mid-September urging the jihadists in Iraq and Syria to unite against their common enemy, America, "the head of infidelity."

Sheikh Nasser bin Ali al Ansi, an AQAP official, released a video on Sept. 30 urging unity against the "Crusader coalition."

Some of the Islamic State's harshest critics are also attempting to use the bombings as an opening for reconciliation. The same day that al Ansi's video was distributed online, a group of jihadist ideologues proposed a truce in a statement titled, "An Initiative and Call for a Ceasefire Between Factions in Syria."

One of the proposed truce's key signatories is Sheikh Abdallah Muhammad al Muhaysini, who is closely tied to the Al Nusrah Front.

Muhaysini has pushed for a truce on multiple occasions. In late September he released a message, "A Statement Regarding the Crusader War on Islam," via a video posted on his popular Twitter feed, which has 330,000 followers. Muhaysini's message included the same themes as AQAP's missives.

And Muhaysini has since launched a web site with both his twitter handle and the word "crusade" in the url address. The site contains a petition denouncing the bombings as part of a campaign "against Islam" and highlights America's alleged "crimes" against Muslims. Various photos of American soldiers supposedly mistreating Muslims are used on the site.

Negotiations in Saudi Arabia between Boko Haram and the government of Nigeria have reportedly reached a ceasefire agreement. While the exact terms of the ceasefire have yet to be fully disclosed, it does appear that the 219 school girls kidnapped by the terrorist group in April are a part of the bargain.

According to Nigerian presidential aide Hassan Tukur, Boko Haram "assured us they have the girls and they will release them." He further noted that he was "cautiously optimistic."

In a conversation with VOA, a man calling himself the secretary-general of Boko Haram, Danladi Ahmadu, commented that he was located along the Nigerian-Chadian border and the girls were "in good condition and unharmed." He did not specify the terms under which the hostages were to be freed. There is scant information available publicly on Danladi Ahmadu and there has been no previous mention of a secretary-general within the structure of the jihadist group.

On Thursday, Boko Haram announced a unilateral ceasefire.

After the conclusion of recent negotiations, the Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff Alex Badeh reportedly ordered all service chiefs "to comply with the cease-fire agreement between Nigeria and Boko Haram in all theaters of operations."

276 school girls were kidnapped from their school in Chibok late at night on April 14. Fifty-seven of them have since escaped; however, 219 girls remain in the terrorist group's control. After their abduction, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau menacingly stated in video released in May, "I abducted your girls ... I will sell them in the market, by Allah."

Shortly after, Boko Haram released a video that showed the kidnap victims. Stoically seated outside, the girls were dressed in traditional Islamic garb as they recited a statement in Hausa followed by excerpts of the Koran.

Weeks after the girls were abducted, a social media campaign erupted to help #BringBackOurGirls. The campaign included world leaders from Michele Obama to recent Nobel Peace Prize winner Malala Yousafzai. While the efforts did not obtain the release of the hostages, they did elicit a response from Boko Haram. In July, Abubakar Shekau fired back at the campaign in a video wherein he remarked "Nigerians are saying BringBackOurGirls, and we are telling Jonathan [Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan] to bring back our arrested warriors, our army."

It is unknown whether this idea of a prisoner swap played into the recent negotiations which were aided by Chadian President Idriss Deby and officials from Cameroon. Though the negotiations reportedly occurred in Saudi Arabia over the last month, Saudi officials did not participate in the talks themselves.

In recent months, Boko Haram has stepped up its campaign, particularly in the country's north east, to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. The group's tactics evolved from traditionally guerrilla attacks to attempts to grab and hold territory. In September, it was reported that the group controlled 25 towns in the Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states of northeastern Nigeria. The Nigerian armed forces have been attempting to wrestle control of these areas from Boko Haram. However, they have only achieved limited successe and Boko Haram appears to still control many towns.

Ever since the head of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, Hakeemullah Mehsud, was killed in a US drone strike in late 2013, the al Qaeda-linked group has been plagued by leadership disputes, infighting, and defections. Mullah Fazlullah, Mehsud's successor, has proven to be incapable of holding the coalition of jihadists together.

The latest members to leave the group are its spokesman, Shahidullah Shahid, and five regional emirs: Hafiz Dolat Khan from Kurram, Hafiz Saeed Khan from Arakzai, Maulana Gul Zaman from Khyber, Mufti Hassan Swati from Peshawar, and Khalid Mansoor from Hangu. Shahid announced their defection in a video (seen above) that was released online earlier this week. The Pakistani Taliban figures are now loyal to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the head of the Islamic State, which has been attempting to woo al Qaeda and Taliban leaders for months.

"I pledge allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful and the Caliph of Muslims Abu Bakr al Baghdadi al Qurashi al Husayni, to obey him when we are enthusiastic and when we are halfhearted, as well as in difficulty and relief," Shahid says in the video, according to a translation obtained by The Long War Journal.

Shahid stresses that his pledge of allegiance (bayat) is not on behalf of the "entire movement," nor has Mullah Fazlullah himself sworn an oath of fealty to Baghdadi. Instead, Shahid says, the oath is "pledged by myself as well as five other Pakistani Taliban emirs, who are the emirs of Orakzai, Kuram, Khaybar, Hangu, and Peshawar regions."

Shahid goes on to claim that this is the fourth time he has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. His claim is curious, to say the least.

The video above was disseminated online on Oct. 13. But less just one week earlier, on Oct. 6, Shahid was quoted as denying that the Pakistani Taliban had sworn allegiance to Baghdadi's group. Shahid was quoted in an account by Reuters, and there is nothing in that report about Shahid or the five other Pakistani Taliban leaders switching their allegiance to Baghdadi.

On the contrary, Shahid was quoted as saying, "We are not supporting any specific group in Syria or Iraq; all groups there are noble and they are our brothers." Shahid continued, "Mullah Omar is our head and we are following him."

In just one week, therefore, the Pakistani Taliban spokesman went from claiming that the group was entirely loyal to Mullah Omar to announcing that he and five commanders now counted themselves among the Islamic State's ranks.

Interestingly, Shahid claims in his defection notice that on a prior occasion in early July he privately swore his allegiance to Baghdadi through Abu Huda al Sudani. This has a ring of truth to it, as al Sudani is a disgruntled al Qaeda veteran who leads a faction in Afghanistan that has sided with the Islamic State. Al Sudani leads a faction that is now loyal to Baghdadi.

It is not clear how many former Pakistani Taliban fighters the defectors command. The emirs of the five regions did have forces under their direction, but it is not publicly known how many jihadists they direct, or if all of their fighters have followed suit.

In reality, Shahid's announced defection to the Islamic State is just the latest blow to Fazlullah's group. It is clear that Fazlullah has not been able to fill Hakeemullah Mehsud's shoes.

Indeed, well before the six Pakistani Taliban leaders announced their decision to side with Baghdadi this past week most of the group had already defected. The majority of the Pakistani Taliban's leaders and fighters had already left its ranks, forming new groups. And the most prominent of these organizations are still loyal to Mullah Omar.

Pakistani Taliban coalition dissolved

The first crack in the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan's coalition appeared long before Shahidullah and the five commanders defected and joined the Islamic State. Divisions within the group appeared immediately after Hakeemullah Mehsud was killed in a US drone strike on Nov. 1, 2013. Initial reports indicated that Sajna Mehsud (who is also known as Khalid Mehsud) from South Waziristan, was appointed to lead the group. But one day after a the rumor of Sajna's appointment emerged, his rival, Asmatullah Shaheen Bhittani, the head of the Taliban's shura or executive council, who was also from South Waziristan, was named the interim emir.

Instead of appointing a member of the Mehsud tribe, who traditionally have led the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, the group's shura named Mullah Fazlullah, a firebrand cleric from Swat, as its emir. The appointment was controversial, and ultimately led to the group's demise. Despite serving as Hakeemullah's deputy, Fazlullah is reported to be considered an outsider in the inner circles of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan.

Added to the unease over Fazlullah's appointment was an internal debate within the Taliban over whether to negotiate a peace agreement with the Pakistani military and government. Asmatullah, who supported peace talks, may have been been killed by his rival Sajna. Fazlullah also supported peace talks with the Pakistani state and ordered a ceasefire on March 1.

The Taliban's negotiations with the government led to the first overt rift with the group. In mid-February, a faction of the Taliban led by Maulana Umar Qasmi, broke away due to opposition to negotiations and formed Ahrar-ul-Hind. A statement by the group said that it is made up of supporters based in "the urban areas of Pakistan" and vowed to continue attacks against the state. Three weeks after its formation, the group claimed credit for a suicide assault on a courthouse in Islamabad.

Sajna Mehsud's faction was the next to break away from the Taliban alliance. In mid-May, Sajna, who is said to support peace talks, formed the Movement of the Taliban in South Waziristan. The spokesman for the new Taliban faction accused its parent organization of being "un-Islamic."

"We consider kidnapping for ransom, extortion, damage to public facilities and bombings to be un-Islamic," a statement released by the group said. "Tehreek-e-Taliban [Movement of the Taliban] Mehsud group believes in stopping the oppressor from cruelty, and supporting the oppressed."

Sajna's group is said to be allied with Hafiz Gul Bahadar, a powerful so-called "good" Taliban commander in North Waziristan who maintains a peace agreement with the governemnt despite his overt support for al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and a host of terrorist groups in the region.

The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan perhaps suffered its death blow when Omar Khalid al Khorasani, the dangerous Taliban commander from the tribal agency of Mohmand, and a group of factions from the agencies of Bajaur, Khyber, and Arakzai, and the districts of Charsadda, Peshawar, and Swat, split off and formed Jamaat-ul-Ahrar. The group merged with Ahrar-ul-Hind and is now led by Qasmi.

In mid-September, another faction in Nortth Waziristan led by Sheheryar Mehsud, who was loyal to Hakeemullah and Baitullah Mehsud, also broke away from the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. The group "declared extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and bombing public places as 'Haram,' (forbidden by Islam)" according to Pakistan Today.

The defections of the various Taliban factions have led to a virtual dissolution of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan long before Shahidullah and the five commanders joined the Islamic State.

The US is reported to have killed a senior al Qaeda leader in an airstrike in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar near the border with Pakistan's tribal agency of Khyber. Despite US military officials claims to the contrary, recent raids and airstrikes against al Qaeda show that the network is not limited to operating in the northeastern Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan.

The National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan's intelligence service, reported that senior al Qaeda leader Abu Bara al Kuwaiti was killed in a US airstrike in Lal Mandi in the Nazyan district in Nangarhar, which is adjacent to the border with the Tirah Valley in Pakistan's tribal agency of Khyber, Pajhwok Afghan News reported.

The al Qaeda leader was at the home of Abdul Samad Khanjari, who is described as an al Qaeda military "commander," when he was killed, TOLONews reported. NDS officers raided Khanjari's home and seized weapons, a laptop, and documents.

Khanjari is also said to double as the Taliban's shadow governor for the Achin district in Nangarhar, according to Afghan Islamic Press. This is not uncommon, as members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are known to double as shadow governors in northern Afghan provinces. Additionally, al Qaeda leaders are also known to serve as Taliban commanders; the US military has described these commanders as "dual-hatted" leaders.

Al Qaeda has not confirmed the death of Abu Bara, nor have online jihadists known to be plugged into the network announced his martyrdom.

The NDS said that Abu Bara "had close relations with the family of Ayman al Zawahiri, the al Qaeda leader."

Abu Bara was likely a member of al Qaeda's General Command. He was known to be a "student" and "comrade" of Atiyah Abd al Rahman, al Qaeda's former general manager who was also known as Atiyah Allah and who was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan in August 2011. Abu Bara wrote Atiyah's eulogy, which was published in Vanguards of Khorasan, al Qaeda's official magazine.

In the eulogy, Abu Bara notes several times that he had access to Atiyah's documents and was trained by the former al Qaeda general manager.

"I was able to know things from his numerous letters in which he advises [jihadists] to be patient, seek the refuge of Almighty God in harsh times, and trust God's promise of victory even in these ruthless times we are living," Abu Bara said in the lengthy eulogy for his former boss.

"He used to treat me like he used to treat his son," Abu Bara continued. "He was like a carrying father and an older brother by guiding me in all issues and teaching and advising me whenever it is possible. I learned from him several things, which he stressed on teaching me. My brother Abu al Hasan al Wa'ili, may God protect him, saw this. He taught me things in religion and life in general."

Additionally, Abu Bara said that Atiyah informed him that Abu Dujanah al Khurasani executed the Dec. 30, 2009, suicide attack suicide attack at Combat Outpost Chapman in Khost province. Seven CIA officers and guards were killed in the attack.

"He [Atiyah] told me all the details regarding this operation and the plan," Abu Bara said.

The death of Abu Bara, if confirmed, is the second major blow against the terrorist network in Afghanistan and Pakistan this week. On Oct. 14, the NDS captured Anis Haqqani, the son of the Haqqani Network's leader and the brother of its operational leader, and Hafiz Rashid, the network's military commander for southeastern Afghanistan, during a special operations raid in Khost province, Afghanistan. [See Threat Matrix report, Afghan intel agency captures two senior Haqqani Network leaders.]

Al Qaeda not concentrated in Kunar and Nuristan

While US military and intelligence officials have repeatedly stated that al Qaeda is confined primarily to the northeastern provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, recent raids indicate that the jihadist group continues to operate in other eastern provinces.

"AQ [Al Qaeda] maintains a limited presence in the remote areas of eastern Afghanistan such as Kunar and Nuristan, and maintains a seasonal presence in other provinces," the US Department of Defense stated in the December 2013 edition of the Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. [See LWJ report, US continues to claim al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan is minimal .]

Over the past year, five senior and mid-level al Qaeda leaders, in addition to Abu Bara, are reported to have been killed in Nangarhar and Paktika, and just across the border in Khyber. The jihadists were killed in December 2013, and September and October of 2014, indicating that their presence is more than just "seasonal."

Just over a week ago, the US killed Sheikh Imran Ali Siddiqi (a.k.a. Haji Shaikh Waliullah), in a drone strike in the Tirah Valley in Khyber. The strike took place right on the border with Nangarhar, and some reports indicate Imran was actually killed in Nangarhar.

Imran is a longtime jihadist who started his career with the al Qaeda-linked Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. His death was announced by Usama Mahmood, the spokesman for al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). [See LWJ report, US drone strike kills veteran jihadist turned senior AQIS official.]

Ayman al Zawahiri and other al Qaeda officials announced the creation of AQIS in early September, explaining that it was two years in the making. Mahmood said in his own statement at the time that AQIS was formed by gathering together "several jihadi groups that have a long history in jihad and fighting." Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, whose leader Fazle-ur-Rahman Khalil is closely tied to the group and signed the 1998 fatwa that declared war on the West, is likely one of those groups.

Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen is currently running training camps in Afghanistan, the US State Department said in a update to the group's terrorist designation in September. [See LWJ report, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen 'operates terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan'.]

In mid-September, the US killed Aqalzadin and Ikramullah, two Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen/al Qaeda commanders, in an airstrike in Paktika province. The two commanders are members of the Badr Mansoor Group. Badr Mansour, the group's former leader who was killed in a US drone strike in North Waziristan in February 2012, was identified in the documents seized at Osama bin Laden's Abbottabad compound as one of al Qaeda's "company" commanders. Mansour was also a Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen leader. [See LWJ reports, 2 al Qaeda commanders reported killed in US airstrike in eastern Afghanistan, Bin Laden docs hint at large al Qaeda presence in Pakistan and Al Qaeda asserts authority in letter to Pakistani Taliban leader.]

In December 2013, the US killed two al Qaeda military commanders, three members of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and two members of the Afghan Taliban, in an airstrike in the Lal Pur district in Nangarhar. The seven jihadists were reported to be traveling to Kunar for a meeting. [See LWJ report, 2 al Qaeda commanders reported killed in US airstrike in eastern Afghanistan.]

The two al Qaeda commanders were described as "close companions of Ilyas Kashmiri," the renowned Pakistani jihadist who was killed in a US drone strike in South Waziristan in June 2011. Kashmiri rose through the ranks of the Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, or HUJI, led Brigade 313, and ultimately served as the leader of al Qaeda's Lashkar al Zil, or Shadow Army, and as a member of al Qaeda's military shura at the time of his death.

The al Qaeda operatives killed in December 2013 were all commanders in the Lashkar al Zil, al Qaeda's paramilitary unit that fields forces in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and also embeds military trainers within Taliban units in both countries. These trainers provide instruction for battling security forces in local insurgencies, as well as knowledge, expertise, funding, and resources to conduct local and international attacks. [For more information on this unit, see LWJ report, Al Qaeda's paramilitary 'Shadow Army,' from February 2009.]

Al Qaeda and its allies have been heavily targeted by ISAF in special operations raids over the past decade. ISAF publicized 338 raids from 2007 until the summer of 2013, when it ended reporting. Many senior jihadist leaders and operatives were killed or captured during those operations. Most of those raids took place outside of Kunar and Nuristan. [See LWJ report, ISAF raids against al Qaeda and allies in Afghanistan 2007-2013.]

Anas Haqqani and Qari Abdul Rasheed Omari (a.k.a. Hafiz Rashid). NDS photos via Khaama Press.

The Taliban has released a statement concerning the recent capture of two Haqqani Network leaders, claiming that the Afghan government has lied about the circumstances surrounding the raid that netted them. The Taliban also claims that the pair had recently visited the senior Taliban leaders freed from Guantanamo earlier this year.

The Taliban's statement could not be independently verified.

On Oct. 16, the Afghan government announced the capture of Anas Haqqani, who is the youngest son of veteran jihadist leader Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Qari Abdul Rasheed Omari, the network's military commander for southeastern Afghanistan. They were detained on Oct. 14.

Omari is the younger brother of Mohammad Nabi Omari, a senior Taliban official who was held at Guantanamo from late 2002 until May when he, along four other Taliban commanders held in US custody, were exchanged for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl. The "Taliban Five," as they've been dubbed in the US, were transferred to Qatar, where they are supposed to live for one year after their release.

The Taliban says in its statement that the younger Omari had recently met with his more infamous older brother in Qatar.

According to the Taliban, Anas Haqqani had been in Qatar as well. Anas Haqqani was captured after "he embarked on his first foreign visit to meet the freed Guantanamo detainees after an invitation by the family of Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Omari (former Guantanamo detainee)."

The Taliban claims that Omari and Haqqani were "returning home on 12th October after spending about a week." They were both allegedly "captured by the American forces in Bahrain from where they were sent back to Qatar and then handed over to Kabul via United Arab Emirates."

Relying on this version of events, the Taliban criticizes the US, arguing that it had no justification for detaining the two and that the Taliban Five were promised their family members would be allowed to visit them without interference.

The Afghan government's description of the pair's capture was entirely different, saying that the two were detained by intelligence officials in Afghanistan's national directorate of security (NDS). There was no mention of the US first detaining them.

The Taliban also seeks to downplay the significance of Anas Haqqani in its statement, whereas the Afghan government says he played a prominent role in the Haqqani Network.

Anas Haqqani was merely "a Talib-ul-ilm (student) in his last year of studies who does not have an affiliation with any current political movements," according to the Taliban.

The Afghan government describes Anas as an influential jihadist and deputy to his older brother, Sirajuddin Haqqani, who leads the Haqqani Network. Anas has "special" computer skills and "was considered one of the masterminds of this network in making propaganda through social networks," the NDS said, according to Khaama Press. Anas "was responsible for collecting and preparing funds from Arabic countries to carry out operations of this network."

The latter accusation is especially intriguing, as Qatar is a known hotbed for jihadist fundraising.

The Afghan government says that Qari Abdul Rasheed Omari was "a shadow governor" for the Haqqanis in "the Ismailkhil district of Khost province." He also oversaw suicide bombing operations.

A Haqqani leader who served multiple roles prior to detention at Guantanamo

The Taliban says that the family of Mohammad Nabi Omari, the ex-Guantanamo detainee, invited Anas Haqqani to Qatar. US officials found that Mohammad Omari was a well-connected Haqqani leader who worked with al Qaeda prior to his detention in Sept. 2002.

In a leaked memo dated Jan. 23, 2008, JTF-GTMO analysts recommended that the older Omari brother be held in "continued detention" by the Defense Department. Omari "was a senior Taliban official who served in multiple leadership roles," according to JTF-GTMO. Omari "had strong operational ties to Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) groups including al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), some of whom remain active in ACM activities."

Intelligence reports cited by JTF-GTMO indicate that Omari was a "member of a joint al Qaeda/Taliban ACM cell in Khowst and was involved in attacks against US and Coalition forces." Omari also "maintained weapons caches and facilitated the smuggling of fighters and weapons."

Prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Omari worked for the Taliban's border security and in this capacity had "access to senior Taliban commander and leader of the Haqqani Network, Jalaluddin Haqqani." Haqqani was the Taliban Minister of Frontiers and Borders at the time and this is what gave Omari the opportunity to become Haqqani's "close associate," according to JTF-GTMO.

Thus, it is entirely possible that Mohammad Nabi Omari invited Jalaluddin's son, Anas, for a visit to Qatar given the two families' historically close ties.

One "sensitive contact" told authorities that Omari was one of "three former Taliban commanders loyal to Haqqani."

A source cited in the JTF-GTMO file told authorities that Omari participated in a Jan. 26, 2002 "planning session to identify a new Governor of Khowst and to propose a list of members for the Khowst City Shura Council loyal to Haqqani." Several other high-level Taliban and Haqqani officials attended the meeting. One of them "directed the group to reconvene after members discussed names with al Qaeda members in their provinces." The leaked JTF-GTMO memo notes: "The plan was to have all personnel identified and vetted to prepare for future al Qaeda control of the area under Jalaluddin Haqqani."

Beginning in February 2002, according to another intelligence report cited by JTF-GTMO, Omari and "three al Qaeda affiliated individuals held weekly meetings to discuss ACM plans and to coordinate Haqqani loyalists."

Then, in July 2002, an "Afghan government employee" reported that Omari had joined "a new Khowst province ACM cell comprised of Taliban and al Qaeda commanders who had operated independently in the past." The list of cell members provided by this source included not only Taliban and al Qaeda leaders, but also individuals affiliated with the HIG and the Haqqani Network.

The JTF-GTMO file includes an intriguing detail about one member of Nabi's cell - a Haqqani money courier named Malik Khan. "Ayman al Zawahiri, the number two leader of al Qaeda" at the time, and now al Qaeda's emir, "has stayed at Khan's compound located outside Miram Shah," Pakistan.

In August 2002, Omari reportedly helped two al Qaeda operatives smuggle "an unknown number of missiles along the highway between Jalalabad and Peshawar," Pakistan. The missiles were smuggled in pieces, with the intent of rebuilding them for attacks near the Jalalabad airport. On Aug. 28, 2002, JTF-GTMO analysts noted, "two Americans were killed during attacks against the Khowst, Gardez, and Jalalabad airports."

Omari was captured in September 2002, detained at Bagram, and then transferred to Guantanamo. Omari was transferred to Qatar earlier this year and, if the Taliban's statement is accurate, then he has been hosting other veteran jihadists.

Clashes between fighters from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Shiite Houthi rebels continued over the past several days as the two groups attempted to expand their respective advances throughout the country. After the Houthis took Yemen's capital, Sana'a, in late September, AQAP declared an open war against the rebels and increased its operations against both the Yemeni military and the Houthis, especially in the central portion of the country.

AQAP has claimed credit for 16 attacks that took place in six Yemeni provinces between Oct. 16 - Oct. 20. Many of these attacks centered around the city of Radaa in Bayda province, where fighting between AQAP and the Houthis began in earnest on Oct. 15, when the Shiite rebels initiated an eastward offensive.

Fighting in Bayda

AQAP claimed credit for a suicide attack on Oct. 16 that targeted a Houthi gathering in the Qaa' Fayd region located between the city of Radaa and Dhamar province to the west. The AQAP statement released the following day stated that the operation was carried out with a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), or car bomb, and that "tens" of Houthis were killed and injured as a result.

A few days later, AQAP released another statement regarding fighting around the city of Radaa, specifically detailing clashes that took place in the Malah region on the outskirts of the city. The statement claimed that on Oct. 16, AQAP sent several groups of fighters to foil the Houthis' advance on the city and noted that one group of jihadists was attacked by a Houthi ambush prior to the eruption of a fierce battle. AQAP then sent reinforcements to aid its besieged fighters in Malah, and the strengthened jihadist force compelled the rebels to withdraw from the Qaa' Fayd region.

AQAP claimed that many Houthis were killed or wounded, three were taken captive, and many light and heavy weapons were looted by its fighters. Additionally, the statement clarifies that the suicide attack reported in an earlier AQAP statement on clashes in the Qaa' Fayd region (see above) occurred following the Houthis' withdrawal from the area.

Two days after the fighting in the Malah region, AQAP launched a coordinated attack in Radaa targeting Houthi positions in the city. An AQAP statement claimed that on the morning of Oct 18, two groups of its fighters simultaneously attacked a Houthi checkpoint in the city as well as a gathering of rebels at a local school. An AQAP "correspondent" in the field is quoted in the statement saying, "the two attacks resulted in the deaths and injury of the Houthis that we cannot accurately count," and added that skirmishes were still ongoing south of Radaa.

AQAP also took credit for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack against a Houthi military vehicle in Bayda on Oct. 18. In a statement released a few days later, AQAP claimed that its fighters detonated an IED at 11:00 a.m. as the Houthi vehicle was passing by the al Nisi mountain in Radaa, resulting in its complete destruction and the deaths of all who were on board.

The following day, AQAP released two brief statements claiming credit for attacks that took place on Oct. 19 in Radaa. The first of the two attacks took place at dawn in the al Arsh region of Radaa; the jihadist group claimed that an unspecified number of rebels were killed. In the second statement, AQAP announced that one of its snipers killed a Houthi fighter in the city.

Fighting in Bayda province further intensified between Oct. 19-20, and on Oct. 20 AQAP released a statement heralding an "advance" in their offensive against the Houthis. The jihadist group claimed that its fighters had passed the provincial borders of Bayda and arrived in Dhamar province. AQAP also claimed that tens of Houthis had been killed and injured in the ongoing battles in the al Arsh region of Bayda.

Arabic media sources reported that battles along the border regions between Bayda and Dhamar provinces over the past 24 hours have left around 60 dead, believed to be mostly Houthi casualties.

Today, AQAP took credit for a suicide attack near the residence of a "Houthi leader" in Radaa, Abdallah Idris, while rebels were meeting inside. In fact, Idris is the chief local official of the General People's Congress, the party of former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Arabic press reports suggested that tribal representatives and Houthi fighters were meeting at Idris' house at the time of the explosion. According to local sources and eye witnesses, 15 people were killed in the bombing, most of whom were Houthis, and 12 others were wounded.

A subsequent AQAP statement claimed that the afternoon attack was carried out by Abu Aisha al Sana'ani using a car bomb and that "tens" of Houthis had been killed.

AQAP retakes al Adayn

During the night of Oct. 15, AQAP fighters carried out coordinated attacks on security, military, and governmental centers in al Adayn in southwestern Ibb province and managed to seize control of the city. After holding the city for about 9 hours, the fighters withdrew on the morning of Oct. 16. The day-long offensive came as a response to the Houthis' seizure of the entire province earlier that day.

Today, AQAP renewed its offensive in al Adayn, launching a massive attack on security locations in the city and consolidating their power over the area once again. Later in the day, AQAP released a statement claiming that the remnants of the Houthi fighters had fled the city following a joint operation carried out by AQAP and Sunni tribes in the area.

AQAP said that its fighters managed to infiltrate al Adayn at dawn, paving the way for the assault to retake the city. According to the statement, the attack began at around 10:00 a.m. when groups of jihadists began attacking locations both inside and outside the city. The homes of Houthi leaders were bombed in the assault, including the residence of Zakaria al Musawa, a military officer aligned with the Shiite rebels.

The AQAP statement emphasized the participation of local Sunni tribes who "gathered with their weapons on board twenty cars" and took part in seizing control of the city. An hour into the attack on al Adayn, AQAP fighters and Sunni tribesman coalesced at a central city square and released three soldiers who were jailed during the last AQAP offensive to take the city, on Oct. 15. The soldiers were released after they renounced their service of the Yemeni military and vowed to not return and fight in its ranks. During this gathering, "the tribesman emphasized...their firm position of uniting their ranks and their coalition with Ansar al Sharia in fighting the rafidi [Shiite] Houthis."

AQAP also claimed credit for an attack elsewhere in Ibb province on Oct. 20. At around 6:30 PM, jihadists stormed the Mashwara military checkpoint in Ibb city, described in an AQAP statement as a "joint Houthi-military military checkpoint," leading to the deaths of all the soldiers at the checkpoint along with two AQAP fighters.

Other AQAP attacks between Oct. 16 - Oct. 20

AQAP claimed credit for two attacks on Oct. 16 targeting Yemeni military personnel in Abyan and Shabwa, two southern provinces where the jihadist group has traditionally maintained a strong presence. At 10:00 a.m., AQAP fighters detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) at the al Houta - Azzan junction, wounding several soldiers according to an AQAP statement. Later in the afternoon, jihadists shot and killed two soldiers of the 111th Brigade in the Ahwar region of Abyan province.

On Oct. 17, AQAP targeted a military convoy in Hadramout heading towards the city of Qatn. At around 10:00am, fighters detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) as the convoy passed by, killing and injuring an unspecified number of Yemeni soldiers.

Two more attacks claimed by AQAP took place on Oct. 19, in Sana'a and the northern Houthi stronghold of Amran. In Sana'a, AQAP fighters lobbed a grenade at a Houthi gatehring in the Bani Houth area of the Yemeni capital. That evening, jihadists attacked a "Houthi headquarters" in the Rayda area of Amran province with a 17 kilogram IED. The subsequent AQAP statement claimed that serious material damage was caused to the headquarters and that no reports of casualties have surfaced.